The blacklisting of St. Vincent and the Grenadines by the FATF as a non-cooperative country in the fight against money laundering and the categorisation by the OECD as an uncooperative tax haven : justified or unjustified? by Lewis, Linton Aron
Durham E-Theses
The blacklisting of St. Vincent and the Grenadines
by the FATF as a non-cooperative country in the
fight against money laundering and the
categorisation by the OECD as an uncooperative tax
haven : justified or unjustified?
Lewis, Linton Aron
How to cite:
Lewis, Linton Aron (2004) The blacklisting of St. Vincent and the Grenadines by the FATF as a
non-cooperative country in the fight against money laundering and the categorisation by the OECD as an
uncooperative tax haven : justified or unjustified? Doctoral thesis, Durham University. Available at
Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1749/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
2
Name: Linton Aron Lewis 
Title: The Blacklisting Of St. Vincent And The Grenadines By The 
FATF As A Non-Cooperative Country In The Fight Against 
Money Laundering And The Categorisation By The OECD 
As An Uncooperative Tax Haven- Justified Or Unjustified? 
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy 
Year of Submission: 2004 
Abstract 
In June 2000 St. Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG) was blacklisted by the OECD and 
the FATF. Both organisations; having assessed the supervisory and regulatory 
framework of SVG's financial system concluded that it was inadequate in the fight 
against money laundering and in so far as the OECD is concerned, maintained an 
uncooperative tax haven regime. This thesis challenges those conclusions and 
demonstrates that the assessments that were conducted by the OECD and FATF were 
inaccurate. Furthermore, this thesis also concludes that the conduct of the OECD/FATF 
was not in conformity with basic international legal principles relating to non- 
intervention and the doctrine of sovereign equality of States. 
In arriving at its conclusions this thesis reviewed the historical imperatives of offshore 
financial centres (OFCs) and money laundering. It establishes that money laundering 
and the criminal activities that generate substantial proceeds of crime commence and 
end in the OECD/FATF member countries, yet none of them was blacklisted with SVG 
in 2000. Moreover, at the time when SVG was listed as an uncooperative tax haven 
certain OECD jurisdictions possessed harmful tax regimes yet none was listed as 
uncooperative. 
The international condemnation of SVG by the OECD/FATF together with their threats 
of sanctions had an adverse effect on SVG's offshore financial services sector (OFSS) 
in particular and the economy as a whole. Accordingly, SVG was forced to amend is 
laws and make certain commitments to increase transparency of its offshore operations 
and provide for the effective exchange of information with other countries about their 
tax payers. The amendment to the laws of SVG did not substantially alter what was in 
existence prior to the blacklisting nonetheless, SVG was removed from the blacklists of 
the OECD in 2002 and the FATF in 2003. 
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Chapter 1. "OFCs- An Introduction to the FATF and OECD's Initiatives" 
1. Introduction 
"... a dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign State 
than the most powerful kingdom. "' 
de Vattel 1758 
This is a study about the application of basic principles of international law and the 
criminal law aspects of money laundering by looking at an important economic sector 
of St. Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG). 2 The study will show the impact of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD)3 harmful tax 
initiative and the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) 4 money laundering initiative on 
SVG's freedom to implement economic measures that sought to develop the offshore 
financial services sector (OFSS) and improve the livelihood of its people. More 
particularly, this study will demonstrate how the OECD and FATF's initiatives 
undermined SVG's freedom of choice as a sovereian State by violating the international 
legal principle of non-intervention and by their conduct, failing to acknowledge the 
existence of the doctrine of sovereign equality of States. 5 Furthermore, it will also 
demonstrate that the OECD/FATF did not have the legal authority to dictate the 
economic policies of SVG. 
This study provides substantial details about the economy of SVG and the economic 
and legal implications of the OECD/FATF's initiatives. It is only by considering those 
1 E. de Vattel, Le droit des gens, ou principes de la loi naturelle (Paris: JA. Aillaud, (1830), i, at 47 
('Preliminaires, ' para. 18) repeated in Cassese A. "International Law, " Oxford 2003 at p. 90 2 St. Vincent and the Grenadines consists of a group of islands in the Eastern Caribbean. 3 www. oecd. org : The OECD is a group of 30 countries which produce two thirds of the world's goods 
and services. It meets as a group to "discuss, develop and refine economic and social policies. They 
COMpare experiences, seek answers to common problems and work to co-ordinate domestic and 
international policies to help members and non-members deal with an increasingly globalise world. " As 
at November 2003 the countries that represent the group are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the USA. 
4 http: /wwwl. oecd. orp-, /fatf/AboutFATF en. htm, "The FATF is an intergovernmental body whose 
purpose is the development and promotion of policies, both at national and international levels, to 
combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The Task Force is therefore a "policy making body" 
which works to generate the necessary political will to bring about national legislative and regulatory 
reforms in these areas. " The FATF represents a group of 33 countries, territories and organisations with 
the most highly developed economies-their main task being to ensure good standards prevail in the global 
financial market place. These countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Genriany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Russian 
Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the 
United States of America. It is however important to note that in 2000 there were 26 FATF members. 
' Buchanan A., "Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination Moral Foundations for International Law" 
Oxford, 2004 at p. 312. "By theformal equality of States here is meant the attribution to all States, large 
or small, weak or strong, of the same rights, immunities, liberties, and ditties. " 
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details that the extent to which small developing States are affected by the decisions 
taken by big developed States can be greatly appreciated. The study concluded that the 
OECD/FATF's initiatives were not in conformity with international law and that those 
initiatives go to the root of the economy of SVG and the economic survival of its 
people. By unden-nining SVG's freedom to choose its economic policies the 
OECD/FATF significantly reduced SVG's power as a sovereign independent nation and 
effectively taken away its statehood. A further implication being that by significantly 
reducing SVGs ability to provide legitimate sources of income for its people, the 
condition was being created for illegitimate sources to take their places. 
In June 2000 SVG was -blacklisted' by the OECD as an uncooperative tax haven and by 
the FATF as non-cooperative in the fight against money laundering. The OECD 
concluded that the fiscal policy 6 of SVG was harinfill to its member countries, in that it 
was not transparent and did not adequately provide for the disclosure of beneficial 
ownership of commercial entities and the effective exchange of information about tax 
payers. 7 Therefore, SVG's fiscal policy was viewed by the OECD as a conduit through 
which tax avoidance and tax evasion activities were facilitated for the benefit of the 
taxpayers of its member countries. Moreover, it also alleged that the fiscal policy of 
SVG encouraged capital flight from its member countries which effectively eroded their 
tax bases. It did not however adduce any evidence in support of those allegations. 
The FATF on the other hand was highly critical of the regulatory and supervisory 
framework of the financial system in SVG and in particular the OFSS. It concluded that 
the said framework was inadequate, which therefore demonstrated that SVG was not co- 
8 operative in the fight against money laundering. The OECD/FATF used the 
international media to condemn SVG as an uncooperative tax haven and a facilitator of 
money laundering and threatened countermeasures against SVG unless it amended its 
policies in a manner that the OECD/FATF considered to be desirable. This 'naming and 
shaming' campaign had an adverse effect on SVG's OFSS in particular and the 
economy as a whole. 9 
6 Parkin M., Powell M., and Matthews K., "Economics, " Pearson Education Limited, 2003, at p. 735, 
"Fiscal policy... is the use of the government budget to achieve macroeconomic objectives such as full 
employment, sustained long- term economic growth and price-level stability. The detailedfiscal policy 
tools are tax rates and the government purchases ofgoods and services. 
7 See below at Chapter 1.4 
8 See Chapter 4 
9 See below at Chapter 1.1.1 
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Interestingly, however, at the time that the OECD 'blacklisted' SVG as an 
uncooperative tax haven, it was reported that some of its member countries were 
engaged in harmful tax practices (see below at para 1.5), 'o yet none of them was 
'blacklisted' and condemned as being uncooperative. Additionally, countries such as 
Switzerland and Luxembourg'' which were substantially engaged in the investment of 
private capital and were in effect competing with small island offshore jurisdictions 
such as SVG, did not support the harmful tax initiative but they were not 'blacklisted' as 
being uncooperative. Certain States in the USA, including Colorado and Montana, in 
order to attract investors, advertised that foreign judgments would not be recognised or 
enforceable against persons investing in those States. 12 The State of Delaware also 
provided anonymity to beneficial owners of limited liability corporations that were 
registered in that State. 13 Nevertheless, the OECD did not 'blacklist' the USA as being 
uncooperative. 
Similarly, there were FATF member countries with regimes that facilitated money 
laundering but none of those countries was 'blacklisted' at the same time as SVG. For 
example, it has been reported that in the USA the revenues from illegal drugs alone 
were estimated to be in excess of $US120 billion annually. 
14 In the United Kingdom 
and Canada over f2.4 billion and $15 billion were laundered every year. 
' 5 What is 
however alarming is that research has shown that 90% of the bank notes in circulation 
in the USA were contaminated with illegal drugs and 99% of bank notes that were 
circulating in London were tainted with cocaine. ' 6 But the UK, Canada and the USA 
were not the only countries with serious money laundering problems. It was reported 
that the monies that were laundered annually in some other countries such as France, 
were in excess of 14 billion Francs, Russia, approximately $US 15 billion, " Switzerland 
approximately $US500 billion and Italy, in excess of $US50 billion just to name a 
10 Hay R, "OFCs: The Supranational Initiatives" -Private Client Business 2001,2,75-91 at p. 84. " See below at Chapter 1.5 
12 lbid 
" lbid 
14 Howard C., "Butterworths Money Laundering Law, " Butterworths, 2001 at p. 1/5 
15 Lilley P, "Digy Dealing-The Untold Truth About Global Money Laundering, " Kogan Page, 2000 at p. 
27 
16 lbid at p. 26 
17 Although Russia was blacklisted at the same time as St. Vincent and the Grenadines it was not at that 
time a member of the FATF. 
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few. 18 What is even more remarkable is that certain OECD/FATF member countries and 
their agencies had deliberately and as a matter of policy, condoned criminal activities9 
and facilitated the money laundering process. 20 Insofar as SVG was concerned, prior to 
it being 'blacklisted' it was ranked as a 'low priority' 21 country for money laundering 
purposes and no money laundering case had ever been brought before the court. 22 
It will also be established in chapter 2 that the criminal activities that generated the 
substantial proceeds that were laundered annually, actually occurred in the 
OECD/FATF member countries. Similarly, those countries were also major producers 
of the weapons that were used by criminals to carry out their crimes and to instil fear, 
serious injuries, murder and mayhem in societies the world over. 23 In the light of the 
foregoing and that which will be established elsewhere in this thesis, questions were 
being raised as to whether the OECD/FATF had been conspiring to introduce measures 
that ensured their continued pre-eminence in the provision of financial services or 
whether there were other insidious motives behind the harmful tax and money 
laundering initiatives. 
For many years the Caribbean has been viewed as beautiful islands with pristine clear 
waters and white sand beaches, havens for those wishing to experience peace and 
tranquillity, joy and happiness. Within recent times however, the Caribbean region in 
addition to its tourist attractions has also been seen as a haven for money launderers and 
tax dodgers. That was the perception of the FATF and the OECD respectively. The 
FATF's money laundering initiative (see chapter 4) due to its significance to the 
stabilisation of the international financial system and its relevance to the peace and 
security of the world will be featured more prominently in this thesis. The harmful tax 
initiative 24 of the OECD runs counter to increased global competition, which is a 
universal policy pursued by the World Trade Organisation (WTO)25 and accepted by the 
18 Lilley P, "Dirty Dealing-The Untold Truth About Global Money Laundering, " 2000 at p. 27 
'9 See below at Chapter 2.9 
20 See below at Chapter 2.8 
21 Griffith I., "Drugs and Securijy in the Caribbean, Sovereignty Under Seige, " Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1997 at p. I 10 
22 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 28 Ih August, 1997, at pp 54 - 55 per Campbell P., 
Attorney General 
23 See Chapter 2.4.1 
24 OECD Report, "Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue" 1998 25 See chapter 6.9.1 for brief discussion on WTO. 
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international community of States 26 and therefore will in this thesis bear less 
significance than the FATF's money laundering initiative. However, to the extent that 
their countermeasures were detrimental to small island economies and bearing in mind 
that in substance the FATF and the OECD were one and the same (see chapter 6.2.4) 
organisation, both initiatives will be examined together where necessary. As Stessens 
has observed: 
"Although the 'blacklisting' in theory only concerns the fight against money 
laundering, it is clear that, in view of both the factual connection between money 
laundering and tax dodging and the timing of the publication of the FA TF review, that 
the 'black list' and the enforcement measures that go with it, are also relevant to the 
fight against 'unfair tax competition. -27 
The FATF was established by the G7 28 countries in 1989 for the purpose of combating 
money-laundering activities worldwide, especially regarding the proceeds of the illegal 
drugs trade and fiscal crime. 29 That perception formed the basis of the FATF's first 
Report in 1990. In it the FATF stated that; 
"These jurisdictions [meaning small island offshore financial centres] are part of the 
world payments system without any restriction. So long as this is the case, cash exports 
will tend to go to these countries for integration into the financial system there and 
return by means of wire transfers (my emphasis added). , 30 
The FATF, it would appear, has concluded that fighting international crime is a task of 
very great difficulty. Therefore, rather than placing emphasis solely on the fight against 
international crime itself, efforts are being made globally to take the profits out of crime 
by criminalizing the proceeds of crime. In that regard McLean has stated that: 
"From the point of view of the criminal, it is no use making a large profit out of 
criminal activity if that profit cannot be put to use ... Putting the proceeds to use is not as 
simple as it may sound Although a proportion of the proceeds of crime will be kept as 
capitalforfurther criminal ventures, the sophisticated offender will wish to use the rest 
26 Greig D., "International Cominuni! y Interdependence and All That Rhetorical Correctness. ' in Kreijen 
G., "State Sovereign1y and International Governance, ' Oxford University Press, 2002 at p. 531 where the 
term "international community" was given four interpretations. The interpretation that is relevant refers to 
the international community, "... normatively as representing the law-making authority of the substantial 
majority of States to establish rules of customary international law, or more particularly to bestow upon 
specific rules the status ofperemptory norms. " 
27 Stessens G., "The FATF 'Blacklist' of Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories, " 14 Leiden Journal 
of International Law 199-208 (2001) at pp. 204-205 
"' The seven most advanced economic nations namely, USA, Germany, France, UK, Canada, Japan and 
Italy. These countries meet periodically to discuss world economic and financial affairs. 
29 Hampton M., & Christensen J., "Offshore Pariahs? Small Island Economies, Tax Havens, and Re- 
configuration of Global Finance" World Development vol. 30., No. 9 (2002) pp. 1657-1673 at p. 1661: 
Note also that in the aftermath of September I Vh, 200 129 the FATF was given further responsibilities to 
combat money laundering of terrorist fundS, 29 thus imposing additional pressure on Caribbean territories 
that provide offshore financial services. 
30 FATF, Annual Report 1989-90, at p9 (1990). See also European Commission, Second Commission 
Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the Implementation of the Aloney Laundering 
Directive, COM (1998) 40 1, at p4 
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for other purposes ... 
If this is to be done without running an unacceptable risk of 
detection, the money which represents the proceeds of the original crime must be 
"laundered 11 ; put into a state in which it appears to have an entirely respectable 
,, 31 provenance. 
Accordingly, attempts to conceal, convert, transfer or in any other way deal with or 
dispose of the proceeds of crime have become criminal offences in many countries and 
those who commit those offences are likely to have their properties forfeited and or 
confiscated. When consideration is given to the suggestion that global money 
laundering totals between $USI. 5 32 and $US2.85 33 trillion per year, the seriousness of 
the efforts to combat money laundering activities then becomes evident. Therefore, it 
appears that if the FATF's efforts to take the profits out of crime succeed, there will be 
no incentive for organised crime to flourish. But that success is only possible with the 
support of nations throughout the world. Accordingly, there is an argument for all 
jurisdictions to institute adequate measures that will ensure effective international 
cooperation in the fight against money laundering. 
That argument is foundational of a policy framework which will be referred to in this 
thesis as the theory of international cooperation. In this regard the FATF in 1990 issued 
and adopted 40 Recommendations 34 for its member States which it considers to be 
effective countermeasures in the armoury of those countries that wish to join the fight 
against money laundering activities. Moreover, in April 2000 it published a Report on 
Non-Co-operative Countries and Territories (2000) which established 25 assessment 
criteria 35 to identify detrimental practices that restrict cooperative measures to combat 
money laundering. Those assessment criteria related to countries and territories that 
were not members of the FATF and were not restricted to offshore finance 
centres(OFCs). The contents of the Report also threatened that countermeasures (see 
chapter 6.7.1) would be taken against jurisdictions that the FATF considered to be non- 
co-operative. 
The 25 criteria for assessing non-cooperative countries and territories represent 
standards within the overarching theory of international cooperation which was founded 
31 McLean, J., "International Judicial Assistance, ", Oxford, 1992 at p. 184. 
32 Lilley P, "Dirty Dealing-The Untold Truth About Global Money Laundering, " 2000 at p. 28: see also 
the United Nations Human Development Report 1999 
33 lbid at pp 29-30 
34 See http: //www. oecd. int/fatf/ 
35 lbid 
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on the premise that the fight against money laundering will gain greater efficacy if all 
countries and territories introduced anti-money laundering legislation which also 
provided for the effective sharing of information. For the purposes of this thesis those 
standards will be categorised under three principles, namely; (a) the principle of disclosure 
which is aimed at strengthening international co-operation in order to facilitate the 
exchange of information that may lead to the conviction of an offender and the freezing, 
seizure and confiscation of his proceeds of crime; (b) the principle of regulation which 
requires the introduction of laws that will criminalise dealing with the proceeds of all 
serious crimes or crimes that will generate large proceeds and permitting the freezing, 
seizure and confiscation of property that relates to the proceeds of crime and; (c) the 
principle of transparency which seeks to establish very clearly the role of financial 
institutions in identifying their customers, instituting effective audit trails so that a 
transaction can be traced from its origination to its completion and reporting on any 
transaction that is considered to arouse suspicion. These three principles will also be 
applied to the OECD' harmful tax initiative (see later in this chapter). The overlapping 
of these principles was highlighted in the 1998 OECD Report wherein it was stated that: 
"Some jurisdictions have enacted laws (e. g., providing anonymous accounts) that 
prevent financial investigators from providing tax authorities with information about 
investors. Thus, lax administrators lack the power to compel such information from 
institutions, and they cannot exchange information under tax treaties or other types of 
mutual assistance channels. The most obvious consequence of the failure to provide 
information is that it facilitates tax evasion and money laundering. Thus, these factors 
are particularly harmful characteristics of a tax haven and ... of a 
harmful tax 
regime. , 36 
In June 2000 after having conducted the evaluation of 26 countries and territories the 
FATF published a Report in which St. Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG) along with 14 
other jurisdictions 37 were blacklisted as being non-cooperative in the fight against 
money laundering. In response to the blacklisting, the Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (FINCEN) 38 issued a Financial Advisory (see chapter 6.7.1) in July 2000 
against SVG . 
39 The Advisory cautioned that all money wire transfers to and from SVG 
36 OECD Report, "Harmful Tax Competition and Emerging Global Issue" 1998, at p. 24 para 53 
37 These 14 jurisdictions are the following: Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, Israel, 
Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Panama, Philippines, Russia, St. Kitts and Nevis. 
'8 A department of the US Treasury 
'9 The financial advisory was issued pursuant to the FATF's Recommendation 21 which provides that, 
"financial institutions should pay special attention to business relations and transactions with persons, 
including companies and financial institutions, from countries which do not or insufficiently apply these 
recommendations. " Recommendation 21 was invoked against all the countries that were blacklisted. The 
FATF has in the past issued official warnings to Turkey, the Seychelles and Austria and advised its 
members to apply Recommendation 21 against those two countries. Awaming was issued on I" 
February, 1996, after the Seychelles had enacted the Economic Development Act 1985 which contained 
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would be diligently scrutinized but stopped just short of instructing investors not to do 
business in or with SVG. This had serious implications for other Caribbean offshore 
jurisdictions. Those that were not as yet evaluated moved with haste to revise their 
40 
regulatory and supervisory framework to give effect to the requirements of the FATE 
Over the past twenty five years or so, and as recently as the 1990's, most of the English 
speaking Caribbean territories 4' have been to a large extent encouraged 42 and even been 
forced into trading in a product that they considered to be competitive with other 
countries (especially developed countries). This product was offshore financial services. 
As a result, some of those Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs) have achieved a 
remarkable level of success 43 which is currently reflected in the increased quality and 
standard of life of their residents. There are those jurisdictions 44 whose economies 
depended solely on the revenues earned from the provision of offshore finance services. 
In carrying out its evaluation, the FATF apparently paid very little attention to the 
vulnerable state of the economies of those OFCs and the likely economic impact of an 
international "name and shame campaign. " Insofar as SVG was concerned, it will be 
established in Chapter 4 that the FATF's assessment of SVG's regulatory and 
supervisory framework was for the most part fraught with inaccurate conclusions and 
dubious to say the least. 
Whereas, it is generally accepted that there needs to be a global effort in the fight 
against international crime, such an effort must also include the views of all the States 
being assessed and be reflective of the prevailing socio-economic, cultural and political 
environments of all of them. The FATF however, appeared not to have considered those 
factors when it evaluated SVG and even if they were considered, no effort was made by 
immunity provisions that would have made lawful the laundering of proceeds of all crimes, except those 
that are serious. The warning was lifted on II th October 2000 after Seychelles repealed the Economic 
Development Act 1985, which had however, never entered into force. The warning against Austria was 
issued on I Vh February, 1999 in respect of anonymous savings passbooks and was lifted on 7 th 
November, 2000 after new legislation came into force on I" November, 2000, which required all holders 
of new savings passbooks to be identified. : See also Stessens G., "The FATF 'Blacklist' of Non-Co- 
operative Countries or Territories"- 14 Leiden Journal of International Law (2001), 199-208 at p 205 
40 Hinterseer K., 'Criminal Finance-The Political Economy of Money Laundering in a Comparative Legal 
Context, ' Kluwer Law International, 2002 at p 244 
41 Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, St. Lucia. 
42 Hampton M., & Christensen J., "Offshore Pariahs? Small Island Economies, Tax Havens, and Re- 
configuration of Global Finance" World Development vol. 30, No. 9, pp. 1657-1673,2002 at p. 1659. 
where it was suggested that Britain encouraged its dependent territories to engage in the provision of 
offshore financial services as a means of reducing aid to those countries. 
43 Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands 
44 Anguilla, Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, Bermuda 
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the FATF to modify its initiative in the light of those circumstances. Moreover, the 
manner in which the evaluation of SVG was conducted and countermeasures were 
imposed did not accurately reflect the adequacy of the regulatory and supervisory 
framework in the fight against money laundering and neither was any consideration 
given to the country's record of international cooperation. 45 Likewise, the OECD which 
also placed SVG on the list of uncooperative tax havens 46 in June 2000 appeared not to 
have given much thought to the legality of its actions and the detrimental effect that 
those actions were likely to have on the economy of SVG. Accordingly, it is herein 
contended that the categorisation of SVG by the OECD as an 'uncooperative tax haven' 
and the blacklisting by the FATF as uncooperative in the fight against money 
laundering, were unjustified. 
The principle of justice requires that there should be equal rights for al 1.47 However, it 
will be established that the manner in which the OECD and the FATF implemented 
their harmful tax and money laundering initiatives was devoid of justice. It represented 
an unprecedented attack on small island OFCs and was discriminatory in its 
condemnation of so-called uncooperative countries. Within the context of this thesis the 
initiatives of the OECD and FATF could only be justified if they were in conformity 
with international law and were in response to SVG's breach of its international 
obligations. It is however contended that SVG by engaging in the provision of offshore 
financial services in the manner that it did was not in breach of its international 
obligations. 48 Buchanan is however of the view that an illegal act which results in 
favourable legal reform is justified in the circumstances . 
49 He argued that it is 
acceptable to reform legal rules which encourage human rights violations by engaging 
in illegal conduct to bring about legal reform. 50 
Whereas money laundering may have the effect of destabilising the peace and security 
51 in the world, this by itself may not provide sufficient justification for the manner in 
45 See Chapter 3 
46 OECD Report, "Towards Global Tax Co-operation" 2000 at p. 17 
47 MacCormick D., "Formal Justice and the Form of Legal Arguments", in Freeman M., "Llovd's 
Introduction to Jur4rudence, ' Sweet and Maxwell, 2001 at p. 1475 "Justice requires that essentially 
similar case be treated in the same way, and that essentially different cases be treated differently. 48 See Chapter 6.7 
49 Buchanan A., "Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination Moral Foundations for International Law" 
2004 at p. 462. 
50 lbid at pp. 464-466 
51 United States Department of the Treasury and the United States Department of Justice, The National 
Money Laundering Strategy for 1999 @www. treas. gov . ..... money laundering is important in its own 
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which the OECD/FATF implemented their respective initiatives. Although Buchanan's 
argument may have a strong moral justification when the illegal conduct is required in 
circumstances of human rights atrocities and violations, it nonetheless could not be 
justifiably extended to situations in which the human rights atrocities were the 
derivatives of the illegal act. Even if there were valid arguments for the improvement of 
the regulatory and supervisory framework of the financial sectors of several countries, 
especially in the face of rising international crime, the merits of those arguments pale 
into significance when consideration is given to the discriminatory and non-transparent 
manner in which the OECD/FATF's initiatives were implemented and the adverse 
economic consequences which ensued. Therefore, it is contended that Buchanan's 
perspective of achieving a favoured position through illegal means may not be 
applicable to the OECD/FATF's initiatives and their relevance to SVG. Instead, Bridget 
Stem's argument that reform of the international legal order should be effected through 
legal means and processes 52 is relevant to determining whether the OECD/FATF's 
initiatives as they related to SVG, were in fact justified and it is herein contended that 
they were not justified. As Stem has observed; 
"... the globalisation of the economy highlights the fact that States are not always well 
equipped with the legal means to deal with actions ... 
However, this is not a reasonfor 
one State to proclaim itself the ruler of the world. On the contrary, collective ways and 
means must be sought to improve the legal approach to economic globalisation. The 
solution has to be found in improving the effectiveness of international law. Some, 
however, are not prepared to wait for such evolution and have started to create their 
own systems of regulation, one which is totally disconnected with States and thus 
disconnectedftom both national and international law. , 53 
Essentially, the FATF had no legal authority in intemational law to impose its money 
laundering initiative on small States such as SVG and neither was the economic 
pressure from OECD member States in conformity with international law. This thesis 
will demonstrate the extent to which the initiatives of the OECD and FATF were 
inconsistent with established international legal rules and cannot be coherently sustained 
in conjunction with other rules in the system 54 of international law. Such a 
demonstration will be emphasised and sustained by arguing: 
right. It taints our financial institutions, and, where allowed to thrive, it erodes public trust in their 
integrity. Further in an age of rapidly advancing technoloSy and globalisation, it can affect trade flows 
and ultimately disturb financial stability. In the end, like the crime and corruption of which it is a 
necessarypart, money laundering is an issue of national security. " See also Hinterseer K., "The Political 
Economy of Money Laundering in a Comparative Legal Context, " Kluwer Law International, 2002 at p. 1 
52 Stem B., "How to Regulate Globalisation?, " in Byers M., "The Role of Law in International Politics, 
Essays in International Relations and International Law" Oxford University Press, 2001 at p. 261. 
53 lbid 
54 See Chapter 6.7 
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1. That offshore financial services is a legitimate commercial activity that should 
be maintained and encouraged and that the OECD's "hannful tax initiative" was 
unjustified. This argument will be robustly proffered in this chapter which also 
provides an overview of the economy of SVG and the historical imperatives of 
the OFSS. Similar arguments will also be made in chapter 6 which deals 
specifically with issues relating to sovereignty and the legality of the 
countermeasures of the FATF and OECD. 
2. That OFCs are not solely responsible for the endemic global money laundering 
problem and the underlying crimes which give rise to the said problem. This 
argument will be made in Chapter 2 which deals specifically with money 
laundering and the extent to which OECD/FATF member countries have 
contributed to money laundering and the criminal activities that generate the 
proceeds which are eventually laundered. 
3. That SVG had demonstrated legislatively and by its conduct ordinarily that it 
was prepared to and was in fact cooperating internationally in the fight against 
international crime (chapter 3). 
4. That the FATF had not conducted a proper and accurate evaluation of the 
supervisory and regulatory framework of the financial system in SVG (chapter 
4). Furthermore, the modifications that were made by SVG to the legislation 
after the blacklisting did not change substantially what had existed previously, 
yet as a result of those changes, SVG was removed from the OECD and FATF's 
blacklists (chapter5). 
5. That the harmful tax and money laundering initiatives were not in conformity 
with international law (chapter 6). 
6. That the loss of opportunity for economic improvement in the OFSS occasioned 
by the FATF/OECD initiatives may result in increased criminal activities in 
SVG, including money laundering (chapter 7). 
In this chapter a brief overview will be given of the economy of SVG and the 
significance that was attached to the efforts to develop the OFSS. Mention will also be 
made of the impact on the OFSS as a result of the OECD and FATF's initiatives. 
Thereafter, a historical perspective of offshore financial services will seek to show the 
emergence of such services and the role that some of the OECD/FATF countries 
actually played in its development. Finally, an assessment will be conducted of the 
II 
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OECD's initiative, wherein it will be argued that the tax regime of SVG when viewed 
within the framework of that initiative should not have been considered as an 
uncooperative regime. 
1.1 St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines is a chain of small islands 150 square miles (or 388 
square kilometres) in size and located in the Eastern Caribbean. For many years it was 
colonised by Britain but gained its independence from Britain on 27'h October, 1979. 
Having been a British colony, its laws are based on the common law 55 of Britain and in 
most respects its statute laws are pari materia with those of Britain. Under the 
Application of English Law Act 1989 as amended in 1991 it is provided that: 
"SuIject to the provisions of subsection (2), without prejudice to the provisions of any 
Act of the Parliament of St. Vincent and the Grenadines and in particular the provisions 
of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) Act, the 
common law and the rules of equity ftom time to time in force in England shall be in 
force in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in so far as they may be applicable to the 
circumstances thereof and subject to such modifications thereto as the circumstances 
may require, save to the extent to which such common law or any such rule of equity 
may be excluded by any Act of the Parliament of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. -56 
Subsection (2) provides as follows; 
"Where on or after the 2 7h October, 1969, any provision of the common law or any 
rule of equity has been, or is, abrogated or superseded by an Act of Parliament of the 
United Kingdom such provision or rule, as the case may be, shall continue to apply in 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines as it applied before such abrogation or supersession 
unless and until an Act of the Parliament of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines provides 
otherwise. , 57 
The Application of English Law Act 1989 (as amended) has essentially extended the 
doctrine of precedent (stare decisis) 
58 in English common law to SVG such that the 
decisions of the courts in England can be applied in the courts in SVG save and except 
where there is a statute in SVG to the contrary or the common law in England was 
altered by statute after 1969. SVG shares the same High Court and Court of Appeal as 
the other territories 59 in the English speaking Eastern Caribbean region but its final 
55 Garner B., "Black's Law Dictionary, " West Group, 2000, at p. 221 defines common law as; "The body 
of law derivedfrom judicial decisions, rather thanfrom statutes or constitutions. 
56 Section 4(l) 
57 Section 4(2) 
58 Garner B., "Black's Law Dictiona! y, " West Group, 2000, at p. 1137 defines stare decisis as; "The 
doctrine ofprecedent under which, it is necessaryfor a court tofollow earlierjudicial decisions when the 
same points arise again in litigation.. " 
59 These territories are also referred to as the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and 
include, Antigua and Barbuda, Anguilla, British Virgin Islands (BVI), Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, 
St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent an the Grenadines. 
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Court of Appeal is the Privy Council60 in the United Kingdom. In the light of Section 4 
of the Application of English Law Act 1989 (as amended) and the fact that the Privy 
Council is the final Court of Appeal, the decisions of cases that have been decided in the 
courts of England and other Commonwealth countries will be used to support the 
arguments that are made in this thesis unless there is any other ruling to the contrary in 
SVG. 
Moreover, due to the fact that no money laundering prosecution was brought before the 
court in SVG prior to the blacklisting by the OECD/FATF's and up to the removal of 
SVG from the OECD/FATF's list of uncooperative countries, the decisions of the courts 
in England and other Commonwealth countries where relevant, will be used to support 
the arguments that are made in this thesis. It is also noteworthy that because this thesis 
relates primarily to the supervisory and regulatory regime of the financial services 
sector in SVG prior to the blacklisting and up to the removal of SVG from the 
OECD/FATF's blacklists, amendments that were made to the said regime after SVG 
was taken off the OECD/FATF blacklists will not be considered, to the extent that those 
amendments may not have had any impact on SVG's removal from the OECD/FATF's 
blacklists. 
1. LI The Economy 
SVG has a population of approximately 116,812 61 people of which about 33%62 falls 
within the age group of 15 to 30 years of age. Unemployment is very high, especially 
63 among the young and has been estimated at 22%. However, that estimate was for the 
year 1997. When it is placed within the context of the large number of persons leaving 
64 school each year in search of jobs , the true employment 
figure could range between 
22% and 40%. Another hurdle that faces the policy makers is the level of poverty in the 
country. In 1996 the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) conducted a poverty 
assessment survey of SVG and thereafter presented a report which showed that the level 
60 There are plans afoot to remove the Privy Council as the final Court of Appeal in most of the English 
speaking Caribbean territories (including St. Vincent and the Grenadines). A Caribbean Court of Justice 
is proposed and may well be established after 3 1" December, 2005. 
61 www. cia. gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/vc. htmi 
62 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Budget Address 2003, at p. 35 
63 www. cia. gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/vc. html 
64 Ministry of Education - 891 males and 475 females in secondary school of which approximately 300 
enter A Level College-On average approximately 300 will leave the A' level college annually. Of that 
amount only 10% may be able to afford tertiary education 
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of poverty was 37.5%. 
65 When compared with the poverty levels in the developing 
66 
countries which were on average 29% in 1990 and 23% in 2002 , the 
level of poverty 
in SVG was very high indeed. 
Between 1997 and 1999 SVG experienced an averaged growth rate 67 of 4% each year. 68 
During that period the offshore sector as will be demonstrated below was showing great 
signs of success. Interestingly, there was a sharp decline in the rate of growth to 2% in 
200069 when SVG was listed as uncooperative by the OECD and FATF. Since then, it 
further declined to 0.25% in 200 170 and -0.5% in 2002 . 
71 SVG's economy is based on 
three main economic sectors, namely, agriculture, services (including tourism) and light 
manufacturing. For years the agricultural sector 72 contributed significantly to the gross 
domestic product (GDP). 73 The Banana Industry was the main contributor but due to the 
advent of the European Single Market Economy 74 and the liberalisation of trade, 75 the 
banana industry has been experiencing significant declines as well. In 1990 the revenues 
earned from bananas exceeded $110.52 76 million Eastern Caribbean Dollars. This 
represented 20.7% of the country's GDP which stood at $EC535.16 million. 77 By 1998 
this had fallen to $EC55.5 million or 6.5% of the GDP which stood at $EC856.63 
65 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Budget Address 2003, at p. 10 
66 www. worldbank. org/data/wdi2002 "The Economy, " at p. 193 
67 The rate of growth is the amount by which the value of aggregate production of goods and services in a 
country is either increased or decreased from one year to the next. See Parkin M., Powell M., and 
Matthews K., "Economics" Adderson Wesley, 5 th edn. 2003, at pp. 424-440. 
68 www. imforR/extemal/np/sec/pn/2002/pno2l I. htm - IMF Report on St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
I 91h February, 2002 
69 Ibid 
70 Ibid 14'h February, 2003 
71 www. cia. gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/vc. htmi 
72 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Budget Address, 2003 at p. 6. "The Agricultural sector, which 
traditionally has significantly impacted economic growth and development, declined by 7.1 % in 2001 
compared with a growth of 66% in 2000, and its contribution to GDP declined to 11.2%ftom 12.5% in 
2000. " 
73 Parkin M,, Powell M., and Matthews K., "Economics" 2003, at pp. 425 where Gross Domestic Product 
was defined as; "... the value of aggregate production of goods and services in a country during a given 
qriod- usually a year. " 
44 McQueen M, Phillips C, Hallam D and Swinbank A, "ACP-EU Trade and Aid Cooperation-Post Lome 
IV" Commonwealth Secretariat, June 1998 at p. 160- The European Single Market was established on Is' 
July, 1993 to harmonise its trading policies by removing all obstacles to trade among EU member 
countries by 31" December, 2002. The effect of the European Single Market meant that the protection 
that SVG received for its bananas under Lome IV was remove and it was then open to competition from 
cheaper bananas from the Latin American countries. 
. 
/courier/ 1662 wer. htm where 75 Werner Hans-Peter - "Lome, the WTO, and Bananas" - www. euforic. or. 2 
there was a discussion about the effect of the removal of the protection under the Lome Convention that 
was given to ACP countries by WTO members in October 1996. 
76 Audited Financial Statements of the St. Vincent and the Grenadines Banana Association. See also 
Eg Statistical Information on the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union area. www. eccb-centralbank. or 
77 www. eccb-centralbank. or Statistical Information on the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union area. -St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines Selected Economic Indicators 
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million. 78 Banana revenues continued to experience further decline up to 2002 when it 
returned $EC35 million in revenues. 79 This decline was also reflected in its contribution 
to the GDP for 2002 where the proportion of banana revenues fell to 3.6% of the GDP 
which was estimated at $EC973.5 million. 80 What was remarkable is that between 1990 
and 2000, banana revenues fell by 55.6%8 1 and since the year 2000 up to 2002 there has 
been a further decline of 28.6%. 82 Accordingly, its contribution to GDP has been 
constantly eroded. Between 1990 and 2000 that contribution declined by 73.9% 83 and 
84 by 33.3% between 2000 and 2002. 
The constant erosion of what was once the bulwark of the economy has hampered SVG 
from reducing its high unemployment and poverty levels and although tourism has 
taken the lead as the main contributor 85 to the GDP, it has not been able to recoup the 
loss that was being suffered as a result of the rapidly declining banana industry . 
81 Most 
importantly, the returns from the tourism sector had not been sufficient for a favourable 
impact on the high unemployment and poverty levels. SVG does not have any natural 
resources apart from its pristine clear waters and beautiful white sand beaches. 
Therefore, it had to diversify into an economic sector that enabled it to compete 
effectively on the international market. 87 Understandably, it turned to offshore financial 
services. SVG saw how well other Caribbean jurisdictions 88 were doing and decided to 
place emphasis on its own OFSS which was established since 1976 but which was 
neglected due to the heavy reliance on the banana industry for its sustenance. 
Accordingly, in 1996 SVG embarked on a mammoth legislative task to reform the 
78 [bid 
79 IMF Country Report No. 03/29- February, 2003, at p. 19 
go Ibid at p. 18 
81 www. eccb-centralbank. or Statistical Information on the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union area. -St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines Selected Economic Indicators. 82 Ibid 
83 Ibid 
84 IMF Country Report No. 03/29- February, 2003, at p. 18 
85 w ww. eccb-central bank. or Statistical Information on the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union area. -St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines Selected Economic Indicators. -where it is shown that the Tourism sector has 
since 1993 surpassed the banana industry as the largest contributor to the GDP of St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines. 
96 IMF Country Report No. 03/29- February, 2003, at p. 3- where it mentioned that the contribution of 
tourism to the GDP for 2002 is 21.7%. 
87 Stem B., "How to Regulate Globalisation?, " in Byers M., "The Role of Law in International Politics" 
2001 at p. 250. "According to the principle of comparative advantage, it is recognised that nation-States, 
considering their endowments injactors ofproduction-natural resources, labour, and capital. Economic 
growth will be higher, on the national as well as international levels, if the international division of 
labour is based on the theory qf comparative advantage rather than on autarkic theories. 
88 Bahamas, Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands, Bermuda and Barbados. 
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OFSS which resulted in six new pieces of legislation 89 (see chapter 3) being passed in 
the House of Parliament. 
1.1.1.1 Offshore Financial Services 
In an address delivered by the then Prime Minister Sir James Mitchell on 18 th 
December, 1996 to launch SVG's new legislative package, he outlined the anticipated 
benefits to the economy and the people of the country. Firstly, he stated they obviate the 
need to impose further taxes on the citizens of the country in order to improve the 
economic infrastructure, education and health and that the millions of dollars that the 
country will earn in fees will go towards financing those projects and a small enterprise 
development fund to help small businesses. 90 Secondly, the livelihood of the people will 
be improved since young professionals working in the OFSS will earn more. The 
business community will also grow and create further employment and other 
opportunities for the young people who are unemployed, thus preventing the country's 
best and brightest from leaving the country to seek further advancement in foreign 
climes. 91 Thirdly, he envisaged growth in the tourism industry which would create 
further employment. 92 The anticipated growth in the tourism industry as a result of 
growth in the OFSS had been seen by others as inevitable. Hampton and Christensen 
have observed that: 
"Government advisers to many SlEs [meaning small island economies] - both those of 
local origin, and those from external institutions including the IMF have continued to 
take the view that a symbiotic relationship exists between the financial services sector 
and pre-existing sectors, particularly tourism. Tourism and offshore finance both 
required rapid air transport links. Both also needed hotels, restaurants, shops and 
attractive climates. The links appeared straightforward and seýf-evident. Likewise the 
benefits. The assertion ran that wealthy tourists would visit the islands, enjoy the 
lifestyle and subsequently establish residence and invest. At the same time bankers and 
tax accountants would be attracted by the climate and lifestyle and would bring with 
them knowledge and experience, adding to the virtuous circle. How could such a 
? -93 favourable situation go wrong. 
89 The 1996 legislative package included, The St. Vincent and the Grenadines Offshore Finance Authority 
Act 1996, The Registered Agents Trustee Licensing Act 1996, The International Business Companies Act 
1996, The Internationals Banks Act 1996, The International Trust Act 1996 and the Confidential 
Relationships (International Finance) Act 1996 
90 Mitchell J., "The Rebirth of an Offshore Jurisdiction, " Offshore Investment Journal, February, 1997 
Issue 73 at p. 31 
91 lbid pp. 31 and 34 
9' lbid p. 34 
93 Hampton M., and Christensen J., "Offshore Pariahs? Small Island Economies, Tax Havens and Re- 
configuration of Global Finance" World Development, vol. 30. No. 9, pp 1677-1673 at p. 1664 
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The new legislation became effective from I" January, 1997 and immediately the 
benefits from the reforrn of the OFSS became evident. At the beginning of 1997 and 
after 20 years of involvement in the provision of offshore financial services, there were 
only 3,471 offshore entities 94 on the registers. By 2000, the year in which SVG was 
listed as uncooperative by the OECD and FATF, SVG had increased its registrations of 
offshore entitieS95 by 8,383 to 11,854 entitieS. 96 Thereafter, the reduction in the number 
of offshore entities has been constant. Interestingly, there were steady increases in 
annual offshore registrations from the reform of the OFSS in 1997 up to 1999. The 
decline actually commenced from 2000, the year in which SVG was blacklisted by the 
97 OECD and FATF . At the end of the 
first year of operations after the reform, annual 
98 
offshore registrations increased by 168% to 1,188 . There were 
further increases in 
1998 and 1999. In 1998 annual registrations totalled 1,750, which represented a 45% 
increase over 1997 registrations. 99 In 1999 the annual number of entities that were 
registered amounted to 2,942 - an increase of 68% of the annual registrations in 1998.100 
There was however a 15% reduction in registrations during the year 2000 in which 
2,503 entities were registered. 101 Since then, annual registrations of offshore entities 
have never reached 1,000 entities 102 and a number of offshore entities closed down their 
operations, 1 03 thus causing the OFSS to contract significantly. SVG therefore lost well 
over 4,400 104 offshore entities and the businesses that resulted from those registrations, 
thus leaving a grand total of 6,756 offshore entities on the Offshore Finance Authority's 
(OFA) registers by October, 2003.105 
94 International Companies, International Banking Companies and International Trusts. 
95 International Business Companies, International Banks, International Trusts, International Insurances 
and Mutual Funds. 
96 Records at the Registry of the Offshore Finance Authority in St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
97 Hampton M& Christensen J., "Offshore Pariahs? Small Island Economies, Tax Havens and the Re- 
configuration of Global Finance" - World Development Vol. 30, No. 9 pp. 1657-1673,2002 at p 1668; 
"The likely outcome of the current re-configuration of the globalfinancial structure will be an erosion of 
the distinction between offshore and onshore finance, with the former losing many advantages that 
originally attracted finance capital to the 'islands in the sun. 'Some 0FCs will experience large-scale 
reductions of their principal economic activity, with direct losses, falling government revenues, and lower 
spending effects ftom the once-booming OFC sector, It is unlikely that the effects will be uniformed 
across all OFCs, and it is useful to speculate about what might happen to different types of OFCs. 
98 Records at the Registry of the Offshore Finance Authority in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
99 Ibid 
100 Ibid 
'0' Ibid 
102 Ibid 
103 Mitchell L., "A World of Opportunities" - 
Searchlight Newspaper vol. 9, No. 40, Friday 3 rd October, 
2003. The author acknowledged that there was a reduction in registrations by over 4,000 offshore entities 
and that the National Commercial Bank encountered difficulties maintaining and obtaining correspondent 
banking relationships. No mention has however been made of annual registrations between 2001 and 
October, 2003. 
104 Ibid 
'0' lbid 
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The OFSS within a relatively short period of time had shown tremendous progress and 
great promise. Essentially, the fall in offshore registrations and the loss of opportunities 
that were available can be attributed to the initiatives of the OECD and FATF's. The 
international condemnation and vilification of SVG by the OECD and FATF, as an 
undesirable financial services jurisdiction, together with the aforementioned Financial 
Advisory, severely restricted the amount of offshore business that would otherwise have 
been established in SVG. 106 When such a negative publication has been reinforced by 
serious demands by the OECD/FATF for disclosure of information about investors and 
threats of economic reprisals, investors and prospective investors no longer considered 
the OFSS in SVG to be a desirable investment proposition. But offshore financial 
services had either directly or indirectly created quite a number of jobs for the young 
people and professionals in SVG, so much so that it has been reported that the OFSS 
generated a minimum of over $EC25 million per year between 1997 and 2000.1 07 The 
loss of opportunity, the lost of jobs and by extension the lost of revenues all militate 
against the justification for the blanket application of the OECD and FATF's initiatives. 
1.2 The Emergence of the Offshore Financial Services Industry 
1.2.1 Terminologies, Definitions and Descriptions of offshorefinance 
Within the past 15 years different persons have used different terms in reference to the 
offshore financial services industry. The original term 'Tax Haven' has since given way 
to 'Offshore Finance Centres' (OFCs). The term OFC was seen as the preferred 
reference. Tax Haven it is believed significantly detracted from the range of financial 
services that were offered by these offshore jurisdictions and conjured up in the minds 
106 Hay R., "Information Exchange and The Offshore Financial Services Centres: Part I, " Private Client 
Business, 2002,2,88-97 at p. 94 "Offshore centres rely on ... 
foreign markets to conduct a financial 
services industry much larger than that which could be supported by domestic demand. Accordingly, it is 
not practicalfor an OFC` to isolate itseýfjrom outside pressure by unpluggingfi-om the international grid 
unless the centre is prepared to restrict the local financial sector to the purely domestic environment. 
Vically tiny markets in most OFCs. " 
th 10 Lewis L., "Whither the Offshore Finance Sector, " The News Newspaper, Friday 17 August, 2001 at 
p. 9 where in enquiring as to whether the Confidentiality Laws or the much stricter regulatory and 
supervisory framework were the reasons for the brief success of the OFSS he stated; "The offshore 
Finance Sector is vital to the economy of this country [meaning St. Vincent and the Grenadines]... What 
was the reasonfor the marked increase between 1997 and 2000? Was it as a result of the Confidentiality 
laws or was it as a result of a much stricter regulatoryframework? Whatever the reason, the government 
benefited to the tune of an average of SEC4 million each year, whilst it is estimated that the overall 
economy would have experienced an average annual income of over SEC25 million (my emphasis 
added). " 
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of all concerned the conduct of undesirable activities in the jurisdictions that offered 
offshore financial services. Since then the phrase 'International Finance Center' was 
coined to describe the range of financial activities being conducted in offshore 
jurisdictions and the global demand for the services offered. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, the terms, Tax Havens, OFCs and International Finance Centres are used 
interchangeably depending to a large extent on the perception that the person using the 
word would have for offshore financial services. Whenever, that perception is clearly 
unfavourable the term Tax Haven 108 is frequently used. Otherwise, the terms OFCs and 
International Finance Centres are the preferred terminologies. For the purposes of this 
thesis the term OFC will be used. '09 
1.22 What is Offshore? 
To a person involved in international finance the word offshore means another 
jurisdiction in which some special tax or other financial advantage is offered to the 
investor. For example, to a resident of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America are offshore jurisdictions in which special 
tax or other financial advantages may be obtained. However, under the offshore laws 
(see chapters 3 and 4) of SVG a resident of SVG may not be entitled to the tax or other 
benefits"o which may be available in the SVG OFSS. Effectively, in the world of 
international finance, offshore refers to anywhere that is not onshore and usually 
onshore represents the jurisdiction that the investor or prospective investor is 
endeavouring to avoid. " 1 The OECD defines an OFC as a jurisdiction actively making 
itself available for the avoidance of tax which would otherwise be paid in relatively high 
taxed countries. 112 On the other hand the U. S Treasury Department describes an OFC as 
a country with: 113 
* low or no taxes on income, profits, capital gains, estates; 
108 OECD Report "Harmful Tax Competition an Emerging Global Issue", 1998. 
109 Hampton M., "Treasure Islands or Fool's Gold: Can and Should Small Island Economies Copy 
Jersey? ' World Development, 1994, vol. 22, No. 2, pp 237-250 at p. 237, "The difference between 0FCs 
and tax havens is sometimes unclear. Generally we can note that tax havens are based upon taxation 
differentials between States. They are usually jurisdictions that have low or no direct taxes. Tax havens 
may or may not host a range offinancial services. Conversely, an OFC, it is a functional centre' may 
host a mixture of activities such as international banking, offshorefund and trust management, lawfirms 
etc. In short, there is a varied economic base rather thanjust taxation advantages. " 
"o See International Banks Act 1996 and the International Trusts Act 1996. 
111 United Nations Office for Drug control and Crime (UN DP) "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and 
Money-LaundginC 1998 at p. 21 where offshore banking was defined in the following manner: "In 
popular use, 'offshore banking' is often taking to mean nothing more than persons resident in one legal 
jurisdiction holding assets infinancial institutions incorporated in anotherjurisdiction. - 
112 OECD Report, "Hannful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue" 1998, at p. 20, paras 42-43 
113 Higgins K., "Offshore Financial Services, An Introduction, " The Counsellors Ltd., 1999 at p5 
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* few or no tax infon-nation exchange treaties; 
*a high level of banking secrecy; 
+ Self promotion as an offshore financial centre; 
*a disproportionately large financial sector; 
* the absence of exchange controls on foreign currency deposits 
It is however important to note that the OECD's definition and the USA Treasury's 
description, though adequate in their assessments of the functions that were performed 
by OFCs, were mainly pronouncements of their dissatisfaction with the financial 
activities that were provided by OFCs. Whether that description and definition 
adequately captured the roles and functions of the current structure of OFCs, especially 
with the intense pressures from the FATF and OECD grouping of countries, remain 
very doubtful indeed. It is rather uncanny that the perception of the OECD and FATF as 
outlined in the description and definition of OFCs, is one that this thesis is striving to 
preserve amidst the rapid legislative changes that OFCs are experiencing. Such changes, 
as will be shown later, have either significantly diluted or removed some of the features 
of OFCs that are intrinsic in the description and definition given. 
Having briefly reviewed the definitions of offshore and OFC, offshore financial services 
can be defined as those services that are provided by financial and legal professionals 
and administrative staff for the purposes of maximizing the returns of non-resident 
investors who have invested in an OFC. These services may include legal and financial 
advice on investments and investment structures and registration, administration and 
management of companies (insurance included), trusts and mutual funds just to name a 
few. 
1.3 Historical Background 
The origins of modem offshore financial services in the Caribbean region can be traced 
back to 1927 with the establishment of a captive insurance 114 in Bermuda. Palan 
114 An insurance that is established for the purposes of insuring the activities of its owners and the 
insurable interests of the employees of its owners. 
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however expressed the view that OFCs are not new. ' 15 He claimed that even all the way 
back to Roman times there is evidence of wealthy individuals using other polities as tax 
havens. 1 16 If the tax advantage is the main reason for the establishment of an OFC, then 
it is reasonable to presume that the origins of an OFC can be traced back to 1868 when 
all direct taxation was abolished by Charles III of Monaco. 117 The abolition of taxation 
and the beautiful Mediterranean weather together attracted the wealthy to the shores of 
Monaco where they invested and for the most part resided in order to acquire the 
benefits associated with the advantage of no taxation. ' 18 
During the late nineteenth century the smaller States in the American Union including, 
New Jersey, Delaware, Rhode Island, Maine and West Virginia enacted liberal 
corporate laws in competition with each other to attract corporate entities. 119 These laws 
were beneficial to corporations that were in the export business 120 and were established 
on fundamental principles that are similar to modem OFCs. In order to raise funds New 
Jersey during the 1880s enacted laws that were more liberal than the laws of other states 
to enable it to attract investors and made it advantageous for corporations to be 
registered there. 121 Similar laws as those that were passed in New Jersey in the 1880s 
were subsequently (1898) enacted by Delaware' 22 which is still an offshore jurisdiction 
today. 
It was not, however, until after 1929 that the modem offshore finance sector 
commenced the crusade that brought it to where it is today. 123 Following a House of 
Lords decision in the case Egyptian Delta Land and Investment Co Ltd v Todd 124 
the modem OFCs actually began to take shape. In that case the House decided that if a 
company was registered in Britain but its directors and secretary perrnanently resided 
elsewhere it was exempt from taxation. Consequently, there was a proliferation of 
companies seeking to take advantage of those opportunities in Britain, thus turning it 
into an offshore finance centre. By virtue of that ruling those opportunities were also 
115 Palan R, "Tax Havens and the Commercialization of State Sovereig ,, nty, 
" International Organisation 
56.1 (2002) 151-176, at p. 158 116 lbid 
117 lbid 
118 lbid 
119 lbid 
120 lbid 
121 lbid 
122 Ibid 
121 lbid 
124 [ 1929] AC 1: [ 1928] 1 KB 152: [1928] 14 TC 119 
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created for the territories of the British Empire and they too (e. g. Bahamas and 
Bermuda) joined into the act. Offshore financial services emerged as it is known today 
for two reasons, namely private banking and euro-currency banking. Private banking 
concerns the management of assets for high net worth individuals. 125 Eurocurrency 
banking refers to the international deposit and lending of funds in all of the major 
currencies. 126 
1.3.1 Private Banking 
During the French revolution the Swiss offered private banking secrecy to the French 
aristocrats for a fee. ' 27 Private Banking actually started in Switzerland during the 
Bolshevik revolution when there was an exodus of capital from Russia to 
Switzerland. 128 Further, instability in the Balkans and Latin America coupled with the 
Nazi threat in Germany all accounted for capital flight to Switzerland. Many were afraid 
that with the constant invasion of European countries by Germany they would have lost 
their assets through confiscation or otherwise and therefore chose to deposit their assets 
elsewhere for safe keeping and asset protection. 129 
There were further political and economic changes taking place in Europe, the United 
Kingdom and North America which precipitated the flow of funds from those areas 
offshore. In England and Europe there was a procession towards, socialist, political 
regimes and ideologies and a significant increase in the influence of Trade Unions on 
government policies. This socialist thinking was heavily founded on the welfare state, 
where provisions had to be made by the State for improvement in education, health, 
housing and the general welfare of the citizens of the State. 130 The first and second 
world wars also resulted in extensive capital outlay, especially in Europe, to rebuild that 
which was lost and destroyed. The rebuilding process coupled with the introduction of 
the welfare state forced governments of the day to seek funds to finance those activities. 
Increased taxes were the easiest and quickest method of raising the funds that were 
needed. 131 Many wealthy citizens of those countries as a result of increased taxation 
125 Valdez S., "An Introduction to Global Financial Markets" Palgrave, 3d edn. 2000, at pp. 16 and 95 
126 lbid p. 133 
127 Palan R, "Tax Havens and the Commercialization of State SovereipRbL: International Organisation 
56.1 (2002) 151-176, at p. 160 
"8 Higgins K., "Offshore Financial Services, An Introduction, " 1999 at p. 1 
129 lbid 
130 lbid 
"' lbid 
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began investing in private banking and on the Eurocurrency markets in order to avoid 
and escape the draconian taxation levels of those countries and at the same time 
maximize the returns on their investments. 132 
Canadian and British interests were at the forefront of the commencement of the 
offshore finance sector in the Caribbean when in 1936 The Bahamas General Trust 
Company was formed in the Bahamas. ' 33 The name was later changed to Roywest 
Banking, a joint venture of National Westminster Bank of Britain and Royal Bank of 
Canada and then to Coutts and Co a wholly owned subsidiary of National Westminster 
Bank. The entity was established to provide investment management services to wealthy 
clients in both the European and North American Markets. The provision of private 
banking services in the offshore sector therefore provided a safe haven for capital 
fleeing both from political and taxation risks by enabling persons with high net worth to 
protect their income and assets in jurisdictions separate and distinct from their original 
country of residence. 
1.3.2 The Eurocurrency Market 
The Eurocurrency market emerged after the 2 "d World War and during the inception of 
the cold war. 134 The Central Banks of the Communist countries became very concerned 
about maintaining their US dollar deposits in New York Banks for fear that such an 
action exposed them to political and financial risks. ' 35 The US has a history (e. g. 
Kuwait, Haiti and Iraq) of freezing the accounts of persons, institutions or countries 
whenever there was a disagreement with the USA. 136 Therefore, in the late 1950s and 
early 1960's the communist block countries decided to deposit their US dollar balances 
with their bankers in London and Paris. 137 With Russia owning a bank in France, Bank 
Commercial pour I'Europe du Nord, it was able to place its deposits there and to use 
that bank to lend US Dollars to other non-US banks in Europe. 138 Thus the term 
132 Higgins K., "Offshore Financial Services, An Introduction, " 1999 at pp. 1-2 
133 lbid 
134 Valdez S., "An Introduction to Global Financial Markets" 2000 at p. 133 
135 lbid 
136 Higgins K.., "Offshore Financial Services, An Introduction, " 1999 at p. 2 
137 United Nations Office for Drug control and Crime (UNDP) "Financial havens, Banking Secrecy an 
Money-Laundering" 1998 at p. 22 
138 Valdez S., "An Introduction to Global Financial Markets" 2000 at p. 133 
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Eurodollar' 39 was used to refer to a US dollar on deposit in Europe rather than in the 
United States. 
After the 2d World War there was a tremendous amount of US dollars circulating in 
Europe, mainly because of the US Dollars that were introduced to rebuild Europe under 
the Marshall Plan. 140 Consequent upon the Treaty of Rome 1957,141 there was an influx 
of American multinational corporations being established and operating in Europe, 
earning and spending vast sums of US Dollars. 142 The availability of these large 
amounts of US Dollars provided a ready market for businesses and even governments, 43 
wishing to acquire US Dollars by way of loans. 144 As a result of the increased demand 
for the US currency, the US government passed the Interest Equalisation Act in 1963 
which imposed interest rate controls in an attempt to restrict the outward flow of 
capital. 145 The strict control of such rates was called Regulation Q. 146 For quite a 
number of years there were restrictions on the interest rates that could be offered to 
depositors. But although the US introduced other controls 147 businesses were however 
able to circumvent Regulation Q by choosing not to convert the Dollars into Francs but 
lending them to other institutions on deposit. 148 There are a number of other reasons 
why the Eurocurrency market developed. These reasons were given by Kevin Higgins 149 
as: 
* Restrictions on the use of Sterling by non-residents of the United Kingdom 
A series of devaluations of the pound sterling which removed both the stability 
and predictability of the value of the pound sterling-this therefore resulted in the 
US dollar becoming the new international unit of account for world trade 
although the United Kingdom remained the pre-eminent financial centre. 
139 Kenwood A., and Lougheed A., "The Growth of the International Economy 1820-2000" Routledge, 
4"' edn. 1999 at p. 274. where a Eurodollar is defined as; "... a time deposit denominated in US dollars 
placed in a bank located in another country, for example, in Britain. As a time deposit it cannot be used 
by its owner during the period of the deposit but it can be lent out by the bank to others who may require 
dollarsfOr transactions purposes. - 
140 Trebilock M., Howse R., "The Regulation of International Trade" Routeledge, 2 nd , edn. 
1999 at p. 23 
141 lbid 
142 Valdez S., "An Introduction to Global Financial Markets" 2000 at p. 133 
143 lbid, "in 1991, Kuwait raised a hugh dollar loan, $5.5bn, from a syndicate of banks in London to 
repair the damage caused during the Guýf War. " 
144 Kenwood A., and Lougheed A., "The Growth of the International Economy 1820-2000" 1999 at p. 
274-275 
145 Ali S., "Money Laundering Control in the Caribbean, " Kluwer Law International, 2003 at p. 30 
146 Valdez S., "An Introduction to Global Financial Markets" 2000 at p. 133 
147 Ali S., "Money Laundering Control in the Caribbean, " Kluwer Law International, 2003 at p. 30 
where mention was made about the other controls imposed by the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program 
and the Foreign Direct Investment Program which were introduced in 1965. 
148 Valdez S., "An Introduction to Global Financial Markets" 2000 at p. 133 
"9 Higgins K, "Offshore Financial Services, An Introduction, " 1999 at pp 34 
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Balance of payments deficits experienced by the USA in the 1960s which 
resulted in serious efforts to stem the flight of capital by imposing a number of 
currency restrictions on capital. Those restrictions left investors in some cases 
with no other alternative than to establish a branch or subsidiary overseas which 
would not be subject to U. S regulatory authority. 
The increase of the price of oil in the 1970s resulting in a massive international 
redistribution of wealth. Those countries that were members of OPEC 
experienced large balance of payments surpluses and those countries that were 
not members of OPEC experienced serious balance of payments deficit. Due to 
the fact that petroleum products are internationally priced and traded in US 
dollars there was an increase in the supply of offshore US dollar deposits from 
exporting countries as well as an increase in the demand for US dollar 
denominated credits by importing countries. 
The Eurocurrency market is not subject to any national monetary regulatory 
authority. 
* There are no legal reserve requirements. 
+ No deposit premiums are required. 
* No restrictions on levels of interest rates 
* No taxes on income, profits or capital gains 
The market deals in large deposits and credits of one million currency units or 
more while avoiding the costs of a retail or branch network. 
The Eurocurrency market is now developed to the extent whereby it is not only traded 
in US Dollars but all of the freely convertible international reserve currencies. 150 Thus 
although the US Dollar remains the single largest denomination, the Eurocurrency has 
now become any internationally accepted currency held on deposit outside its country of 
issue. For example the Euro-Yen refers to the Japanese Yen placed on deposit outside of 
Japan. 151 
150 Valdez S., "An Introduction to Global Financial Markets" 2000 at p. 146 
151 Kenwood A., and Lougheed A., "The Growth of the International Economy 1820-2000" 1999 at pp. 
274-275; "The Growth of Western Europe, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, was partlyfinanced with 
Eurodollars. By 1995 the market for Eurodollars had grown to around $4,000 billion. Other 
Eurocurrencies, such as the deutsche mark Sterling, Swiss ftanc, and the yen have appeared and have 
grown in importance since the 1960s and, in 1995, the total was around $2,000 billion. The introduction 
of the new European currency, the euro has led to the dropping of the term 'eurocurrencies'ftom reports 
infavour of cross-border bank claims and liabilities. " 
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1.3.3 Why go offshore? 
In addition to the reasons aforementioned persons wishing to invest may go offshore 
for, asset protection 152 from creditors 153 and spouses, 154 avoidance of forced heirship 
rules, tax planning purposes, 155 more favourable legal systems, 156 lower transactions 
costs, 157 professional expertise, banking, insurance, 158 investment, ship management and 
registration, trustee services, avoidance of religious restraints, escaping bureaucratic 
regulations and exchange control planning. There are also those who go offshore for 
undesirable reasons such as, laundering the proceeds of crime, fraud and concealment of 
assets from partners and family members. 
The development of the Eurocurrency banking and private banking sector did not 
commence in small island economies (SIEs) OFCs but in the developed financial 
centres such as London and Switzerland (see chap 1.3.2). Today, there has been very 
little change in that regard since both London and Switzerland are still engaged 
significantly in the provision of those financial services. It is rather uncanny that 
Eurocurrency banking is not viewed in the same way as offshore banking in OFCs, yet 
on the basis of the foregoing, there seems to be very little or no regulation of the 
Eurocurrency banking operations (see chap 1.3.2). Whereas in the offshore banking that 
is conducted in the OFCs, there are and always had been regulations governing offshore 
banking operations. 
It is interesting to note that President Kennedy in July 1963 in recognition of the 
advantages that were taken of the US Dollar in Europe decided to tax dollar bonds 
... Ali S., "Money Laundering Control in the Caribbean, " 2003 at p. 40 
153 lbid at p. 40 "Since the beneficial ownership in trust property passes to the beneficiaries, it falls 
outside the ambit of the settlor's or trustees assets in the event of a claim against such assets... also a 
debtor may seek to place his wealth safely away ftom creditors by the use of an offshore trust. This is 
because the beneficial ownership in trust property resides in the beneficiaries and not in the 
settlorldebtor. " 
154 UNODCCP Report, "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering" 1998 at p. 9, where 
it is stated that one of the most common purposes for the establishment of offshore trusts is to dodge 
decisions of the divorce courts. 
155 Ali S., "Money Laundering Control in the Caribbean, " 2003 at p. 39 
156 Higgins K., "Offshore Financial Services, An Introduction, " 1999 at p. 13 
157 lbid at p. 19 
'58 Ali S., "Money Laundering Control in the Caribbean, " 2003 at p. 39; "Many of the offshore 
Caribbean havens have an active captive insurance industry, that is an insurance business where by all 
risks and premiums originate outside the jurisdiction, and where the company is owned mostly by non- 
residents. In many cases the captive company is a wholly owned subsidiary of aforeign company and the 
structure is invoked as a tax avoidance scheme. " 
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(otherwise called yankee bonds) that were issued in the US by non-residents of the 
USA. The immediate response by those operating in the Eurocurrency banking sector 
was to issue those bonds in Europe to escape the tax. 159 It is reported that in 1963 the 
first Eurobond for the amount of $15 million was managed by Warburg's and issued in 
London to an Italian company, Autos trade. This issue placed London as the most 
appropriate financial centre for doing that type of business. As Al Alletzuhauser 
expressly stated: 
"Almost overnight the world's financial centre shifted to London. The big four 
Japanese stockbrokers wasted no time in setting up offices there. ff they could not sell 
Japanese stock to the Americans, they would sell them to the Europeans. Over the 
years, it proved to he one of the most profitable moves Japan's brokers ever made 
abroad. "'60 
The success of London as an international finance centre for euro-currency banking 
appears to be the main reason for the establishment of a number of foreign banks in 
Britain. It has been reported 161 that in 1950 there were 140 foreign banks in London but 
since then that figure increased to 340 by 1973 and 541 by 2000. It is estimated that 
euro-currency dealings have increased from $lbn in 1959 to $6 billion by 1992 and is 
still a very viable industry even after the US abolished the restrictions which occasioned 
the rapid growth in euro-currency banking in the first place. 162 
Those institutions that are and have been providing euro-currency banking operations, 
have been successful and so have London and other European countries in which euro- 
currency banking is being conducted. 163 This success came due to the ingenious ways in 
which those institutions were able to avoid any kind of regulation that will minimize 
their returns and pose a threat to the safe keeping of their assets, in this case the euro- 
dollar. There are indeed parallels to be drawn here between the euro-currency banking 
being conducted in Europe and the private international banking being conducted in 
OFCs. Both operations are established for the purposes of asset protection, tax 
avoidance, minimisation of transaction costs and ultimately, the maximization of 
returns. The major difference is that private international banking in OFCs is regulated. 
159 Valdez S., "An Introduction to Global Financial Markets" 2000 at pp. 133-134. 
"'0 Ibid at p. 134. 161 Ibid 
162 Ibid 
163 Kenwood A., and Lougheed A, "The Growth of the International Economy 1820-2000" 1999 at pp. 
274-275; 
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Given the sizeable sums of monies which are transacted through euro-currency banking 
operations and the lack of regulatory controls, there is a greater need for deeper scrutiny 
of those operations than those of offshore banking in the OFCs. What is however most 
interesting about the development of offshore financial services is that certain members 
of the OECD and FATF have introduced it, were actively involved in it, availed 
themselves of the opportunities that were derived from it, developed it and still provide 
such services. Moreover, it is also noticeable that their involvement in the provision of 
offshore financial services was predicated on tax avoidance, asset protection and an 
unregulated financial environment. Those three underlying factors were more 
successfully achieved in an environment of privacy and confidentiality. It is therefore 
rather duplicitous that those same member States' 64 of the OECD and FATF, having 
developed their wealth in that way, are now vilifying OFCs for following in their 
footsteps. 
1.3.4 Offshore Finance Centres 
Over the past 20 years many SlEs have depended significantly on offshore financial 
services for their economic survival. 165 Some countries have been providing such 
services for over forty years 166 but others 167 have more recently diversified their 
economies into offshore financial services since they considered it an economic sector 
that could be used to compete more effectively with developed countries. In this way, 
some OFCs have attempted to meet the challenges with which they are faced as a 
consequence of the Word Trade Organisation's(WTO) 168 rulings on free trade and the 
removal of trade barriers. Further, the process of globalisation occasioned by the rapid 
growth in technology, the expansion of transnational companies, the forging of 
economic unions and the constant removal of geographical boundaries to enable an 
easier flow of labour, products and capital to and from countries have all affected 
Caribbean OFCs. 
'64 These countries include, France, Gennany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK and the USA 
165 Hampton M& Christensen J., "Offshore Pariahs? Small Island Economies, Tax Havens and the Re- 
configuration of Global Finance" - World Development Vol. 30, No. 9 pp. 1657-1673,2002 at p 1657- 
Where it was stated that Jersey has over 90% of its government revenues originating from offshore 
activities and 20% of local labour force also employed in the activities of offshore finance. 
166 Bermuda and The Bahamas 
167 St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia 
168 see chapter 4 for discussion 
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Those economies that have been providing offshore financial services for a considerably 
long period of time have been able to take advantage of the opportunities that are 
available through the process of globalisation. The other countries that placed 
significant emphasis on other economic sectors such as light manufacturing, agriculture 
and tourism are experiencing severe difficulties with economies of scale. 169 They soon 
enough discovered that with the free movement of labour, capital and products and the 
rapid improvement in technology, especially relating to telecommunications, the 
markets that they once had were beginning to decline with rapidity. Consequently, they 
were either forced to significantly improve their offshore financial services sectors to 
make them more marketable or to diversify into offshore financial services. These 
efforts are designed to recoup revenues that the other economic sectors are losing as a 
result of the process of globalisation and the rulings of the WTO. But there are those 
who are sceptical about the significance of the OFSS to small island OFCs. As one 
writer expressly stated; 
"Moreover, many small countries riddled with poverty and debt, have looked to new 
economic alternatives to save them. Typically these include tourism and now the 
provision of offshore financial services. The redeployment of resources into the latter 
has created a myriad of opportunities for criminals to both disguise the origins offunds 
andplace them out qf the reach of western jurisdictions. , 170 
Many SlEs followed the path that leads to the provision of offshore financial services. 
The demand for such services was relatively high, especially in the early to mid 1980s 
and the 1990s with the increase in private capital flows. 17 1 The 2000 Merrill Lynch 
Gemini Study has reported that the number of US Dollar millionaires in the world 
economy has increased by 50% between 1997 and 2000 to a current total of 
approximately seven million millionaires. 172 The rapid expansion of the world economy 
continues to increase global wealth and further enhancing growth in the offshore world. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has also reported that cross border assets and 
liabilities in offshore banks increased by 6% annually during 1992-1997 to 
approximately $US5 trillion in 1997.173 A British report of 1998 has also estimated that 
169 Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
170 Lilley P., "Dirty Dealing, The Untold Truth About Money LaunderinR72000, at p. 4 
17 1 Kenwood A., and Lougheed A., 'The growth of the international economy 1820-2000' Routledge 199 
4'h edn., at p. 321 
172 Hay R, "OFCs -The Supranatural initiatives" Private Client Business. 2001,2,75-90 at p. 90 
17-1 lbid at p. 2 
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the amount invested offshore exceeded $6 trillion. At that time it was estimated to be 
more than the GDP of every country in the world except USA. 174 
Other factors positively affecting demand include, the low or no tax rates of small island 
economies offshore centres compared to the relatively high rates of taxes that were 
imposed on tax payers in the developed countries, technological advancements in the 
banking system occasioned by the speed and ease with which monies can be transferred 
around the world, banking secrecy, confidentiality and anonymity. Together, those 
factors created the environment that was conducive to investors. The only ingredient 
that was required by SIE OFCs was to ensure that their offshore legislation reflected 
those factors. Accordingly, many of them, especially in the Caribbean region, either 
amended or introduced new legislation that imposed no or low taxes where taxes 
previously existed. They further extended banking secrecy and established 
confidentiality laws with stringent penalties for unauthorised disclosure of the affairs of 
investors. 175 Additionally, the legislation that regulated offshore entities omitted certain 
registration, licensing and incorporation requirements that were considered to be 
onerous. 176 In this way the regulators were able to respond with great speed and 
accuracy to the demands of investors for the registration of offshore entities and 
offshore structures. 
Most if not all of the SlEs with offshore finance sectors have very poor financial market 
arrangements and therefore acquiring funds for investment purposes in the private and 
public sectors proves very difficult. "' Consequently, there is very little scope for the 
introduction of monetary policies that will vary the cost and availability of credit to 
affect aggregate monetary demand and achieve the desired employment levels. These 
islands are left with the only feasible macroeconomic tool - fiscal policy. It is this policy 
that is used to create fiscal incentives in order to encourage foreign direct investment 
and generate the desired investment levels to "kick start" the economies and to enable 
them to continue to flow relatively smoothly. 
174 Neocleus E, "Off-shore Financial Centres-Recent Developments"- J. 1.13.1- 2002,17(5), 136-139 at p 
136 
175 Hampton M, & Levi M, "Fast Spinning into Oblivion? Recent developments in money-laundering 
policies and offshore finance centres"- Third World Quarterly, Vol 20, No 3, pp 645-656 1999 176 
see Chapter 3 and 4 177 lbid 
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The tax incentives coupled with the favourable legislation and political environment 
encouraged investors to establish investment vehicles in these OFCs. These investments 
attracted no taxes or very low taxes and by and large escaped taxes in the developed 
countries from which the funds to finance these investments originated. The 
confidentiality and banking secrecy laws accorded to investors anonymity and a greater 
sense of security. Thus, it conveniently enabled investors to minimize their tax liability 
and maximize their returns. These advantages to investors are not however seen in a 
favourable light by governments of the G7 countries. For example, the majority of 
OECD countries view the offshore legislation as encouraging their citizens and 
residents to engage in tax avoidance and tax evasion with impunity. 
This seems rather strange when members of the OECD have encouraged these OFCs to 
diversify into areas in which they will be able to compete effectively with developed 
countries. Britain at one time encouraged its dependent territories to establish offshore 
financial regimes to reduce their dependence on British aid. 178 It appears however, that 
those dependent territories have now fallen vulnerable to the European Union's (EU) 
initiative on exchange of unrestricted tax information. In 2000 at a meeting in Portugal, 
EU member States agreed to unrestricted information exchanges between the national 
tax authorities as an alternative to implementing a trans-EU withholding tax on non- 
residents savings. The British government having played a significant role in arranging 
and negotiating that initiative was therefore forced by the EU and the USA to 
encapsulate its dependent territories within this EU initiative. 179 
1.4 The OECD's Harmful Tax Initiative 
The OECD complained that vast sums of money having been transferred from its 
member States to be invested in OFCs are then structured in such a way that the 
ownership of those funds become so concealed that without assistance from OFCs it is 
virtually impossible to identify the beneficial ownership of those funds. Consequently, 
fewer funds will fall to the incidence of tax, ' 80 thus significantly eroding the tax bases of 
17' The Gallagher report(1990) Commissioned by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
179 Hampton M., & Christensen J., "Offshore Pariahs? Small Island Economies, Tax Havens, and the Re- 
configuration of Global Finance. " World Development vol. 30, No. 9, pp. 1657-1673,2002 at pp. 1659- 
1660. 
180 OECD Report, "Towards Global Tax Co-Qperation " 2000 at p. 14, para. 24; "Countries face public 
spending obligations and constraints because they have to finance outlays on, for example, national 
defence, education, social security, and other public services. Investors in tax havens, imposing zero or 
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its member States. Accordingly, in 1998 it launched the hanuful tax initiative against 
these OFCs following the publication of a Report entitled "Harmful Tax Competition, 
An Emerging Global Issue. " In this Report amongst other things, the OECD established 
five criteria for determining whether an OFC was engaging in harmful tax competition. 
These are as follows: 181 
(a) "No or low taxes on relevant income. 
(b) Lack of effective exchange of information -Tax Havens typically have in place laws or 
administrative practices under which business and individuals can benefit ftom strict 
secrecy rules and other protections against scrutiny by tax authorities thereby 
preventing the effective exchange of information. 
(C) Lack of transparency- A lack of transparency in the operation of the legislative, legal 
and administrative provisions is anotherfactor in identifying tax havens. 
(d) No substantial activities - The absence of a requirement that the activity be substantial 
is important since it would suggest that a jurisdiction may be attempting to attract 
investment or transactions that are purely tax driven. 
(e) Ringfencing - Thefact that a countryfeels the need to protect its own economyftom the 
regime by ring-fencing provides a strong indication that a regime has the potential to create 
harmful spill over effects. Ring-fencing may take a number offorms including: (i) a regime 
may explicitly or implicitly exclude resident taxpayersftom taking advantage of its benefits; 
(ii) enterprises which benefitftom the regime may be explicitly or implicitly prohibitedftom 
operating in the domestic market. " 
182 - However, in a subsequent Report it abandoned the ring- fencing criterion and 
concentrated only on (a), (b), (c) and (d) above. This was after there was significant 
opposition from four of its own members 183 and from OFCs. In that regard Switzerland 
criticised the harmful tax initiative in the following manner: 
"The Report [meaning the 1998 OECD Report] recognises that each state has 
sovereignty over its tax system and that levels of taxation can differ ftom one state to 
another. However, that same Report represents the fact that tax rates are lower in one 
country than another as a criterion to identifying harm/ul preferential tax regimes. This 
results in unacceptable protection of countries of high levels of taxation, which is, 
moreover, contrary to the economic philosophy of the OECD. , IN4 
In the 2000 Report the OECD having evaluated the tax regimes of 47 jurisdictions 185 
that it considered to be in the tax haven category, listed 35 186 of them, including SVG, 
nominal taxation, who are residents of non-haven countries, may be able to utilise in various ways those 
tax haven jurisdictions to reduce their domestic tax liability. Such tar pavers are in effect 'free riders 
who benefitfrom public spending in their home country andyet avoid contributing to its financing 
181 lbid at pp. 23 and 27-Boxes I& 11 
182 OECD Report, "Towards Global Tax Co-operation" 2000 at p. 10 
18.1 Switzerland, Luxembourg, Belgium and Portugal 
184 OECD Report, "Harmful Tax Competition an Emerging Global Issue- Synthesis and Summary of 
Recommendations statement by Switzerland, http: //www. oecd. org/daf/fa/tax_comp/taxcomp. ht 
'85 OECD Report, "Towards Global Tax Co-operation" 2000 at p. 10 
186 lbid at p. 17, where the countries included are; Antigua, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, 
Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, Gibraltar, Grenada, 
Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Montserrat, 
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as uncooperative tax havens and recommended that certain defensive measures should 
be taken against them. 1 87 The inclusion of SVG on that list raises three questions. 
Firstly, was it correct to categorise SVG as an 'uncooperative tax havenT In that regard 
the OECD contended that: 
"Thefact that ajurisdiction may impose no or nominal tax on the relevant income is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the jurisdiction to be considered a tax haven. 
Whether ajurisdiction meets the tax haven criteria is determined based on all thefacts 
and circumstances, including whether thejurisdiction has a significant untaxed offshore 
financiallother services sector relative to its overall economy. /88 
Secondly, did the OECD have the legal authority to dictate the tax regime that SVG 
should implement in the interest of its people? Thirdly, was the international 
condemnation of SVG coupled with threats of defensive measures in conformity with 
international law? In this chapter the first question will be considered and a brief 
response will be given to the second question. However the second and third issues will 
be examined more extensively in chapter 6. 
1.4.1 Is SVG a Tax Haven? 
In determining whether SVG should have been categorised as an uncooperative tax 
haven, it may well be most instructive to start with a definition or description of a tax 
haven. Thereafter, an assessment of the factors identified by the OECD as being 
characteristics of a tax haven will be measured against the tax regime and the overall 
economy of SVG. Hampton distinguishes an OFC from a tax haven in the following 
manner: 
"The difference between OFCs and tax havens is sometimes unclear. Generally we can 
note that tax havens are based upon taxation differentials between States. They are 
usuallyjurisdictions that have low or no direct taxes. Tax havens may or may not host a 
range offinancial services. Conversely, an OFC, if it is a functional centre'may host a 
mixture of activities such as international banking, offshorefund and trust management, 
law firms e1c. In short, there is a varied economic base rather than just taxation 
advantages. "'" 
Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Niue, Panama, Samoa, Seychelles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Tonga, Turks and Caicos Islands, US Virgin Islands, Vanuatu. 
187 lbid at pp. 24-25 
188 OECD Report, "Towards Global Tax Co-operation" 2000 at p. 10 
189 Hampton M., "Treasure Islands or Fool's Gold: Can and Should Small Island Economies Cop 
Jersey? " World Development, 1994, vol. 22, No. 2, pp 237-250 at p. 237, 
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The OECD and Hampton alike accepted that it is difficult to attribute a definition to tax 
havens and therefore they have chosen to make certain distinctions in order to provide a 
satisfactory description of a tax haven. In that regard the OECD stated that: 
"While the concept of 'tax haven' does not have a precise technical meaning, it is 
recognised that a useful distinction may be made between, on the one hand, countries 
that are able to finance their public services with no or nominal income taxes and that 
offer themselves as places to be used by non-residents to escape tax in their country of 
residence and, on the other hand, countries which raise significant revenues ftom their 
income tax but whose tax system hasfeatures constituting harmful tax competition. In 
thefirst case, the country has no interest in trying to curb the "race to the bottom " with 
respect to income tax and is actively contributing to the erosion of income tax revenues 
in other countries ... 
Because of this difference, this report distinguishes between 
jurisdictions in thefirst category, which are referred to as tax havens... "19() 
Hampton and the OECD have essentially described tax havens as jurisdictions in which 
no or nominal taxes are imposed. In SVG the higher rate of tax in the domestic financial 
services sector is 40% and it reduces, depending on the level of taxable income. 
However, offshore entities are exempt from the payment of income tax (see chapter 3) 
but their employees are not. To say, as expressly indicated by the OECD, that SVG 
offers itself as a place 'to be used by non-residents to escape tax, ' 191 gives the 
impression that the sole purpose behind the establishment of the OFSS was to 
deliberately entice tax payers away from their fiscal obligations to OECD member 
States. That appeared not to be the case. It has already been demonstrated earlier in this 
chapter that SVG badly needed to diversify into another economic sector to recoup the 
loss that is being sustained from falling revenues in the banana industry. Moreover, the 
economy needed to stimulate investment in order to reduce unemployment and poverty 
levels. The differences in tax rates that are imposed by SVG represent concessions to 
those wishing to maximise their returns. This is a common feature that can be found in 
the economic policies of many countries and is recognised in the OECD as desirable. In 
that regard the report stated: 
"The Committee recognises that there are no particular reasons why any two countries 
should have the same level and structure of taxation. Although differences in ta-V levels 
and structures may have implication for other countries, these are essentially political 
decisions for national governments. Depending on the decisions taken, levels of 
taxation may be high or low relative to other states and the composition of the tax 
burden may vary. Thefact that a country has modernised itsfiscal infrastruclure earlier 
that other countries, for example by lowering the rates and broadening the base to 
promote greater neutrality, is principally a matter of domestic policy. Countries should 
remain free to design their own tax systems as long as they abide by internationally 
accepted standards in so doing. , 192 
'90 OECD Report, "Harmful Tax Competition an Emerging Global Issue" p. 20 paras 42-44 
'9' Ibid at para 42 
192 Ibid at p. 15 para 26 
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The OECD did not however stipulate what it meant by "internationally acceptable 
standards. " In that regard, it will be established in chapter 6.5 that SVG was not in 
anyway departing from its international legal obligations concerning international 
taxation. Instead, its fiscal policy was consistent with the international legal principles 
which relate to international taxation. 
The economy of SVG is managed through its fiscal policy, which is adjusting taxes to 
affect the amount of money that is circulating in the economy. 193 Unlike the member 
States of the OECD, SVG does not have at its disposal the luxury of using either a 
monetary poliCY194 or a combination of monetary and fiscal policy to influence the 
economy. Therefore, it is only by adjusting taxes that SVG can influence levels of 
economic activity. That perspective has been recognised by the OECD when it stated 
that: 
"Tax competition and the interaction of tax systems can have effects that some 
countries may view as negative or harmful but others may not. For example, one 
country may view investment incentives as a policy instrument to stimulate new 
investment, while another may view investment incentives as diverting real investment 
ftom one country to another. In the context of this last effect, countries with specific 
structural disadvantages, such as poor geographical location, lack of natural 
resources, etc., frequently consider that special tax incentives or tax regimes are 
necessary to offset non-tax disadvantages, including any additional costftom locating 
in such areas. Similarly, within countries, peripheral regions often experience 
difficulties in promoting their development and may, at certain stages in this 
development, benefit from more attractive tax regimes or tax incentives for certain 
activities. This outcome, in itself recognises that many factors affect the overall 
competitive position of a country. Although the international community may have 
concerns about potential spill over effects, these decisions may be justifiable from the 
point of view of the country in question. "195 
In the light of the fact that SVG can only finance its public expenditure by raising both 
direct and indirect taxes it can be strongly contended that SVG does not fall into the tax 
haven category established by the OECD. Due to the fact that SVG provides a wide 
range of financial services, for example, international banking, international trusts, 
mutual funds, shipping and international insurance, along with the management of other 
entities, such as international business companies it is more likely to fall within the 
category of OFC as described by Hampton. Having contended that SVG does not fall 
'9' Parkin M., Powell M., and Matthews K., "Economics" 2003, at p. 418 
194 Ibid - where it is stated that 'monetary policy, '- "consists of changes in interest rates and in the 
amount ofmoney in the economy. " 
195 OECD Report, "Harmful Tax Competition an Emerging Global Issue" P. 15 para 27. 
35 
Chapter 1. "OFCs- An Introduction to the FATF and OECD's Initiatives" 
into the OECD's tax haven category, attention can now be drawn to considering 
whether the factors that the OECD identified as characteristics of a jurisdiction that is 
engaged in harmful tax competition are applicable to the tax regime in SVG. 
1.4.2 Characteristics of an Uncooperative Tax Haven 
Earlier in this chapter reference was made to the 'theory of international cooperation' as it 
relates to the FATF's anti-money laundering initiative. Mention was also made of the 
three principles that underlie that theory, namely, the principle of regulation, the principle 
of disclosure and the principle of transparency. It was stated that these three principles 
needed to be effectively applied to the regulatory and supervisory framework of a 
jurisdiction before it can be considered to be cooperative in the fight against money 
laundering. The theory of international cooperation also applies to the OECD harinful tax 
initiative (see 1.0 above). The criteria that are identified by the OECD as determinants 
of an 'uncooperative tax haven' also fall within the three principles aforementioned. 
Whereas no or nominal taxes and no substantial activities can be brought within the 
principle of regulation, exchange of information and transparency which are the 
foundational pillars of the theory qf international cooperation fall within the principle of 
disclosure and the principle of transparency respectively. Accordingly, the remainder of 
this chapter will be devoted to discussing issues relating to the principle of regulation. 
Although issues relating to the principles of disclosure and transparency will be introduced 
at this stage they will be more extensively discussed in chapters 4 and 6. Despite the 
fact that chapter 4 specifically relates to the anti-money laundering initiative of the 
FATF the discussion will nonetheless be relevant to the OECD's harmful tax initiative. 
]AZI No or nominal taxes 
This criterion falls within the principle of regulation due to the fact that some form of 
regulation is necessary to institute SVG's fiscal policy wherefrom the decision to tax, 
the rate of tax or not to tax is outlined. All of the arguments that were proffered above at 
paragraph 1.4.1 and which concerned, no or nominal taxes are also relevant in this 
instant. By no or nominal taxes the OECD appears to be referring to a jurisdiction that 
does not impose any income tax or if it does, the rate of tax is minimal. This criterion 
raises two questions. Firstly, consideration must be given as to whether the OECD can 
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dictate the economic policies of SVG. Secondly, what could have been the reason for 
exempting offshore entities from taxation and whether those are the only facilities that 
are the beneficiaries of such exemption? 
In response to the first question, under international law, every State has a wide 
discretion to introduce the economic policies that it considers will meet the social, 
political, economic and cultural needs of its peoples (see chapter 6.8 for further 
discussion). 196 In implementing those policies, harrn may be caused to the economy of 
other countries but that does not in anyway affect the wide discretion that States 
possess, unless the said policies are inconsistent with their international legal 
obligations. 197 Under international law it has been noted that, 'restrictions tpon the 
independence of States cannot therefore be presumed"" and therefore the OECD member 
States should not be restricted from conducting their relationships with any other State 
in the manner that they consider appropriate to their interests. 199 This does not, however, 
accord to the OECD member States the automatic right to retaliate with 
countermeasures. Any such retaliation is governed by certain international legal rules 
(see chapter 6.7)200 to which the injured State 201 is required to conform, and failing so to 
do may be interpreted as a violation of international law. One of those fundamental 
rules requires that the responsible State must have breached its international 
obligationS202 to the injured State before any countermeasures are permitted. There is no 
evidence that SVG was in breach of any of its international obligations to the member 
States of the OECD (see chapter 6.5). Therefore, any conduct which can be interpreted 
as interference into the internal economic affairs of SVG will be seen as a breach of the 
principle of non-intervention under international law (see chapter 6.5). 203 Accordingly, 
196 General Assembly Resolution 213 1 (XX), UNGAOR, 20, h SeSS., SUPPI. 14(A/6220), 1965, p, 11: See 
also Beveridge F., "The Treatment and Taxation of Foreign Investment Under International Law- 
Towards international Disciplines" Juris, 2000, at p. 76 
197 OECD Report, "Harmful Tax Competition an Emerging Global Issue" 1998, p. 15 para 27. 
198 SS Lotus Case (France v Turkey P. C. I. J. Reports, Series A, No. 10 (1927) at p. 18 
199 Elagab 0.., "The Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures in International Law" Oxford, 1988 at 
197. 
Crawford J., "The International Law Commissions Articles on State Responsibility-introduction, Text 
and Materials" Cambridge, 2002 : ARSIWA Articles 48-53 : See also Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Proiect 
(Hunga[y v Slovakia Judgment, ICJ Reports (1997), p. 7 
201 Ibid at pp. 23-25 where the definition given to 'an injured state' as being "any state whose right is 
infringed by an internationally wrongful act of another state, " was criticized by Crawford as being 
problematic. 
202 
ARSIWA Article 2 
203 Case Concerning Military and Paramilita1y Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United 
States of America), Merits and Judgment, ICJ Reports (1986), p. 14 at para 204 
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SVG being a sovereign State is legally authorised to dictate its own economic policies 
without any interference from the OECD (see chapter 6.1). 
However, in such a globalised world where there is a growing tendency for States to 
integrate and form regional blocs for the purposes of enhanced economic 
opportunities, 204 there may well be a moral obligation to implement economic measures 
that do not cause any harm to the economies of other States (see chapter 4.14). But there 
are times when economic han-n may be inevitable, although not deliberate. 205 For years 
now SVG has been pursuing a low tax policy and since 1976 entities that were 
registered in the OFSS were exempt from paying income taxes. In order to attract 
foreign direct investment, the Fiscal Incentives Act 206 granted special concessions to 
any qualified business that establishes its operations in SVG. The hotels have also been 
granted tax concessions to enable them to improve their facilities and develop tourism 
generally. 207 Tax concessions have also been granted in the agricultural sector to enable 
farmers to irrigate their crops and to acquire vehicles and other equipment that will aid 
them in farming. This also includes exempting farmers from the payment of income tax 
to encourage them to remain in farming in spite of the falling prices and climatic 
uncertainties. 208 
In 1998 and 1999 SVG increased the lower rate band for personal income tax from 
$EC 10,000 to $EC 11,000 in 1999 and from $EC 11,000 to $EC 12,000 per annum in 
2000209 such that persons whose annual taxable income do not exceed $EC 11,000 and 
$EC12,000 respectively are exempt from income tax. This was an attempt to leave more 
moneY210 in the hands of the poor '211 thus reducing their 
dependency on the State, 
increasing their spending power and stimulating economic activity. Essentially, the tax 
concessions that were given above to enable each of the major economic sectors to 
grow, was in keeping with SVG's overall policy to attract foreign direct investment in 
order to stimulate sufficient economic activity to create employment and reduce 
204 Tebilcock M., Howse R., "The Regulation of International Trade" 1999, at p. 23 
205 As in the case of SVG where its only form of managing the economy is through its fiscal policies. 
206 Chapter 336 of the 1990 Revised Laws of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
207 Chapters 339 and 340 of the 1990 Revised Laws of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
'08 Response by St. Vincent and the Grenadines to the OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition, 1999 
at pp. 9-10 
209St. Vincent and the Grenadines Budget Address 1998 at p. 32. 
210 lbid - where it stated that the standard deduction will leave $EC2.5 million in the hands of taxpayers. 211 lbid - over 1,000 persons benefited from the raising of the lower band. 
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poverty. 212 That the offshore laws were not drafted with the specific aim of encouraging 
investors to deliberately and fraudulently forego their tax obligations in their respective 
countries, can be gleaned from the remarks of the former Prime Minister of SVG, Sir 
James Mitchell, in his welcoming address which was presented at the Caribbean 
Offshore Conference in Puerto Rico on 21s' May, 1997. He stated that: 
"Those who earned their money legitimately and are seeking a secure and effective 
vehicle through which such funds can be channelled, will find in SVG the offshore 
finance capabilities which will provide utmost protection ftom prying eyes and those 
engaged infishing expeditions. It is however important to note, that it is not our desire 
to benefilftom weaknesses that exist in some societies but by the same token, we will 
not he the guardian of other countries tax laws, since it is the responsibility oj'each 
country to effectively administer its own regulatory regime. Our offshore finance 
authority has been established with the needs of our clients and prospective clients in 
mind We are mainly interested in, and receptive to those needs and theftwering of 
financial strength. , 213 
That statement clearly indicated that emphasis was placed on the OFSS mainly for the 
purposes of satisfying the economic needs of the country and not to purposely induce 
tax payers to abdicate their responsibilities to pay tax in their respective countries. SVG 
lacked the resources that were necessary to function as the tax policeman of the world 
and under international law it was not obligated to take notice of another country's tax 
laws. 214 Those issues were also reflected in the aforesaid statement by Sir James 
Mitchell. Therefore, by reforming the OFSS and exempting all the offshore entities 
from income tax SVG appeared to be conducting its economic affairs in confon-nity 
with its overall fiscal policy of low or no taxation and also in accordance with 
international law. It therefore raises the question -where is the evidence that SVG's 
fiscal policy was specifically designed to encourage foreign tax payers to ignore their 
tax obligations? 
1.4.22 Exchange of information and Transparency 
The OECD's Report 215 in which the 35 countries were listed as *uncooperative tax 
havens' did not stipulate whether SVG's regulatory and supervisory framework was 
lacking in provisions that facilitated the effective exchange of infonnation or was 
212 Ibid 
213 Mitchell J., "A Season of Light-A series of Messages on Development in St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, " Concept Publishing Inc. 2001 at p. 62 
214 Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 314 at p. 343 
215 OECD Report, "Towards Global Tax Co-operation" 2000 at p. 17 
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lacking transparency. However, in reference to what this thesis considers to be the 
principles of disclosure and transparency, the Report stated that; 
"Beyond no or nominal taxation, other key factors in identifying a tax haven are the 
lack of transparency in the operation of the jurisdiction of the jurisdiction's 
administrative tax practices and the existence of provisions- whether legislative, legal 
or administrative - that prevent (or would prevent) effictive exchange of information. 
Because non-transparent administrative practises as well as an inability or 
unwillingness to provide information not only allow investors to avoid their taxes but 
alsojacilitate illegal activities, such as tax evasion and money laundering, thesefactors 
are particularly troublesome. Some jurisdictions have enacted laws (e. g., providing 
anonymous accounts) that prevent financial institutions ftom providing lax authorilies 
with information about investors. Thus tax administrators lack the power to compel 
such information ftom institutions, and they cannot exchange information under tax 
treaties or under other types of mutual assistance channels. The most obvious 
consequence of the. failure to provide information is that it jacililales tar evasion and 
money laundering. Thus, these factors are particularly harniful characterislics of a lax 
haven and ... of a 
harmful tax preferential treatment. -116 
The OECD further explained the principle of disclosure in the following manner; 
"The ability or willingness of a country to provide information to other countries is a 
keyfactor in deciding upon whether the effect of a regime operated by that country has 
the potential to cause harmful effects. A country may be constrained in exchanging 
information, for the purpose of the application of a tax treaty as well ai; for the 
application of national legislation, because of secrecy laws which prevent the tax 
authoritiesftom obtaining informationfor other countries on ta-cpayers beneýfitingfirom 
the operation of a preferential tax regime. In addition, even where there are no formal 
secrecy laws, administrative practices may impede the exchange (? f information. For 
example, the country may determine as a matter of administrative policy that certain 
transactions or relations between an enterprise and its customers are a business secret 
which need not be disclosed under Article 26 paragraph 2(c) of the OECD Model ToLr 
Convention, or the country with the preferential tax regime may simply be 
uncooperative with other countries in providing information. Such laws, administrative 
policies, practices or lack of co-operation may suggest that the preferential tax regime 
constitutes harmful tax competition. -217 
On the basis of the aforesaid, two salient issues concerning the theory of international co- 
operation are highlighted. Firstly, there should be procedures in place to identify the 
beneficial ownership of every commercial entity that is registered in SVG. In the 
absence of such procedures, the fiscal regime of SVG will be considered to be han-riful. 
Secondly, any constraints (whether legal or otherwise) on the provision of inforination, 
will also be considered harmful. Therefore, the principle of disclosure and the principle of 
transparency must be effectively applied to the regulatory and supervisory framework of 
SVG in order for it to escape being labelled as an 'uncooperative tax haven. ' The mere 
fact that SVG was labelled as such raises the presumption that its legal and 
administrative practices were not conducive to the effective exchange of information 
216 OECD Report, "Harmful Tax Competition an Emerging Global Issue" 1998, pp. 23-24 para 53. 
217 Ibid at p. 30 para. 64 
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and that they lacked transparency. Even if that were the case it is nonetheless herein 
contended that SVG did not violate any international legal principles to justify the 
categorisation attributed to it by the OECD. 
To the extent that the OECD contended that the regulatory regime of the OFSS did not 
provide for the effective exchange of tax infon-nation about the identities of the 
beneficial owners of offshore entities in SVG that contention was not without merit. 
That does not however imply that there were no procedures and practices in existence 
and thus, the OFSS was not transparent. Issues relating to exchange of infon-nation and 
transparency will be more appropriately and extensively discussed in chapter 4. 
However, a brief overview of issues relating to the exchange of information will 
nonetheless, be provided at this stage. 
The offshore finance laws restricted the disclosure of information relating to tax and 
revenue matters 218 and also in some instances information about investors, whether or 
not the matter related to tax, 219 except that in situations of criminal conduct 220 the 
disclosure of information was permitted (for a more extensive analysis see chapter 
4.14). In SVG the laws that govern the OFSS are different to those that govern the 
domestic financial services sector. In the domestic sector the restriction on the 
disclosure of information is not as stringent as those in the OFSS. Nevertheless, it can 
be strongly argued that in criminal matters, the OFSS and the domestic financial 
services sectors are governed by the same law, namely, the Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters (MACM) Act 1993 (see further chapter 2.7 and 2.14). Section 37 of 
that Act provides that: 
"The Provisions of this Act shall take effect notwithstanding any provision of any other 
Act to the contrary, to the extent that any such provision of any other Act shall be 
deemed to have been hereby amended to the extent required to ensure compliance with 
the relevant provisions of this Act. " 
... Section 3(3)(b)(iii) of the Confidential Relationships Preservation (International Finance) Act 1996 
which provides that; "This Act has no application to the seeking divulging or obtaining (? f conjidential 
information 
... 
by or to ... the 
Offshore Finance Inspector or a State police officer of the rank of Inspector 
or above, specifically authorised by the Minister in that connection, investigating an offence against the 
criminal laws of another State, other than an offence under that other State's tax or revenue laws. 
committed or alleged to have committed outside the State, which offence, if it had been committed in the 
State would have been an offence against its criminal laws, so long as the confidential information sought 
, obtained or 
divulged is directly relevant to the investigation of that offence. " 
"9 Sections 13(3) and (4) and 22 of the International Banks Act 1996; Section 64 of the International 
Trust Act 1996; Section 42 of the International Insurance Act 1998; Section 38 of the Mutual Funds Act 
1998 
220 Section 3(3)(b) of the Confidential Relationships Preservation (international Finance) Act 1996 
41 
Chapter 1. "OFCs- An Introduction to the FATF and OECD's Initiatives" 
That section appears to elevate the MACM Act above any other legislation, whether 
offshore or domestic, that relates to the disclosure of information in criminal matters. 
Accordingly, OECD countries which are also members of the Commonwealth may 
submit request to and should receive from SVG, information relating to a criminal 
investigation, provided that the conditions for the provision of information are satisfied 
(see chapter 2.7 for further discussion). Although the MACM Act 1993 is primarily 
concerned with the provision of mutual assistance in criminal matters within the 
Commonwealth, it can nonetheless be extended to include other countries in the scheme 
to give effect to treaty arrangements in criminal matters. Such an extension can easily 
be made by way of Regulations. 221 
It is however important to note that the restriction that was imposed by Section 
3(3)(b)(iii) is not without legal justification. It essentially puts into statute a long 
standing common law principle which states that, 'no country ever lakes notice of the 
revenue laws of another. 222 This is still good law today, although public policy may 
demand that the foreign laws be recognized, especially where there is a transaction 
relating to a tax evasion scheme (see chapter 4.14). It is not however the duty of SVG to 
be the tax policeman of any country. 223 In this regard Lord Denning expressly indicated 
that the Court does . ..... not sit to collect taxes for another country or to inflict punishments 
for it , 22' Accordingly, the courts have been requested to bear in mind that, "In every case 
the substance of a claim must he scrutinized and, if it then appears that it is realýv a suit 
hroughtfor the purpose of collecting the debts of aforeign revenue it must be rejected , 225 On 
the basis of the foregoing the law is clearly on the side of SVG and supports the privacy 
and confidentiality of tax information required by the OECD. 
The OFSS, as was mentioned above, is predicated on two fundamental factors, namely, 
confidentiality and asset protection. The maximisation of returns as a result of the 
minimisation of taxes also holds great significance. If information about tax payers is 
disclosed to the tax authorities in the country in which they reside, then the whole 
notion of offshore investment would be severely undermined. Moreover, this would 
have serious implications for an individual's right to privacy. There is indeed an 
221 Section 30 of the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1993. 
222 Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 314 at p. 343 
223 Mitchell J., "A Season of Light-A series of Messages on Development in St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, " Concept Publishing Inc. 2001 at p. 62 
224 A-G(New Zealand) v Orti [ 1984] AC I at p 20 
225 Peter Buchanan Ltd and Macharg v Mc Vey [ 1955] AC 155 at 529 
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argument for the restriction of an individual's right to privacy whenever the 
infringement of that right is necessary for law enforcement officials to conduct a 
criminal investigation and procure a conviction. But the OECD does not only require 
the disclosure of criminal tax information, it also seeks the disclosure of tax information 
226 that relates to civil matters as well . This 
is clearly borne out in the 1998 Report 
wherein the distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance becomes blurred. 
1.4.2.2.1 Tax evasion and Tax avoidance 
Whereas tax evasion is illegal '227 tax avoidance 
is not228 and that distinction should be 
maintained. In Duke of Westminster v IRC, 229 Lord Tomlin stated that: 
"Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching tinder 
appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so 
as to secure this result, then, however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue or his ftllow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay 
an increased tax. , 230 
If the view is also taken that no one should be penalised for a conduct that is not 
forbidden by laW231 then investors possess the right and freedom to invest wherever they 
so desire. The avoidance of tax by investing in an OFC is not therefore illegal, although 
it may be seen by the OECD as immoral. But then immorality in tax matters should not 
be the basis on which the OECD threatens to impose countermeasures on OFCs for 
engaging in what it terms as harmful tax competition. On the basis that SVG, as stated 
above, has adopted the English common law system its tax regime will not base the 
232 
payment of taxes on issues of morality. In Mrshire Pullman Motor Service v IRC 
Lord Clyde stated that: 
"No man in this country is under the smallest obligation, moral or other, so to arrange 
his legal relations to his business or to his property so as to enable the revenue to put 
the largest possible shovel into his stores. The Inland Revenue is not slow- and quite 
rightly- to take every advantage which is open to it under the ttvcing statutes. for the 
226 OECD Report, "Harmful Tax Competition an Emerging Global Issue" 1998, p. 10 para 12 in which 
the initiative concerned both tax evasion and tax avoidance. 
227 Fitzwilliam v IRC [19931 STC 490 at 520. "Tax evasion now carries with it overtones (? f improper 
conduct such as supplying false or misleading information to the inland revenue or submitting false or 
misleading documents such as the provision of invoices chargingfeesfor services or goods which are not 
supplied " 
228 Lord Ternplernan, "Tackling Tax Avoidance" in Shipwright A, "Tax Avoidance And The Law- Sham, 
Fraud or Mitigation? " 1997, p. 1, "Tax avoidance reduces the incidence of tax borne by an individual tax 
payer contrary to the intentions of Parliament but does not involve concealment and is not unla%jul. 
"9 (1935) 19 TC 490 
210 Ibid at p. 520 
23 1 Dicey A., "The Law of the Constitution" I Oth edn 1960 202: "A man may be punishedfor a breach of 
law, but he can be punishedfor nothing else. 
232 (1929) 14 TC 754 
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purpose of depleting the taxpayer's pockets. And the tax payer is, in like manner, 
entitled to be astute to prevent, so far as he honestly can the depletion of his fnean by 
the Revenue. , 233 
Lord Templeman has also expressed his disagreement for any tax which is based on 
issues of morality when he stated that, "there is no morality in a tax and no illegality or 
immorality in a tax avoidance scheme. , 234 Therefore, it is difficult to see how the 
OECD can consider itself justified in requesting the disclosure of information about 
someone who has not committed a crime by arranging his affairs to minimise tax and by 
doing so in SVG. Lord Upjohn has also recognised the need to maintain an individual's 
right to organise his affairs in order to minimise the amount of taxes that he pays. In this 
regard he stated that; 
"My Lords, I would only conclude myjudgment by saying, when a question (? f carrving 
out a genuine commercial transaction, as this was, is considered, thefact that there are 
two ways of canying it out-one by paying the maximum amount of tax, the other by 
paying no, much less, tax- it would be quite wrong as a necessary consequence to draw 
the inference that in adopting the latter course one of the main objects is, for the 
purposes of the section, avoidance of tax. No commercial man in his senses is going to 
carry out commercial transactions except upon the footing of pcýying the smallest 
amount of tax involved , 235 
If investment in offshore structures in SVG provides such a way, then it seems 
unreasonable to hold that SVG is engaging in harmful tax competition. Many of the 
OECD countries have themselves encouraged tax avoidance by introducing tax 
incentive schemeS236 into their legislation and inadvertently or by design left loopholes 
that persons have exploited to their advantage. For States to blame the OFCs for the 
ingenuity of their taxpayers without having considered significantly the structure of 
their own fiscal policies raises questions concerning the real reasons for the tax 
initiative. Another rather interesting development with the principle of disclosure is that 
it requires from jurisdictions in which income tax is exempt the effective exchange of 
information on tax payers. But how could there be any effective exchange of 
information when the jurisdiction in which there was complete exemption from income 
tax would not have any need to request information on criminal or civil tax matters? 
... lbid at pp. 763-764 
234 Ensign Tankers(Leasing) Ltd v Stokes [ 1992] 1 AC 655 or [199212 ALL ER 275 
235 1 RC v Brebner (1967) 43 TC at p. 705 at p 718H 
236 see tax incentives offered by England for non-domicilliaries Section IV - Clarke G, "Offshore Tax 
Planning, " Tolley Lexis Nexis 9h edn 2002 discussion in chapters 3,5 and 6 
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Moreover, that jurisdiction understandably may not have any need to criminalise tax 
evasion 237 since there is no tax to evade. In SVG where the offshore finance sector is 
exempt from income tax, should there be any effective exchange of information on 
persons who are investing in that sector? If they cannot be charged in SVG with tax 
evasion for non-payment of income tax as a result of their commercial activities in the 
offshore finance sector, why then should information relating to tax and revenue matters 
be disclosed to the countries in which the tax payers reside? The offshore legislation 
seemed to have solved this matter and many other questions by prohibiting altogether 
any disclosure that related to tax and revenue matters. 
IAZ3 No or substantial activities 
The OECD contended that: "Many harmful preferential tar regimes are designed in a way 
that allow taxpayers to derive benefits from the regime while engaging in operations that are 
purely tax driven and involve no substantial activities. -2" In so far as the OFSS sector in 
SVG is concerned it will be argued that such a contention does not have any relevance. 
It was mentioned earlier that one of the main purposes of the reform of the OFSS was to 
facilitate the creation of jobs for the unemployed. This is reflected in certain provisions 
of the offshore legislation and also has been an administrative practice of the Offshore 
Finance Authority (OFA). For example, under Section 4(2) of the International Banks 
Act (IBA) 1996 239 the OFA was permitted to issue international banking licenses 
subject to certain conditions. One of the conditions which was consistently imposed 
with the issuance of an international banking license, was that the licensee was required 
to employ a minimum of two persons in its banking operations in SVG. In that way no 
ýname plate' or 'shell' banks 240 were legally permitted in SVG. 
Moreover, Section 18(l)(g) of the IBA 1996 imposed on any international bank which 
did not accord with that condition, certain penalties, including the revocation of its 
237 Hampton M& Christensen J., "Offshore Pariahs? Small Island Economies, Tax Havens, and the Re- 
configuration of Global Finance" World Development Vol. 30, No. 9 pp. 1657-1673,2002 at p. 1662 
"Switzerland, for example, still does not recognise tax evasion as a crime and refuses to remove statutorv 
obstacles posed by banking secrecy provisions in cases of legitimate enquiries by tax authorities. Despite 
claiming to have State of the art anti-money laundering legislation Swiss money laundering investigations 
concentrated at cantonal level, and suffer ftom a lack of cooperation between cantons. Succesýful 
prosecution are few and far between, and Geneva prosecutors have yet to achieve a successfid 
prosecution in a variety of cases involving Russian-related money laundering. " 
238 OECD Report, "Harmful Tax Competition an Emerging Global Issue" 1998, p. 34 para 79. 
219 See www. stvincentotTshore. com for the International Banks Act 1996 and its amendments. 
240 Those are banks that do not conduct any operations in the jurisdiction where they are registered. 
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licence. 24 1 The International Business Companies (IBC) Act 1996 also encouraged any 
IBC to establish its operations in SVG by providing that its administrative functions, 
though local, will not in anyway adversely affect its status as a company that is exempt 
from income tax. 242 Similarly, Sections 25 and 26 of the IBC Act 1996 impose on every 
IBC the obligation of establishing its Registered Office in SVG and maintaining a 
Registered Agent therein as well. There are provisions in other offshore legislation that 
also require that some form of commercial activity must be located in SVG. 
The nature of the offshore industry is such that an offshore entity may be registered in 
one jurisdiction but the commercial activity may be conducted elsewhere. What SVG 
anticipates is that its Registered Agents and other service providers are given the 
opportunity to manage the affairs of offshore businesses in SVG. For example, an IBC 
or mutual fund that is registered in SVG may have invested in the USA but the 
management of those activities may be located in SVG. The provisions of the 
Registered Agent and Trustee Licensing Act (RTLA)1996, together with the Mutual 
Funds Act (MFA) 1998 and the International Insurance Act (IIA)1998 ( see chapter 4) 
are crafted in a manner that makes it mandatory for certain offshore entities to engage in 
commercial activities in SVG. 
Interestingly, the criteria 'no substantial activity' is problematic in that it does not 
provide any guidelines regarding what is or is not substantial. What may not be 
substantial for the economy of a developed country may well be substantial for a small 
developing country like SVG. In the OECD Report of 2000 some clarity was 
introduced. The 'no substantial activity' criterion was made to relate to ajurisdiction 
that --facilitates the establishment offoreign-owned entities without the needfor a local 
substantive presence or prohibits these entities ftom having any commercial impact on the 
economy. , 243 Although it is now clearer as to the legislative circumstances under which a 
jurisdiction is said to fall within the 'no substantial activity' criterion, the uncertainty as 
to what is or is not factually substantial still remains. Nevertheless, SVG's offshore 
policy perspectives together with its offshore legislation clearly encouraged as opposed 
to prohibiting substantial activity in its jurisdiction. For that reason it is contended that 
SVG should not be considered as falling within the 'no substantial activity' criterion. 
241 Section 18(2) of the International Banks Act 1996 242 Section 5(2) 
243 OECD Report, "Towards Global Tax Co-operation" 2000 at p. 10 note 4 
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1.5 The Unfairness of the harmful tax initiative 
Switzerland and Luxembourg opposed the OECD tax initiative but were not placed on 
the list of 35 countries 244 that were blacklisted by the OECD and neither were they 
amongst the 20 countries on the blacklist by the February, 2002 deadline. Switzerland 
refuses to recognize tax evasion as a crime and still maintains obstacles through its 
banking secrecy legislation in the way of those wishing to obtain the disclosure of tax 
information. 245 As Hay has observed: 
"The OECD appears to take the position that this dissenting view is de minimis, as 27 
other countries approved the Report. However, this overlooks the fact that the non- 
cooperating OECD states are the principal onshore competitors for the offshore world 
and account for many of the tax neutral structures run onshore within the 
OECD 
... 
Offshore centres are concerned that ýf Switzerland (and Luxembourg, ) are not 
obliged to adhere to the standard sought to be imposed on offshore centres, business 
will migrate ftom offshore centres to OECD member countries. If Switzerland's 
commitment is delayed so that it remains the 'last man standing'for client's seeking 
financial privacy, client structures may well come to rest there, even ýf Swiss laws 
subsequently change. , 246 
The OFCs argued that the OECD by instructing them to restructure their fiscal policies 
to accord with the requirements of the harmful tax initiatives was impinging on their 
sovereignty (see chapter 6.2). They argued that they as independent territories (States) 
must be left to manage their affairs with minimum or in some instances no interference 
from other countries. Although this argument was strong enough to garner international 
support, it did not gather sufficient strength to hold back the strong tide of the tax 
initiative. Much support came from Mr Paul O'Neill when he stated that: 
"I share many of the serious concerns that have been expressed recently about the 
direction of the OECD initiative. I am troubled by the underýying preinise that low tax 
rates are somehow suspect and by the notion any country, or group of countries, should 
interfere in any other country's decision about how to structure its own lax system. I am 
also concerned about the potentially unfair treatment of some non-OECD countries. 
The USA does not support efforts to dictate to an 'v country what 
its own tax rates or 
system should he, and will not participate in any initiative to harmonize world IILV 
systems. The United States simply has no interest in sfýfling the competition thal, forces 
governments-like businesses-to create efficiencies... -24 
244 Antigua, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin 
Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liberia, 
Liechtenstein, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Montserrat, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Niue, 
Panama, Samoa, Seychelles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Tonga, Turks 
and Caicos Islands, US Virgin Islands, Vanuatu. 
245 Hampton M& Christensen J., "Offshore Pariahs? Small Island Economies, Tax Havens. and the Re- 
configuration of Global Finance. " World Development vol. 30, No. 9, pp. 1657-1673,2002 at p 1662 
246 Hay R., "Information Exchange and The Offshore Finance Centres Part I" Private Client Business, 
2002,2,88-97 at p. 95 
247 Ibid pp 137-138: Mr. Paul O'Neill in his capacity as US Treasury Secretary, made this statement on I oth 
May, 2001 
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Due to fear of reprisals from the OECD countries in the form of economic 
countermeasures many of the OFCs relented and signed letters of commitment with the 
OECD to exchange tax information between 2004 and 2006 . 
248 This required the 
modification of the offshore legislation in those OFCs that gave the commitment and a 
significant dilution in the strength and potency of banking secrecy, privacy and 
confidentiality. But as Hay 249 acknowledges a level playing field does not exist and 
cannot exist where OFCs are asked to adhere to rules that are not universally accepted 
by the OECD members. In this regard, he stated that as a result of the OECD's Report 
which was tabled on June 26,60 harmful tax preference regimes existed in its member 
territories. Another published Report 250 revealed that there are about 200 preferential tax 
regimes in member territories and 85 such regimes in dependent or associated 
territories. There were no threats or countermeasures against those member territories 
who do not remove those harmful tax preferences by April 2006. Furthermore, Hay also 
acknowledges that the OECD is overlooking the dissenting voices of Switzerland and 
Luxembourg on the bases that they are a minority and continues to ignore the fact that 
those countries are strongly competing with the OFCs. 251 Those two countries account 
for the vast majority of the tax neutral structures conducted onshore in the OECD. It is 
reported that in 1996 Luxembourg accounted for more than half the world's offshore 
mutual funds. 252 
Neocleous questioned the double standards of the OECD by suggesting that the export 
tax breaks and subsidies that they gave to extremely large corporations are just as 
hannful as low direct taxes and special treatment of international business companies. 
He further gave examples of the WTO ruling on the substantially large tax breaks that 
were given to companies like General Electric, Boeing and Microsoft and which were 
later ruled as illegal by the WTO in January 2002.253 The uneven playing field that 
24' Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Malta, Mauritius, San Marino, Isle of Man, Netherland Antilles, 
Seychelles, Aruba and St. Vincent and the Grenadines to name a few: See [lay R., "Information 
Exchange and The Offshore Finance Centres Part I" Private Client Business, 2002,2,88-97 at p. 97 249 Hay R, "OFCs: The Supranational Initiatives" -Private Client Business 2001,2,75-91 250 Primarolo Report drafted in a parallel E. U initiative published on February 28,2002. 
25 ' Hay R., "Information Exchange and The Offshore Finance Centres Part I" Private Client Business, 
2002,2,88-97 at p. 95 
252 Neocleus E, "Off-shore Financial Centres-Recent Developments"- J. I. B. L 2002,17(5), 136-139 at p 
137 
253 lbid at p. 139 
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exists and projects the OECD's harinful tax initiative as lacking credibility was 
emphasised by I lay who stated that: 
"Some countries withi?, lite OECI) membership have had great tlýfficuln, in ensuri . ng 
that local and state governments observe the commitments a(Irpted h_w- the national 
government. The United States. fi)t- example, perceives constitutional constraints in 
supervising state governments. Mus, tit the same lime as the Uniled States fideral 
government was threatening sanctions tigainst fiweign jurisdictions reluct(int to 
compromise banking privac " 
v, Montana and Colorado passed lau-s creating jbreign 
capital depositories' designed as coqfidenliul accounts and described us "the first 
Swiss st 
, 
vle private hanking in lite US. A. ' Advertising fi)r lite fiwilities hased in 
Colorado included representations that 
. 
1breign CiVil 1110 l(LIC jUdgMeWS (IgIIi))Sl 
depositors would not be eqIbi-ceahle tit the I Y'nitedSlales. .,, i4 
I le further eniphasised that-, 
"Simikirl 
,v concerns arist, 
ftom lite opporlunitY to eslablish United States hiniied 
liabiliI. I. corporations in Delaware ( and most other United States ) with no disclosure 
ol'bettelicial ownership. The OECI) is threatening sanctions against qff'Yhore centres 
which do not iTree to record and exchange itl/ormation on beneficial ownership, yel lite 
UniiedStates state governments wouhiplainlY be unable to provide similar itIlbrination 
in respect qffav-lýee limiled habilitY corporali . ons CLLCs') established in the United 
States. ", , 
It is against this background that a brief' overview of' the taxation issues that are 
germane to this thesis is provided. A more extensive analysis will be provided in 
chapter 5 when the international initiatives to combat money laundering will be 
discussed. 
The OECD argued that OFCs by their fiscal policies were eroding the tax basis of' 
OFCD countries. It did not however present any empirical data to support such a 
hypothesis. But it is contended that the 1reedom of'movement ol'capital is an inevitable 
consequence ot'globalisatioti. 25" As Fitzgerald observed, --intermitional c(q)ital. 17mi, s twe a 
central characieristic qfthe global econoinY ofts-hich developitkiz countries increasing4vjbrin a 
parl. -25 - Essentially, in a world with such liberal trading arrangements it is anticipated 
that capital would move towards the economic sectors with the greatest advantages to 
the investor, be they tax. privacy or rate of' return. In any event, investments made in 
OFCs are predominantly For the purposes of' tax planning and privacy and are usually 
214 1 lay R., 'IntJorination Fxchange and Me 011'%hore Finance Ccntrcs Part I" Private Client Business, 
2002,2,88-97 at p. 96 
2is I lay R., "Information Exchangge and The Offshore Finance Centres Part I" Private Client Business, 
2002,2,88-97 at p. 96 
2"' Stern B., Ilow to Reolate Globalisation, ' in Byers M., -The Role ot'l. aw in international Politics, " 
Oxford 2003, at p. 248 
2S7 Beveridge F., "The Treatment and Faxation ot'Foreign Investment Under International Law" 2000 at 
p. 197 
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made with funds that were generated Crom economic and commercial activities which 
took place in OECD countries. Offshore Tax planning involves arranging one's 
qffifirs to take wMintage ofthe obvious and qfien intended c, . 
/kcts rules in order it) 
maximise one'S qfter- tar returns. For the most part those funds would have already 
suffered either indirect or direct taxes bef'Ore the investment is made. To require 
inflormation about persons that would restrict the lawful usage of their monies and 
dictate where and how it should be spent and invested, clearly intcri'cres with those 
persons' privacy and freedom ofchoice. 2W 
The right to privacy, or as it is otherwise called, the right to private lifle is a fundamental 
right that should be preserved within certain acceptable limits. Thus inflon-nation should 
be disclosed in circumstances where a Craud or a crime has been committed. Further 
discussion ofthis issue will be made in chapters 4.14 and 6.8.1 lowever, it is instructive 
to note that the I JN Declaration of I luman Rights 1948 recognises this right and protects 
privacy as a basic right human right. Article 12 provides that: 
"No one shall he suýjeaed to arhitrar v interlýrencc with his privac v, fiinii4v, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has a right to 
the protection qf1he /aw against interfi, rence and attacks. - 
Even if it is accepted by the OFCD that offshore tax planning is desirable there is still 
the uneasy intrusion of the requirement to disclose information about their residents 
who are investing in OFCs. Many of' the OFCs have either amended their laws to 
facilitate such a disclosure or have given the commitment to do so by 2004 flor criminal 
tax in6on-nation and by 2006 fior civil tax information. The OF. CD has threatened to 
impose countermeasures if such commitments were not given. This approach by the 
OECD raises several issues relating to the right to private lifie, sovereignty and private 
international law issues concerning the recognition, enforcement and exclusion of 
floreign revenue laws. On the issue of' right to private lile it was stated that, "The 
complete recortiql'un indivithials. financial transactions now sought on a global basis. 1brins a 
revealing insight inio infintate detuds ql'one 's personal 1ýk- The collection andsharing qj'such 
hilorinafion and the us, We ofdatabaves throqgh the use of electronic tools. poses rnan-v 
questionsfi)r Me privacy Whereas in some cases (e. g. tax evasion) it may 
24 James S., & Nobes C., -Fhe Economics of"I'axation-Principles. Policies and PractiLjqZ Prentice Hall 
7'h edn, 2002/2003 at p. 16: See also Clarke G, - l'ollqs Offshore Tax Planninv" 9" edn 2002 'roneys p5 
para 1; although the UK is used its the countr)- whose tax the investor is trying to avoid this does not inean 
the saine definition will hold true for other jurisdictions like the UK. 2s') See chapter 6 
2(, 0 [lay R, -OFCs- The Sgpraqaýtural nitiatives. ' 2001 Private Client Business 2001,2,75-91 p 78 -L--- 
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be desirable to disclose tax information, there are also problems associated with the fear 
of that inforniation falling into the wrong hands. For example, in 1998 the United 
Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (LJNDCCP) published a Report 
which indicated that in the lormer Soviet [ Won -criminal gangs hought hanks in order to 
delerinine who had bank accounis large enough to make kithiappings worthwhile. "26 ' 
With regard to issues of sovereignty (see chapter 6) the OFICD has in the past been 
confronted by its members in its attempt to negotiate a Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI). The majority of European countries and the developing countries 
considered the MAI to be encroaching on their territorial sovereignty. 262 In that regard 
Stern observed that: 
"Slates shouhl he ahle to set their own hierarchy ofi-ahies and not be. 1brced to tolerate 
the outcomes of liheralisation without question. Finallv, in November 1998 the 
negotiations were slopped, and the ALI/ is /br the lime heing dead 
On the basis that the MAI was not accepted due to issues of' sovereignty, it seemed 
rather strange that some of' those COUntries in the OECD who opposed the MAI were 
actually supporting the OFICD's harmful tax initiative. 
1.6 Conclusion 
Hampton and Christensen although recognizing the many prollound economic 
disadvantages of SIF OFCs and the reasons for their emphasis on offshore financial 
services stated as l'ollows: 
"Perhaps not surprisipigh, manY SIE Kovernments have Kone to greal lengihs to 
encourage the growth ofollýhorefinance activitY, qfien without considering the adverse 
impacts that such booming growth might iI inpose upon the pre-exisling in(histries.. It is 
reasonable to ask, why so many SIE governments allowed themselves to become over4v 
dependent tpon an acti .01t*v that common sense suggests would sooner or later become 
the fiwits of inlernational intervention. Was it incre/Y a fifilure ol'prudentiol risk 
Inalitigement on their parls. or were other 
' 
lorces tit p1qv that prevented thein ftoin 
managing their dependency tpon cconomit-fiietors. ' bt other words how did lax havens 
und OF( ' host governmenis lose control o0heir destinies. ' 
2" United Nations Office for Drug Control Crime and Prevention (tJNO[)CC'I)): Financial Havens, Bank 
Secrecy, Money Laundering double issue 34 and 35 of the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
Newsletter and Issue 8 ofthe UNDC11' Fechnical services, 1998 at p. 68 
2"2 Stern B., "How to Regnilate Globalka-tion " in Byers M., -Fhe 
-Role 
of Law in international Politics, " 
Oxford 2003, at p. 249 -. See also Beveridge F., '*I'hc Treatment and Taxation of Foreign Investment 
Under International Law" 2000 at p. 197 
Ibid 
Ilampton M& Christensen J., -Oft'shorc Pariahs? Small Island Economics, Tax Havens, and the Re- 
configuration of Global Finance. " World Development vol. 30, No. 9, pp. 1657-1673,2002 at p 1663 
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The response to those questions is that SIE OFCs by virtue oftheir sizes and economic 
differences had to find a niche market. One in which they are able to compete 
effectively on the international market given the WTO's rulings on free trade and the 
removal of barriers to free trade. These OFCs had to -piggy back" off developed 
countries in order to conquer the disadvantages that accompany their small sizes and 
scales. Baldacchino in retlerence to arguments on the development of' small states 
responded that, - successfid economies were those who were able to manipulate the larger 
countries (or regional blocs) to create a local tuh, untage. 16r themselves. Pursuing this theme, ... 
this exemplified an opportunist, pragmatism with microstate goi, erninents sei: ing passing 
ol)porfunities in a similar inanner to which islanders h(we historical4t, been Ifirates and 
prii, ateers in inany parts q1"the world. I "t, i 
Whereas to a large extent SIE OFCs have been managing their economies off the 
dependency on countries with large economies, it is totally untrue, unreasonable, 
inconsiderate and unfair to compare that conduct with those of' pirates and privateers. 
Such a comparison connotes illegality or illegitimacy on the part ol'01-Cs due to their 
involvement in offshore financial services. SIF OFCs for the most part are established 
to encourage clean and hard earned monies to be invested within their shores in the 
same way that encouragement is given to investors by developed countries to participate 
in the available investment opportunities. The major difference apart From size is the 
fact that the developed countries can use both the monetary and fiscal macroeconomic 
tools to stimulate or contract investment. SIF OFCs due to their relatively inactive 
financial markets are left with the fiscal tool to manage their economies. What is the 
difference between advertising the sale of' microchips, motor cars, arms and 
ammunitions, aeroplanes and advertising offshore financial services'? Both encourage 
persons from all over the world to participate in the activities either by buying the 
product or paying 11or the services. They also encourage the movement ofcapital from 
one place to another, a concept currently advocated by the OECD as capital flight. 
Support flor the establishment of' OR's was given by Park who argued that by 
internationalizing the financial services provided by these OR's, floreign direct 
investment will be attracted and so will specialist knowledge and experience in the 
provision of financial services. Once these spill offs are achieved they will provide great 
26' Hampton M& Christensen J., "Offshore Pariahs? Small Island Fconornies, Fax Havens. and the Re- 
configuration of Global Finance. " World Development vol. 30, No. 9, pp. 1657-1673,2002 at p 1663 
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assistance to helping the local industry to become internationally competitive . 
"66 It iS 
perfectly reasonable and legitimate for OFCs to participate in the provision of offshore 
financial services. The developed countries have been providing those services for years 
and have been successful at it. Some of the factors that were responsible for the 
emergence of the OFSS through euro-currency and private banking still exist today. As 
sovereign nations many of these SIE OFCs have engaged in offshore financial services 
which are perfectly legal. Furthermore, it raises the question as to why should the USA 
attempt to permit such financial services on its shores (e. g. Delaware) yet it sees the 
services provided by SIE OFCs as undesirable? Euro-currency banking is still very 
much a part of every day life in the financial centres of Europe, especially London and 
private banking is the hallmark of financial services in Switzerland. 
It was not failure of prudential risk management or the loss of control by the 
government of OFCs that brought on the pressures that they now experience. It was the 
external forces at play that are significantly influencing the way their economies are 
managed. Those forces, (apart from globalisation and the wro, which are concepts and 
processes designed to impact positively on world trade) are the complaints by the 
OECD of capital flight and by the FATF concerning their alleged contribution to the 
money laundering process. Surely the FATF and OECD countries are aware that the 
development of the euro-currency and private banking sectors were as a result of capital 
flight from one country to another? The development of those sectors came about 
because of increased benefits to be derived from transacting outside a regulatory and 
supervisory framework. The conduct of business activity in that way created the 
circulatory system through which the proceeds of crime flowed with impunity. 
Research has shown the extent to which capital flight was prevalent in the euro- 
currency banking system and the significant sums of money that were laundered every 
year in the OECD/FATF countries. Although it has been reported that over $6 trillion in 
assets were placed in OFCs, 267 those assets were eventually invested in the international 
financial markets to provide a source of capital for the expansion ofeconomic activities 
in the OECD/FATF countries. The multiplier effect of such investment was 
266 Park Y, "The economics of Offshore Finance Centres"- Columbia Journal of World Business (1982) 
31-35: see also Hampton M& Christensen John, "Offshore Pariahs? Small Island Economies. Tax 
Havens, and the Re-configuration of Global Finance. " World Development vol. 30, No. 9, pp. 1657-1673, 
2002 at p 1663 
267 Neocleous E., "Offshore Financial Centres-Recent Developments" J. B. I. L. 2002,17(5). 136-139 at p. 
136 
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phenomenal. Those funds would have been used to create employment, pay both direct 
and indirect taxes, improve and expand capital through the process of construction and 
improvement to capital assets. 
If it is accepted that there was significant capital flight from OECD member countries to 
OFCs, such flight it is contended was only transient and may not have had a devastating 
effect on the tax bases of OECD member countries. What was significant may be the 
loss in tax revenues that may otherwise have been collected had the funds not been sent 
offshore in the first place. But the net effect of any alleged loss in tax revenues should 
be the benchmark by which the impact of capital flight on the economics of 
OECD/FATF countries should be measured. It is therefore suggested that empirical data 
in that regard is necessary before any convincing argument about capital flight should 
be entertained. It is also reasonable to state that the administration of those assets that 
form the basis of the capital flight may take place in SIFI OFCs, from which revenues 
are earned by the OFCs. However, the vast majority of the benefits of those funds 
remain in the developed countries through repatriation of income and/or investment in 
capital. 
There is no denying that the problem of money laundering must however be given 
greater attention. What however is unfair and unreasonable is the suggestion that the 
SIE OFCs because of inadequate supervisory and regulatory Framework are mainly 
responsible for creating the environment flor money laundering to flourish. It is not 
advisable to assess the problem of money laundering solely on the basis of inadequate 
financial controls, since to do so will be ignoring the problem altogether. In many of the 
OECD/FATF countries money laundering is rille. Even in the USA where there are 
extensive regulatory controls, it was noted earlier in this chapter that money laundering 
is still very high. Whilst SIF OFCs swiftly introduced and amended their anti-money 
laundering legislation in response to the initiatives, other countries 
including Switzerland and Austria still maintained banking secrecy provisions in their 
financial services legislation. Despite its bold claims to have state ofthe art anti-money 
laundering legislation the prosecutors in Switzerland have failed to secure convictions 
amidst the multitude of cases, especially concerning Russian related money laundering 
cases. 268 It is therefore rather strange that the FA, rF did not conduct any evaluation of 
268 Hampton M& Christensen J., "Offshore Pariahs'? Small Island Economics, Tax Havens, and the Re- 
configuration of Global Finance" World Development Vol, 30, No. 9 pp. 1657-1673,2002 at p. 1662 
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Switzerland or Luxembourg. As a matter of fact at the time of the blacklisting of SVG 
no evaluation had been conducted on any FATF member territory, although the United 
Nations UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention in their report on Financial 
Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering mentioned Switzerland, Luxembourg and 
other European jurisdictions as secrecy havens. 269 
This is not to say that the poor and inadequate regulations of certain OFCs should be 
allowed to subsist. Every effort should be made to improve them and significantly 
mitigate any opportunity that can be easily exploited by the launderer. Blacklisting 
those OFCs in the way it was done was not the answer. There were many OECD/FATF 
countries that should have been on the blacklist, because of the extent of money 
laundering activities that research data have shown were occurring in those countries. 
Their absence substantially weakened the FATF's initiative and cast suspicion on its 
motives. Accordingly, the mere fact that many countries, in fear of reprisals, actually 
introduced legislation that favoured the money laundering initiative did not necessarily 
mean that they would be effectively implemented. 
There has got to be a two pronged approach to the FATF's initiative. The first approach 
has to do with the eradication of the organized criminal activities from which the 
proceeds of crime originate. These activities in the main were concentrated in 
OECD/FATF countries and will form a substantial part of the discussion in the 
following chapter. Suffice it to say however, that this is where the emphasis should be 
placed and should not be used as an excuse for placing the emphasis on the proceeds of 
crime. The major markets for all organized criminal activities exist in developed 
economies. Those economies provided the markets for drugs, trading in illegal weapons, 
trading in people, fraud and other types of serious crime(see chapter 2). Those activities 
must be significantly alleviated and must not be ignored. 
The second approach is the eradication of money laundering activities. These two 
approaches on first appearance may seem tantamount to a 'chicken and egg' situation 
but they are not. The first can exist in isolation of the second but the second cannot exist 
in isolation of the first. Although both approaches are of concern to SIE OFCs, 
especially in relation to drugs the one that requires most attention is money laundering 
269 United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy 
and Money Laundering_" ( 1998) at p 29. 
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where the financial opportunities available in SIE OFCs can facilitate the money 
laundering process. Although there is a need for improvement in the regulatory and 
supervisory framework of some SIE OFCs, such an improvement could have been 
achieved without imposing unnecessary pressures on them. Such pressures can be 
compared to the maxim, 'taking a sledge hammer to crack a nut. ' If the SIE OFSS are 
pressurized in this way they will undoubtedly be dismantled but there will still be no 
guarantee of the abatement of money laundering activities world wide. 
Having given an overview of the historical perspectives of OFCs and the justification 
for their continuance, the stage has now been set for similar perspectives to be given of 
money laundering and its evils to society. In that regard, the following chapter will 
discuss money laundering and the role that was played by governments and agencies of 
governments of developed countries in perpetrating the money laundering process. 
Chapter three will however place emphasis on the money laundering and offshore laws 
of St. Vincent and the Grenadines in an effort to show whether they adequately satisfied 
the requirements of the FATE 
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2.0 Introduction 
Over the past ten years or so money laundering has created tremendous difficulties for 
local, regional and international law enforcement agencies. The problem of money 
laundering is great. As Peter Lilley pointed out: 
"Money laundering is the dynamic that enables criminal activitv Qf all descriptions to 
grow and expand This process-the delivery channel of cleanedfimdv- is now embedded 
in the normal business environment that we may well have little chance to control it. "' 
In the previous chapter it was mentioned that in order to effectively control money 
laundering all jurisdictions, no matter how small or how large, rich or poor, must 
cooperate and give their fullest support to combating money laundering. There must not 
be one rule for certain countries and another for other countries. Similarly, in 
apportioning responsibility, equity and good reason must prevail. 
This chapter, as in the previous chapter and as will be demonstrated in the subsequent 
chapters, will show that in the apportionment of blame, OFCs have been receiving more 
than their fair share. Although it is accepted that some OFCs have facilitated the money 
laundering process, all have been condemned by the FATF and other exponents of the 
anti-money laundering initiatives. What was most remarkable however was that several 
of the FATF member States were infested with the scourge of money laundering and the 
underlying criminal activities from which the proceeds of crime were derived. In some 
instances they were not only facilitating or condoning money laundering but were 
actually perpetrating it as well. In this chapter, it will be contended that FATF member 
States were the hosts for the nefarious activities that gave rise to money laundering and 
that the initial stage of the money laundering process began within those States and then 
the proceeds were distributed to other jurisdictions, including OFCs. Yet not one of the 
FATF member States was blacklisted with SVG in June 2000. 
In support of that contention a brief overview will be given about the origins of money 
laundering and the money laundering process. Thereafter, emphasis will be placed on 
the involvement of certain FATF countries in the money laundering process and the 
criminal activities that generate the proceeds of crime. In essence, this chapter 
highlights the need for further action in the FATF States to control the criminal conduct 
from which substantial proceeds of crime have accrued. Although it is accepted that 
1 Lilley P., - "Dirty Dealing, The Untold Truth About Global Money Laundering, " 2000 at p. 2 
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there needs to be gallant efforts in the fight against money laundering, it is nonetheless 
contended that money laundering is a part of a process which mainly began and ended 
in the FATF States. Therefore, the need for a much greater effort by FATF States to 
control the criminal activities that were carried on within their borders cannot be 
ignored and should be given greater attention than that which was given to the anti- 
money laundering initiative. 
21 Origins of the term Money Laundering 
Money laundering as it is known today is a term that originated in the United States of 
America during the 1920s 2 to describe the methods used by criminals to conceal or 
disguise the proceeds of criminal activities but it has since gained popular usage, 
especially after the Watergate Inquiry in the USA in the mid- 1970s. 3 However, it was 
not until around 1982 in the case US v $US 4,255,625.394 that it gained legal 
recognition. Thereafter, it has been used by all and sundry as an acceptable description 
for transactions concerning the proceeds of crime. In effect, it has now become a term 
of law. 
2.2 What is money? 
The term money originated from the Latin word moneta where the first Roman coin was 
minted at the temple of Juno Moneta in 34413C. 5 In the money laundering context, 
money represents the proceeds of ill-gotten gains and this may take the forrn of cash, 
gold, silver, a house, an aeroplane, a yacht, a financial instrument or any other item that 
is accepted as money. It is therefore important to understand the meaning of money in 
order to appreciate the complex and sophisticated methods that are employed in the 
laundering process. Money has been defined in the following terms: 
"Anything which is generally acceptable in purchasing goods or settling debts can 
he said to be money. It need not consist of coins and notes. Oxen, salt, amber, 
woodpecker scalps, and cotton cloth have at times all been used as money. In fact, 
the precise substance, its size and shape, are largely a matter of convenience and 
2 lbid at p. 5 
' Vallance P, "Money Laundering: The Situation in the United Kingdom" Paper presented to the 
Council of Europe Money Laundering Conference, Strasbourg, France, 18-30 September 1992 at p. 1. 4 (1982) 551 F Supp. 314. 
rd 5 Beardshaw J- "Economics a student's Puide" Financial Tines/Prentice Hall, 3 edn. 1992 at p. 473 
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custom. But whatever is used, it should be immediately and unquestionably accepted 
in exchangefor goods and services. "(' 
Therefore, if in exchange for the sale of illegal drugs the drug trafficker received any 
property, for example, a car, a house, expensive jewellery or any other item instead of 
coins or notes, that which is received is referred to as the proceeds of drug trafficking 
and is also referred to as money. Understandably, the quantity, quality or level of the 
proceeds will depend on the value that is attached to those proceeds by the drug 
trafficker when compared to the value that is placed on the illegal drugs at any 
particular point in time. Equally, any such benefit that is derived from criminal conduct 
may also be referred to as the proceeds of crime and any attempts to conceal the 
provenance or ownership of such proceeds will be tantamount to money laundering. 
23 What is laundering? 
The term laundering on the other hand originated from the legitimate business activities 
in which criminal elements were engaged. Many of the criminals 7 owned and operated 
launderettes whose relatively large takings were cash based. These cash takings were 
frequently deposited at banks which after some time had grown accustomed to 
accepting cash deposits from those activities and were not usually alarmed by or 
suspicious of the level or the frequency of the deposits that were made. 8 The criminals 
then used the takings from the laundering businesses, commingled those takings with 
the proceeds of their criminal activities and constantly made deposits in order to avoid 
creating any suspicions about the origins of some of the deposits that were made. In 
effect, the launderettes were used as front activities in an effort to conceal and disguise 
the origins of most of the monies that were deposited. In this way, criminals were able 
to integrate the proceeds of their criminal activities into the financial system to enable 
them to maintain a luxurious lifestyle, finance future illegal activities and also to invest 
in legitimate businesses 10 without being easily detected. 
"' Harvey J- "Intermediate Economics" 4h edn. 1986 at p. 181 : Livesey F -"A Textbook of Economics" 
2 nd edn. 1985 at p. 176: Lipsey R, "An Introduction to Positive Economics" 6 th edn. 1 985 at p. 568 
7 Mainly American gangsters operating in the 1920s and during the days of prohibition in the USA. 
8 Morris-Cotterill N., 'How not to be a Money Launderer' Silkscreen Publications 2 nd edn. 1999 at p. 3 
9 Lilley P., - "DiM Dealing, The Untold Truth About Global Money Laundering, " 2000 at p. 5. 
10 Gilmore W., "Di!:! y Money- The Evolution ofthe Money Laundering Countermeasures, " 1999 at p. 37 
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2.4 Defining Money Laundering 
Having considered the foregoing, it is important to establish a definition of money 
laundering that will capture the range of activities to which ingenious schemes will be 
targeted in an effort to put beyond the reach of law enforcement officials the proceeds 
of ill-gotten gains. Accordingly, an assessment will be made of varying definitions in 
order to determine that which will more effectively address the problem of money 
laundering, given societal' perception of the activities that give rise to money 
laundering and the initiatives currently in place to combat such activities. In that regard, 
it is instructive to firstly consider the definition of money laundering in the Oxford 
English Dictionary wherein it is defined as: 
"transferringfunds of duhious or illegal origin, usuallyftont aforeign country and 
then later to recover themftom what seem to he clean sources. "// 
This definition although it recognizes that the funds in question are not necessarily 
required to be illegal, has nonetheless created the impression that dubious and illegal 
funds which originate within the jurisdiction are not likely to fall within the definition of 
money laundering. This definition is, however, too narrow. Money laundering efforts 
should be directed against illegal and dubious funds originating from within the 
jurisdiction as well as those that enter from abroad. 
Money laundering has also been defined as; "... a process by which criminals attempt to 
conceal the true origin and ownership of their criminal activities. If done successfidly, it also 
allows them to maintain control over these proceeds and ultimately to provide a legitimate 
coverfor their source of income. "" Another definition refers to money laundering as; "a 
process of converting or cleansing property, knowing that such property is derivedftom serious 
crime, for the purpose of disguising its origin. , 13 
Whereas the last two definitions cover the reasons for engaging in money laundering 
activities, the last definition is defective to the extent that it presumes that unless a 
person knows that the property being laundered is derived from serious crime he cannot 
11 Oxford English Dictionary (eds. Simpson and Weiner)(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989), vol. Vill pg. 
702 
12 Drage J, "Countering Money Laundering" Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (Nov 1992) at p. 418 
" Sherman T, "International Efforts to Combat Money Laundering: The Role of the Financial Action 
Task Force" in MacQueen, H., "Money Laundering" ( Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1993), 
p. 12 at p. 13 
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be said to have engaged in money laundering. It therefore fails to recognise that 
suspicion of the criminal provenance of the property may well suffice for the conduct to 
be categorised as money laundering. The second definition of money laundering is the 
most appropriate of all three. It acknowledges that criminals need to distance the 
provenance and ownership of property as far as possible from themselves in order to 
give it a legitimate appearance and to retain control of it to be utilised for other 
purposes. 14 In essence, it is clear from the foregoing definitions that money laundering 
is a process through which the proceeds of crime are channelled before they are 
legitimately integrated into the financial system. Accordingly, the FATF refers to 
money laundering as "the processing of ... criminal proceeds to 
disguise their illegal 
origin" 15 and suggested that there are three stages in the money laundering process, 
namely, the placement stage, the layering stage and the integration stage, 16 each of which 
will be discussed in turn. 
2.4.1 The Placement Stage 
The placement stage is the most important of the money laundering process. It is at this 
stage that the proceeds of crime initially enter the financial system, 17 either by deposits 
into deposit taking institutions 18 or the acquisition of an asset. 19 For this reason a 
tremendous amount of effort needs to be placed into subverting all attempts to introduce 
illicit gains into the financial system. A simple example of how the proceeds of crime 
can be placed, layered and integrated into the financial system is as follows. 
"Cash collected in the USA ftom street sales of drugs was smuggled across the border 
to Canada where some was taken to currency exchanges to increase the denomination 
of the notes and reduce the bulk. Couriers were organised to hand carry the cash by air 
to London where it was paid into a branch of a financial institution in 
Jersey ... Enquiries in London by HM Customs and Excise reveal that internal 
bank 
transfers had been made ftom the UK to Jersey where fourteen accounts had been 
opened in company names using local nominee directors. The funds were repatriated to 
North America with the origin disguised, on occasions in the form of sham loans to 
14 UNODCCP, "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy And Money Laundering, " 1998 at p. 4 
15 www l. oecd. org/fatf/MLaundering_en. htm 
See also www. unodc. org Vunodc/en/money laundering cycle. htmi in which the UNODC defined money 
laundering as "theprocess that disguises illegalprofits without compromising the criminals who wish to 
benefaftom the proceeds. " 
16 Gilmore W., "Dirty Money- The Evolution of the Money Laundering Countertneasures, " 1999 at p. 29 
17 Hinterseer K., "Criminal Finance, The political Economy of Money Laundering in a Comparative 
Legal Context" 2002, at p. 17 
'8 Howard C., "Butterworths Money Laundering Law" 200 1, at p. 2/1 -2/85 
at pp. 2/14 - 2/52 where the following are examined and categorised as deposit taking institutions- 
Banks, including offshore banks, Credit Unions, Building Societies, Insurances 
19 Gilmore W., "Di]:! y Money- The Evolution of the Money Laundering Countermeasures, " 1999 at p. 29 
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property companies owned hy the principals, either using the Jersey deposits as 
collateral or transferring it hack to North America. , 20 
Another example was given by Blum, Levi Naylor and Williams of cash movements 
between the USA and Mexico which also involves the usage of bank drafts. They stated 
that; 
"Someone might smuggle cash to Mexico, deposit it in a UnitedStates dollar account, 
draw out a draft, mail or carry it into the United States, deposit or cash it in a United 
States bank - with no requirement under United States law for the bank to report the 
transaction. Once cashed, the draft returned to Mexico, and the issuing bank wired 
payment to the cashing bank often in a bulk payment to cover a number (? f drafts at the 
same time, thusfurther obscuring the trail. , 21 
There are numerous money laundering typologies 22 and therefore those examples are by 
no means the only money laundering methods. 23 In recognising the importance of the 
placement stage some countries introduced measures to circumvent and frustrate attempts 
by launderers to introduce illegal gains into the financial system at that stage of the 
money laundering process. 24 Bearing in mind that the proceeds of most illicit activities 
are cash based 25 the natural inclination was to introduce measures that would assist in 
identifying the origins and provenance of the cash. One such method that was employed 
by the USA and Australia 26 is the Customer Transaction Reporting (CTR) mechaniSM. 27 
This is where the deposit of cash in excess of a certain amount 28 requires the completion 
of documents for the purpose of declaring the source and the beneficial ownership of the 
funds. 29 Although the CTR mechanism is considered to be an effective anti-money 
laundering tool, launderers have at times been able to circumvent it by employing a 
number of persons to make deposits at deposit taking institutions of amounts below the 
'0 Money Laundering: Guidance Notes for Banks and Building Societies, London, 1990, Appendix A: See 
also Gilmore W., "DiM Money- The Evolution of the Money Laundering Countermeasures, " 1999 at p. 
30 
21 UNODCCP, "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy And Money Laundering, " 1998 at p. 10 
22 www l. oecd. org/fatf/ - for FATF Reports on Money Laundering and Trends. 
23 Howard C, "Butterworths Money Laundering Law" 2001, at p. 2/1 -2/85 for an overview of the 
different methods of laundering money. 
24 Hinterseer K., "Criminal Finance, The political Economy of Money Laundering in a Comparative 
Lep, al Context" 2002, at p. 18 where efforts by Switzerland enabled it to seize "... a sum of cash so large 
that it was described not in millions of dollars but as 1.2 tons of money. " 
2' Arrastia J., "Money Laundering -A US Perspective" in Rider B., and Ashe M., "Money Launderiqg 
Control" Sweet & Maxwell, 1996 at p. 236; "Criminals deal in money -cash or its equivalent. The 
deposit and withdrawal of large amounts of currency ... under unusual circumstances may 
betray criminal 
activity. ": See also Gilmore W., "Dirty Money- The Evolution of the Money Launderin 
Countermeasures, " 1999 at p. 31 
26 Hinterseer K., "Criminal Finance, The political Economy of Money Laundering in a Comparative 
Legal Context" 2002, at p. 185 
27 Alldridge P., "Money Laundering Law-Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil Recovery, Criminal Laundering 
and Taxation Of the Proceeds of Crime, " 2003 at pp. 262-263 
28 lbid at 262 where it is stated that the threshold in the USA is $ 10,000-00 
29 lbid 
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statutory maximum. 30 In this way they were able to avoid the mandatory requirement to 
produce inforination about the source of the funds to be deposited. 31 Not only did 
launderers use different deposit taking institutions 32 but they also made several deposits 
at the same institution, each of which was less than the maximum at which source of 
funds documentation was triggered. This process is referred to as 'smurfing. ' 33 Deposit 
taking institutions are therefore required to be extremely vigilant to avoid the abuse of 
the CTR mechanism in that way. 
OFCs such as SVG 34 introduced CTR mechanisms which have no doubt deterred 
launderers. The days when launderers were able to travel to OFCs with suitcases full of 
cash 35 are becoming if they have not already become a thing of the past, thus forcing the 
launderer to become more ingenious in the methods used to conceal the provenance of 
the cash. As Blum, Levi, Naylor and Williams have stated that; "... offishore hanks do not 
deal with the general public; nor do they accept cash in suitcases. "" They have further 
observed that; 
"Contrary to popular stereotypes, only the rankest of amateurs would arrive at the door 
of a Swiss bank with a suitcase of high denomination United States bank notes and 
demand to open a numbered account. That would undoubtedly both begin and end the 
would-be launderer's life of crime. , 37 
Small island OFCs do not provide lucrative markets for organised criminal activities 
and therefore those large illegal earnings to which reference is made in this chapter 
cannot be realised in these centres. For example, it was estimated by the FATF that in 
the USA and Europe alone the profits of drug trafficking yield $232,115 per minute. 38 
Similarly, the UN has conservatively estimated that $500bn is laundered each year in 
30 UNODCCP, "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy And Money Laundering, " 1998 at p. 8 "Equally 
notorious, in response to the cash transaction reporting systems, are the multiple schemes launderers 
have devised to get around the reporting rules: prior conversion of cash to checks through formal or 
informal check-cashing services; breaking cash deposits down to sums below reporting threshold; 
securing an exemption from reporting and even bribing bank staff. " 
31 Gilmore W., "Dirty Money- The Evolution of the Money Laundering Countermeasures, " 1999 at p. 31 
32 wwwl. oecd. org/fatf/ - for FATF Reports on Money Laundering and Trends. which provides examples 
of different methods used by laundering to introduce the proceeds of crime into the financial system 
33 Gilmore W., "Di! jy Money- The Evolution of the Money Laundering Countermeasures, " 1999 at p. 31 
34 Section 51 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 1997 (now repealed) 
" Gilmore W., "Dirty Money- The Evolution of the Money Laundering Countermeasures, " 1999 at p. 32 
"The money courier fills suitcases with cash, hides cash in cargo, or sends cash in an international 
express package. The money is physically transported to aforeign country that has no currency controls 
and preferably has banking secrecy laws ... 
In the tax haven country the cash will be deposited into a bank 
or otherfinancial institution andfrom there it can be moved at will. The money is now indistinguishable 
from the legitimalefunds that are routinely transferred throughout the world'sfinancial systems. 
16 UNODCCP "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering" 1998 at p. 16 
37 Ibid at p. 8 
38 Howard C., "Butterworths Money Laundering Law, " 200 1, at p. 1/4 
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the industrial world . 
39 That being the case, the placement of the proceeds will usually 
take place much closer to the markets for organised criminal activities since to do so 
will obviate the need to transport large bulks of cash by air, land or by sea which would 
increase the chances of detection. 40 It was for that very reason why it was reported that 
the deceased Columbian Drug Baron Pablo Escobar lost approximately $US40 million 
which had rotted in a basement in a house in California because he was unable to place 
it into the financial system without being detected .41 
The difficulties of transporting 
cash have been eased by shipping precious metals (e. g. diamonds and gold) and other 
42 high valued items that are eventually converted into cash . 
The war on money laundering which is fought at the placement stage must not only be 
engaged on the battlefields in the OFCs. 43 In referring to the USA's Banking Secrecy 
Act 1970 Hinterseer stated that; 
"In its attack on money laundering the BSA focuses on the placement stage of the 
money laundering process. It reflects the assumption that it is at this point that the taint 
of illegality associated with money remains strongest. 44 
Therefore the FATF member States must make a special effort to eradicate the 
conditions that are responsible for the war in the first place. These include drug 
trafficking, trading in illegal weapons and nuclear materials, and trading in human 
beings. 45 To coin a notable maxim, 'an ounce of prevention is better than one pound of 
cure. ' Essentially, this means that a greater portion of the resources, should be 
employed against organised criminal activities and reducing the appetite of the residents 
of FATF member States for the consumption of illegal substances. 
As will be demonstrated later in the chapter the OFCs do not possess the resources and 
the infrastructures that sustain the organised criminal activities above mentioned. The 
'9 Ibid 
40 UNODCCP "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering" 1998 at p. 8 
"Large deposits (whether in cash or in checks) with no apparenijustification potentially attract attention. 
Unlike the situation even a decade ago, so much attention has been focussed on instances when banks 
accepted a huge bundle of cash from unknown parties and either wired it abroad or converted it into 
bearer instruments, this avenue is likely going to be used less often. 
41 Robinson J., "The Laund! ymen, " 1996 at p. 218 
42 UNODCCP "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering" 1998 at p. 7 
43 Ibid at p. 8 "The usual presumption of law enforcement is that, once the money is inside the banking 
system, most of the battle is lost. " 
44 Hinterseer K., "Criminal Finance, The political Economy of Money Laundering in a Comparative Legal 
Context" 2002, at pp. 180-181 
45 Lilley P., - "Digy Dealing, The Untold 
Truth About Global Money Laundering. - 2000 at p. 8 "The 
United Nations estimate that over 500,000 women and girls are entrapped in this modern version of the 
slave trade each year. - 
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weapons that are responsible for instilling fear and causing death and carnage are 
manufactured in the FATF States. 46 The demand for and consumption of illegal 
substances are a substantial feature of some of those States. 47 The trade in human beings 
progress from poor States to rich States. Essentially, the dream of living in a more 
developed country with greater opportunities and democratic societies motivate those 
whom are traded virtually as slaves. Many of those persons in one way or the other 
facilitate illegal activities and further the money laundering process. For example it has 
been reported that; 
"Sweat shops, in big cities in the industrialised countries hire illegal aliens who are 
brought in by smuggling groups that may also deal in banned or restricted commodities 
are financed by loan sharks who may be recycling drug money and make cartel 
agreements with trucking companies run by organised crime families, all in order to 
sell their goods cheaply to prestigious and eminently respectable retail outlets that 
serve the general public. The masses of street peddlers in the big urban centres of 
developing countries, sell goods that might be smuggled, produced in underground 
factories using faked brand name labels or stolen from legitimate enterprises, thereby 
violating customs, intellectual property and larceny laws. They pay no sales or income 
taxes but make protection payments to drug gangs that control the streets where they 
operate. The drug gangs might then use the protection money as operating capital to 
finance wholesale purchases of drugs or arms. 48 
Moreover, organised criminal activities are fuelled by large sums of money which can 
only be generated in the FATF States. For those reasons the emphasis, both financial 
and otherwise should be on eradicating those criminal activities. Although it is accepted 
that efforts have been made in that regard it does not seem to carry the same 
international significance as the anti-money laundering initiative. In a UN Report it was 
stated that: 
"Today money-laundering attracts the most attention when associated with trafficking 
in illicit narcotics. However, enterprising, criminals of every sort, ftom stockfraudsters 
to cooperate embezzlers to commodity smugglers must launder the moneyflowfor two 
reasons. The first is that the money trail itseýf can become evidence against the 
perpetrators of the offence; the second is that the money per se can be the target of 
investigation and action. 49 
46 Small Arms Survey 2003, Oxford at p. 13 where it is stated that; "Based on existing information and 
research the global volume of small arms production, including both military sjy1e small arms and 
commercial firearms, is estimated in the range of 7.5 million to eight million units per annum. Global 
production of commercial firearms (approximately 7 million per annum) is dominated by the United 
States (four million), the countries of the European Union (one million), the Russian Federation (one 
million), and a handful of other countries such as Brazil, Canada, China, the Czech Republic, Israel, 
Japan, Switzerland and afew others. " 
47 Lilley P., "Di!:! y Dealing, The Untold Truth About Global Money Laundering, " 2000 at p. 26. "Drug 
sales in the United States are estimated by the Office of National Drug Control Policy to generate $57.3 
billion annually (and these are 199 7figures). Research has shown that 90% of banknotes in circulation in 
the United States are contaminated by narcotics - and in London an analysis in 1999 showed that 99% of 
all bank notes circulating in the Capital are tainted with cocaine, with I in 20 exhibiting high levels of the 
drug, suggesting handling by dealers or actually being used to snort the drug. " 
48 UNODCCP "Financial Havens. Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering" 1998 at p. 13 
49 lbid at p. 4 
65 
Chapter 2. "Money Laundering, Drug Trafficking, Organised Crime and The 
FATF Member States" 
It is the responsibility of the FATF States to ensure that the proceeds of crime do not 
enter the financial system in the first place. Likewise, small island OFCs are also 
required to act responsibly by maintaining adequate anti-money laundering measures. 
Launderers have for quite a number of years been reducing the bulk of their cash by 
converting small denominations into large denominations of the same currency. 50 The 
developed financial systems in the FATF States facilitate the placement of proceeds of 
crime through brokerage services, 51 insuranceS52 and bureau de exchange serviceS53 or 
the buying and selling of properties. 54 Similarly, criminals acquire cash based 
businesses through which they can commingle licit with illicit cash to avoid detection. 
Some of those business activities may take the form of retail distribution businesses, 
vending machines arcades, car washes, laundrettes and restaurants to name a few. 55 it 
has also been suggested that horse and dog racing provide money launderers with the 
opportunity to purchase winning tickets at a premium in order to declare the source of 
funds as being derived from gambling. A similar scheme has been applied to winning 
tickets from State lotteries. 56 The mere fact that extreme pressure is brought to bear on 
OFCs is a reflection of the failure of the FATF States to eradicate criminal activities and 
significantly mitigate the substantial sums of money that are introduced into their 
financial systems in preparation for distribution worldwide and in many instances 
OFCs. 
50 Gilmore W., "Di! ly Money- The Evolution of the Money Laundering Countermeasures, " 1999 at p. 31 
"... in the United States it has become common practicefor criminals to engage the services of numerous 
individuals to convert cash in small denominations into larger bills -a process sometimes known as the 
'refining' of dirty money. " 
" FATF on Money Laundering Report 1995-1996 Annex 3 p. 7; "A number of features make this 
business an attractive target. First, it is by its nature international. Brokerage firms ftequently have 
offices all over the world and its ordinary for transactions to be conducted by wire transfer from, to or 
through multiple jurisdictions. Second, the securities markets are highly liquid Purchases and Sales can 
be made and settlements consummated within a very short period of time. Third. securities brokers 
operate in a comprehensive environment. Because their compensation is often based primarily on sales 
commissions, there is ample incentive to disregard the source of clientfunds. Finally, in some countries, 
securities accounts can be maintained by brokerage firms as nominees or trustees, thus permitting the 
identities of the beneficiaries to be concealed - See also Gilmore W., "Dirty Money- The Evolution of the 
Money Laundering Countermeasures, " 1999 at pp. 34-35 
52 Howard C., "Butterworths Money Laundering Law, " 2001 at p. 2/42-48 - 2/51 5' lbid at p. 2/41 
54 UNODCCP "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering" 1998 at p. 6 "Someone 
wishes to wash money buys a piece of property, paying with formal bank instruments and legitimately 
earned money for a public recorded price that is much below the real market value. The rest of the 
purchase price is paid in cash under the table. The property is then resoldfor thefull market value and 
the money recouped, with the illegal component now appearing to be capital gains on a real estate 
transaction. 
55 lbid 
16 lbid 
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The extent of the contribution that was made by FATF member countries to the money 
laundering process can be gleaned from the figures that are depicted on Table I below. 
In that Table John Walker 57 has attempted to capture the global money laundering 
flows, which in effect showed that the money laundering activities that were originated 
in Europe and North America were valued at $985 billion and $681 billion dollars 
respectively. Together they represented 58.5% of the total value of global money 
laundering activities which were estimated at $2.85 trillion each year. Moreover, the 
overall money laundering flows in Europe and North America were $1,281 and $686 
respectively, which in essence accounted for 69% of global money laundering flows. 
., 
is Global Money Laundering, " JMLC, 1999, Vol. 3, No. I pp. 25-37 at pp. 31 Walker J., "How Bi2 
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2.4.2 The Layering Stage 
It is at the layering stage of the money laundering process that further attempts are made 
not only to hide the provenance of the funds but more importantly to conceal its true 
ownership. ' Having been placed into the financial system the funds may either be 
further invested and utilised onshore or wire transferred 2 to another or other countries, 
preferably OFCs because of the secrecy provisions and in some cases the geographical 
distance. ' The structure of the OFCs makes them vulnerable at this stage. The banking 
secrecy and confidentiality laws 4 and the liberal offshore financial legislation provide a 
safe haven for money launderers. Those characteristics have also caused Senator 
William Roth to retort: 
"... we have repeatedly heard testimony about major narcotics traffickers and other 
criminals who use offshore institutions to launder ill-gotten profits or to hide them from 
Internal Revenue Services. Haven secrecy laws in an ever increasing number of cases 
prevent US. law enforcement officials ftom obtaining the evidence they need to convict 
US criminals and recover illegal funds. It would appear that offshore haven secrecy 
laws is the glue that holds many US criminal operations together. "5 
It is nonetheless difficult to see how banking secrecy laws can be the glue that holds US 
criminal operations together when it is usual for such laws to be waived when there is a 
criminal investigation in progress. 6 
The international business companies (IBCs) and international trusts are the two main 
offshore entities that were used by launderers. In referring to IBCs a UN Report has 
suggested that; "... virtually all money laundering schemes use these entities as part of the 
scheme to hide the ownership of assets. ' Moreover, Beare and Schneider have observed 
that; 
... the incorporation, financing and operation of companies satisfy three prime 
objectives of a laundering vehicle. It allows criminals to convert illicit cash into other 
1 Gilmore W., "Di!:! y Money- The Evolution of the Money Laundering Countermeasures, " 1999 at p. 29 
2 lbid at p. 33 "... wire transfers are probably the most important layering method available to money 
launderers. They offer criminals many advantages as they seek to cover their trail. Speed distance, 
minimal audit trail, and increased anonymity amid the enormous daily volume of electronicJund transfers 
are all major benefits. 
3 lbid 
4 UNODCCP "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering7 1998 at p. 17 
5 Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies, Committee on Governmental Affairs 
Report to the United States Senate. Report 99-130 (August 1985), p. 4: See also UNODCCP "Financial 
Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering': 1998 at p. 2 
6 UNODCCP "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering" 1998 at p. 9 
7 Ibid at p. 60 
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assets, create a perception of a legitimate source of funds, all the while effectively 
concealing the true beneficial owner- the criminal enterprise. "' 
In some OFCs SVG included, IBCs could be incorporated with bearer shares (see 
chapter 4) which were easily transferable from one owner to the next without any 
regulatory requirement to have the transfer recorded in a share register. Accordingly, it 
was virtually impossible to determine the identity of the owner of the bearer shares. 9 
SVG has now by way of legislation immobilised bearer shares. 10 This was done by 
requiring offshore services providers to retain custody of the bearer shares and to 
maintain records which show particulars of the owners of those shares. " In SVG IBCs 
were not required to submit annual returns and were not in any way mandated to 
conduct any commercial operations. In essence, they could conduct any type of business 
activity that was not prohibited by the offshore legislation. For example, they could be 
used in a process called double invoicing where an IBC pays a fictitious invoice that is 
presented to it by the launderer. 12 Alternatively, the launderer may invoice a third party 
for goods or services that have been legitimately provided by the launderer. However, 
rather than the invoice being issued for the actual amount directly from the launderer to 
the third party, he may instead invoice an IBC for a lower amount and the IBC will in 
turn invoice the third party for the actual value of the goods or services that were 
provided. 13 In this way the launderer is able to understate his sales and minimise his 
tax. 14 There have also been instances in which launderers have overstated invoices in 
order to justify the level of sales and the amount of money that is being deposited. As 
Professor Gilmore has observed: 
"Such offshore ... corporations 
have a special utility at the placement and layering 
stages of the operation. In the latter context it is not uncommon for several such 
companies in differentjurisdictions to be used in an effort to eliminate the audit Irail. In 
many cases, however, the overall needs of the criminal will require that the funds are 
eventually repatriated in such a way that it appears they have been legitimately 
acquired abroad. "15 
" Beare M., & Schneider S., "Tracing of IlliOt Funds: Money Laundering in Canada, " 1990 at p. 183: See 
also Gilmore W., "DiLty Money- The Evolution of the Money Laundering Countermeasures, " 1999 at p. 
37 
9 Ali S., "Money Laundering Control in the Caribbean" 2003, at p. 38 
'0 Section 22 (1) of the International Business Companies Act 1996 (as amended) provided that: "Any 
share certificate issued to bearer shall not be distributed but shall be retained in the safe custody of the 
registered agentfor the corporation which issued such certificate in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
11 Ali S., "Money Launderinp, Control in the Caribbean" 2003, at p. 38 
12 Gilmore W., "Dirty Money- The Evolution of the Money Laundering Countermeasures, " 1999 at p. 39 
" lbid 
14 UNODCCP "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering" 1998 at p. 8 
15 Gilmore W., "Di! n Money- The Evolution of the Money Laundering Countermeasures, " 1999 at p. 38 
70 
Chapter 2. "Money Laundering, Drug Trafficking, Organised Crime and The 
FATF Member States" 
The international trusts on the other hand could have been registered without any 
requirement for the revelation of its true beneficial owner. 16 The settlor was not 
prohibited from retaining control of the trust. 17 Essentially, the launderer could have 
concealed the provenance of the funds and the real beneficial ownership thereof. It was 
the ideal situation for the launderer. Interestingly, although OFCs were not established 
for that purpose and for the most part did not condone money laundering they 
nonetheless facilitated the money laundering process. 18 The relatively liberal offshore 
laws coupled with restrictions on the disclosure of beneficial ownership made it 
extremely difficult for law enforcement officials to investigate, apprehend and procure 
convictions of launderers and organised criminals if they were separate individuals. 
Launderers were therefore left with the freedom of employing bright lawyers and 
accountants to develop complex financial structures which remove the true beneficial 
owner further away from its source. For example a structure may consist of a bearer 
share IBC which establishes an international trust 19 as the settlor and another bearer 
share IBC as the beneficiary. In this way the beneficial ownership of the IBCs are 
concealed. Moreover, the trust adds another layer to the structure by maintaining the 
distance of the settlor and beneficial owner and still enables that owner to have 
significant influence over the administration of the assets of the trust either through a 
letter of wishes or a concept referred to as protectorship. 20 Other layers may also be 
added. For example an international trust may establish an insurance company 21 which 
may establish several other IBCs for investment purposes. Each step in the registration 
process moves the true beneficial owner company further away from the funds and the 
provenance of the funds become a distant past. As Ali has pointed out; "For a settlor 
with criminally derived wealth, the trust would seem to be a useful weapon for shielding 
propertyfrom seizure, since it is placed outside his ownership and control -22 
16 UNODCCP "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Launderinp" 1998 at p. 61 
17 lbid 
18 lbid at p. 9 where it was stated that "... there are many perfectly legal reasons for the establishment of 
an offshore trust. " 
19 Ali S., "Money Laundering Control in the Caribbean" 2003, at p. 39 
20 UNODCCP "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering" 1998 at p. 61: See also 
Section 16 of the International Trusts Act 1996 which provides that, "the terms of an international trust 
may provide ... 
for the position of the protector of the trust. " Section 17(l) of the International Trust Act 
1996 provides that; "A trust instrument may also provide for the appointment of one or more trust 
advisors who, acting alone or in concert may offer advice to a trustee or a protector but who shall not be 
deemed to be bound by the duties of either. - 
21 Ali S., "Money Laundering Control in the Caribbean" 2003, at p. 39 
22 lbid at p. 40 
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Unravelling the complex offshore structures may become more perplexing for law 
enforcement officials where the launderer is able to acquire his own bank through which 
he launders the proceeds of crime and leaves no paper trail as evidence of his laundering 
activities. 23 However, offshore banks are mainly used for tax minimisation and to avoid 
liquidity and interest rate limitations and not for the purpose of hiding money. 24 This is 
not to say that they have never been acquired by criminals. But criminals do not 
necessarily pursue the acquisition of offshore banks alone. They have acquired onshore 
banks as well. As one writer pointed out; 
"The Rodriguez Orejuela brothers, Miguel Angel and Gillberto, created an economic 
andpublic relations empire which had as its cornerstone the Banco de lo Trabajadores 
(workers hank). The Rodriguez brothers understood that running a bank would not only 
permit them to launder drug money, but, through the business of savings accounts and 
lending, would allow them a structure with which to approach and cultivate public 
relations. , 25 
2.4.3 The Integration Stage 
Having layered the funds into different structures the launderers commence the process 
of integrating the funds into the financial system. This may involve transferring the 
funds to different accounts in different parts of the world 26 before repatriating the funds 
to the country in which the launderer resides. As Blum, Levi, Naylor and Williams 
suggested; 
"Probably the neatest solution of all is to bring the money home in the form of a 
business 'loan. ' The criminal arranges for money held in an offshore account to be 
Ient'to his/her on-shore entity. Not only is the money returning home in complete non- 
taxable form, but it can be used in such a way as to reduce taxes due on strictly legal 
domestic income. Once the 'loan' has been incurred, the borrower has the right to 
repay it, with interest, effectively to himself or herself. In effect, the criminal can legally 
ship even more money out of the country to a foreign safe haven while deducting the 
'interest' component as a business expense against domestic taxable income. With the 
employment of various 'loan back' techniques, the money laundering Cycle is not 
merely closed, it can actually he increased in diameter. , 27 
Once the integration stage of the money laundering process has been completed 
undetected it is extremely difficult for law enforcement officials to follow the money 
23 UNODCCP "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering" 1998 at p. 10 
24 lbid at p. 16 
25 Varela-Cid E., "Hidden Fortunes Drup, Money, Cartels and The Elite Banks" 1999 at p. 50 
26 Gilmore W., "Di! jy Money- The Evolution of the Money Laundering Countermeasures, " 1999 at p. II 
"Thus mass communication has facilitated contacts with associates in other countries and continents, 
modern banking has facilitated international criminal transactions and the modern revolution in 
electronics has given criminal groups access to new tools enabling them to steal millions and to launder 
the huge illicit profits. " 
27 UNODCCP "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering" 1998 at p. II 
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trail and to secure convictions for suspected money launderers. As Blum, Levi, Naylor 
and Williams have observed; "The more successful the money laundering apparatus is in 
imitating the patterns and behaviour of legitimate transactions, the less likelihood of it being 
exposed , 28 
It must be noted that OFCs were not necessarily the conduits for any or all of the three 
stages of the money laundering process. All three stages of the process could have taken 
place in FATF States and there is ample evidence to that effect. In 1999 John Walker 
published an article 29 in which he proposed a model for estimating the extent of the 
global money laundering flows. In it he noted that; "the top 20 countries of origin for 
laundered money ... are developed countries. "'0 
His observation is depicted in Table 2 
below which is an identical replication of the information that he presented in the said 
article. 
Table 2: The Top 20 Orikins of Laundered Mone 
Rank Ori2in Amount($US/vr) % of Total 
I. us 1,320,228 46.3 
2. Italy 150,054 5.3 
3. Russia 147,187 5.2 
4. China 131,360 4.6 
5. Germany 128,266 4.5 
6. France 124,748 4.4 
7. Romania 115,585 4.1 
8. Canada 82,374 2.9 
9. UK 68,740 2.4 
10. Hong Kong 62,856 2.2 
11. Spain 56,287 2.0 
12. Thailand 32,834 1.2 
13. South Korea 21,240 0.7 
14. Mexico 21,119 0.7 
15. Austria 20,231 0.7 
16. Poland 19,714 0.7 
17. Philippines 18,867 0.7 
18. Netherlands 18,362 0.6 
19. Japan 16,975 0.6 
20. Brazil 16,786 0.6 
Total All countries 2,850,470 100.0 
John Walker Model of Global Money Laundering Flows, 1999 
Moreover, Table 1 above has also shown the extent to which the illicit proceeds 
originating in Europe and North America were also laundered within those regions. The 
28 UNODCCP "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering" 1998 at p. 12 
29 Walker J., "How Big is Global Money Laundering, " JMLC, 1999, Vol. 3, No. I pp. 25-37 
30 lbid at p. 33 
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extent of the laundering activities and the countries that were alleged to have played a 
major role in facilitating those activities are depicted on Table 3 below. 
Table 3: Top 20 Flows of laundered money 
Rank Orizin 
1. us 
2. us 
3. Russia 
4. Italy 
5. China 
6. Romania 
7. us 
8. us 
9. France 
10. Italy 
11. Gen-nany 
12. us 
13. Spain 
14. Thailand 
15. Hong Kong 
16. Canada 
17. UK 
18. us 
19. Germany 
20. Hong Kong 
Total A ll countries 
Destination 
us 
Cayman Islands 
Russia 
Italy 
China 
Romania 
Canada 
Bahamas 
France 
Vatican City 
Germany 
Bermuda 
Spain 
Thailand 
Hong Kong 
Canada 
UK 
Luxembourg 
Luxembourg 
Taiwan 
Amount($USm/vr) 
528,091 
129,755 
118,927 
94,834 
94,579 
87,845 
63,087 
61,378 
57,883 
55,056 
47,202 
46,745 
28,189 
24,953 
23,634 
21,747 
20,897 
19,514 
18,804 
18,796 
2,850,470 
% of Total 
18.5 
4.6 
4.2 
3.3 
3.3 
3.1 
2.2 
2.2 
2.0 
1.9 
1.7 
1.6 
1.0 
0.9 
0.8 
0.8 
0.7 
0.7 
0.7 
0.7 
100.0 
John Walker Model of Global Money Laundering Flows, 1999 
Walker pointed out that; 
"It is interesting... to note how much of the laundered money ... flows to already developed countries - particularly the USA and Europe. The potential of money 
laundering to widen the gap between the rich countries and the poor countries is 
another important issue that can be tested using a model of this kind "" 
That statement is very interesting because it highlights the likely impact on poor 
countries due to the prevalence of money laundering. It was a very significant issue 
which should have been given very serious attention and which should also have been 
emphasised by the FATF in its efforts to implement the anti-money laundering 
initiative. The fallacy is usually that OFCs at all times participate in at least one of the 
laundering stages. It must however be borne in mind that some of the vehicles that were 
provided by the OFCs and were needed to facilitate the money laundering process could 
also have been obtained in some FATF States. 32 The mere fact that within recent times 
monies are wire-transferred to OFCs is a clear indication that those funds had actually 
31 Walker J., "How Big is Global Money Laundering, " JMLC, 1999, Vol. 3, No. I at p. 34 
3' For example, Hong Kong, Ireland Luxembourg, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA 
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been placed in the financial system elsewhere and their provenance and beneficial 
owners already concealed. But even so, Walker's model of global money laundering 
flows revealed that only three small island OFCs 
33 were listed among the top 20 
destinations of laundered money (see Table 4 ). It is once again evident that the 
developed countries, including the FATF member countries were the major finance 
centres for money launderers. 
Table 4: The Top 20 Destinations of Laundered Money 
Rank Destination Arnount(SUS/vO % of Total 
I. us 538,145 18.9 
2. Cayman islands 138,329 4.9 
3. Russia 120,493 4.2 
4. Italy 105,688 3.7 
5. China 94,726 3.3 
6. Romania 89,595 3.1 
7. Canada 85,444 3.0 
8. Vatican City 80,596 2.8 
9. Luxembourg 78,468 2.8 
10. France 68,471 2.4 
11. Bahamas 66,398 2.3 
12. Germany 61,315 2.2 
13. Switzerland 58,993 2.1 
14. Bermuda 52,887 1.9 
15. Netherlands 49,591 1.7 
16. Liechtenstein 48,949 1.7 
17. Austria 48,376 1.7 
18. Hong Kong 44,519 1.6 
19. UK 44,478 1.6 
20. Spain 35,461 1.2 
John Walker Model of Global Money Laundering Flows, 1999 
On the basis of the foregoing, it is contended that OFCs were facilitating the integration 
stage of the laundering process but were not mainly responsible for the global money 
laundering problem. Nonetheless, Savona and Defoe have observed that; 
"The Royal Hong Kong Police reports that a money launderer was employed to cleanse 
cashfrom the street sale of heroine in Australia The hired money launderer utilised the 
cash to purchase kruggerrands and kilogram gold bars, which he then carried into 
Hong Kong andplaced in safety deposit boxes. The gold was sold afew kilograms at a 
time over the counter at a Hong Kong bank. The proceeds of the sale of the gold were 
wire transferred to shell company accounts in the Channel Islands, Zurich, New York 
and Vanuatu. The money launderer requested that the proceeds of one particular sale 
be paid in the form of a number of demand drafts, which were traced to Manila where 
they had been cashed by the bearer. A total of HK$13,812,000 in drug proceeds was 
remittedfrom Hong Kong , 34 
33 Cayman Islands, Bahamas and Bermuda 
34 Gilmore W., "Di! jy Money- The Evolution of the Money Laundering Countermeasures. " 1999 at p. 40 
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From the example given above, it is noticeable that the ownership and provenance of 
the funds had already been disguised and concealed prior to the monies being wire- 
transferred and mailed from Hong Kong to the other jurisdictions. In those 
circumstances OFCs become vulnerable to money launderers. The drafts would have 
been prepared and the funds would have been transferred by a bank, thus adorning those 
bank drafts and the funds with an appearance of legitimacy. 35 For the most part OFCs 
are used for legitimate business activities but just as the financial system in FATF States 
are abused and manipulated to facilitate money laundering, so too are OFCs. It cannot 
therefore be considered fair to attribute blame solely to OFCs for the evils of money 
laundering when effectively the crimes from which the funds are generated usually take 
place in the FATF countries and the placement of the proceeds of crime is usually in 
those States. 
In recent times OFCs may only be used in the layering and integration stages and this 
may be after the provenance and ownership of the proceeds of crime had already been 
concealed and disguised. Moreover, there was no concrete evidence that such usage was 
more prevalent in the OFCs than the FATF States. The John Walker's model of global 
money laundering flows (see Tables 1,2,3 and 4 above) has revealed otherwise, in that 
the FATF member countries were the main facilitators of money laundering activities. 
What therefore is the reason for attributing to OFCs the blame for the money laundering 
debacle? 
25 Money Laundering and the Services Sector 
The OECD/FATF countries have been experiencing economic progress on the back of 
globalisation and trade liberalisation. The growth of those countries is particularly 
evident in the proportion of the working population that is now employed in the services 
industry. It has been estimated that in the United Kingdom one out of every five persons 
is employed in manufacturing. Similarly, the decline in workers in the manufacturing 
sectors is also a feature in the USA, which is estimated at one in six and in Germany 
one in three. 36 Not surprisingly, except for Turkey, Greece and Portugal, over 50% of 
35 UNODCCP "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering" 1998 at p. II "In essence, 
the rule in successful money laundering is always to approximate, as closely as possible, legal 
transactions. As a result the actual devises used are themselves minor variations on methods employed 
routinely by legitimate business. " 
36 Lowenfeld A., "International Economic Law, " Oxford, 2002 at p. III 
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the work force in the OECD countries is employed in the services sector. 37 In essence, 
the services industry contributes in excess of 50% of the combined GDP of the OECD 
countries. 38 The implication of the growth in the services sector of any country has been 
suggested by a UN Report as favourable to the proliferation of money laundering. 39 The 
Report suggested that: 
"The best coverfor money laundering is a business engaged in legitimate retail trade, 
especially one that generates large amounts of cash on a regular basis. The higher the 
services content of the products sold, the greater the potential to use the legitimate 
retail business to hide the proceeds of crime. It is much easier in services to cloud the 
audit trail, since there is seldom as clear a relationship between physical inputs and the 
market value of outputs in a service firm as there is in one supplying physical goods. 
Tax authorities have long been aware that it is simpler in the services than in the 
physical goods industries to skim off income and tinder report earnings. It is equally 
easy to do the opposite, to mix illegally earned with legally earned income and report it 
all as if it were legal. A simple rule is: other things being equal, the higher the ratio of 
services to physical goods production in a country's GNP, the greater thefacility with 
which its legitimate businessfirms can be avedfor laundering money. -40 
Therefore, due to the fact that the substantial sums of money that are generated from 
criminal conduct are earned in the OECD/FATF countries (see below) and in the light 
of the magnitude of the burgeoning services sector, 41 the proliferation of money 
laundering activities(see chapter 1) in those countries is not surprising. It highlights the 
need for the OECD/FATF countries to introduce effective measures to deal with the 
root causes of the money laundering problem. These causes can be categorised under 
two headings, namely, crime and the placement of the proceeds of crime into the 
financial system, both of which were common features in the OECD/FATF countries. 
Similarly, continued and justified pressure should be brought to bear on OFCs who 
facilitate the money laundering process at the layering and integration stages. However, 
in so doing the OECD/FATF must be prepared to accept and acknowledge that their role 
in the money laundering process should be greater, since without crime there will be no 
proceeds of crime and if there are no proceeds, there will be nothing to place into the 
financial system; if there is nothing to place in the financial system there will not be any 
money laundering activities for the OFCs to facilitate. The mere fact that the placement 
stage is centred within the OECD/FATF countries and it is reported that approximately 
$2.85 trillion is laundered each year, if OECD/FATF's law enforcement officials with 
substantial resources are unable to stem the flow of illicit funds, how can small OFCs 
37 Lowenfeld A., "International Economic Law, " Oxford, 2002 at p. III 
" lbid 
39 UNODCCP "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering" 1998 at p. 13 
40 lbid 
41 www. oecd. org where it is stated that the OECD countries produce two thirds of the world's goods and 
services. 
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with relatively infinitesimal resources be more efficient and effective? Is it that the 
OECD/FATF countries are expecting more competence from OFCs than they seem to 
be demonstrating in their fight against organised crime and money laundering? 
2.6 Money Laundering and Organised Crime 
Within recent times there has been an increased global effort to fight organised crime, 
yet it still flourishes and money laundering progresses unabated. Such a situation has led 
Peter Lilley to conclude that: 
"The rise in organized crime is now an accepted, if regrettable fact of global 
business life. The massive sums of money generated by such activity need to be 
legitimised by inserting and washing them in international banking and business 
systems. Running parallel are the globalisation and internationalization of markets; 
the sophistication of information technology and the uncertain political and 
economical environments... 42 
It has been reported that organised crime is the world's third largest industry after the 
international oil trade and foreign exchange . 
43 However, this has now been surpassed by 
the drug trafficking industry which was reported to have approximately 400 million 
regular customers and generated annual revenues of $400 billion, half of which was 
laundered internationally. 44 In essence, organised crime seemed to have become the 
largest industry in the world. Many 45 attribute the increase in organised criminal 
activities to globalisation and trade liberalisation. As one writer pointed out; 
"Modern technology has provided new impetus not only to legitimate trade and 
commerce, but also to criminal business enterprises. Thus, mass communications have 
facilitated contacts with associates in other countries and continents, modern banking 
has facilitated international criminal transactions and modern revolution in electronics 
has given criminal groups access to new tools enabling them to steal millions and 
launder huge illicit profits. , 46 
Whereas it may be correct to state that improvements in technology, the formation of 
regional blocs and the advent of trade liberalization have contributed significantly to the 
increase in organized criminal activities, it may also be the case that with the emphasis 
42 UNODCCP "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Launderinp, " 1998 at pp. 2-3 
43 Howard C., "Butterworth Money Laundering Law" 2001 pg I/3 
44 Lilley P., "DiM Dealinv- The Untold Truth About Global Money Launderin 2000, at p. 3 
45 Friman R., & Andreas P., "The Illicit Global Economy and State Power, " Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 1999 at p. 54 : Jordan D., "Drug Politics Dirty Money and Democracies, " 1999, at p. 100 : 
Lilley P., "Digy Dealing- The Untold Truth of Money Launderingý: 2000 at p. 34 : Williams P., 
"Organizing Tranisnational Crime: Networks, Markets and Hierarchies" in Williams P., & Vlassis D., 
"Combating Transnational Crime Concepts, Activities and Responses, " ISPAC, 2001 at p. 66 
46 Gilmore W, "Dirty Money-The Evolution of Money Laundering Countermeasures" 1999 at p. II 
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being placed on money laundering over the past ten years, insufficient attention was 
given to the underlying criminal activities that gave rise to money laundering. 
Consequently, whilst the war against organized crime concentrated on the circulatory 
system of organized criminal activities, the criminals set about engaging the services of 
well trained financial mercenaries to fight that war in order to circumvent the money 
laundering initiatives. In the meantime, organized crime was given a breathing space 
that was used to plan, organise and in many cases merge with each other in order to 
effectively execute their nefarious activities (see para 2.7 below). In that regard the 
statement made by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network(FINCEN) of the USA is 
very instructive. It clearly indicates that there may well be a weakening of the stance in 
the fight against the underlying criminal activities and a strengthening of resolve against 
money laundering. Accordingly, FfNCEN pointed out that: 
"With few exceptions criminals are motivated by one thing-profit. Greed drives the 
criminal, and the end result is that illegally gained money must be introduced into a 
nation's legitimate financial systems ... Money laundering involves disguising assets 
so they can be used without detection of the illegal activity that produced them. This 
process has devastating social and economic consequences. Money laundering 
provides the fuel for drug dealers, terrorists, arms dealers to operate and expand 
their operations ... Left unchecked, money laundering can erode the integrity of our 
nation's and the world'sfinancial institutions. , 47 
On the basis of the foregoing, it is clear that the eradication or significant mitigation of 
organized criminal activities is pivotal to the money laundering process. So long as 
those activities continue unabated, there will always be a money laundering issue for the 
reasons aforementioned, since criminals will go to all lengths, corruption and murder 
included, to ensure that their criminal activities are not in any way frustrated. No doubt 
the FATF is aware of the existence of such a situation, thus the reason for bringing 
pressure to bear on small island OFCs that were alleged to be facilitating the money 
laundering process. 
It is contended that whereas, money laundering is indeed a global concern, organized 
and transnational criminal activities, pose a much greater threat to humanity and should 
therefore be given the major share of attention. Emphasis will be given to this view in 
support of the arguments about the deficiencies and the inadequacies of the FATF 
initiatives on small island OFCs. For that reason an understanding of organized crime is 
required so that its role in the money laundering process in small island states can be put 
47 The United States Department of the Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FINCEN 
Advisory, March 1996,1, Issue 1. 
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into its proper perspective, especially if it is believed that the love of money is the prime 
motivational factor to increased and sustained criminal activities. 48 
To gain such an understanding of organized crime within the context of money 
laundering world wide and the Caribbean small island States in particular, it is 
important to show why there has been such a marked escalation in organized criminal 
activities; the types of organized criminal activities that earn substantial sums of money; 
and the extent to which governments through their domestic and foreign policies and in 
order to achieve their economic and politica149 objectives have facilitated organised 
criminal activities. To effectively embark upon such an approach requires firstly, at 
least a general appreciation of what is meant by organized crime, secondly the historical 
imperatives of organized crime and thirdly, the impact of organized crime on the 
twentieth century civilization. 
2.7 What is Organised Crime? 
Organized crime has been defined as, "any enterprise or group of persons engaged in 
continuing illegal activity which has as its primary purpose the generation of profits 
irrespective of national boundaries. -5' This definition though sound in its general context 
has failed to clearly and expressly indicate or even recognize that there are 
circumstances where the profits earned from illegal activities are not the primary 
reasons for those activities. There are times when illegal activities are the means to an 
end and although the end may for the criminals justify the means, this does not mean 
that the means were their primary aim. Take for example the terrorists who rob banks 
and engage in racketeering. 51 Those activities are only the means to achieving the end, 
which is financing their main objective, the destruction of human lives and property in 
48 The United States Department of the Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FINCEN 
Advisory, March 1996,1, Issue 1. 
49 Jordan D., "Drup Politics DiLty Money and Democracieýf 1999, at p. 68 " ... the CIA's Contra support 
operation coincided with major expansion in the Caribbean cocaine trade and that the coincidence 
between cocaine trafficking and covert operations made the DEA's task of drug interdiction almost 
impossible. Assuming that the United States maintained the relationships in Southeast Asia, Pakistan, and 
Central America as described, the CIA inspector general's conclusion that the agency needed an 
assessment of the possible adverse repercussions' of its relations with drug dealers seems mild In any 
case, there is considerable evidence that individuals in the United States government have been 
consciously involved in thefacilitation of narcotics traffickingfor political purposes. " 
'0 See memorandum submitted by Interpol and reproduced in the House of Commons, Home Affairs 
Committee, Organised Crime, H. C. Paper 18-11 1994-95 at pg 150 
51 Letizia P., "Criminal Fraternities or Criminal Ente! prises? " in Williams P., & Vlassis D., "Combatin 
Transnational Crime Concepts, Activities and Responses, " ISPAC, 2001 at p. 104 
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order to satisfy or further their political52 or religious beliefs 53 - and what about the 
inveterate offender? Is he motivated by profits or the acquisition of wealth? Although 
one may justifiably argue that such a person does not amount to a group or an enterprise 
it is possible that, that person could well be extremely influential within a criminal 
grouping and may therefore dictate the course of action taken by the membership of the 
organisation to which he belongs. 
There have been many stories of the wealth of many of the leaders of organized crime 
54 
syndicates. Some of them own planes, ranches, farms, castles, ships. Their wealth 
extends beyond the GDP of many developing countrieS55 and is significantly more than 
is required to lavishly sustain them and/or their families during their entire lifetimes. For 
example, it has been reported that the Columbian drug trafficker Carlos Lehder Rivas at 
one time owned an extremely large property at Norman's Key in the Bahamas, a fleet of 
five small aircraft, several farms and estates in Armenia and a hotel "The German inn, " 
just to name a few. 56 On the other hand Pablo Escobar is reputed to have owned "200 
apartments scattered throughout Florida, an airline and a hotel in Venezuela, another airline in 
Bogota, and several hotels in Medellin. He also owned an estate, known as 'Hasienda Napoles, ' 
that featured its own zoo and boasted a list of 843 personnel. , 57 If the primary aim of 
organized criminals was solely to make profit, it is reasonable to assume that many may 
not have been incarcerated 58 and some would have been alive today. 59 It is therefore 
contended that with such vast amounts of wealth, it is highly probable that they would 
have eventually become so risk averse that the marginal increase in risk that would have 
accompanied every additional illegal activity, would have exceeded the incremental 
utility of an additional increase in earnings from illegal activities. Therefore, to state 
that their initial aim was to maximise profits and to acquire wealth and power may be 
the preferred position to advocate. 
5' Letizia P., "Criminal Fraternities or Criminal Entetprises? " in Williams P., & Vlassis D., "Combatin 
Transnational Crime Concepts, Activities and Responses, " ISPAC, 2001 at p. 104 
53 For example the attack using two planes on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in New York 
and the crashing of a plane into the Pentagon in Washington by the terrorist Al Qaeda Network on I Vh 
September, 200 1. 
54 Varela-Cid E., "Hidden Fortunes, Drug Money Cartels and Elite Banks" Hudson Street Press, New 
York, 1999 at pp 50 -59. 
55 Jordan D., "Drug Politics Di! jy Money and Democracies, " 1999, at p. 18 
56 Varela-Cid E., "Hidden Fortunes, Drug Money Cartels and Elite Banks" York, 1999 at pp 40 & 42. 
57 Ibid at p. 36 
58 Jordan D., "Drug Politics Di!:! y Money and Democracies, " 1999, at p. 78 where its was noted that 1,500 
politicians and businessmen were arrested in Italy in the first two years of Operation Clean Hands. See 
also p. 83 where over 166 persons in Colombia were arrested. 
'9 Ibid at p. 82 -the death of Pablo Escobar 
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The extent of the wealth of organized crime syndicates in some countries dwarfs the 
GDP of the countries in which they are based . 
60 Their power, wealth and influence are 
so imposing that certain villages and even countries depend on the investments of those 
criminals for their survival. 61 With such power and authority they pose a significant 
threat to the sovereigntY62 of certain states. In many respects they dictate political and 
economic policies by ensuring that their golden boys are catapulted into the political 
directorate 63 or by scaring away those who overtly oppose their criminal activities. 64 it 
is from this vantage point that they wield their power and authority and influence 
change in the direction that they consider most desirable. 
It is contended that having acquired a vast amount of wealth many of those involved in 
criminal activities are then motivated by power and self-preservation. Those who have 
already acquired wealth and are motivated by power are the driving forces behind these 
criminal activities. 65 They possess the capacity to keep the criminal machinery well 
oiled, operational and sustainable. They relish the status of being the godfather and so 
they threaten and if necessary, kill and maim 66 those who oppose their activities or 
bribe 67 and corrupt every one who comes within yards of them in order to maintain that 
power and self-preservation. In that regard Varela-Cid observed that; 
"Once back in Colombia, a young inexperiencedjudge convicted Jorge Luis Ochoafor 
illegal importation of bulls, and sentenced him to two years in prison. Three months 
later, after an appeal, the same judge released Ochoa on a bail of $11,500, and 
required him to appear before the tribunal twice a month. Ochoa was never triedfor 
drug trafficking, although authorities continued attempting to do so for many years. 
60 Williams P., "Organizing Transnational Crime: Networks, Markets and Hierarchies" in Williams P., & 
Vlassis D., "Combating Transnational Crime Concepts, Activities and Responses, " 2001 at p. 67 
61 Varela-Cid E., "Hidden Fortunes, Drug Money Cartels and Elite Banks" 1999 at p. 37 in referring to 
the assistance given by a drug trafficker to the town of Nicoli it was stated that; "Hisfame grew to such a 
point that the parson of Necoli, a town not far from Medellin, nonchalantly expressed to a newspaper: 
'Our town would be nothing without Mr. Campo. The people see this man as the work of God Who has 
arrived to help with our development projects. "' 62 Jordan D., "Drug Politics DiM Money and Democracies, " 1999, at p. 98 
63 Varela-Cid E., "Hidden Fortunes, Drug Money Cartels and Elite Banks" " 
1999 at p. 38 "Another 
powerful Colombian drug trafficker was Severo Escobar Ortega, who specialized in transporting cocaine 
ftom Bogota to Miami and New York. He was an inspirited, conservative leader who had quickly become 
an important businessman. Backed by ex-Senator Bertha Henandez de Ospina, who had readily accepted 
his contribution of $1 million, he won a seat in the House of Representatives. After his stint in the House, 
he assumed the post of secretary of agriculture, and with stale funds ordered the construction of a 
luxurious pool in the municipality of Medina. Later it was discovered that the dressing rooms were 
actually laboratoriesfor cocaine refinement. - 
64 Jordan D., "Drug Politics Di!! y Money and Democracies, " 1999, at p. 82 where it has been reported 
that presidential candidates have been assassinated in Colombia. 65 lbid at pp. 50-59 66 lbid at pp 34-37 
67 lbid at p. 21-22 where an assassin was able to bribe the State Registrar for a new identity. 
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After her decision to ftee Ochoa, the judge disappeared and is believed to be living in 
Europe. According to Drug Enforcement Authority reports, after freeing Ochoa, the 
judge met with Fabio Ochoa and Pablo Escobar, who gave her a payment of about $5 
million. " 
Even with all that wealth, there still appears to be a chilling fear within them - the fear 
of allowing some other criminal or criminal organization to surpass them in terms of 
wealth and the capacity to wield more power and authority. 69 When they have reached 
that stage, it is contended that illegal profits then becomes a means to an end and not the 
end or primary objective as the aforesaid definition clearly indicates. 
Further analysis of the definition of organized crime was conducted by Frank Hagan 
who concluded that the majority of American criminologists are of the view that, 
organized crime involves a continuing enterprise operating in a rational fashion and 
focused towards obtaining profits through illegal activities. 70 This description was 
criticized by Letizia Paoli on the basis that; "the associations that are thought to be 
prototypical of organized crime are neither exclusively involved in illegal market activities, nor 
is their development and internal configuration the result of illegal market dynamics. "" Whilst 
it is indeed correct to conclude that organized criminals like the mafia, the drug cartels 
and other associations are engaged in legitimate commercial and business ventures, it is 
contended that Frank Hagan's description of organized crime should not be construed as 
narrowly as was indicated by Paoli. Hagan does not indicate that organized criminal 
enterprises are engaged exclusively in illegal activities. As a matter of fact the 
description referred to 'a continuing enterprise' in the context of a conduit through 
which illegal activities are conducted. This conduit may well have been established, 
developed and configured legally and legitimately to conduct legitimate business 
activities but it may also be used to conduct illegal activities as well. As was noted 
earlier in this chapter that was the modus operandi of organized criminals during their 
"halcyon" days of prohibition and it was as a result of such conduct that the term money 
laundering was actually originated. 
68 Jordan D., "Drug Politics Dirty Money and Democracies, " 1999, at p. 49 
69 Letizia P., "Criminal Fraternities or Criminal Enterprises? " in Williams P., & Vlassis D., "Combatin 
Transnational Crime Concepts, Activities and Responses, " 2001 at p. 104 
70 Hagan F., "The Organised Crime Continuum: A Further Specification of a New Conceptual Model" 
Criminal Justice Review, Vol. 8 (Spring, 1983) at pp. 52-57 
71 Letizia P., "Criminal Fraternities or Criminal EnteEprises? " in Williams P., & Vlassis D., "Combatin 
Transnational Crime Concepts, Activities and Responses, " ISPAC, 2001 at p. 88 
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On reviewing the conduct of criminal enterprises mentioned below, it will become 
evident that the focus of those legal and illegal operations must be on those activities 
that are illegal. Earlier it was mentioned that money laundering is becoming if not 
already the world's largest industry and that it is estimated that over $2.85 trillion are 
laundered every year. The IMF however, estimates that the amount of money that is 
72 laundered each year ranges between 2% and 5% of the world's GDP. That being the 
case, a phenomenal amount of money is earned each year through illegal activities 
because it is contended that the said $2.85 trillion is only a portion of illegal earnings. In 
essence, this means that much greater profits are earned as a result of illegal activities 
than through legal operations. This therefore requires tremendous efforts on the part of 
those criminal associations to avoid by whatever means being interdicted by the law 
enforcement authorities. Accordingly, there must be some emphasis or intense focus on 
the illegal operations in order to be able to generate such returns and to launder those 
proceeds with impunity. 
Another definition or rather description of organized crime was given by Cyril Fijnant 
et al in 'Organised Crime in the Netherlands' where it was expounded that "organized 
crime involves groups primarily focused on illegal profits that systematically commit crimes 
with serious repercussions for society and are capable of shielding these crimes relatively 
effectively, in particular by way of their willingness to use physical violence or eliminate 
individuals by means of corruption. - That description of organized crime closely relates to 
the modus operandi of organized criminals who (although the description emphasized, 
focus on illegal profits) also engage in legitimate activities as well but for the most part 
to conceal their money laundering activities. The said description of organised crime is 
an amplification of the description given above by Frank Hagan except that it has 
expressly indicated that criminal organizations as a form of protection of their illegal 
activities engage in further criminal activities such as violence and corruption. A closer 
reading of Hagan's description would however reveal that those criminal activities are 
intrinsic in the description given by Hagan. 
On the basis of the aforesaid, the definition of organized crime that is considered to be 
most applicable to this thesis and the modem day activities of organized criminals is as 
follows, 'organised crime is the unlawful conduct of a group of persons in association 
with each other who are engaged in a continuing enterprise, which may commingle licit 
72 FATF-OECD, "Policy Briefs - Money Laundering" OECD Observer July, 1999. 
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and illicit activities for the purpose of the acquisition of wealth and/or for some other 
social, cultural, political, religious or economic reason. ' It is however important to note 
that not all criminal activity or groupings may be considered as being organised crime. 
As Friman and Andreas have observed, 
"trafficking organizations come in all forms and sizes. While they are often lumped 
together as organized crime, this is misleading due to the extreme variation in the levels 
of organization and degree of criminality. Traffickers range ftoin independent 
entrepreneurs to loose networks of transnational gangs, to highly developed and 
vertically integrated criminal organizations. , 73 
In an effort to clarify the extent to which criminal groups may be referred to as being 
involved in organised criminal activity the UN 74 has provided a definition of an 
organised criminal group as follows: 
"Organised criminal group shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, 
existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or 
more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in 
order to obtain directly or indirectly, afinancial or other material benefit. , 75 
The serious crimes to which the definition relates represent offences that are punishable 
for a maximum period of at least four years, or a more severe penalty. 76 It has also been 
provided that ad hoe groups that are formed for the immediate commission of an 
offence may not be considered as structured groups. However, the mere fact that the 
structure of the group may not be developed or possess a stable membership does not 
necessarily mean that it is not a structured group. 77 
28 Organised criminal groups 
During the early 1980's and the latter part of the 1990's there was a concerted effort by 
organized criminal syndicates to cooperate with each other in order to avoid detection 
by law enforcement agencies and to market and distribute their illicit products 
effectively. 18 There have been reports of cooperation between 79 the organised criminal 
73 Friman R., & Andreas P., "The Illicit Global Economy and State Power, " 1999 at p. 7 
74 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 2000 which entered into force on 
29th September 2003. 
75 Article 2(a) UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, 2000. 
76 lbid at Article 2(b)- "Serious crime shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by a 
maximum deprivation of liberty of at leastfour years or a more serious penalty. " 
77 lbid at Article 2(c) - "Structured group shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the 
immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its 
members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure. " 
78 Jordan D., "Drug Politics Di! ly Money and DemocracieL: 1999, at p. 79, "In the post- cold war era 
the Sicilian mafia, which was thought to have no equal, wasjoined by other major players. The most 
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syndicates in an effort to further criminal activities in a coordinated manner and to avoid 
conflicts among each other. It has been reputed that these efforts to cooperate resulted in 
two meetings being held by these criminal associations. One in Aruba in 1987 and the 
other in Rome in 1992 . 
80 As a result of the cooperation between the Colombian drug 
cartels and the Italian Mafia it was agreed that the Colombian drug cartels would have 
exclusive rights to traffic South American cocaine to Europe. 81 It is this type of 
organisation and coordination that provide tremendous difficulties for money laundering 
law enforcement officials. As Lilley has observed: 
"Money laundering by international criminal enterprises challenges the legitimate 
authority of national governments, corrupts officials and professionals, endangers the 
financial and economic stability of nations, diminishes the efficiency of global interest rate 
markets and routinely violates legal norms, property rights and human rights... In some 
countries such as Columbia, Mexico and Russia the wealth and power of organized 
criminal enterprises rival the wealth andpower of the government. -112 
28.1 The Colombian Cartels 
The Colombian cartels (Medellin and Cali ) for years have been ferocious thorns in the 
side of law enforcement agencies. Between them they have killed countless people 
within Colombia, ranging from ordinary civilians to prominent persons in the judiciary 
and the political directorate. 83 They have also been responsible for the assassination of 
countless military personnel'84 the deaths of members of the clergy and for the 
prominent ones, besides the Russians, were the Chinese Triads and the Japanese Yakuza. Claire Sterling 
believes that these three mafias, together with the American and Colombian mifas, have beenforming a 
worldwide criminal consortium. " 
79 lbid at p. 81 where it was stated that the Japan Yakuza has been cooperating with the Cosa Nostra 
(Italian Mafia) since 1960. 
80 lbid at p. 98 "With the help of economic globalisation, organised crime is in a position to operate 
throughout the world with little political check. The various criminal organisation worldwide are well 
aware of each other and have developed methods to coordinate their activities. The Sicilian Mafia, 
Colombian drug cartels, the Turkish Mafia, the Chinese Triads, the Japanese Yakuza, the Russian Mafia 
and the NCS met in Aruba in 1987 and in Rome in 1992, where they agreed to avoid cori/licts, plan 
common strategies, and peacefully divide the planet among themselves. Orlando Cediel Ospina- Vargas, 
alias Tony Duran, leader of the Colombian cocaine mafias, planned to use these international 
connections to launder money in a professional, sophisticated and efficient manner. " " lbid at p. 77 "European police sources believe the Sicilian mafia has aboutfifteen hundred members 
and close to fifteen thousand accomplices in Sicily, Calabria, A cpulia, Compania, and Naples. Its main 
income is derived from cocaine and heroin trafficking. It created the new European cocaine market 
through an agreement with the Colombian drug cartels in which they gave the Columbians 'exclusive 
rights'for trafficking South American cocaine in Europe. " 
82 Lilley P., "Di!:! y Dealing- The Untold Truth of Money Laundering, " 2000 at p. 6 
" Friman R., & Andreas P., "Illicit Global Economy and State Power, " 1999 at p. 13. "The Cartels 
victims by the early 1990s speak to the potential levels of violence that can be generated. The list of those 
killed within Columbia includes nearly 500 policemen, 40 judges, a minister of justice, an attorney 
general, a governor, 3 presidential candidates, a number of leadingjournalists and over 500 civilians to 
car bombs alone. " 
84 Jordan D., "Drug Politics Diqy Money and Democracies, " 1999, at pg 82 
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corruption (through fear, in many cases) of many important and influential persons in 
the country. It is reported that the Cali cartel alone is worth approximately SUS206 
billion. 85 One can hardly imagine what would be their combined value as a result of 
their involvement in the primary illegal activity, drug trafficking. Even with the death of 
Pablo Escobar of the Medellin Cartel and the incarceration of the Rodriguez Orejuela 
brothers of the Cali Cartel in 1997 86 and many other important drug traffickers 87 there is 
still a relentless effort by them to maintain the earnings capacity and influence of their 
ruthless 88 criminal syndicates. 
2 8.2 The Italian Maflas 
The Italian Mafias89 on the other hand have been hard hit9o by law enforcement 
authorities over the past ten years or so but even with large numbers of persons being 
incarcerated they still survive and have been able to diversify their illegal activities into 
areas that will avoid detection. They are known to be heavily involved in, gambling, 
loan sharking, extortion, contraband tobacco and the disposal of toxic waste and have 
been able to secure approximately 20 per cent of the commercial activities in ltaly. 
9 I 
They have also modified their roles to include money laundering services and the 
effective management of their network to facilitate the distribution of drugs. 
Z 8.3 The Mexican Cartels 
The Mexican organized criminal associationS92 and the Columbian Cartels have for 
years been cooperating with each other to smuggle illegal drugs into the USA. The 
Mexican Cartels account for 20% of the heroin, 60% of the marijuana and 40% of the 
cocaine that enter the US market. 93 The amount of money that it laundered in 1994 was 
'5 Lilley P., "Diqy Dealing- The Untold Truth About Global Money Laundering 2000, at p. 18 
86 Ibid at p. 18 
87 Jordan D., "Drug Politics DiLty Money and Democracies, " 1999, at p. 83 
" Ibid at p. 166 "... the 1996 murder rate in Medellin was 228 per 100,000 people, compared with the 
highest murder rate in the UnitedStates - 70 per 100,000 people in Washington, DC ... 
More than thirty 
thousandpeople were murdered in Colombia, the violence capital of the world, in 1995 alone. " 
89 Lilley P., "DiM Dealing- The Untold Truth About Global Money Launderin " 2000, at p. 21 -Italian 
Mafias include, the Cosa Nostra approximately 6000 members; Ndangheta approximately 6000 members; 
the Camora approximately 7000 members and the Sacra Corona Unta. 
90 Robinson J., " The Merger" The Overlook Press, New York, 2000 at pp. 248-250 
9' Lilley P., "Diqy Dealing- The Untold Truth About Global Mongy Laundering" 2000, at p. 21 
92 lbid 19 - Mexican crime syndicates include, Tijuana cartel; the Juarez cartel; the Miguel Caro-Quintero 
organization and the Gulf cartel: 
93 Jordan D., "Drug Politics DiM Money and Democracies, " 1999, at pp. 84-88 
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estimated to range between $3 and $6 million. 
94 One of its cartels (Gulf cartel) is 
95 
estimated to be worth over $ 10 billion. By forging links with each other, organized 
criminals have been able to avoid and evade the law enforcement authorities and 
achieve their objectives. There are reports of ingenious methodS96 being used to 
smuggle illegal drugs into the lucrative markets of Europe and the USA and with 
extensive cooperation from the Mexican crime syndicates and the Italian Mafias, the 
task of interdiction becomes extremely difficult. 
Z8.4 The Japanese Yakuza 
The Japanese Yakuza has been established for centuries 97 and has been built around the 
principles of loyalty and brotherhood. It is considered to be the largest industry in Japan 
with an estimated annual turnover of $US90 billion. 98 The membership of such an 
association is estimated at 100,000 persons who are mainly involved in loan fraud, 
extortion, prostitution and drug trafficking. The Yakuza is known to have spread its 
wings into the western regions of the USA and concentrates heavily on the real estate 
business as one of its main activities outside of Japan. 99 
Z8.5 Chinese Triads 
Like the Yakuza, the Triads have been established for centuriesloo except that it is 
believed that the Triads were established long before the Yakuza. The triads are a fusion 
of three separate criminal organizations in China, being the Won Sing Wo, the Sun Yee 
On and the Wo On Lok. They are involved in several illegal activities, including fraud, 
trading in human beings, counterfeiting, drug trafficking, extortion, gambling and 
money laundering, from which they earn approximately $US200 billion every year. 101 
They are believed to be ruthless and control their followers through the precept of fear. 
94 lbid at p. 84 95 lbid 
96 lbid at p. 82- where the Cali cartel inserts the coca paste into concrete posts, plastic chairs, slippers and 
other unusual products. 
97 Letizia P., "Criminal Fraternities or Criminal Ente! prises? " in Williams P., & Vlassis D., "Combatin 
Transnational Crime Concepts, Activities and Responses, " ISPAC, 2001 at p. 89- where it is stated that 
the Yakuza was established during the early 18'h century. 
98 Lilley P., "Di! 1y Dealing- The Untold Truth About Global Money Laundering 2000, at p. 21 
99 lbid 
100 lbid at p. 22 - where it is noted that the Triads may be able to trace their origins back to the 17 th 
century. 
'0' lbid 
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28.6 The Russian Maftya 
Since the fall of communism the Russian Mafiya has been creating an international hue 
and cry with its involvement in contract killings, drug trafficking, sex trading, fraud, 
stolen cars and extortion among other things. 102 It is alleged to have within its control 80 
percent of the Russian businesses including banks. 103 With a membership of over 
300,000 worldwide it is fast becoming the greatest problem for law enforcement 
authorities. 104 
Z8.7 The Nigerians, Turkish Mafia and the Jamaican Yardies 
The Nigerians on the other hand are specialists in the art of fraud, although they have 
recently been dabbling with drug trafficking and have been able to secure annually an 
estimated income of SUS3.5 billion. 105 Other criminal organizations including the 
Turkish Mafia, the Hells Angels and the Jamaican Yardies, are thorns in the side of law 
enforcement officials. It is alleged that the Turkish Mafia contributes 80% of the heroin 
that is smuggled into the United Kingdom market each year. 106 They are also involved 
in the illegal smuggling of immigrants. 107 The Hells Angels biker group which 
originated in the USA has now spread its wings far a field to Scandinavian countries. 
The country that appears to be most badly affected by this group is Canada where it is 
involved in prostitution, drug trafficking, theft and extortion. 108 
Z8.8 Overarching reasonsfor organised crime 
All of these organizations in addition to those aforementioned are very closely knit and 
are extremely loyal to their causes. It is this loyalty factor that would have been 
established amongst them through fear, kinship or blood ties that makes it sometimes 
virtually impossible and impregnable for the law enforcement authorities to penetrate, 
102 Ibid at p. 20 
103 Jordan D., "Drug Politics Digy Money and Democracies, " 1999 at pp. 75 - 76 where it is noted that 
the mafias own and control most of the 1,800 banks in Russia: see also Lilley P., "Dirty Dealing-- The 
Untold Truth About Global Money Laundering" 2000, at p. 20 
104 Lilley P., "Di! jy Dealing- The Untold Truth About Global Money Launderin " 2000, at p. 20 
'0' lbid at pp. 22-23 106 lbid at p. 22 107 lbid 
108 lbid at p. 23 
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interdict, prosecute and incarcerate. 109 These strong ties may well have developed due to 
the need for the acquisition and accumulation of wealth, in addition to the other 
motivational factors such as culture, politics and religion. Suffice it to state however, 
that certain criminal acts are committed by those who are poverty stricken, blinded by 
cupidity, castrated by undue influence, obsessed with power, embittered as a result of 
religious and other political beliefs purged by acts of terrorism and the exponents of 
matters concerning foreign policy and international relations. 
When considering the institution of measures against those criminals, law enforcement 
must look beyond the horizons of profits and zoom in on other principal reasons such as 
power and authority and terrorism so that the problem can be magnified, evaluated and 
surgically removed. Going easy on crime, complicity to crime, conspiring to commit a 
crime and collaborating with criminals in the furtherance of crime must be dealt with 
effectively if the anti-money laundering initiative is to gain efficacy. It is therefore 
necessary at this juncture to provide an overview of how history, politics, economics 
and culture have fuelled criminal conduct and how at times collaborative efforts of 
certain governments and government officials have elevated to the ranks of prison 
dons, ' 10 and prized leaders many of the perpetrators of organized criminal activities. 
The overview that will be provided is very significant in order to show that the criminal 
activities that gave rise to the money laundering problem had actually been taking place 
outside of small island OFCs and to a large extent had been condoned by some 
OECD/FATF and other developed countries. Such support for organized criminal 
activities has resulted in the establishment of societies that have been fashioned off 
criminal activities. This has left a mind set in those societies that is geared towards the 
accumulation of wealth without regard to human life and suffering. ' 11 Consequently, 
there are countries in which prominent individuals may well be convinced that their 
survival, whether political or economic, depends on crime. 112 To turn a blind eye to 
such malaise and iniquity is furthering a socialization that regards evil as an acceptable 
way of life and murder as the norm in ensuring political and economic stability. The 
small island OFCs as will once again be demonstrated, are not responsible for such a 
1 09 Letizia P., "Criminal Fraternities or Criminal Entetprises? " in Williams P., & Vlassis D., "Combatin 
Transnational Crime Concepts, Activities and Resl2onses, " 2001 at pp. 94-99 
"0 Jordan D., "Drug Politics Dirty Money and Democracies, " 1999, at p. 82 where it is stated that Pablo 
Escobar prison cell was luxurious. 111 Varela-Cid E., "Hidden Fortunes, Drug Money, Cartels and the Elite Banks, ", 1999 pp. 20-79 
112 lbid at pp 23,35 and 41 
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morose situation and therefore the direction of legislative efforts should reflect that 
position. 
However, it is also recognized that in a globalised world the sins of one country are 
usually visited upon the next and therefore it will not augur well for the comity of 
nations if one country were to turn a blind eye to a global problem. How such a state of 
affairs originated and is allowed to continue ought to be examined within the historical, 
social, economic and political context. These factors of life must be put into their 
correct perspectives when considering the extent to which certain small island OFCs 
and SVG in particular, facilitate the money laundering process and therefore are alleged 
to be non-cooperative in the fight against money laundering activities. To commence 
this examination it is most instructive to be guided by the historical imperatives of 
criminal activities and money laundering. 
Z9 Mon ey la un dering an d th e State 
The depraved and heinous conduct in which many have engaged for increased wealth 
and ultimate power has existed for centuries. The extent to which such conduct has been 
prevalent has for the most part been dependent on the support and encouragement of 
heads of States, leaders and other important organs of the state. The Caribbean region at 
one time was the home for criminal activities that were encouraged by those countries 
whose economic interests may well have benefited tremendously. 113 
The involvement in or condonation of the State or State controlled institutions in 
undesirable acts have at times made a mockery of the investigative processes conducted 
by law enforcement agencies. 114 Such conduct has led Jeffrey Robinson in referring to 
money laundering to express the view that "Governments have been known to do it as 
" 11 5 well, whether to subvert terrorists or to arm freedom fighters . 
For this reason it is 
imperative that attention is drawn to the involvement of the State in the money 
laundering process as a means of showing why unless drastic steps are taken to obviate 
113 UNODCCP "Financial Havens Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering" 1998, at p. 3 
114 Jordan D., "Drug Politics Di! ly Money and Democracies, " 1999, at pp. 68 & 97, where the CIA's 
involvement in the global heroin trade had frustrated the efforts of the Drug Enforcement 
Authority(DEA) of the USA; see also McCoy A., "The Politics of Heroin, " Lawrence Hill Books, 1991 
at pp. 469-470 where the CIA were found by the IRS to be laundering money through Castle Bank. The 
case had to be dropped because the CIA invoked national security. 
"5 Robinson J., " The Laundrymen" Arcade, 1996 at p. 20 
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certain oppressive domestic and foreign policies in certain FATF countries in particular, 
there will always be difficulties suppressing money laundering activities. 
The impact of globalisation has expedited the process giving rise to the retreat of the 
State 1 16 and the return of the undesirable activities which fashioned the emergence of 
the State in the first place. 117 It is this vicious cycle to which attention must be drawn in 
support of the argument that both the domestic and foreign policies of some, if not all of 
the FATF countries are responsible for the extent of the money laundering problem. 
Therefore, imposing stringent legal guidelines on small developing OFCs may only 
serve to increase crime in those centres and not necessarily combat money laundering 
effectively. 
Accordingly, a brief historical overview of the emergence of the national State system 
and the significant role that was played by non-State actors in that regard is necessary to 
show the extent to which certain States for centuries have through violence and crime 
been able to secure economic prosperity for their peoples by pillaging and plundering 
and to use a more modem term laundering the spoils of other States. ' 18 
The emergence of the nation State system when considered in conjunction with legal 
anthropological theories serve to demonstrate the difficulties that are inherent in the 
institution and implementation of a regulatory framework that will effectively combat 
money laundering activities. Rebecca Redwood French referred to legal anthropology as 
'the study of legal systems using methods and theory of cultural anthropoloýý. It is centred in 
the analysis of law as a phenomenon inseparable ftom cultural context. the agenl-aclors, 
language, history and traditions of the society in which it operates. ""' This statement 
supports the perspective that unless the law is reflective of the cultural aspects of the 
society over which it is designed to govem, there will undoubtedly be difficulties in its 
acceptance and adherence. 
116 Strange S., " Retreat of the State The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy" Cambridge, 2000 
at pp. I 10- 121 
... Thompson J., "Mercenaries Pirates and Sovereipns, ' Princeton University Press, 1996 at pp. 10- 11 
118 UNODCCP "Financial Havens Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering" 1998, at p. 3 119 French R., "Law and Anthropology" in Patterson D., "A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Lmal 
Theo! y Blackwell Publishers 1999 at p. 397 
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For example, since as early as the thirteenth century there existed a culture of violence 
and crime in the furtherance of commercial supremacy and economic sustenance. 120 
This culture of violence and crime in the forms of piracy, 121 privateering, 122 
mercenarism 123 and mercantile companies 124 though on the surface may appear to have 
been eradicated or in some instances significantly mitigated, are nonetheless very much 
present in societies today. The only difference is that more sophisticated and ingenious 
ways have been developed to conceal and or disguise the identical conduct which was 
prevalent from the thirteenth century up to the nineteenth century 125 . As Janice E. 
Thompson pointed out, "one reasonfor this turn to non-state violence was the ruler's lack of 
revenue. By authorizing individuals and groups to exercise political power and violence, rulers 
avoided the expense associated with someforeign ventures. , 126 
In most instances States turned a blind eye to those atrocities even after complaints were 
made by the recipient States. Accordingly, carte blanche was given to non-State actors 
to institute violence in the name of the State provided that some benefit accrued to the 
State as a result of such atrocities. ' 27 It was such a deplorable state of affairs that led the 
Spanish Ambassador to England to impress upon the King of Spain that he should issue 
orders; 
"that no foreign ship should be spared in either the Spanish or Portuguese Indies but 
that every one should be sent to the bottom... This will be the only way to prevent the 
English or the French from going to those parts to plunder; for at present there is 
120 Thompson J., "Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns, " 1996 at pp. 21-22 
121 Piracy consists in acts of violence done upon the ocean or unappropriated lands, or within the territory 
of a State through descent from the sea with a body of men acting independently of any politically 
organized society-see Stark F., 'The Abolition of Privateering and the Declaration of Paris. " In Studies in 
History, Economics and Public Law, edited by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University, 
vol. 8, no 3. New York: 1897; For legal description of Piracy see Art 15 of the Convention on the High 
Seas of 1958. 
"' Vessels belonging to private owners, and sailing under a commission of war empowering the person to 
whom it is granted to carry on all forms of hostility which are permissible at sea by the usages of war. See 
Thompson J., "Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns, " 1996 at pp. 22-26 
123 A Mercenary is one who fights for an employer other than his home State and whose motivation is 
economic. The soldier of fortune is the ideal type of Mercenary. See Thompson J., "Mercenaries, Pirates 
and Sovereigns, " 1996 at p. 26 
124 Mercantile Companies were based on a State granted monopoly on trade between the home country 
and regions outside of Europe. Though they were financed largely with private capital they were not 
private organizations in the modem sense. They possessed military, judicial and diplomatic power. For 
example, the charter of the United East India Company of the Netherlands granted it the power to make 
war, conclude treaties, acquire territories and build fortresses. These companies made treaties with each 
other and with foreign governments, governed subjects of their home states, raised armies and even 
coined their own money. See Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns 1994 pgs 10- 11 
125 Abhyankar J., "Maritime Fraud and Piracy" in Williams P., & Vlassis D., "Combating Transnational 
Crime, Concepts, Activities and Revonses'll 2001 at pp. 157-194 
126 Thompson J., "Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns, " 1996 at p. 21 
127 Williams E., "From Columbus to Castro the Histo1y of the Caribbean 1492-1969" Andre Deutsch, 
1997 at pp. 73-79 and 83-85; see also the Prize Act of 1708 which allowed a privateer to retain all his 
prizes and was paid a bounty based on the number of prisoners he took. 
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hardly an Englishman who is not talking of undertaking the voyage, so encouraged are 
they by Drake's return. , 128 As one 17 th century writer in referring to pirates pointed 
out, "they walk the streets with their pockets full of gold and are the constant 
companion of the chief in the government. They threaten my life and those who were 
active in apprehending them; carry their prohibited goods publicly in boats ftom one 
place to anotherfor a market, threaten the lives of the King's collectors and withforce 
and arms rescue the goods ftom them. All these parts swarm with pirates, so that if 
some speedy and effectual course be not taken the trade with America will be 
ruined , 129 
Certain European States were able to enjoy the benefits of the unlawful acts of pirates, 
privateers, mercenaries and mercantile companies without having to accept the burdens. 
This approach was founded on the principle of plausible deniability. "0 Noblemen such 
as Sir Francis Drake, Sir John Hawkins, Sir Walter Raleigh and Sir Henry Morgan, all 
engaged in acts of piracy and privateering and insofar as Sir Henry Morgan was 
concerned in acts of buccaneering with the knowledge and approval of the rulers of 
Britain during the 17 th and 18 th centuries. The East and West India Mercantile 
Companies along with the Hudson Bay Mercantile Company 131 all played a significant 
role in the acquisition of land and wealth for the rulers of their respective countries. The 
Dutch also benefited tremendously from such nefarious activities especially in 1628 
when Piet Heyn of Holland captured the Spanish treasure fleet off the coast of Cuba. 132 
The French rulers also encouraged their nationals in acts of piracy and privateering. 
This was in evidence in 1522 when the King of France accepted presents of treasures 
which were stolen from Spanish vessels by a Florentine buccaneer Giovanni 
Verrazano. 1 33 
It is indeed interesting to note that those men stole, robbed, burgled and killed, yet some 
were granted knighthoods and permitted to exist as noblemen, except for Sir Walter 
Raleigh who was eventually executed in 1618.134 Piet Heyn was also granted the award 
of being appointed Lieutenant-Admiral of Holland second only to the head of state, the 
Prince of Orange. 135 Even if one were to very quickly point out that the aforesaid 
"' lbid at p. 74 
129 Madinger J., & Zalophony S., "Money Laundering- A Guide for Criminal Investigators" CRC Press, 
New York, 1999 at p. 21 
"0 Thompson J., "Mercenaries Pirates and Sovereigns, " 1996 at p. 21 where Plausible Deniability was 
described as a situation in which a ruler of a state claimed the benefit of a private undertaking that was 
authorized by him. If however the enterprise caused conflict with another state, the said ruler could claim 
that it was a private operation for which he could not be held responsible. 
131 lbid at pp. 32-42 and 59-68 
132 Williams E., "From Columbus to Castro the HistoEy of the Caribbean 1492-1969" 1997 at p. 84 
"' lbid at p. 73 
134 Ibid at p. 79: See also Thompson J., "Mercenaries Pirates and Sovereip'ns, " 1996 at p. 23 
131 Williams E., "From Columbus to Castro the History of the Caribbean 1492-1969" 1997 at p. 84 
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conduct was acceptable during those turbulent 300 years and that states and their 
agencies conducted themselves differently in modem times, the evidence to support 
such a contention will be extremely difficult to adduce. This is mainly because rulers of 
certain states have been found to be directly involved in decisions that encourage money 
laundering activities. It is reported that during Reagan's term in office as President of 
the USA he was aware of and did encourage a money laundering scheme which 
involved selling arms to Iran, the proceeds of which were then diverted to finance the 
Contra rebels of Nicaragua in their armed struggle against the Sandinista regime. 136 
Ferdinand and Emelda Marcos of the Philippines also allegedly laundered billions of 
dollars through a complex network of corporations world wide. 137 Manuel Antonio 
Noriega was involved in drug trafficking and money laundering. 138 Sadam. Hussein has 
also been accused of laundering the proceeds of jewellery, expensive cars and other 
valuable items that were stolen from Kuwait. ' 39 During George Bush (Snr) tenn of 
office as President of the USA the CIA was actually selling cocaine in 1990 and 
laundering the proceeds only later to admit that the whole affair was regrettable. 140 
The CIA's further involvement in money laundering was conducted through Associated 
Traders Corporation, a company which was located in Baltimore Maryland. The CIA it 
141 is reported regularly laundered money through the First National Bank of Maryland . 
In the late 1970s the CIA assisted the then Argentinean administration to launder money 
through Florida to assist a known associate of drug traffickers, General Luis Garcia 
Meza Tejada to launch a coup against the Bolivian regime. 142 It has also been reported 
that Joseph Mobutu of the Congo transferred up to $US5 billion from his country. 143 
There are countless other incidents of the CIA's involvement in money laundering and 
the same can be said of many other rulers and officials of countries 144 other than the 
USA. What is however alarming is the fact that the money laundering activities in 
136 Robinson J., "The Laundrymen" 1996 at p. 20 
137 Robinson J., "The Laund[ymen" 1996 at p. 22 
138 lbid at pp. 67-69 
"9 lbid at pp. 61-65 
140 lbid at p. 76 
141 lbid at p. 77 
142 Ibid at p. 78 
143 lbid at p. 31 
144 Morris-Cotterill N., "How not to be a Money Launderer, " 1999 at p. 4 where it is alleged that Burma 
refuses to enact any anti-money legislation because its domestic economy would suffer if such laws are 
introduced : Lilley P., "Diqy Dealing-The Untold Truth About Global Money Laundering, " 2000 at p. 5- 
Where it is stated that Russian officials laundered state funds through offshore jurisdictions 
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which those persons and/or organizations are involved have served to exacerbate the 
money laundering problem not only by actually being engaged in it but also by 
condoning the activities of others, if to do so will further a preferred political purpose. 
The question that needs to be answered is whether these so called responsible persons 
institutions and States intend to cease such a deplorable practice? If not, how then can 
small island offshore finance centres make a difference when those who are charged 
with upholding the law are actually utilizing the secrecy provisions of offshore banking 
sectors 145 to carry out clandestine and unlawful acts. Thus it is clear from the foregoing 
that states emerged from a culture of violence and crime, 146 a culture that still exists 
today. The challenge is one to influence that culture if any meaningful progress is to be 
made in the current money laundering efforts. 
2 10 Drug Trafficking and The State 
One of the main reasons for the current thrust towards the eradication of money 
laundering is the evil attending drug trafficking which is considered to be the main 
illegal activity from which monies are earned and laundered. The continued success of 
drug trafficking has been highlighted by Richard Friman and Peter Andreas who 
expressed the view that; 
"For example, while drug trafficking networks are certainly not a new phenomena, 
their scope, reach and intensity have greatly increased in recent decades. The illicit 
opium trade during the 1800s entailed the British and US traffickers shipping drugs 
ftom India and Persia respectively, into China Illicit trade networks during the early 
1900s included heroin and cocaine produced in the United States and Europe and 
transhipped through Japan and Russia into China What has changed since the 1960s 
... is the rise of the mass markets and sophisticated tr 'cking networks 
fior heroin, 
cannabis, and cocaine in the United States and Europe. "/f 
It was mentioned earlier in this chapter that drug trafficking is the largest industry in the 
world today. 148 Research has revealed that approximately 90% of the cash circulating in 
London is tainted with drugs and 99% of that which is circulating in the USA is tainted 
with cocaine. 149 The annual drug trafficking revenues that are generated in the USA are 
estimated at $120 billion of which f20 billion relates to expenses. 150 It is further 
suggested that as much as $200 billion worth of illegal drugs enters the US market 
145 Robinson J., "The Laund! ymen" 1996 at p. 76 
146 Thompson J., "Mercenaries, Pirates, & Sovereigns" 1996 at p. 4 
147 Friman R., & Andreas P., "Illicit Global Economy & State Power, " 1999 at p. 6 148 Lilley P., "DiM Dealing- The Untold Truth About Global Money Laundering" 2000, at p. 3 149 lbid at p. 26 
150 Howard C., "Butterworths Money Laundering Law, " 2001 at p. 115 
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annually. 151 The United Kingdom (UK) is also reputed to be a lucrative market for 
illegal drug consumption. Since 1993 the UK's drug trafficking market was estimated to 
have generated approximately f2.4 billion per annum, of which 70% of the profits is 
said to be laundered in the UK financial institutions. ' 52 The extent of drug trafficking 
and laundering in the UK seems to confirm a remark which was made by John Moscow 
(a US Attorney) that; 
--too many British institutions turn a blind eye when there customers are laundering 
funds connected with drugs, terrorism and arms dealing ... the 
City does not appear to 
accept the view that people who transmit money are responsible for their actions ... as a 
result some New York launderers were choosing to route their 'dirty deals' through 
London , 153 
Bearing in mind that offshore banks are condemned as being facilitators of money 
laundering the statement that "the biggest offshore centre is actually the City of London" 154 is 
not without foundation. But the drug trafficking problem does not only reside in the 
UK. The combined profits from drug trafficking in Europe and the USA are estimated 
to yield $232,115 per minute. This shows that the contribution of Europe and the USA 
to the $1 trillion in annual drug trafficking revenues 155 is significant. 
Therefore, every effort must be made by the international community, especially the 
FATF countries and the USA in particular to rid the world of the drug menace. The 
question still remains whether enough is being done to significantly mitigate or 
eradicate drug trafficking. It may well be necessary to place greater emphasis on border 
controls to reduce the influx of illegal drugs. Perhaps there is a need for further research 
to be carried out on the possible implications of decriminalising certain classes of drugs. 
Moreover, an increased and relentless international campaign is necessary to educate 
consumers about the evils that are associated with drug consumption and the extent to 
which their contributions may be financing terrorists and other criminal activities. 
Whilst instituting measures to reduce the demand for illicit drugs more attention should 
be given to the reasons why people engage in the supply of illegal drugs. In this way 
assistance that will increase the opportunities for the relatively poor farmers can be 
much better targeted to enable them to diversify away from the production of illegal 
drugs. With other economic alternatives available there is always the possibility that 
'51 lbid 
152 lbid at p. 1/ 14 
153 Howard C., "Butterworths Money Laundering Law, " 2001 at p. 115 
154 UNODCCP, "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering" 1998 at p. 16 
155 Howard C., "Butterworths Money Laundering Law, " 2001 at p. 1/4 
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there will be a successful procession away from the production of illegal drugs. Such a 
success was experienced by the poor coca fan-ners of the Upper Huallaga Valley in 
Bolivia by using a method referred to as 'crop substitution. ' 156 This is where the coca 
farmers substituted coca for another legally grown crop. 157 
If those alarming drug trafficking and money laundering statistics are to be taken as 
even closely representative of the actual drug problem it is difficult to conceive that 
such drug related activities can be conducted unabated without much success in 
apprehending those who are responsible. It is therefore important to examine the State 
and its agencies in order to determine the extent to which their activities are geared 
towards eradicating, encouraging and condoning the drug problem. Understandably, the 
extent to which the State is involved in the eradication process is significant in 
deten-nining the extent to which any laws concerning money laundering can be 
effective. 
Since it does appear that the introduction of money laundering legislation is not 
sufficiently adequate to obviate the drug problem, serious attention must be paid to the 
actual implementation of anti-drug legislation globally. It is only with the intransigent 
assistance of the State that an effective regulatory framework concerning drug 
trafficking and by extension money laundering can be properly instituted and 
administered. For this reason an appreciation of drug trafficking and the State is 
paramount in establishing the framework within which money laundering legislation 
can be crafted and implemented efficaciously. It is to such a relationship that 
consideration will now be given. 
History has taught us about the evils of state involvement, encouragement or 
condonation of drug trafficking. It leads to nothing but reprisals and the consequences 
are usually disastrous. The British' direct involvement in the opium trade 158 resulted in 
two Opium Wars being fought between Britain and China in 1840 up to 1842 and 1858 
up to 1860. Even after the use of opium had a significant debilitating effect on the 
Chinese population and the continued pleas by the emperor for a cessation of the opium 
trade, the British, determined to improve its balance of trade with China was relentless 
156 Davids D., "Narco-Terrorism A United Strategy To Fight a Growing Terrorist Menace" Transnational 
Publishers Inc. 2002 at p. 51 
157 Ibid 
158 McCoy A., "The Politics of Heroin, " 1991 at p. 4-5 
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and intransigent. 159 The trade in opium had a devastating effect on the Chinese 
population. 160 Britain however, was not the only country whose non-state actors 
engaged in the sale of opium to the Chinese, the Dutch, the Portuguese and the 
Americans did also play a significant role in one form or another. 161 
Having experienced first hand the dangers of opium consumption, the Chinese 
communist leader Mao Tse tung unleashed opium on the US military in the far East. 
162 
The Soviet Union also used drugs as a deliberate strategy to weaken the US forces 
during the Korean War. 163 Accordingly, the Soviet formed association with organized 
criminal groups in order to obtain assistance in the distribution of drugs and to acquire 
very valuable intelligence information. 164 
The French authorities and the CIA were aware of the trafficking of opium by 
Vietnamese government and French officials. It has been reported that the USA assisted 
in the marketing of the opium on behalf of anti-communists Vietnamese groups. 165 This 
historical experience did not however deter the Americans in any way. The Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) appears to be making it a habit to be associated with drug 
traffickers and undesirable characters, if to do so will further a political purpose 
consistent with the domestic and foreign policies of the USA. During a congressional 
hearing in June 1972 the US Inspector General retorted that, "the agency did not support 
drug trafficking as a matter of policy. The agency, however cooperated with drug 
trafficking for other purposes. " 166 For the most part, the purpose is not usually achieved 
and if ever it has been achieved the detrimental effects of the CIA's 
167 condonation of 
drug trafficking far outweigh any pleasure that the CIA can gain from its reckless 
conduct. 
"9 Morton S., "China its Histo! y and Culture, " McGraw Hill, 3 rd edn. 1995 at pp. 151-157: See also 
Welsh F., "A History Of Honk Kong, " Harper-Collins Publishers, 1997 at pp. 33-37: Jordan D., "Drug 
Politics Di! jy Money And Democracies, " 1999 pp. 55-62 
160 Jordan D., "Drug Politics Dirty Money And Democracies, " 1999 at p. 59 
161 Ibid at p. 244 
162 Jordan D., "Drug Politics Dirty Money And Democracies-" 1999 at p. 63 
163 Ibid at p. 64 
164 Ibid at pp. 64-65 
165 Ibid at p. 65 - 66 
166 Ibid at p. 66 
167 McCoy A., "The Politics of Heroin, " 1991 at p 491 -where the CIA provided National Chinese 
irregulars in Burma with the logistic support that was used to transform that country's shan states into the 
world's largest opium producer. 
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Take for example the fiasco in Afghanistan where the CIA turned a blind eye to drug 
trafficking by the Pakistani military. The vehicles that transported the arms for the 
Afghan guerrillas returned with cargoes of poppy seeds hidden among grains and other 
goods. 168 The CIA despite being aware of such deplorable conduct, did nothing to stop 
the magnitude of poppy being transported for further processing into heroin. As a result, 
during the 5 year period of the Afghan war against Russia it was reported that 
Pakistan's drug revenues totalled $US 10 billion dollars. During that period "80 per cent 
of all heroin consumed in Britain and 30 per cent in the USA, came from Pakistan. " 169 
As a result of the CIA's condonation of the opium trade Pakistan became the supplier of 
70 per cent of the world's heroin. 170 There was also a correlation between the quantity 
of the heroin which flooded the US market and the rise in drug related deaths by 77 per 
centin 1979.171 
As was mentioned earlier, the USA supported the Contras of Nicaragua against the 
Sandinista regime in the mid-1980s. 172 The Contras required funds to support its 
military campaign and in that regard established drug connections that extended to 
Panama, Costa Rica and Honduras. 173 It was these drug connections that the USA 
exploited to lend its support to the Contras. This support resulted in the major expansion 
of the cocaine trade passing through the Caribbean region during the height of the 
Contras military campaign. 174 
Having encouraged, supported, condoned and being at times directly involved in the 
drug trade, it seems rather duplicitous to now stand as the shining beacon for moral 
propriety. It is clear from the aforesaid, that the revenues from the drug trade are more 
significant than those of other illegal activities and therefore should be given much 
greater attention if the problem of money laundering is to be effectively addressed. The 
extent to which such attention will address the money laundering problem will be 
dependent on the support given by states and their law enforcement agencies. It is 
nonetheless extremely difficult to obliterate the money laundering problem when those 
who are charged with the responsibility for combating crime and those who have the 
168 lbid at pp. 445-460 
169 Jordan D., "Drug, Politics Digy Money And Democracies, " 1999 at p. 66. 
"0 lbid at p. 67 
171 McCoy A., "The Politics of Heroin, " 1991 at p. 437 
172 Jordan D., "Drug Politics Di! ly Money And Democracies, " 1999 at p. 97. 
173 lbid at p. 67 
174 lbid at p. 68 
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resources to do battle with the criminals are essentially facilitating and perpetrating the 
underlying activities that give rise to money laundering. 175 
What is rather uncanny is that one of the largest consumers of illegal drugs is the USA 
market, yet there are countless reports of its complicity in drug trafficking. Even more 
alarming are reports that 16,000 US citizens die each year from illegal drugs and the 
country incurs a cost of approximately $US67 billion to deal with drug related illnesses, 
crimes and deaths. 176 It was David Jordan who quite rightly pointed out that; "In short, it 
is clear that corruption infiltrates governments at the highest levels and that mafta cartels 
cooperate with each other much like States across international ftontiers. Organised crime 
operates in terms of its own imperatives for economic expansion, for coalition building among 
its various national cartels, and enforcement of its interests. To flourish, it depends on 
government protection and opportunities provided by the globalisation of international 
capitalism. 477 
Z11 Conclusion 
Having reviewed the aforesaid, it is clear that the small island OFCs do not engage in 
the organized criminal activities that generate the substantial sums of monies that are 
being laundered each year. Neither are those phenomenal sums of monies earned within 
the jurisdictions of those offshore centres. The nefarious and deplorable criminal acts 
are therefore committed outside of those jurisdictions and the revenues earned from 
those acts are not generated within the small island OFCs. Therefore, the placement of 
the proceeds of crime is more likely to be made in the FATF countries where the illicit 
funds originate. That being the case, why should the FATF blacklist and condemn other 
countries as being uncooperative when it would appear that the money laundering 
problem commences and ends in its member countries? 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the roles that small island OFCs play in the money 
laundering process need to be closely examined since their liberal offshore finance laws 
and banking secrecy provisions have exposed them to abuse by organised criminals. 
175 Scott p., & Marshall J., "Cocaine Politics, " University of Califomia Press 1998 at p. 5 where it is 
stated that for the CIA to target international drug networks, it would have to dismantle prime sources of 
intelligence, political leverage, and indirect financing for third world operations. 
176 Lilley P., "Di! jy Money-The Untold Truth About Global Money Laundering, " 2000 at p. 8 
177 Jordan D., "Drug Politics Dirty Money And Democracies, " 1999 at p. 98 
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Equally, there have been a number of drug trafficking, arms dealing 178 and money 
laundering 179 cases involving small island OFCs. It is therefore contended that OFCs 
have a responsibility to ensure that their regulatory and supervisory framework and their 
conduct in general, create an environment that is not favourable to money laundering 
activities. The categorisation by John Walker of three small island OFCs among the top 
twenty destinations for money laundering activities (see Table 2 above) provides an 
indication of the likely level of tolerance for those activities. This tolerance level must 
however be mitigated but unless there is a much greater reduction of organised criminal 
and money laundering activities in the FATF member countries any attempts by small 
island OFCs to combat money laundering will be futile. 
In so far as SVG is concerned, there has been a determined effort to prevent money 
laundering activities from being perpetrated within its shores. In that regard SVG passed 
a number of laws which facilitated the exchange of information with other countries and 
tightened up on its OFSS to prevent its abuse by organised criminals. It is to that 
regulatory framework that attention will be drawn with a view to ascertaining whether 
there was in place an effective regulatory and supervisory framework to combat 
international criminal and money laundering activities. 
178 Griffith L, "Narcotics Anns Trafficking, Corruption and Governance in the Caribbean, " JMLC, 1997 
Vol. I NO, 2 at pp. 138-147 
179 UNODCCP, "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering" 1998 at pp. 3446 
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3.0 Introduction 
This chapter will focus on the legislative framework that existed during the period (mid 
2000) that the FATF conducted its review of SVG. It will be argued that SVG had 
demonstrated legislatively and by its conduct ordinarily that it was prepared to and was 
in fact cooperating internationally, in the fight against international crime. Moreover, it 
will also put into proper perspective the efforts that were made by SVG to meet its 
international obligations and to maintain a reputable financial services sector, with 
specific emphasis on the OFSS. Accordingly, it establishes the foundation for the other 
two chapters that follow by providing an overview of the legislation that was pertinent 
to the money laundering initiative. The following chapter will continue the discussion 
that is commenced in this chapter but it will be primarily examining the conclusions that 
were reached by the FATF, with a view to highlighting the deficiencies and fallacies of 
its assessment of the regulatory and supervisory framework of SVG. In chapter five an 
analysis will be conducted of the legislative measures that were taken by SVG in order 
to be removed from the blacklist on I 9th June, 2003.1 This analysis will seek to 
demonstrate that to the extent that the legislative modifications facilitated SVG's 
removal from the blacklist, it did not represent any significant departure from what 
existed prior to the blacklisting. It is anticipated that together, the three chapters would 
synthesize to; (a) provide a sufficiently comprehensive analysis of SVG's efforts to 
combat crime and in particular money laundering and; (b) demonstrate that had the 
FATF conducted a proper evaluation of the legislative framework relevant to its money 
laundering initiative the conclusions would have been more favourable to SVG. For this 
reason, certain legislative provisions which may not have been discussed in this chapter 
or which may not have been expounded with sufficient detail, will be more 
appropriately dealt with in the other two chapters. 
3.1 The Drug (Prevention Misuse) Act 1988 
SVG's intention to combat money laundering was originally reflected in the passage of 
the Drug (Prevention Misuse) Act (DPMA) 1988. Its provisions, by and large 
1 FATF Report, "Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories: Increasing The World- 
Wide Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures, " 2003. 
103 
Chapter 3. "The Supervisory and Regulatory Framework- Prior to the Blacklisting 
of SVG. " 
conformed with the requirements of Articles 42 and 353 of the Single Convention on 
Narcotics Drugs 1961 which provided for the cooperation with other States in the fight 
against drug trafficking. Drugs money laundering was made a criminal offence pursuant 
4 to section 17(l) of the DPMA 1988. That section criminalised any assistance given to a 
drug trafficker that enabled him to conceal, transfer or in any other way deal with the 
proceeds of his drug trafficking. 5 The Act went further to criminalise any assistance 
given to the commission of a drug related offence outside of SVG provided that there 
was a corresponding law 6 in place, in the other country that punished that offence. 7 
Effectively, SVG was prepared to deal with the cornmission of a drug trafficking 
offence not only within its territorial borders but also without it as well. In doing so, 
' Article 4 of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (520 UNTS 204,1961) provided that: "The 
parties shall take such legislative and administrative measures as may be necessary - (a) to give effect to 
and carry out the provisions of this Convention within their own territories: (b) to cooperate with other 
States in the execution of the provisions of this convention... " 
3 Article 35 of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (520 UNTS 204,1961) provided that: "Having 
due regard to their constitutional legal and administrative systems, the parties shall: (a) make 
arrangements at the national level for the coordination of preventive and repressive action against the 
illicit traffic;... [of narcotic drugs]; (b) assist each other in the campaign against the illicit trqlflc in 
narcotic drugs; (c) co-operate closely with each other ... with a view to maintaining a co-ordinated 
campaign against the illicit traffic; (d) ensure that international co-operation between the appropriate 
agencies can be conducted in an expeditious manner; and (e) ensure that where legal papers are 
transmitted internationallyfor the purposes of a prosecution, the transmittal be effected in an expeditious 
manner to the bodies designated by the parties... " 
4 Section 17(l) provides: "If a person enters into, or is otherwise concerned in, an arrangement whereby- 
(a) the retention or control by or on behat(of another (call him "A') of the proceeds of drug 
trafficking by A isfacilitated (whether by concealment, removalfrom thejurisdiction, transfer to 
nominees or otherwise); or 
(b) the proceeds of drug trafficking by A- 
0) are used to ensure thatfunds are placed at A's disposal, or 
(h) are usedfor A's benefit to acquire property by way of investment or otherwise, 
knowing or suspecting or having reasonable grounds to suspect that A is a person who carries on, or has 
carried on, drug trafficking, he is guilty of an offence. 
Section 17(2) provides: "In this section, references to the proceeds of drug trafficking by any person 
include a reference to any property which, directly or indirectly, represented in his hands the proceeds of 
drug trafficking by him. " 
5 Reizina v lain Farquar MacMaster [ 1999] 1 CAR 402; [ 19991 Crim LR3 10, where conceal or d isguise 
may be taken to mean intention to hide proceeds of drug trafficking : Section 17 of the Drug (Prevention 
Misuse) Act 1998 is pari materia with the English Section 50 of the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 
6 Section 35(l) of the DPMA 1988 defines Corresponding Law in the following manner: " In this Act the 
expression "corresponding law" means a law stated in a certificate purporting to be issued by or on 
beha4f of the government of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to be a law providing for the control and 
regulation in that country of the production, supply, use, export and import of drugs and other substances 
in accordance with the provisions of the Single Convention of Narcotic Drugs signed at New York on 30"' 
March, 1961 or a law providingfor the control and regulation in that country of the production, supply, 
use, export and import of dangerous or otherwise harmful drugs in pursuance of any treaty, convention 
or other agreement or arrangement to which the government of that country and the government of Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines arefor the time being parties. " 
Section 35(2) provides that: "A statement in any such certificate as aforesaid to the effect that anyjacts 
constitute an offence against the law mentioned in the certificate shall be conclusive evidence of the 
matters stated. " 
7 Section 21 of the DPMA 1988 provides that "A person commits an offence if in Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines he assists in or induces the commission in any place outside Saint Vincent and the Grenadines of an offence punishable under the provisions of a corresponding law inforce in that place. " 
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there was required to be some form of cooperation among countries to rid the world of 
the drug menace. 8 By criminalising drug money laundering in that way, and at that time, 
SVG was at the forefront in the fight against money laundering. 
3.2 The Vienna Convention 
In 1988 SVG signed the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances ("Vienna Convention") and acceded to it on 17 th 
May 1994. Interestingly, the DPMA 1988 came into force on 17 th October, 1988, two 
months prior to SVG signing the Vienna Convention on 20th December, 1988. The 
Vienna Convention which entered into force on II th November, 19909 sought to address 
the global problem of drug trafficking and initiated the novel idea of criminalising and 
confiscating the proceeds of drug trafficking. 10 The countries'' that ratified the Vienna 
Convention were required to introduce legislation that made dealing with the proceeds 
of drug trafficking a criminal offence. 12 In this way it was hoped that by taking the 
profits out of crime, the incentive to traffic in narcotics and psychotropic substances 
would have been significantly removed, thus reducing the incidence of drug related 
crimes. 13 
3.3 The Fugitive Offenders Act 1989 
Under Article 6 of the Vienna Convention parties are required to implement legislative 
and other measures that will ensure that the offences listed under Article 3, paragraph 
114 were extraditable offences. Moreover, it imposed upon signatories an obligation to 
expedite extradition procedures that would easily facilitate the extradition of person or 
persons whose return was requested by another party. SVG heeded that call when on 
8 See Sections 21 and 35 of the DPMA, 1988. 
9 Gilmore W., "Di! U Money- The Evolution of Money Laundering Countermeasures, " Council of Europe 
Publishing, 1999, p 50. 
'0 lbid p 51 
11 treaty(dun. or The number of countries that ratified the Vienna Convention up to 3 rd March 2004 was 
173. The Congo was the country that ratified the Convention on that date. 
12 Article 3 of the Vienna Convention imposed on States that executed the convention a duty to introduce 
laws that criminalise a list of activities to do with drug trafficking, money laundering and the confiscation 
of the proceeds of drug trafficking. It provides that: "Each party shall adopt such measures as may be 
necessary to establish as criminal offences tinder its domestic law, when committed intentionally: and 
went on to list activities that should be criminalise. 
13 Gilmore W., "Dirty Money- The Evolution of Money Laundering Countermeasures, " (1999), p51. 
" See note 12 above 
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29th December, 1989 the Fugitive Offenders Act (FOA) 198915 came into force. The 
FOA 1989 essentially provided for the extradition of a person who was accused of a 
relevant offence or who was unlawfully at large after the conviction of such an 
offence. 16 'Relevant offence' was defined in the Act as one of the categories of offences 
that were listed in the First Schedule to the Act or an offence which if committed in 
another country would have been an offence when committed within SVG. 17 
Unlike the Vienna Convention where Article 6 required States to introduce legislation 
that will make drug related offences extraditable offences, the FOA provided a Schedule 
of offences which included drug related and a number of other offences that were 
relevant for the purposes of extradition. Although it did not list money laundering 
offences other than those that were drug related, the FOA nonetheless included an 
international dimension and was drafted to assist other countries to bring to justice those 
whom might have fled to SVG to escape the burdens of the law. Understandably, the 
non-inclusion of money laundering offences, apart from those that were drug related 
" The FOA incorporated the Extradition Acts of 1870 to 1935 and the Fugitive Offenders Act of 1970. 
Section 31 provides that: (1) "Notwithstanding the cesser of the application of the United Kingdom Acts 
known as the Extradition Acts 1870 to 1935, the Orders-in-Council made tinder the said Acts and 
specified in the second column of the Second Schedule made under the said Acts and app4ving the said 
Acts to the foreign countries specified in the first column of that schedule (which Orders have been 
applied to St. Vincent and the Grenadines and are so applied at the commencement of this Act) shall 
continue to apply unless and until provision is otherwise made by the order of the Governor General 
under Section 4(5). 
(2) Where before the 2 7h December, 1989, proceedings for the return of any person have been 
commenced under the provisions of the Fugitive Offenders A ct, 19 70, or the Extradition A cts of 18 70 to 
1935 and have not been concluded, such proceedings shall be deemed to have been commenced tinder the 
provisions of this Act and may be concluded hereunder. 
(3) This A ct applies to offences committed both before and after the commencement of this Act. 
16 Section 5 of the FOA 1989 provides that; "Subject to the provisions of this Act, a personfound in Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines who is accused of a relevant offence in any country being- 
(a) a Commonwealth country 
(b) the Republic of Ireland: or 
(c) aforeign country to which this Act applies, or who is alleged to be unlawfully at large after conviction 
of such an offence in any such country, may be arrested and returned to that country as provided by this 
Act. " 
17 Section 6 of the FOA 1989 provides that; "(1) For the purposes of this Act, apt offence of which a 
person is accused, or has been convicted, is a relevant offence if- 
(a) it is an offence against the law of that country which, however described in that law, falls within 
any of the descriptions set out in the First Schedule and is punishable tinder that law with 
imprisonmentfor a term of twelve months or any greater punishment; and 
(b) the act or omission constituting the offence or, the equivalent act or omission, would constitute 
an offence against the law of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines if took place therein, in the case 
of an extra-territorial offence, in corresponding circumstances outside Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines. 
(2) In determining for the purposes of this section whether an offence against the law of a country falls 
within a description set out in the First Schedule, any special intent or state of mind or special 
circumstances of aggravation which may be necessary to constitute that offence under that law shall be 
disregarded. " 
(3) References to the law of any country include references to the law of any part of that country. 
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could have been attributed to the fact that the Vienna Convention only dealt with drug 
related offences and did not address the wider money laundering issues. 
3.4 The Criminal Code- Chapter 124 of the 1990 Revised Laws ofSVG 
Chapter 124 of the 1990 Revised Laws of SVG ("The Criminal Code") made provisions 
for the forfeiture of the proceeds of certain offences that were committed by persons 
who were employed in the public service. Section 32 18 empowers the court to recover 
from persons who are convicted of offences under sections 85,19 86 20 and 104 2' of the 
Criminal Code any property, which has passed in connection with any of those offences. 
Section 85 criminalised the corrupt solicitation or receipt of any property by a person 
employed by the public service for the purposes of discharging the duties of his office. 
It also criminalised any corrupt procurement or offer that is made by any person to an 
employee of the public service. Moreover, Section 86 makes it an offence for a person 
employed within the public service to accept for the performance of his duties any 
reward or a promise of any reward, except from his employers. Insofar as Section 104 is 
concerned, it is an offence to accept any consideration for the concealment of 
" Section 32 of the Criminal Code 1988 (as amended) provides that: " Where any person is convicted of' 
an offence under section 85,86 or 104, the court may, in addition to or in lieu of any other penalty which 
may be imposed, order the forfeiture to Crown of any property which has passed in connection with the 
commission of the offence or, if such property cannot beforfeiled or cannot be found of such sum as the 
court shall assess as the value of the property; and any such property or sum forfeited shall be dealt with 
as the Governor -General shall direct. Payment of any such sum ordered to beforftited may 
be enforced 
in the same manner and subject to the same incidence as in the case of afine, costs or compensation. 
19 Section 85 of the Criminal Code 1988 (as amended) provides that: "An ,v person who- (a) being employed in the public service, and being charged with the performance qJ* any A4, b, v 
virtue of such employment, corruptly solicits, receives or obtains, or agrees or attempts to 
receive or obtain, any property or benefit of any kindfor himself or any other person on account 
of anything already done or omitted to be done, or to be oi/lerwards done or omitted to he done, 
by him in the discharge of the duties of his office; or 
(h) corruptly gives, confers or procures, or promises or offers to give or confer, or to procure or 
attempt to procure, to, upon orfor any person, employed in the public service, or to, upon, orfor 
any other person, any property or benefit of any kind on account of such act or omission on the 
part of the person so employed, 
is guilty of an qJfence and liable to imprisonmentfor three years. 
20 Section 86 of the Criminal Code 1988 (as amended) provides that: "An 
,v 
person who, being emploYed 
in the public service, takes or acceptsftom any personfor the performance of his (hity as such tin officer, 
any reward beyond his proper pay and emoluments, or any promise oJ"such reward, is gitiltv of an offence 
and liable to imprisonmentfor three years. 
" Section 104 of the Criminal Code 1988 (as amended) provides that: "(/) Where any person has 
committed an offence, any other person who, knowing or believing that the offence or some other of'ence 
has been committed and that he has information which might be of material assistance in securing the 
prosecution or conviction of an offenderfor it, asksfor, accepts or agrees to acceptfor not disclosing that 
information, any consideration other than the making good of the loss or injury caused b, v the offence, or 
the making of reasonable compensation for the loss or injury, is guilty of an q1fence and liable to 
imprisonmentfor two years. 
(2) A person shall be deemed to conceal his knowledge of an offence if without lawful excuse. heJails or 
refuses to disclose to proper authority all materialfacts known to him relative to that oflýnce. 
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information that is material to the prosecution or conviction of an offender. By 
legislating in this way, SVG is restricting the incidence of any corrupt practices in the 
public service by not only criminalising those practices but also removing any benefits 
to be derived from such conduct. By virtue of Section 104, SVG seeks to deter the 
acceptance of monetary reward by any one in return for the suppression of information 
that is vital to the investigation process by law enforcement officials. 
3.5 The Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFA TF) 
The Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) was established following two 
meetings which were convened in Aruba and Jamaica in 1990 and 1992 respectively 
22 
and attended by Caribbean countries (including SVG). It was established to assist its 
member countrieS23 to implement anti-money laundering measures in an effort to 
combat crime. Arising out of those two meetings were an additional 19 
recommendations 24 that were considered to be appropriate to the circumstances of the 
member countries and complementary to the 40 FATF money laundering 
recommendations. 25 During the meeting in Jamaica, Caribbean and Latin American 
countries declared (the Kingston Declaration on Money laundering) that amongst other 
things, they would ratify the Vienna Convention and endorse and implement the 40 
FATF recommendations and the 19 CFATF recommendations. 26 The member countries 
also agreed to subject themselves to a process of evaluation by their peers (officials 
from other member territories). 27 Accordingly, in May 1995 SVG voluntarily requested 
a mutual evaluation of its regulatory and supervisory framework. The CFATF's mutual 
evaluation was conducted during the period 20-24 th October, 1997 and the draft report 
on the evaluation was completed on 10th July, 1998. The CFATF's report contained 
several observations about the domestic and offshore financial services sectors. 
Amongst those observations were several areas that the CFATF considered to be 
22 See www. cfatforg 
23 There are 26 member territories which are; Antigua and Barbuda, Anguilla, Aruba, Barbados, The 
Bahamas, Bermuda, Belize, The British Virgin Islands, The Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Republic of Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, The Netherlands Antilles, 
Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, The Turks 
and Caicos Islands, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela 
24 See www. cfatf. org 
25 Lambert A, "The Caribbean Anti-Money Laundering Programme, ' JMLC, 2001, Vol. 5, no. 2 at p 158 
26 See. www. cfatf. org - Kingston Declaration on Money Laundering 1992, p2 para 5 27 lbid p3 para 8 
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deficient and warranted remedial attention. Accordingly, it made the following 
recommendations: 28 
The need to introduce international insurance legislation; 
The need for legislation and guidelines to combat money laundering; 
The supervisory functions of the Authority should be administered by Public 
Officers; 
(iv) More Staff should be recruited and trained; 
(v) The need to establish a National Anti-Money Laundering Standing 
Committee comprising of Senior Government supervisory and enforcement 
agency officials; 
(vi) The need to establish a Financial Intelligence Unit as a central authority for 
the receipt of large currency transaction and suspicious activity reports. 
(vii) That International Business Companies (IBCs) and Mutual Funds should be 
required to submit their annual accounts to the Authority; 
Prior to the blacklisting of SVG in June 2000 it had implemented all but two of the 
aforesaid CFATF's recommendations. SVG did not support the suggestion (in (iii) 
above) that only public officers should be members of the Board of Directors of the St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines Offshore Finance Authority ("OFA") and accordingly 
refused to accept that any such change was necessary (see the following chapter for 
further discussion). It also did not consider the mandatory requirement for the 
submission of annual returns by IBCs ( see (vii) above) an advisable amendment to the 
International Business Companies legislation especially since other offshore 
jurisdictions did not make that requirement mandatory. SVG's membership of the 
CFATF, its voluntary request for a mutual evaluation and the implementation of the 
substantive recommendations of the CFATF were cogent indicators of its commitment 
to the eradication of crime in general and organised crime in particular. 
3.6 The Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1993 
In 1993 SVG passed the Drug Trafficking Offences Act (DTOA) and the Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters (MACM) Act. Both Acts provided for international 
CFATF, "Mutual Evaluation Report St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 11 July 1998 at pp 21-27 
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cooperation in the fight against global crime and with regard to the DTOA, emphasis 
was placed on the criminalisation of drug related money laundering. The DTOA 1993 
retained the drug related offences that were provided in its predecessor, the DPMA 
1988, but introduced an additional offence of concealing or transferring the proceeds of 
drug trafficking. 29 Whereas the DPMA 1988 is an Act which provided for the 
criminalisation of 'dangerous and otherwise harmful drugs and related matters, "" the DTOA 
provided for 'the recovery of the proceeds of illicit drug trafficking andfor matters connected 
therewith or incidental thereto. " Moreover, the DTOA also made provisions for the 
confiscation 32 of the proceeds of crime and the seizure and detention 33 and forfeiture 34 
of cash. 
29 Section 22(l) of the DTOA 1993 provides that: "A person is guilty of an offence if he - 
(a) conceals or disguises property which is in whole or in part, directly or indirectly 
represents, his proceeds of drug trafficking; or 
(b) converts or transfers such property or removes itfrom thejurisdiction, 
to avoid prosecution for a drug trafficking offence or the making or enforcement in his case of a 
confiscation order. " 
Section 22(2): "A person is guilty of an offence if knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that 
property is, or in whole or in part directly or indirectly represents, another person's proceeds of drug 
trafficking, he- 
(a) conceals or disguises the property; or 
(b) converts or transfers the property or removes it from the jurisdiction, to assist a 
person to avoid prosecution for a drug trafficking offence or the making of a confiscation 
order. " 
Section 22(3) "A person is guilty of an offence if knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that 
property is, or in whole or in part directly or indirectly represents, another persons proceeds of drug 
trafficking, he acquired the propertyfor no consideration orfor an inadequate consideration. 
30 The title of the DPMA 1988. 
3 'The title of the DTOA 1993 
32 Section 5 of the DTOA 1993- 
(1) where a person appears before the court, having been remandedfor sentence in respect of 
one or more drug trafficking offences of which he has been convicted a magistrate either b'v 
the court or by a magistrates court and has not previously been sentenced or otherwise 
dealt with in respect of any ofthose convictions, the court shall act in accordance with 
subsections (2), (4) and (5). 
(2) The court shallfirst determine whether he has benefitedfrom drug trafficking. 
(3) For the purpose of this Act, a person who has at any time, whether before or after the date 
of commencement of this Act received any payment or other reward in connection with drug 
trajJicking carried on by him or another has benefitedfrom drug trafficking. 
(4) The court determines that he has so benefited, it shall, before sentencing or otherwise 
dealing with him in respect ofthe offence, determine in accordance with section 9 the 
amount to be recovered by virtue of this section. 
(5) The court shall then, in respect of that offence- 
(a) order him to pay that amount; 
(b) lake account of the order before- 
0) imposing anyfine on him; 
(H) making any order involving any payment by him; or 
(iii) making any order under section 28 of the Drugs (Prevention of 
Misuse) Act; and 
c) subject to paragraph (b), leave the order out of account in determining the 
appropriate sentence or other manner of dealing with the person against whom 
proceedings have been institutedfor the drug trafficking offence. 
Section 25 (1) of the DTOA 1993- "A customs officer or a member of the police may seize and, in 
accordance with this section, detain any cash which is being imported into or exportedftom this State if 
its amount is not less than ten thousand dollars and he has reasonable groundv for suspecting that it 
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Law enforcement officials were also given additional powers to apply for and obtain 
restraining orders 35 to prohibit any dealing with property that may be the subject of a 
confiscation order. 36 Further, financial institutions were required to maintain and 
preserve proper financial records for a prescribed period of time (see chapter 4.7). -37 
Essentially, the DTOA amplified the provisions of the DPMA. Moreover, it reiterated 
Article 4 38 of the Vienna Convention which dealt with the establishment of jurisdiction 
over drug related offences. It also implemented the recommendations made under 
Article 5, which emphasised the need for measures to confiscate the proceeds of drug 
related offences. Interestingly, during the year (1993) that the DTOA was passed in 
parliament, there were 407 reports of drug offences. 39 However, there are no records 
available which show the number of prosecutions and convictions, if any, that arose 
from those 407 reports which essentially represented 5.1 per cent of the total number of 
crimes that were reported for the year 1993. In effect, that level of drug crimes reports 
appears not to give any clear indication of the existence of a serious drug problem. 
Nonetheless, the Hon. Carlyle Dougan expressed some concern for the growing abuse 
of drugs in SVG when he expressly indicated that in the past: 
directly or indirectly represents any person's proceeds of or is intended by any person for use in, drug 
trafficking. " 
34 Section 26(l) of the DTOA 1993- "The Magistrate may order the forfeiture of any cash which has 
been seized under section 25 if satisfied, on an application made by the Comptroller of Customs or 
member of the police force while the cash is detained under that section, that the cash directly or 
indirectly represents any person's proceeds of or is intended by any personfor use in, drug trafficking. " 
" Section 13(l) of the DTOA 1993 provides that; "The Court may by order (hereinafter referred to in 
this section as a "restraint Order') prohibit any person from dealing with attv realisable propeqv 
subject to such conditions and exceptions as may be specified in the order. 
36 Section 5 
37 Section 30 of the DTOA 1993 provides that: "(1) Subject to this section, and to section 3 1, afinancial 
institution shall retain, in its originalformfor the minimum retention period applicable to the document, 
(a) a document that relates to afinancial transaction carried out by the institution in its capacitv as 
afinancial institution... - 
(2) For the purposes ofsection the expression "minimum retention period" means- 
(a) where the document relates to the opening of an account with the institution, the period of 7 years 
after the day on which the account closed; 
(b) where the document relates to the opening by a person of a deposit box held b, v the institution, lite 
period of 7 years after the day on which the deposit box ceases to be used by the person: and 
( c) in any other case, the period of 7 years after the day on which the transaction takes place... 
38 Article 4 of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances which provides: "Each party: 
(a) shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish itsjurisdiction over the qjfýnces it has 
established in accordance with Article, paragraph 1, when: 
0) The offence is committed in its territory; 
00 The offence is committed on board a vessel flying its flag or an aircraft which is 
registered under its laws at the time the offence is committed; 
(b) May take such measures as may be necessary to establish itsjurisdiction over the offences it 
has established in accordance with article 3, paragraph I... " 
'9 Crime Statistics Report for the Period 1990- 2002- The Royal St. Vincent and the Grenadines Police 
Force. 
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"... when you heard of drugs here it might havejust been in transit - in and out: maybe 
mar4uana. Now, we are speaking about the effect on our youth of the abuse of drugs... 
We have to call on all the people, all the parents, all the sons and daughters, everybody 
in every part of this society, the churchmen, the preachers; we have to fight it, we have 
to fight it at the source now before it is too late. It has gotten out of hand in the United 
States- there the demand is greatfor it. 40 
He also appeared to be concern that drug traffickers were acquiring arms with the 
proceeds of drug money when he stated that: "They are buying guns with the drug 
money ... if we are not careful, you know, we cannot walk the streets of this country safely... It is 
a good thing that the vast majority of Vincentian peoples are honest and law biding peoples. "' 1 
Although those statements represented expressions of concern about the evils of drug 
trafficking, they did not appear to go as far as to conclude that there was a serious drug 
problem in SVG. They merely highlighted the need for urgent attention to prevent the 
prevalence of drug trafficking from gaining a foot hold in SVG. Accordingly, it seems 
appropriate to suggest that rather than being a measure to deal solely with a problem 
that existed locally, the DTOA was indeed another effort by SVG to cooperate 
internationally in the war against organised crime. That suggestion which will be borne 
out in this and the following chapters was also evident in the presentation of the Drug 
Trafficking Offences Bill 1993 when the Attorney General Hon. Parnel Campbell stated 
that: 
" The objects of this are to update legislation in St. Vincent and the Grenadines for the 
suppression of drug trafficking offences and to enable the Government to adhere to the 
United Nations Convention signed at Vienna in 1988, directed against such traffic. , 42 
3.7 The Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1993 
The MACM Act 1993 dealt specifically with providing assistance in criminal matters to 
Commonwealth States. 43 In essence, it was largely the implementation of the Scheme 
44 Relating to Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters within the Commonwealth . The 
MACM Act 1993 also made provisions to provide assistance in criminal matters to 
States that were not part of the Commonwealth of Nations. 45 SVG's continued efforts to 
40 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debates 12th December, 1993, at p 33. 
41 Ibid 
42 Ibid at p 26 
43 Section 5(l) 
44 Mc Clean D., "International Co-operation In Civil and Criminal Matters, " Oxford, 2002 at pp. 197-213 45 Section 5(l) of the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act "Subject to subsection (2). this Act 
other than Part IV, shall apply in relation to all Commonwealth Countries. " Part IV applies to countries 
other than the Commonwealth. 
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introduce measures that would, through international cooperation, effectively combat 
drug trafficking and other related offences, were demonstrated in its efforts to 
implement the recommendations of the Vienna Convention. This was illustrated by the 
remarks of the Attorney General during the parliamentary debate on the MACM Bill 
when he stated that: 
"This Bill is the sister Bill to the one [meaning the Drug Trafficking Offences Bill] we 
have just passed. It is sought to be passed in conformity with our obligations under the 
1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, for under that Convention, which we have now adopted we 
are obliged to adopt domestic legislation (my emphasis added). , 46 
The MACM Act 1993 fundamentally established SVG's position on international crime 
and international cooperation. SVG was prepared to provide assistance in criminal 
matters to Commonwealth countries and other countries with which it subsequently 
executed relevant agreements. 47 The types of assistance in criminal matters include 
amongst other things (a) the provision of any article or thing that would be relevant to a 
criminal proceeding; 48 (b) making arrangements for the attendance of persons to give 
assistance or other evidence relevant to any criminal proceedings; 49 (C) identifying and 
locating persons that would provide assistance relevant to a criminal proceeding; 50 (d) 
the arrangement or the transfer of any prisoner who could provide or give evidence and 
assistance relevant to a criminal proceeding; 51 (e) tracing property that is connected with 
a serious offence 52 and; (/) the making and enforcement of confiscation and restraining 
orders. 53 The MACM Act 1993 provided for a comprehensively wide range of 
circumstances in which SVG could provide and receive assistance where the requesting 
State had reasonable grounds to believe that the assistance required was relevant to the 
criminal proceeding. 
What was (and still is) of primary significance about the MACM Act 1993 was its 
apparent primacy over all other legislation which sought or may seek to restrict its 
application to cooperate internationally by providing assistance in criminal matters. This 
was reflected in Section 37 of the MACM Act wherein it was provided that; 
46 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 16 th December, 1993 at p 40 
47 Sections 6 and 30 48 Section 9 
49 Section 10 
50 Section 8 
" Section 11 
52 Section 15 
53 Section 16 
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"The provisions of this Act shall take effect notwithstanding any provision Qf ally other 
Act to the contrary, to the intent, that any such provision of any other Act shall he 
deemed to have been hereby amended to the extent required to ensure compliance with 
the relevant provisions of this Act. , 54 
Nevertheless, it encouraged other forms of assistance and cooperation between SVG 
and another State or law enforcement institution. By providing that; 
"Nothing in this Act derogates ftom, or prevents the development of cooperation 
(whetherformal or informal) in respect of criminal matters, between this State and any 
Commonwealth country, or between this State, or any organisation in this State, and the 
International Criminal Police Organisation or any other organisation. "5-5 
Another important feature of the MACM Act 1993 was the clarity accorded to the 
provisions in the First and Second Schedules to the Act that outlined the procedure that 
should be followed in requesting and providing assistance or refusing the assistance 
requested. Having already taken measures to implement Articles 3,4,5 and 6 of the 
Vienna Convention, the MACM Act 1993 essentially established the legislative 
framework, as required under Article 7,56 to cooperate with Commonwealth and other 
States in the fight against drug related and other criminal offences. 57 
3.8 The Drug Eradication Programme 
SVG continued to demonstrate an unwavering commitment to fighting crime by 
cooperating with the United States of America (USA) which provided military 
helicopters to bum marijuana fields in SVG under the Drug Eradication Programme. In 
referring to the drug situation in SVG, Hymie Rubenstein observed in the early 1990s 
that: 
"MarUuana-ganja- and cocaine are still relatively new to St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, the latter not arriving until the mid-1980s. The plant has been taken tip 
with such vigour that St. Vincent now produces more ganja than any of the other small 
States of the region, a fact reinforced by the US- Vincentian sweeps of the Souftiere 
region on their continuing marýuana eradication deployments. Estimating that about 
10% of the crop is destroyed, Rubenstein projects the annual sales (? f Vincentian ganja 
54 Section 37 
" Section 6 
56 Article 7 of the Vienna Convention which provides: "The Parties shall afford one another, pursuant to 
this article, the widest measure of mutual legal assistance in investigations, proseculions andjudicial 
proceedings in relation to criminal offences established in accordance with Article 3, paragraph 1. " 
57 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 16'h December, 1993 at p 44 in referring to the 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Bill stated that: "This legislation is necessaiy in the international 
cooperation against crime, particularly crimes involving money laundering and drug trafficking. 
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at about US$40 million, several millions more than the value of the national banana 
exports. " 
But note that the CIA fact file on SVG has stated that only small amounts of cannabis is 
grown in SVG . 
59 Although there have been lamentations about the status of drug 
trafficking in SVG, the number of reported drug offences relative to the total number of 
crimes that were reported in SVG between 1993 and 2002 hovers around an average of 
5.3%. 60 This seems rather low when consideration is given to the extent of the 
speculation about drug trafficking. During the period 1993 to 2002 the highest number 
of drug offences reported was 528 in 1997 and the lowest was 345 in 1998.6 1 In spite of 
the fact that drug trafficking money laundering was introduced by the DPMA 1988 62 
and amplified by the DTOA 1993,63 during the House of Parliament debate on the 
Proceeds of Crime Bill 1997, the former and longest serving Attorney General retorted 
that: 
"So many of them [drug offenders] are not aftaid of the normal penal sanctions that 
you have now, but they bound to get afraid when you have a law that said, fillowing 
that conviction, the authorities can now look at all the property you have anti see if they 
can prove that some or all of that property was derivedfrom criminal activity. That is 
what the drug pushers are afraid of. I am stressing drug pushers because in St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines, money laundering as far as I am aware is not something that is 
known to authorities in any major or significant way, or as one person said 'who will 
come to St. Vincent to launder money? 'I am not saying there isn't any of it, hut I have 
yet to hear of somebody being charged for money laundering. It is an exceeding4v 
difficult offence to prove. You need technical expertise of the highest kind andyou need 
to he able to go from jurisdiction to jurisdiction to get the sort of evidence that will 
enable you to successfully prosecute money launderers (my emphasis added). 64 
Despite the fact that arising out of that statement was a recognition of the need for 
international cooperation in the fight against money laundering, it was nonetheless 
surprising, having regard to the mountain of speculation about the preponderance of 
drug actiVity'65 that no one (including a Vincentian) had ever been convicted of a money 
laundering offence. Moreover, it seemed rather strange that the Attorney General who 
presented both the DPM Bill 1988 and the DTO Bill 1993 to the House of Parliament 
58 Brana-Shute G., "Narco Criminalijy in the Caribbean" in Griffiths I., "The Political Economy of Drugs 
in the Caribbean, " Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000, at p 100 
59 www. cia. pov/publications/factbook/geos/vc. html 
60 Crime Statistics Report for the Period 1990- 2002- The Royal St. Vincent and the Grenadines Police 
Force. 
61 lbid 
62 Section 17 
63 Sections 21 and 22 
64 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 28 Ih August, 1997, at pp 54 - 55 65 See, St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 16 Ih December, 1993, at pp 3 1-38: Griffith's 
1, "The Political Economy of Drugs in the Caribbean, " Macmillan Press Ltd. 2000, at pp. 100- 102 
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on the basis of that statement ignored the fact that the DPMA 1988 66 and the DTOA 
1993 contained drug money laundering 67 and confiscation 68 provisions. Similarly, the 
MACM Act 1993 had provided a comprehensive legislative regime for assistance in 
criminal matters. 
3.9 Maritime Counter Drug Operations (The Ship Rider Agreement) 
1995 
The Ship Rider Agreement was also another important effort between SVG and the 
USA to combat illicit maritime drug trafficking. '9 The Agreement essentially, permitted 
the Coast Guards of the parties to the Agreement, to board and search in SVG's waters 70 
with the authorisation 71 and in some cases without the authorisation of either party, 
vessels, cargo and persons that either party reasonably suspected were engaging in illicit 
drug trafficking. 72 This Agreement was considered to be vital to the drug interdiction 
programme of the USA in its efforts to significantly mitigate or if possible eradicate the 
movement of illegal drugs originating from Latin America and which were being 
66 Section 17 of the DPMA 1988 
67 Sections 21 and 22 of the DTOA 1993 
68 Section 5 of the DTOA 1993 
69 Article I of the Ship Rider Agreement 1995 provides that; "The parties shall cooperate in combating 
illicit maritime drug traffic to the fullest extent possible, consistent with available law enforcement 
resources and relatedpriorities. " 
70 Article 3(a) defines St. Vincent and the Grenadines waters as "the territorial sea and internal waters of 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and the air space over such waters. " 
7' Article 7 provides that; " When a shiprider is embarked on the other party's vessel, and the enj6rcement 
action carried out is pursuant to the shiprider's authority, any search or seizure ofproperty, an ,V detention of a person, and any use offorce pursuant to this Agreement whether or not involving weapons, 
shall be carried out by the shiprider except asfollows; 
(a) crew members of the other party's vessel may assist in any such action if expressly requested to 
do so by the shiprider and only to the extent and in the manner requested Such request may onýv 
be made, agreed to and acted upon in accordance with the applicable laws andpolicies of both 
parties; and 
(b) such crew members may useforce in self-defence in accordance with the applicable laws and 
policies of their government. " 
72 Article 8 "The government of the United States ofAmerica shall not conduct counier-drug operations 
in Vincentian waters without the permission ofSt. Vincent and the Grenadines, granted by this agreement 
or otherwise. This agreement constitutes permission by the government ofSt. Vincent and the Grenadines 
forUnited States counter-drug operations in any of thefollowing circumstances: 
(a) an embarked St. Vincent and the Grenadines shiprider so authorises; 
(b) A suspect vessel or aircraft, encountered seaward of the territorial sea ofSt. Vincent and the 
Grenadinesflees into Vincentian waters and is pursued therein by a US vessel without a St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines shiprider embarked, in which case any suspect vessel may he 
boarded and searched, and, if the evidence warrants, detainedpending deposition instructions 
ftom St. Vincent and the Grenadines authorities; and 
(c) A St. Vincent and the Grenadines shiprider is unavailable to embark on a US vessel may enter 
Vincentian waters in order to investigate any suspect aircraft or board and search any suspect 
vessel other than a St. Vincent and the Grenadinesflag vessel, and if the evidence warrants, 
detain any such vessel pending disposition instructions ftom St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
authorities. " 
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transhipped to the USA and European markets through Caribbean Islands. 73 Together 
with the Drug Eradication Programme, the Ship Rider Agreement provided the 
cooperation that the USA badly needed to combat the drug related crimes from which 
substantial revenues were generated in its lucrative drug market. 74 
The extent of SVG's cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking was reflected in 
the remarks of the former Attorney General and Deputy Prime Minister P. R Campbell, 
who stated in March 1995 that 'short of handing St. Vincent and the Grenadines over to the 
Americans to administer, I do not know what else the government of St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines could lawfully do to combat drugs. 75 This sentiment was also echoed a year 
and a half later by the former Prime Minister, Sir James Mitchell who retorted that, 'we 
have surrendered our sovereignty. We're giving the US all the cooperation in the world - what 
else do they want us to do? 76 Arising out of those statements was the presumption that 
there was nothing else that SVG could have done to assist the US in its dug interdiction 
and enforcement efforts. The Ship Rider Agreement was seen as a substantial surrender 
of one country's sovereignty to another. As Lowe has observed; 
"It is unusual, but not unknown, for one State to give another permission to exercise 
enforcementjurisdiction in its territory. Perhaps the most significant agreements of this 
kind in recent years are the so-called 'ship rider' agreements made, for example, by the 
United States with a number of Caribbean States, under which US Navy vessels may in 
certain circumstances enter the territorial seas of the other party in order to pursue and 
arrest vessels suspected of being engaged in the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs- , 77 
3.10 The 1996 Extradition Treaty between SVG and the USA 
The FOA 1989 specifically applied to Commonwealth States and The Republic of 
Ireland. It however included certain foreign countries which were listed under the 
Second Schedule and which were held over from the periods prior to October 1979 
when SVG gained its independence from the United Kingdom. The FOA incorporated 
certain provisions of previous legislation such as the Fugitive Offenders Act 1970 and 
73 Griffith's I., "The Political Economy of Drugs in the Caribbean, " 2000, at p 72 where it is stated that 
the US officials believe that 20% of the 760 tonnes of cocaine annually produced in South America is 
transhipped to the United States through the Caribbean basin. - European officials suspect that close to 
30% of the cocaine smuggledfrom Latin America to Europe passes through the Caribbean as well 
7' Lilley P., "Dir1y Dealing-The Untold Truth About Global Money Laundering, International Crime and 
Terrorism, " Kogan Page, 2003 at p 30 where the revenues from the sale of illicit drugs in the USA was 
estimated in 1997 by the Office of Drug Control Policy to be $57.3 billion annually and that 90% of the 
bank notes that circulate in the USA are contaminated by narcotics. 
75 Munroe T., "Cooperation and Conflict in the US- Caribbean Drug Connection" in Griffith's I., "The 
Political Economy of Drugs in the Caribbean, " 2000, at p 194 
76 Ibid 
77 Lowe V., "Jurisdiction, " in Evans M., "International Law, " Oxford, 2003, at p. 352 
Chapter 3. "The Supervisory and Regulatory Framework- Prior to the Blacklisting 
of SVG. " 
the Extradition Acts 1870 to 1935.78 Accordingly, it also incorporated the Statutory 
Instruments from 1894 to 1976 by which those countries under the Second Schedule 
became parties to the extradition arrangements. 79 FATF members were also included in 
the Second Schedule. The USA was incorporated by a Statutory Instrument in 1976 but 
decided nonetheless to establish an Extradition Treaty with SVG in 1996.80 The Treaty 
was actually executed on 15 1h August, 1996. 
Under the Extradition Treaty 1996 the USA and SVG agreed to extradite to each other, 
persons who are wanted in either State for prosecution on extraditable offences or who 
have been convicted of an extraditable offence. 81 Article 2(l) of the Treaty defines an 
extraditable offence to be one that is punishable by imprisonment by either party to the 
Treaty for a period in excess of one year. What is most interesting about the Treaty is 
that it further prescribed that an extraditable offence is one which not only includes 
money laundering 82 but also one which, '... consists of an attempt or a conspiracy to commit, 
aiding or abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of or being an accessory before or 
after thefact to any offence described in paragraph 1.83 
78 Section 31 of the FOA 1989 provided as follows; "Notwithstanding the cesser oJ'application oJ'the 
United Kingdom Acts known as the Extradition Acts 1870 to 1935, the Orders-in-Council made under the 
said Acts to theforeign countries specified in the second column of the Second Schedule made under the 
saidActs and applying the saidActs to theforeign countries specified in thefirst column oj'thatSchedule 
(which Orders have been applied to St. Vincent and the Grenadines and are so applied at the 
commencement of this Act) shall continue to apply unless and until provision is otherwise made ýy order 
of the Governor General under section 4(5) or by treaty or otherwise. 
79 Section 4(2) of the FOA 1989 provided that; "Subject to the provisions ofsubsection (2) to (5), this Act 
applies to - 
(a) everyforeign country specified in the Second Schedule; 
(b) every foreign country with whom St. Vincent and the Grenadines has concluded an e-viradifion 
treaty after 2 7h October, 19 79; 
(c) every foreign country who is a party to a multinational international convention to which St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines is a party; 
Provided that this Act only applies to a country to which subparagraph (D relates in respect of offences to 
which such conventions relates, unless the provisions ofsubparagraphs (a) or (b) apply to such country, - 80 Section 4(4) of the Fugitive Offenders Act 1989 which provides that; "If this Act applies to a foreign 
country specified in the Second Schedule before the concluding of an Extradition Treaty between St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines and that country and the treaty affects or amends an earlier extradition 
treaty with that country which extended to St. Vincent and the Grenadines at the commencement of this 
Act 
, then this Act shall apply thereafter in relation to such foreign country subject to that earlier 
extradition treaty as modified by the later treaty. - 
" Article I of the Extradition Treaty 1996 provides that; "The Contracting States agree to extradite to 
each other, pursuant to the provisions of this Treaty, persons sought for prosecution or convicted of an 
extraditable offence by the authorities in the Requesting State. " 
82 Section 17 of the DPMA 1988; and Sections 21 and 22 of the DTOA 1993 are punishable under 
Section 22(6) for periods in excess of one year. Similarly Sections 59,60,61 of the PCA 1997. 
83 Article 2( 2) of the Extradition Treaty 1996 provides that; "An offence shall also be an extraditable 
offence if it consists of an attempt or a conspiracy to commit, aiding or abetting, counselling or procuring 
the commission of or being an accessory before or after thefact to, any offence described in paragraph 
1.11 
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The First Schedule of the FOA 1989 did not include inchoate offences. 84 Therefore, the 
Treaty effectively extended the number and types of extraditable offences that were 
listed under the FOA 1989 which was drafted with sufficient flexibility to include such 
85 offences on a case by case basis. Moreover, by including inchoate offences as 
extraditable offences, the Treaty has improved the chances of bringing to justice those 
who may not have actually engaged in the physical acts that constituted the crime but 
were insidiously lurking in the shadows as the masterminds or the financiers of criminal 
activities. The Extradition Treaty 1996 is yet another demonstration by SVG of its 
willingness to cooperate in the suppression of international crime. 
3.11 The Offshore Finance Legislation 
In 1996 SVG carried out a complete overhaul of the OFSS by the introduction of seven 
new pieces of legislation 86 which revolutionised the regulatory and supervisory 
framework of the sector. Prior to the introduction of the legislation the OFSS was 
governed by two Acts of Parliament. These were The St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Trust Authority ('The Trust Authority') Act 87 and the International Companies Act 
1976(which was repealed and replaced by the International Companies Act (ICA) 
88 1982). The Trust Authority Act which became effective on 31s' December, 1976 
essentially established the St. Vincent and the Grenadines Trust Authority (hereinafter 
8' Simester A., & Sullivan G., "Criminal Law Theoly and Doctrine, " Hart Publishing, 2000 at p 257 
where it was stated that; "The offences of incitement, conspiracy, and attempt are known as inchoate 
offences because liabilityfor these crimes may arise before, or indeed without, the commission of any 
principal offence ... The obvious virtue of inchoate offences is that they permit the law/ul restraint and 
arrest of aspirant criminals prior to the realisation of any concrete harm. 
85 Section 4(3) of the FOA, 1989 
86 The legislation included; The St. Vincent and the Grenadines Offshore Finance Authority Act 1996, the 
Registered Agents and Trustee Licensing Act 1996, The International Business Companies Act 1996, The 
International Trust Act 1996, The International Banks Act 1996, The International Insurance Act 1996 
and the Confidential Relationships Preservation (International Finance) Act 1996: There were also 
Regulations accompanying the Acts. These were; The Registered Agents and Trustee Licensing 
Regulations 1996, The International Business Companies Regulation 1996, The International Trust 
Regulations 1996 and The International Banks Regulation 1996. No Regulations for the Regulations of 
International Insurance were made. 
87 Chapter 114 of the 1990 Revised Laws of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. This Chapter was 
however, repealed by Section I1 (1) of the SVGOFA Act 1996 which stated that. "The Trust Authority 
Act, and every rule and regulation promulgated there under, is repealed in its entirety as of'the týftective 
date of this Act, and save only to the extent any such law, rule or regulation shall expressly remain 
applicable to a trust registered there under but continuedfor the period of time setforth in the 
International Trusts Act. " 
"' Chapter 104 of the 1990 Revised Laws of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Chapter 104 was however, 
repealed by Section 112(l) of the International Business Companies Act (IBC)1996 which provided 
that, 
"The ICs Act, Cap 104, as amended is hereby repealed 
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referred to as the "Trust Authority")89 and provided for the registration of international 
trusts. 90 The ICA on the other hand became effective on 20th April, 1982.91 It provided 
for the registration and regulation of ICs 92 which included international banking 
companies9' and international insurance companies9' as well. Where appropriate, 
comparisons will be made, between the two former offshore Acts and the six new pieces 
of offshore legislation, in an effort to show the steps that were being taken by the 
governinent to combat money laundering activities. 
3.11.1 The St. Vincent and the Grenadines Offshore Finance A uthority Act 1996 95 
The St. Vincent and the Grenadines Offshore Finance Authority Act (SVGOFA) 1996 
established the Offshore Finance Authority ("OFA" )96 for the purposes of 
administering, marketing, regulating and supervising the conduct of offshore business in 
the country. 97 Section 11 of the SVGOFA repealed the Trust Authority Act 1976. 
Accordingly, all applications for offshore entities" and to become offshore 
representatives" are required to be submitted to the OFA for registration and licensing. 
The OFA is the first regulatory body that was established for the purposes of 
administering, licensing and regulating the OFSS in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
Under the Trust Authority Act local representatives' 00 submitted their applications for 
the registrations of trusts'01 and ICS102 to the Trust Authority, which in turn submitted 
those applications to the Registrar of Trusts 103 and the Registrar of Companies'04 for 
'9 Section 3 
90 Section 6 
9' Note that the ICs Act 1982, replaced the ICs Act 1976. 
92 Section 4 of the ICs Act 1982 
93 Sections 4-15 
9' Section 3(4) 
95 This Act was passed in the House of Parliament on 27h June, 1996 and was given the Govemor 
General's assent on 7th October, 1996. 
96 Section 3 
97 Section 8 
98 For example, International Business Companies, International Trusts, international Banks and later 
Mutual Funds and International Insurance Companies. 
99 See Section 2 RATL Act 1996 where Offshore Representation is defined. Effectively an offshore 
representative is some one permitted by the Offshore Finance Authority to conduct offshore business. 
'0' Section 2 provides that : Local Representative means the Authority and any other person residitkg in 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines by whom an international companýv is representedfor the purposes qfthe 
lCs Act. 
'01 Section 6 
102 Section 12 
103 Section 6(l )(a) 
104 Section 12(l)(a) 
120 
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registration. The Registrar of Trusts and the Registrar of Companies were civil servants 
who were employed at the government's local Registry Department. Therefore, the 
Trust Authority's role was that of an intermediary in the process of trusts and lCs' 
registrations. Its regulatory functions were dichotomous. On the one hand it received 
and submitted applications for the registrations of trusts and companies and on the 
other, it shared with the Registrar of Companies the supervisory functions for the 
operations of international banking companies. 
What was even more interesting about the functions of the Trust Authority was the 
hybridity of its role both as a local representative 105 and a regulator'06 of international 
banking companies. Such hybridism could have created difficulties in the regulatory 
process if the situation had arisen where the Trust Authority acted in the capacity as 
local representative for an international company in possession of an international 
banking license. Attempts were however made within the provisions of the ICA tor the 
Registrar of Companies 107 and the Attorney Genera. 1108 to supervise the conduct of the 
Authority whenever such a necessity arose. This did not however remove the anomalous 
character of the Trust Authority due to the fact that the law created the situation where it 
was permitted to be judge and jury in its own case and this did not augur well for the 
transparency and proper administration of the OFSS. 
This anomaly was however removed by Section 8 of the St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Offshore Finance Authority Act 1996 which bestowed upon the OFA the duty, ultimate 
authority and exclusive right amongst other things to, administer, license and supervise, 
Registered Agents 109 and International Banks and supervise the activities of the 
Registrar of Trusts and the Registrar of Companies. Whereas in the past the 'rrust 
Authority which was a body corporate, shared the regulatory responsibilities for K's and 
international trusts with the Registrar of Companies and the Registrar of Trusts who 
were civil servants, those responsibilities are now solely within the province of the 
OFA. Effectively, an OFSS regulatory and supervisory regime has been created which 
"' The definition of local representative also includes the Trust Authority. 
106 The following sections contained regulatory powers of the Authority: Sections 6,8,9,10(l), 15,24 of 
the ICs Act 1982. 
107 Section 12 of the ICA 1982 (now repealed) 
108 Section 31 of the ICA 1982 (now repealed) 
109 Registered Agents are persons who are licensed by the Offshore Finance Authority to conduct the 
business of offshore representation. 
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is separate and distinct from the regulatory and supervisory requirements of the 
domestic finance sector. 
Moreover, unlike the Trust Authority Act which permitted the Trust Authority to 
function as a local representative, the SVGOFA 1996 did not retain that provision and 
therefore the OFA currently exists as a regulatory and administrative body. Instead, the 
Registered Agents and Trustees Licensing Act 1996 which was passed by the House of 
Parliament on 27 th June, 1996 and to which the Governor General granted his assent on 
7 th October, 1996 established a separate regulatory regime for those persons wishing to 
provide offshore finance services. 
Under the St. Vincent and the Grenadines Trust Authority Act 1976 and the ICA the 
Trust Authority was granted a wide discretion to detennine those who it was satisfied 
should be allowed to function as local representatives. In accordance with Section 2 of 
the ICA' 10 the Trust Authority need only be satisfied that the person: 
"... is a resident of St. Vincent and the Grenadines and possesses a qualification and 
status satisfactory in the opinion of the Authority to ensure proper and efficient 
representation of the international company concerned... " 
It appeared that no application to become a local representative was required to be made 
to the Trust Authority and no guidance was given as to the type of qualification and the 
extent and type of experience that a local representative should possess. Therefore in the 
absence of an application procedure there was no effective process for excluding those 
persons who were to become local representatives. 
3.11.2 The Registered Agents and Trustee Licensing Act 1996 
The main purpose of the Registered Agents and Trustee Licensing ('RATL') Act 1996 
is to regulate the conduct of those persons wishing to engage in the business of offshore 
representation in order to ensure that efficient and effective services are provided to 
offshore clients by reputable and competent persons. "' This is exemplified by its 
rigorous licensing procedure, 112 the stringent duties 113 that are imposed on licensees and 
110 See also Section 2 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Trust Authority Act 1976 
111 Lewis L., "A Revolution in Representation, " Offshore Investment, October 1998, Issue 90, pp. 27-30 
at p. 27 
112 See the First Schedule to the RATL Act 1996: See also Sections 4,5,6,7,11 and 16 of that Act. 
113 See Sections 12,14,13,17,18 and 19 
122 
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the likely penalties for misconduct 114 and consequences of non-compliance. 11 5 The 
provisions of the RATL Act 1996 clearly emphasised the government's intention to 
provide not only exemplary offshore financial services but to protect the interest of 
investors as well. In this regarded and in reference to the RATL Act it was stated that: 
"Understandably, it is vital to ensure that only reputable and capable persons are 
engaged in the business of offshore representation. In the light of the fact that only 
registered agents are permitted to submit applications for offshore facilities (e. g. 
registration of trusts, companies, banks etc) every effort is made by the OFA in its 
supervisory capacity to ensure that the interests of investors are protected and 
preserved "116 
3.11.3 The Companies Legislation 
3.11.3.1 The ICs Act 
The ICA 1982 provided for the formation, registration and regulation of ICs. Section 2 
defined international company in the following manner: 
"international company means a company incorporated as an international company or 
international insurance company or international banking company or an international 
shipping company and includes a superannuation fund to which the provisions of this 
Act are applicable. " 
The ICA primarily provided for the registration of companies and the licensing of 
international banks. There were however no provisions for the regulation of the conduct 
of shipping or insurance operations except for those which were incorporated into the 
ICA pursuant to the Statutory Rules and Orders 29 of 1978, which outlined the 
procedure by which an international shipping company may apply for the registration of 
a ship owned by the company. Insofar as international banking was concerned the 
provisions of the ICA did not provide a coherent regulatory structure and was deficient 
in terms of its supervisory and licensing capacities. 
Under the ICA, The Trust Authority was required to share regulatory powers with the 
Governor General, ' 17 the Minister, ' 18 the Registrar of Companies'19 and the Attorney 
114 Section 24 
115 Sections 8 and 9. 
116 Lewis L., "A Revolution in Representation, " Offshore Investment, October 1998, Issue 90, pp. 27-30 
at p. 28 
117 Section 5 (1), (8), (9)(e) 
"" Section 6 (1) 
'19 Section 4 (4), 11,12,23 (3), and 25 
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General. 120 However, pursuant to Section 24 the Trust Authority was empowered to 
assess, examine and investigate the operations of any registered international 
12 22 company. 1 But on the basis of the definition of local representative, , 
it was also 
required to assess, examine and investigate itself. This was indeed an anomaly in the 
law and as stated above, a mischief which the very Act attempted to avoid by granting 
to the Attorney General supervisory powers to assess, examine or investigate the 
conduct of the Trust Authority when it was acting as local or resident representative. 123 
Moreover, the Trust Authority could have been placed in the embarrassing position of 
being a local representative for an international company that held itself out as an 
international banking company when in fact that was not the case. Such a company 
would have contravened section 5(6) of the ICA 1982 and therefore the Trust Authority 
would have been guilty of an offence pursuant to section 5(7) of the ICA for which 
there were penalties. The ICA imposed upon the Trust Authority a number of 
responsibilities and duties 124 concerning the regulation and supervision of ICs, all of 
which also applied to the Trust Authority itself in its capacity as local representative. 
Effectively, the provisions of The ICA echoed the famous maxim "putting the rat to 
watch the cheese. " With the advent of the six new pieces of legislation the govenunent 
was able to remove those anomalies and create a more efficient "one stop shop" 
operation with all applications for offshore entities being submitted to one body, the 
OFA. 
3.11.3.2 The International Business Companies Act 1996 
The International Business Companies (IBC) Act 1996 125 has made numerous radical 
and fundamental changes to the requirements that were laid down in its predecessor, the 
ICA 1982. It maintained the tax exemption incentive' 26 but extended the statutory 
provisions to include the protection of the interests of shareholders 127 and certain 
120 Section 31 
121 ICs Act 1982 or Chapter 104 of the 1990 Revised Laws of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
122 Section 2 
123 Section 31 of the international Companies Act 1982 (now repealed) 
124 Sections 4 (2) and (5), 5 (1), (6), (7), (8), (10), (16), 6 (1), (2), (3), (4) 8,9,10,15,26,27,29,30 
125 see website www. stvincentoffshore. com for the entire International Business Companies Act 1996 
which was granted assent on 7h October, 1996. 
126 Section 99 of the IBC Act 1996 
127 Sections 46-61 of the IBC Act 1996 
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creditors and the management' 28 and dissolution of companies. 129 Many of those 
changes were intended to reform the regulatory character of the business of international 
company registration and regulation in keeping with the government's thrust towards 
building a hygienic offshore finance sector. For example, the IBC Act provides that no 
individual of an unsound mind, less than eighteen years of age and who possesses the 
status of a bankrupt will be permitted to form or join in the formation of an international 
business company (113C). 130 The ICA 1982 did not provide for such a restriction and it 
was therefore possible for a bankrupt, a minor or a certified mentally ill individual to 
participate in the formation of an 113C. This situation was untenable and had the 
potential to generate issues relating to an individual's legal capacity to function on 
behalf of and in the interest of the IBC. Moreover, the absence of such a provision in the 
ICA 1982 actually encouraged an individual to defraud creditors and other investors, 
declare himself bankrupt and use the funds that he had defrauded to start afresh under 
the guise of an IBC. 
What is also of significance is the new provision under the IBC Act 1996 whereby any 
one can inspect the register of an IBC provided that a proper purpose was shown for the 
inspection. 1 31 Moreover, the IBC Act authorises the Registrar of Companies to issue a 
certificate of good standing, which amongst other things, must show whether the IBC is 
in the process of being wound up or any proceedings have been issued to strike the 
name of the IBC off the register. ' 32 The requirement can provide some protection to 
persons who intend to engage in any business transaction with an IBC and want to find 
out more information about the financial status of the company. On applying to the 
Registrar of Companies for a certificate of good standing the Registrar is expected to 
have sufficient information about the solvency 133 of the IBC before a certificate of good 
standing can be issued. 
Moreover, under the IBC Act a company may elect to submit to the Registrar of 
Companies its registers of directors, shares and mortgages or charges or any document 
128 Sections 28-45 of the IBC Act 1996 
129 Sections 76-81 of the IBC Act 1996 
130 Section 3 of the IBC Act 1996 
131 Sections 106 of the I BC Act 1996 
132 Section 105 of the IBC Act 1996 
133 It is submitted that although the Act does not require an IBC to submit to the Registrar of Companies 
annual returns it is difficult to see how a certificate of good standing could be issued without a review 
being conducted of the financial statement of the IBC to ascertain if it is solvent. 
125 
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creating any encumbrances over some or all of its assets. 134 In this way any person 
wishing to transact business with the company or law enforcement officials could have 
inspected its register' 35 at the office of the company's registry to ascertain very pertinent 
information about the company. However, the mere fact that the requirement to submit 
the information was voluntary and not mandatory reduced the level of transparency that 
may well be warranted in the circumstances. Nonetheless, the movement towards 
greater transparency has made it much more difficult for criminal elements to function 
since they rather exist in a shroud of secrecy, whereas the honest investor prefers to 
ascertain more information about a business transaction before committing himself. The 
absence of any credible information on the register, although admittedly may frustrate 
the efforts of law enforcement officials, it may also have the virtue of restricting the 
effective conduct of business activities since it may arouse unwanted suspicion. 
The IBC Act 1996 like the ICA 1982 did not severely restrict the type of activities in 
which IBCs can engage. Therefore, an IBC, just like its predecessor, the international 
company, could have been used to conduct insurance and other type of investment 
activities. 1 36 Although the IBC Act 1996 restricted the use of certain names by IBCs, 137 
it did not extend any restrictions to the activities in which the IBC was able to 
participate. For example, although an IBC was prohibited from using the words 
insurance or assurance in its name 138 an IBC could have conducted insurance and 
mutual fund activities without violating the IBC Act. 139 
134 Section 115 
"' Section 106 
136 Note under Section 5(6) of the ICs Act 1982 and Section 3(1)of the International Banks Act 1996 an 
IBC was prohibited from doing banking business without an international banking license. 
137 Section 10(2)(b) of the IBA 1996 
"' lbid 
D9 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 24th September, 1998 at p 70 (as per Hon. 
Stanley K. John); "Up to 1996, the situation was that offshore ICs couldhave includedin their objects, he 
conduct of the business of insurance without obtaining ftom any regulatory authority in St. Vincent a 
license to do so. An IBC could not include banking in business, in its objects because our laws provided 
that ifyou wanted to do banking business you must obtain a licence to do banking business, protect your 
depositors, protect St. Vincent and the Grenadines and make sure that you conduct your affairs 
satisfactory to certain minimal requirements, but in relation to insurance there was no such measure. It 
means therefore then that an American could have come down to St. Vincent orfax information down to 
St. Vincent, incorporate an IBC which takes a matter of hours, put in its objects insurance business then 
go back to the United States, Europe or Canada and elsewhere and start doing business as an insurer. - 
126 
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3.11.4 The International Insurance Acts of 1996 and 1998 
There was an International Insurance Act that was passed in the House of Parliament on 
19'h September, 1996. It was not however implemented due to the lack of clarity in its 
provisions 140 and its omission to exclude international insurance companies from 
conducting insurance business in the domestic sector. 141 In the absence of a functioning 
international insurance legislation, ICs and IBCs that were registered under the ICA 
1982 and IBC 1996 respectively were conducting business as insurance companies even 
though their activities were not regulated. This was an unacceptable state of affairs for 
SVG but it nonetheless took two years before any remedial action was taken. This 
action resulted in the enactment of the International Insurance Bill in the House of 
Parliament on 24 th September, 1998. This Bill was considered to be a welcoming relief 
by parliamentarians who were understandably uncomfortable with the situation where 
ICs conducted insurance business without any forrn of regulation. In that regard the 
Hon. Stanley K. John said: 
"So we were effectively letting loose criminals and unsuspecting people who wanted 
insurance desperately because there is a big market out there(this offshore insurance 
business). So that the introduction now of the regulatory regime that we have in this 
particular measure [meaning the International Insurance Bill 1998] can only go 
towards protecting, unsuspecting or desperate potential clients and victims out there 
and safeguarding our good name as an offshore financial services provider and the 
good name of St. Vincent and the Grenadines as a country (my emphasis added). , 142 
The International Insurance Act (IIA) 1998 is described in its preamble as "An ACT to 
amend and restate the International Insurance Act 1996 " It essentially repealed the 
International Insurance Act 1996 in its entirety, due to the substantial amendments and 
by virtue of the fact that it was introduced to parliament as a completely new Bill. The 
IIA 1998 prohibits the conduct of international insurance business by those ICs and 
IBCs that do not possess an international insurance license 143 and made it an offence for 
non-compliance. 144 It introduced five different classes of insurance licenses. 145 Classes 
1146 and 11147 are permitted to conduct any international insurance business and general 
140 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 24th September, 1998 at p 75 (as per Dr. Hon. 
Ralph Gonsalves an opposition member who supported the International Insurance Bill) 
141 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 24th September, 1998 at p 63 
142 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 24th September, 1998 at p 71 
143 Section I1 (1) of the IIA 1998 
'44 Section 11(2) of the IIA 1998 
145 Under Section 4(l) of the IIA 1996 there were three classes of Insurers license. 
146 Section 12(l)(a) of the IIA 1998 
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international insurance 148 business respectively. Class 1,1149 on the other hand 
established a hybrid structure wherein it was permitted to conduct with its owners and 
affiliates 70% of its insurance business as long term 150 and general international 
insurance business and the remaining 30% with other persons. A Class III international 
insurance license was essentially 70% captive. The other two classes (Classes IV and 
V)151 of insurances were also captive insurances 152 and therefore did not require the 
same extensive regulatory framework as Classes 1,11 and 111. In this regard Hon. 
Amhim Eustace pointed out that; 
--the licenses for class one to three are subjected to a much greater scope of 
regulation. This is so because those classes of licence will be selling policies to the 
general public; but with respect to classes four andfive Mr. Speaker, they are captive 
147 Section 12(l)(b) of the IIA 1998 
148 Section 4 of the IIA 1998 defines 'general international Insurance business' to mean; "international 
insurance business other than long term international insurance business, andfor the removal of doubt 
includes - 
(a) credit life business, that is the business of effecting and carrying out contracts of insurance 
against risk of loss to persons arising ftom the non-payment of debts due to such persons by 
reason of the death of their debtors, being contracts that are - 
(i) not contracts of domestic insurance business, 
00 expressed to be in effectfor a period of eight years or less, and 
(iii) not either automatically renewable or convertible into contracts of insurance of 
any other kind orfor any other different period; and 
(b) employee group business, that is the business of effecting and carrying out contracts Of 
insurance on the lives of employees of the insured or of an affiliate of the insured being 
contracts that are - 
N not contracts of domestic insurance business, 
(ii) expressed to be in effectfor a period of eight years or less, 
(iii) not either automatically renewable or convertible into contracts of insurance of 
any other kind orfor any other different period; and 
OV) made on a group basis; 
149 Section 12(1)C) of the IIA 1998 
... Section 4 of the IIA 1998 defines 'long term international Insurance business' to mean; "international 
insurance business of'any of the following kinds which is not general international insurance business, 
namely - 
(a) effecting and carrying out contracts of international insurance on human live or contracts to pay 
annuities on human life: 
(b) effecting and carrying out contracts of international insurance against risks of the person 
insured- 
0) sustaining injury as a result of an accident or of an accident of a specified class, - or 
00 dying as the result of an accident or of an accident of a specified class; or 
(iii) becoming incapacitated or dying in consequence of disease or diseases of a 
specfed class; or 
(c ) effecting and carrying out contracts of international insurance, whether by the issue of 
policies, bonds, endowment certificates or otherwise, whereby in return for one or more 
premiums paid to the insurer a sum or series of sums is to become payable in the future to the 
persons insured, not being contracts otherivisefalling within either paragraph (a) or (b): 
being contracts that are expressed to be in effect for a period of more than five years or without limit of 
time and either not expressed to be terminable by the insurer before the expiration offive years from the 
effective date thereof are expressed to be so terminable before the expiration of that period only in special 
circumstances therein mentioned; 
151 Sections 12(l)(d) and (e) of the IIA Act 1998 
152 A captive insurance is described as an insurer that conducts insurance business with its owners. 
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insurance which do not sell to the public at large, but rather sell or insures the risk of 
the owners of the insurer or affiliates of the insurer. , 153 
He further referred to the significance of the distinction between the classes of insurance 
licence within the context of the time period in which companies that were conducting 
insurance business without an international insurance license should comply with the 
licensing requirements under the IIA 1998. Accordingly he stated that; 
"... there are some one hundred and fifty companies already registered which are 
involved in the insurance business, and the transitional provisions 154 of the Act provide 
for the conversion by those companies within a specified period of time with special 
attention being paid to the fact that those which are dealing with the public will have a 
shorter time to meet the transitional provisions in classes four andfive which are not 
selling to the public. "155 
Nonetheless, all Classes of licenses are required to at all times maintain the required 
minimum margin of solvency prescribed by the Regulations. 156 Regulation 7 of the 
International Insurance Regulations (11R) 1999 defines minimum margin of solvency as 
'the minimum amount hy which the total value of an insurer's allowahle assets must exceed the 
total value of its liahilities. ' The minimum margin of solvency establishes a financial 
benchmark below which an insurer is not required to go if it wishes to maintain its 
license. 
Moreover, the IIA 1998 introduced provisions to protect the interests of the insured and 
effectively regulate the conduct of intermediaries, (e. g. insurance brokers, insurance 
managers and insurance agents) and the international insurance business in the OFSS. It 
has set out to do so by legislating that only suitable persons 157 should be permitted to 
function as licensed intermediaries. 158 It has also imposed on those persons, a legal 
obligation to report to the Commissioner of Insurance, any knowledge or information 
that they may have that the insurer is not conducting its insurance business activities in 
the interests of the insured 159 or in accordance with the 11A 1998160 and the criminal 
laws of any country or jurisdiction. 16 1 The IIA 1998 by prohibiting the intermediary 
from being a shareholder, officer, employee or in any other similar way connected to the 
"' See, St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 24 th September, 1998, at p 63 
... Section 49 of the 11A 1998 
"' See, St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 24th September, 1998 at p 64 
156 Section 17 of the IIA 1998 
157 Section 33(l) of the IIA 1998. 
158 Section 30 of the IIA 1998. 
'5" Sections 36(l)(a), (c) and (d)of the IIA 1998. 
160 Section 36(l)(b) and (f) of the IIA 1998. 
161 Section 36(l)(f) of the IIA 1998. 
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insurer, has sought to ensure that there is no conflict of interest between the 
intermediary and the insurer and that the intermediary is not unduly comprornised. ' 62 
Further operating and reporting requirements have been imposed on insurers; (a) not to 
stray from the particulars in their application in the conduct of their insurance 
businesses; 163 (b) to seek the approval of the Commissioner of Insurance before 
effecting any change in the nature of their insurance businesses for which Classes 1,11 
and III licenses are held'64 and; (c) to prepare annual audited accounts 165 which shall be 
submitted to the Commissioner along with other returns. 166 The auditor is also required 
to report to the Commissioner his findings as to whether the insurer, either is 
experiencing, or may experience any difficulties meeting its financial commitments, the 
financial requirements of the Act or Regulations or that he no longer holds the position 
as auditor of the insurer. ' 67 Under the IIA 1998 reporting requirements are not merely 
restricted to inten-nediaries and auditors. The Commissioner of Insurance also has a 
responsibility not only to keep registers of the particulars of insurers and 
interinediaries 168 but also to submit a report to the OFA about the state of affairs of the 
overall insurance business in the OFSS. 169 To assist him in his supervisory 
responsibilities and to ensure that the interest of the insured and the reputation of the 
OFSS are preserved and maintained, provisions are also made for the Commissioner to 
gain access to the books and records of the insurer or an intermediary. 170 
The IIA 1998 was championed in the House of Parliament as a Bill that did . ..... not 
expose us unduly as a nation, while at the same time trying to meet that delicate balance 
between marketing and the legal requirements which is a critical problem in dealing with all the 
offshore legislation in this House. , /7/ SVG clearly did not want its OFSS to be abused by 
criminal elements and the IIA 1998 bears ample testimony to that fact. The IIA 1998 by 
its provisions seeks to ensure that only persons with a sound financial background, the 
requisite knowledge and a good reputation were permitted, not only to be international 
insurers but also to conduct business as intermediaries. Together with the IIA 
162 Section 35 of the IIA 1998 
163 Section 22 (3) of the IIA 1998 
'6' Sections 22(4) and (5) of the IIA 1998 
165 Section 22(6) of the IIA 1998 
166 Section 24 of the IIA 1998 
167 Section 40(l) of the IIA 1998 
168 Section 9 of the IIA 1998 
169 Section 8 of the IIA 1998 
170 Section 7 of the IIA 1998 
171 See, St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 24h September, 1998 at p 64 
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Regulations 1999 (see next chapter), the IIA 1998 has effectively established the legal 
framework that will deter criminals from seriously contemplating turning to the OFSS 
as an aid to their felicitous schemes. During the parliamentary debate on the 
International Insurance Bill 1998 the Hon. Stanley K. John in a succinct manner 
emphasised the need to maintain a reputable OFSS when he stated that: 
" We need to putforemost in our minds the safeguarding or protection of the interests Of 
the people who are being insured That the legislation must of necessity ensure that ... 
the policy holders who are taking advantage of the products offeredfrom St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines ... are protected 
We need to safeguard at the same time the 
reputation of St. Vincent and the Grenadines as afinancial services sector, noijust our 
financial services sector but St. Vincent and the Grenadines itsetf. In our debate on the 
Mutual Funds Act, I made reference to the widespread incidence of fraud that is 
pervasive in international financial circles and certainly in relation to the use of 
offshore financial services facilities in different countries. , 172 
Subsequent to the introduction of the IIA 1998, and up to September 2003 there were 
only 3 international insurance licenses issued by the OFA. 173 It therefore raises the 
question as to why over 150 companies conducted insurance business prior to the IIA 
1998 but only three 174 were licensed by the OFA five years later. 
3.11.5 The International Banks Act 1996 
The International Banks Act (IBA) 1996 was another welcomed addition to the 
regulatory framework of the OFSS. Previously, the ICA 1982 regulated the conduct of 
international banking companies. 17 -5 There were no Regulations providing guidance on 
the activities of an international banking company or the process of applying for a 
banking license. An application for an international banking license along with the 
particulars as stipulated in the ICA 176 was submitted through the Trust Authority to the 
Governor General for his approval or refusal. The Authority informed the applicant of 
the status of his application 177 but the ICA was silent as to who had the responsibility of 
issuing the license. 178 Moreover, both the Governor General 179 and the Minister of 
172 See, St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 24 th September, 1998 at p 66 
173 Insurance Registry at the St. Vincent and the Grenadines Offshore Finance Authority. 
174 See www. stvincentoffshore. com/offshore_indus. htm. 
175 Section 5 of the IBA 1996 
176 Ibid 
177 Section 10 of the ICA 1982 
17" Records at the Offshore finance Authority showed that the Minister of Finance issued the international 
banking license. 
179 Section 5(8) of the ICA 1982. 
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Finance 180 possessed the power to revoke an international banking license whereas the 
Trust Authority had the authority to suspend a licensee on the advice of the Minister of 
Finance. 181 Under the IBA 1996 the OFA pursuant to Section 18 may with the advice 
of the Minister of Finance take certain measures, which also include the revocation of 
an international banking license. 
The International Banks Act 1996 provided greater clarity in the licensing process. 182 
Under that Act, an application for an international banking license was submitted to the 
OFA 183 which recommended to the Minister of Finance that the license should be 
approved. Having received the Minister's approval in writing the license was issued to 
the Applicant by the OFA. 184 There was no requirement under the ICA to submit the 
names of shareholders along with the application for a license., 8' This was a very 
crucial omission. In the absence of such information the door was opened for criminals 
to enter the OFSS and acquire an international banking license without the Trust 
Authority and the Minister of Finance being aware of the ownership of the international 
banking company. Furthermore, no provision was made for the supervision of the 
banking activities and apart from the submission of the annual audited financial 
statements, 186 the Trust Authority had no further access to the records or activities of the 
international banking company. Under the IBA 19961 87 and the International Banks 
Regulation (IBR) 1996,188 the names and addresses of the shareholders must be 
submitted along with the application and there are provisions for the regulation and 
supervision of banking activities. 189 Essentially, the OFA is authorised by the IBA 1996 
to request information from a licensee and to have access to its books and records (see 
chapter 4.5). 190 
'80 Section 6(l) of the ICA 1982 
181 Section 6(2) of the ICA 1982 
182 The International Banks Regulation 1996 provide forms and further guidance as to what is required to 
be submitted with the application. 
181 Section 4(2) of the IBA 1996 
'" Section 4(4) of the IBA 1996 
185 Section 5(2) of the ICA 1982 
186 Section 8 of the ICA 1982 
187 Section 4(2) of the IBA 1996 in particular see the Schedule to the Act 
188 See the Second Schedule 
189 Section 13 of the IBA 1996 
" Section 13(2) of the IBA 1996 
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3.11.6 The International Trusts Act(ITA) 1996 
Under the St. Vincent and the Grenadines Trust Authority Act 1976 provisions were 
made for the registration of trusts'91 but there were no provisions which defined an 
international trust or regulated the concept of a trust and its functions. The concept of a 
trust, its role and functions were all left to the principles of common law to determine. 
The International Trust Act (ITA) 1996 192 has however not only provided a definition of 
trust 193 and an international trust, 194 by the definitions it has also outlined the 
characteristics of a trust. Under the Trust Authority Act the only qualifications that were 
necessary for a trust to be registered were that (a) the beneficiaries of the trust must not 
include persons resident in St. Vincent and the Grenadines at the time of the 
application 195 and (b) the trust may only be registered if at least one of the trustees is the 
Trust Authority or a suitably qualified person who is resident in SVG. 196 
Under the ITA both qualifications were retained but were extended to include the 
characteristics of an international trust. 197 There were additional requirements to be 
satisfied such as the formal requirements for the creation of a trust, which the ITA 
provides must be by deed or settlement, the contents of which must not purport to do 
anything contrary to the laws of the state. 198 Moreover, the ITA imposed upon a 
Registered Trustee the obligation of ascertaining that the settlor was solvent at the time 
of the settlement of the trust; that the settlor did not become insolvent as a result of the 
settlement or any subsequent disposition to the trust; and that none of the said transfers 
were made with the principal intention to defraud a creditor. 199 The fact that those 
provisions were not included in the Trust Authority Act exposed the OFSS to 
infiltration by undesirable persons. Now that the ITA 1996 has made it more difficult 
for such persons to register international trusts, it therefore represents another serious 
step towards the prevention of crime. 
'91 Sections 6,8,9,10,14,15,16 and 17 of the St. Vincent and the Grenadines Trust Act 1976 
192 see www. stvincentoffshore. com for the International Trust Act 1996 and other offshore legislation 
193 Section 4 of the ITA 1996 
194 Section 2 of the ITA 1996 
195 Section 9(l) 
196 Section 9 (2) 
197 Section 56(l) of the ITA 1996 
'98 Section 6 of the ITA 1996 
'99 Section 56(l) of the ITA 1996 
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One of the main purposes of Trust Authority Act was to make provisions for the 
registration of certain trusts on payment of specified fees in lieu of income tax. 200 
Insofar as the registration of trusts is concerned the Act exempted registered trusts from 
income tax if distributions of the trust funds were only made to beneficiaries who were 
neither resident nor domiciled in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 201 The ITA 1996 has 
maintained that exemption 202 but has also extended the tax exemptions to include 
inheritance tax, excise tax, stamp duty and capital gains tax 203 provided certain 
requirements are met. 204 The extension of the tax exemptions although they may have 
provided a potent marketing tool for the OFSS and incentive for prospective investors 
may well have contributed largely to SVG being categorised as a harmful tax 
jurisdiction. 
The International Trusts Act 1996 provides for the registration and regulation of 
international trusts. In effect it codified many of the common law trust principles 
relating to the creation 205 and types of trusts, 206 the operations of a trust and the 
termination 207 and breach 208 of a trust. The major and significant departures from the 
provisions of the Trust Authority Act 1976 have been indicative of the intention by the 
government of St. Vincent and the Grenadines to introduce transparency into the 
offshore finance sector and prohibit undesirable investors from participating in the 
opportunities that are available. Such intention is reflected in the provisions that do not 
validate a disposition of property by a settlor to a trust where that property is not owned 
by the settlor at the time of the disposition. 209 Additionally, it does not validate a 
disposition of immovable property that is invalid under the law of the situs of the 
propertY2 10 or validate testamentary trusts or dispositions that are invalid under the law 
of the testator's domicile. 211 In this way the ITA 1996 is giving recognition to the laws 
of a foreign jurisdiction. This is borne out by Section 3 2(2) which provides that: 
200 The preamble of the Trust Authority Act 1976 states that it is an "Act to establish the St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines Trust Authority: to make provision for the registration of certain trusts on payment of 
specifliedJees in lieu of income tax, andfor the purposes connected therewith are incidental thereto. 
201 Section 10 of the Trust Authority Act 1976 
202 Section 62(1) of the ITA 1996 
203 Section 62 (4) of the ITA 1996 
204 Section 62(l) of the ITA 1996 
205 Section 30 
206 Sections 10,11,12 
207 Section 18-21 
208 Section 22-27 
209 Section 32(l)(i) 
210 Section 32(l)(e) 
211 Section 32(l)(f) 
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"The recognition of anyforeign law in determining whether the Settlor was the owner 
of the properly referred to in this Part or the holder ofproperty so referred to before or 
at the lime of disposition is not affected by this Part. " 
Further recognition is provided under section 34 (1) which stipulates that: 
"Where a husband and wife make a disposition ofproperty to an international trust or 
to a trust that subsequently becomes an international trust and, immediately before such 
disposition, such property or any part thereof or any accumulation thereto is or was, 
pursuant to the law of its or the law either of the transferors' domicile or residence, 
determined to be community property, then, notwithstanding such transfer and except 
where the provisions of the trust deed may expressly provide to the contrary, that 
property and any accumulation thereto shall, for the purpose of giving effect to that 
law, be deemed to be community property and be dealt with in a manner consistent with 
that law but in every other respect shall he dealt with in accordance with the terms of 
the trust. " 
The ITA has been firm on the issue of the legality of an international trust and the 
reasons for its creation. In that regard the ITA has expressly empowered the court to 
declare an international trust to be invalid in circumstances where the trust was 
established under duress or undue influence or by mistake or misrepresentation, 212 
where the trust is immoral or contrary to the public policy of the State 213 and where it is 
created for any unlawful purpose. 214 These provisions were not previously included in 
the Trust Authority Act 1976. 
3.11.7 The Confidential Relationships Preservation( International Finance) Act 1996 
The Confidential Relationships Preservation (International Finance) Act 1996 ("CRPA 
1996") was introduced to ensure that confidential information was only disclosed under 
prescribed circumstances. The CRPA 1996 defined confidential information to 
"... include any and all information and data, whether contained in a written document, 
electronic storage medium or otherwise, concerning any property or other thing of value in 
which the principal has a legal or beneficial interest, that would not be generally known to the 
recipient thereof outside of his relationship with the principaL , 2" This definition was 
buttressed by Section 3(l) where it was provided that the State's policy was to protect 
and preserve confidential information "with respect to business of a professional nature 
which arises in or is created or disseminated within or is transported into thejurisdiction of the 
State. " But it was section 3(2) that brought recipients of confidential information within 
212 Section 36(l)(a) 
213 Section 36 (1)(b) 
214 Section 36 (2) 
215 Section 2 
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the ambit of the CPRA 1996. It did not matter how or where the recipient came into 
possession of confidential information relating to 'business of a professional nature. ' 
Pursuant to Section 3(2) the disclosure of that information was subject to the CPRA 
1996.216 Essentially, implicit within that section was an extraterritorial element since it 
required persons within or without SVG who came into possession of confidential 
information to disclose that information only in accordance with the provisions of the 
Act. 
Sections 3(l) and (2), although in isolation appeared to be extremely harsh and contrary 
to the money laundering initiative, were nonetheless softened when read in conjunction 
with Section 3(3) and the Act as a whole. The Confidentiality Act not only subjected 
Section 3(2) to the provisions laid out in Section 3(3) it also sought to ensure that 
criminals were not permitted to utilise SVG's policy on confidential information to 
carry out their crimes. Pursuant to Section 3(3) the Act had no application to the 
obtaining and disclosure of confidential information in compliance with a court order or 
by or to the OFI and a police officer of the rank of Inspector and above for the purposes 
of investigating a criminal offence alleged to have been committed against the criminal 
laws of SVG or another country. The section also permitted disclosure by a professional 
person acting in the normal course of business or by a bank or financial institution 
where it was reasonably necessary for the protection of the interests of the bank or the 
financial institution. 
The CPRA 1996 Act however expressly excluded the disclosure of any information 
relating to tax or revenue matters. 217 It was this exclusion that created great concern for 
the FATF and was one of the reasons given for the blacklisting of SVG. This issue will 
however be discussed in the following chapter where the justification for the 
blacklisting of SVG will be further assessed. What was also noteworthy about the Act in 
its original form was that where information concerning the violation of the criminal 
laws of a foreign country was to be disclosed, it was a requirement that proceedings 
must have been commenced against a named defendant in that country before the 
216 Section 3(2) of the CRPA 1996 provided that; "Subject to section 3(3), this Act has application to all 
confidential information with respect to business of a professional nature, which information arises or is 
held in or is created or disseminated within or is transported into the State (through whatever medium) 
and to all persons coming into possession of such information, under claim of right or otherwise, at any 
time thereafter whether they be within thejurisdiction of the State or outside thereof Without limiting the 
foregoing, all confidential information shall remain subject to this Act no matter where it is located and 
, 
ýýrdless of the medium or media in which it is contained or transmitted re 
21 Section 3(3)(b)(iii) 
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218 information could have been disclosed . Moreover, enquiries that were conducted 
by a 
grand jury, an investigating magistrate, enquiring magistrate or any similar investigation 
and any proceeding which was criminal in the foreign country but which if brought 
within SVG would have been civil, were not covered as proceedings for the purposes of 
disclosure. However, the references to grand jury, investigating magistrate and enquiry 
magistrate were removed on I Oth November, 1999 by an amendment in the House of 
Parliament .2 
19 This made it easier for those types of proceedings to seek and obtain 
assistance in criminal matters and was well within the ambit of the requirements of the 
MACM 1993 . 
220 Not surprisingly, the FATF in 2000 still referred to that restriction as if 
it had never been amended and actually listed it as a reason for partially meeting 
criterion 16 221 of the 25 criteria for assessing non-cooperative countries and territories 
(see next chapter). 
3.12 The Proceeds of Crime Act 1997 
On 28 th August, 1997 with the passing of the Proceeds of Crime Act (PCA), 
222 SVG 
expanded the offence of money laundering to include the proceeds of crimes other than 
drug trafficking. Money laundering was made an indictable offence . 
223 The PCA Act 
1997 defined money laundering in the following manner: 
"A person shall be taken to engage in money laundering where - 
(a) the person engages, directly or indirectly, in a transaction that involves money or 
other property, that is the proceeds of crime; or 
(b) the person receives, possesses, conceals, disposes of or brings into Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines money or other property that is the proceeds of crime, 
and the person knows or ought reasonably to know that the money or other property is 
derived, obtained or realised, directly or indirectly from some form of unlawfid 
activity. 224 
218 Section 3(4) 
2 '9 Act No. 12 of 1999 provided "Subsection (4) ofsection 3 of the principal Act is amended by deleting 
the words (i) a grandjury investigation, an investigating or enquiry by an investigating magistrate or an 
enquiring magistrate, or a similar investigation... " 
220 Section 6(l) of the MACM Act 1993 provides as follows: "Nothing in this Act derogates ftom, or 
prevents the development of other forms of cooperation whether fiormal or informal) in respect of 
criminal matters, between this State and any Commonwealth country or between this State, or any 
organisation in and the International Criminal Police organisation or any other organisation. " 
22 1 FATF' Report on St. Vincent and the Grenadines Against the Criteria For Assessing Non-Cooperative 
Countries. at pp, 5-6 
222 This Act has been substantially repealed by Section 68 of the PCMLA 200 1 which provides as follows: 
" This Act repeals and replaces the PCA save and except the sections 59,60 and 61. 
223 Section 59 (1) of the PCA 1997 
224 Section 59(3) of the PCA 1997 
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That definition was so wide that it included any dealing whatsoever in the proceeds of 
crime or the handling of money or property that was derived from unlawful activity. 
SVG's determination to combat crime and to cooperate internationally was also 
reflected in the definition given to the terms "proceeds of crime" and "unlawful 
activity. " Proceeds of crime was defined to include the proceeds that were derived from 
the commission of one of the scheduled offences of the PCA 1997 and also from the 
occurrence of any criminal act or omission in another country which, had it occurred in 
SVG, would have constituted a scheduled offence. 225 The term "proceeds" referred to 
property that was acquired from the commission of a scheduled offence; 226 and a 
scheduled offence included money laundering, organised fraud 227 and possession of 
property derived from unlawful activity. 228 'Unlawful activity' did not only include the 
violation of a criminal law in force in SVG but it also referred to the violation of the law 
of another country. 229 Essentially, SVG was prepared to apprehend, charge, try in a 
court of law and convict and sentence if necessary, any one present within its 
jurisdiction for a money laundering offence, irregardless of where the money laundering 
or predicate offence had actually occurred, provided the act or omission constituted a 
scheduled offence and the person is present within its jurisdiction. 
The PCA 1997 also imposed on financial institutions a legal obligation to maintain and 
preserve proper records 230 of financial transactions for prescribed periods 23 1 depending 
on the type of transaction involved. Moreover, it encouraged those institutions to 
225 Section 2 of PCA 1997 
226 Ibid 
227 Section 61 (1) provides that: "A person who engages in organisedfraud commits an indictable offence 
and is liable on conviction to - 
(a) afine not exceedingfive hundred thousand dollars or imprisonmentfor a period not 
exceeding twenlyfive years, or to both suchfine and imprisonment: or 
(b) afine of one million dollars if body corporate. 
Section 61(2) provides that: "A person shall be deemed to engage in organisedfraud if he engages, afier 
the commencement of this Act, in acts or omissions- 
(a) that constitute three or more publicftaud offences: and 
(b) ftom which he derives a benefit. 
228 Section 60 (1) provides that: "A person who, after the commencement of this Act, receives, possesses, 
conceals, disposes of or brings into St. Vincent and the Grenadines any money, or other propeqv that he 
knows or ought reasonably to know to be the proceeds of crime commits an indictable ()Jfence and is 
liable, on conviction, to - 
(a) afine not exceeding two hundred andfifty thousand dollars or imprisonmentfor a period 
not exceedingfive years, or to both suchfine and imprisonment; or 
(b) aftne not exceedingfive hundred thousand dollars in the case of a body corporate. 
229 Section 2 of the PCA 1997 which defined unlawful activity as, "an act or omission that constitutes an 
offence against a law in force in St. Vincent and the Grenadines or against a law of any other country. " 
230 Section 49(l) of The PCA 1997 
231 Section 49(2) of The PCA 1997 
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disclose to a police officer or the Director of Public Prosecutions information about any 
account in their possession provided that they had reasonable grounds for believing that 
it was connected with some unlawful activity. 232 The PCA 1997 was later amended 233 to 
impose a mandatory obligation on financial institutions to provide information on an 
account if they had reasonable grounds to believe that it was used for any unlawful 
activity. 234 
The mandatory disclosure requirement was also extended to cash transactions in excess 
of $US10,000.00 or its equivalent. The Offshore Finance Inspector (OFI) was to be 
informed if the transaction related to an International Business Company. In all other 
cases the cash transaction report was to be made to the anti-money laundering Unit or 
someone designated by the Minister of Finance . 
23' By mandating financial institutions 
to maintain and preserve proper records for prescribed periods, an audit trail was made 
available to law enforcement officials that would enable them to effectively investigate 
money laundering offences. The records may also provide very valuable evidence to be 
used at a trial. Furthermore, a foreign country may be able to obtain access to those 
records by requesting for assistance either pursuant to the MACM Act 1993 or the 
MLAT 1998 (see below). 
The PCA 1997 made provisions for very serious steps to be taken to ensure that those 
who committed a scheduled offence must not benefit from their crimes. In that regard 
there were provisions for the forfeiture, 236 confiscation, 237 seizure and restraint of 
tainted property. 238 Accordingly, tainted property was defined to include property that 
was derived from or used for the commission of a scheduled offence. 239 The PCA 1997 
also provided law enforcement officials with certain investigative tools that simplified 
the investigation process and augmented the chances of a successful conviction. These 
240 241 investigative tools included powers of search and seizure , restraining orders, 
232 Section 51 (I)of the PCA 1997 
233 The amendment was passed in the House of Parliament on 27'h August, 1999 and given the assent of 
the Governor General on 13'h December, 1999. 
234 Section 51 (I)of the PCA 1997 as amended. 
235 Section 51(2) of The PCA 1997 as amended. 
236 Sections 3-15 
237 Sections 16-22 
238 Sections 23-28 
239 Section 2 
240 Sections 23-29 
241 Sections 30-39 
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production orders 242 and monitoring orders. 243 During the parliamentary debate on the 
Proceeds of Crime Bill 1997 it was bome out that the contents of the Bill were the 
collective efforts of other countries 244 and that SVG was not alone in that legislative 
exercise. This willingness to harmonise such an important piece of legislation was in 
itself a demonstration of SVG's willingness to cooperate with other countries in their 
anti-money laundering efforts. 
3.13 The Mutual Funds Acts of 1997 and 1998 
The Mutual Funds Act (MFA) 1997, contained quite a number of typographical and 
245 
substantive errors and therefore it was never promoted . Substantive amendments 
were carried out in the Mutual Funds Bill 1998 which was enacted on 27 th day of 
August, 1998, one year after the enactment of the Mutual Funds Bill 1997. The Mutual 
Funds Act 1997 created two types of mutual funds 246 namely, the public fund 247 and the 
private fund 248 and immediately prohibited ICs and IBCs from conducting mutual 
242 Sections 40-45 
243 Sections 46-48 
244 See, St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 28 th August, 1997 at p 67 as per the 
Attorney General Hon. Carl Joseph: "And if I may allay the fears of the Honourable Member on the 
opposite side, this legislation has been introduced in many other Caribbean countries. Injact I personally 
had worked on this whilst working in this areafor a number qfyears. We had several meetings so I can 
inform the House that this is almost a harmonised piece of legislation with the rest qf the region. So we 
are not exceptional in the provision at all in this Bill. " 
245 The records at the St. Vincent and the Grenadines Offshore Finance Authority revealed that no mutual 
fund was registered under the Mutual Funds Act 1997. 
246 Section 2 of the MFA 1997 defined a mutual fund as "a company incorporated a partnership formed 
or a unit trust organised, under the laws of the State or of any other country or jurisdiction -(a) which 
collects and pools funds for the purpose of investment in accordance with the principle of risk spreading, 
and: 
(b) issues shares (as herein defined) that entitle the holder to receive on demand or within a specified 
period after the demand an amount computed by reference to the value of a proportionate interest in the 
whole or in a part of the net assets of the company, the partnership or the unit trust, as the case ma ,v 
be, 
and includes an umbrella fund whose shares are split into a number of dijferent class junds or sub- 
funds; " 
247 Section 2 of the MFA 1997 defined a public fund as "a mulualfind which, by means ofpublishing or 
distributing a prospectus or by any other means, offers any shares it issues for subscription or purchase 
to any interested member of the general public. " 
248 Section 2 of the Mutual Funds Act 1997 defined a private fund as "a mutualjund that; 
(a) the shares issued by it are not ofjýred to the general public and are owned or held by 
0) not more than fifty investors where the first time investment of each of such 
investors is not less than seventy five thousand dollars or the equivalent in any 
other currency; or 
(h) any number of investors where thefirst time investment of each ofsuch investors is 
not less than seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars or the equivalent in any 
other currency; or 
(b) is designated as a privatefund by regulations. 
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funds 249 activities without obtaining a license to do SO. 250 In this way another restriction 
was imposed on the free. for a/V characteristics of ICs and IBCs. Those companies could 
no longer legally conduct certain types of insurance and investment activities in an 
unregulated business environment, thus, prohibiting fraudulent activities and severely 
restricting the abuse of the separate legal personality of ICs and IBCs for the purposes 
of criminal conduct. 
Under the MFA 1997 public funds were subjected to greater scrutiny than private funds. 
This was so because the public fund was permitted to offer shares to the public by way 
of a prospectus 251 or any similar document252 whereas the private fund was prohibited 
from so doing. Essentially, the autonomy of shareholders of private funds to arrange 
their affairs amongst themselves in a manner which best suited their own investment 
requirements and expectations was maintained by the MFA 1997. On the other hand it 
took a paternalistic approach to unsuspecting and gullible shareholders or even those 
who were consumed with cupidity. Those investors needed further protection from 
incompetent advisors and criminal elements. Thus the MFA 1997 not only required the 
prospectus to be duly filed with the Registrar of Mutual Funds and to be published, it 
also prescribed the minimum particulars that should be contained therein. 
253 The MFA 
1997 also prohibited persons from providing services as administrators and managers of 
mutual funds unless they were granted permission by the Registrar of Mutual Funds to 
conduct such services. 254 In this way the OFA sought to ensure that only reputable and 
suitably qualified persons were engaged in the provision of those services. 
Moreover the particulars 255 that should accompany an application for registration for a 
public fund are more detailed than those that are required for a private fund. 
Interestingly, the MFA 1997 did not prescribe the particulars that should accompany an 
application for recognition as a private fund. It only required proof that the private fund 
was either lawfully constituted under the laws of SVG or those of another country. 256 
249 Section 8 of the M FA 1997 provided that: "No privatefund shall in orfrom within the State, carry on 
business or manage or administer its affairs unless it is registered under this Act. " 
210 Section 18 of the MFA 1997 provides that: "No publicjund shall carry on any business or arrange or 
administer its affairs in orftom within the State unless it is registered under this Act. 
251 Section 2 of the MFA 1997 
252 Section 14(l) of the MFA 1997 
253 Section 14(2) of the MFA 1997 
254 Section 22 of the MFA 1997 
255 Section 9 of the MFA 1997 
256 Section 19 of the MFA 1997 
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Those particulars were nonetheless subsequently included pursuant to Regulation 11257 
of the Mutual Funds Regulation (MFR) 1999. Section 9 of the MFA 1997 and Schedule 
I to the said Act outlined the particulars that should be contained in the application for 
registration of public funds. Those particulars amongst other things required the 
applicant to submit personal details 258 about the officers, managers, administrators, 
investment advisors and custodian of the public fund. In this way the Registrar of 
Mutual Funds was able to have a reasonably good idea as to the identities of the 
significant players in the public ftind and to control the intrusion of criminal elements. 
The private ftind on the other hand was always exposed to the vagaries of money 
laundering. Although Section 40 of the MFA 1997 created an offence with penalties and 
other sanctions for any false or misleading statements and for non-compliance with its 
provisions, an offence was more easily made out against the public fund which was 
legally obliged to submit an annual certificate of compliance and maintain proper 
records and financial statements. Moreover, the legal requirement which empowered the 
Registrar of Mutual Funds or any person designated by the OFA to access information 
and records of a fund appeared to have greater effect against a public fund as opposed to 
a private fund. This is so because the private fund unlike the public fund was not legally 
obliged under the MFA 1997 to maintain any records and prepare any accounts. 
The MFA 1998 maintained and in some instances extended the substance of the 
provisions outlined above. The additions that are relevant to this chapter relate to; (a) 
the introduction of an additional type of fund, referred to as the accredited fund 259 which 
was placed under the category of private fund and; (b) the prohibition that was imposed 
on the use of the words fund' or 'mutual fund' in the name of an entity without the 
consent of the Registrar of Mutual Fund. Under the MFA 1997, mutual funds activities 
were prohibited but there were no restrictions on the use of those words in the names of 
25' Regulation II of the MFR 1999 provided that, "An applicationfor recognitionfor a privatefund or an 
accreditedfund whether such fund is constituted under the laws of the State or otherwise, shall be made 
under the provisions of Section 19 of the Act on Form PAF, the form of which is set out as Exhibit 4 to 
these regulations. Any information required in the said section 19 and not required in Form PAF shall he 
provided with the application. " 
258 For example, names, addresses, residency, references, certificate of criminal record if any etc.. 
259 Section of the MFA 1998 defined accredited fund as "afund: 
(a) the shares of which are made available only to accredited investors and the initial investment in 
which, in respect of the majority of such investors, is not less than twentyfive thousand dollars 
per investor in the United States currency or its equivalent in any other currency; provided, such 
minimum investment threshold shall not apply in respect of an investment made by the manager, 
administrator, promoter or underwriter of thefund; or 
(b) which is designed as an accreditedfund by regulations; 
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IBCs or ICs. This addition was a clear demonstration that efforts were made by SVG to 
remove all doubts about the nature of the business activities in which IBCs and ICs 
were allowed to engage. The prohibition on the use of IBCs and ICs for insurance and 
mutual funds businesses, in the absence of the relevant licenses, was sending an 
unequivocal message internationally that the activities of those companies (especially 
where they were used for investment purposes) were becoming increasingly regulated. 
What is however noteworthy about the MFA 1998 and the accompanying Mutual Funds 
Regulations ('MFR') 1999 is that together they; (a) effectively establish the 'know 
your customer' principles as required in accordance with the information requested on 
the forms prescribed by Regulations 10,11 and 12 of the MFR 1999; (b) increased the 
accountability of mutual funds, especially private funds as required pursuant to 
Regulations 4,19,23 and 24 and; (c) introduced greater transparency in the activities of 
mutual funds in accordance with Regulations 22,23 and 24. Those attributes represent 
the hall marks of a country that places the anti-money laundering initiative at the centre 
of its legislative agenda. 
3.14 The Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Treaty 1998 
The Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Treaty ("MLAT") between SVG and 
the USA was executed on 8'h January, 1998. This Treaty essentially provided the basis 
on which the contracting parties would mutually assist each other in connection with the 
prevention, investigation and prosecution of criminal offences. 
260 As have already been 
indicated above, SVG's MACM Act 1993 only applies to Commonwealth Countries 
although provisions have been made for the incorporation of any bilateral treaty with a 
non-Commonwealth State. 26 1 Apparently, such incorporation is only effective on the 
publication of Regulations which state that the MACM Act 1993 applies to the country 
262 in question, the USA . Up to the time of the 
blacklisting of SVG in June 2000, no 
Regulations were made subjecting the USA to the provisions of the MACM Act 1993. 
This therefore raises the question as to whether MLAT had any force and therefore 
could have imposed any obligations on SVG. It is indeed arguable that Section 37 of the 
260 Article I of the MLAT 1998, "The Contracting Parties shall provide mutual assistance, in accordance 
with the provisions of this Treaty, in connection with the investigation, prosecution, and prevention of 
criminal offences, and in proceedings related to criminal matters. 
261 Section 30(l) of the MACM Act 1993 
262 Section 30(2) of the MACM Act 1993 
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MACM Act 1993 accorded the MACM Act primacy over every other arrangement 
concerning mutual assistance in criminal matters. Section 37 provides as follows: 
"The provisions of this Act shall take effect notwithstanding any provision of any other 
Act to the contrary, to the extent that any such provision of any other Act shall be 
deemed to have been hereby amended to the extent required to ensure compliance with 
the relevant provisions of this Act. " 
When Section 37 is read in conjunction with Section 30 of the said Act it would appear 
that the MLAT could only be implemented after Regulations have been made to that 
effect. Thereafter, the provisions of the MACM 1993 become applicable to that Treaty. 
263 If however the treaty had been ratified , then SVG and the 
USA were bound in 
international law. 264 SVG could not rely on its failure to make the necessary 
implementing Regulation as a justification for any breach on international law which 
results. 
During the parliamentary debate on the MACM Bill 1993 the Attorney General in his 
presentation, after having refer-red to the objects of the Bill and its application to 
Commonwealth countries, expressly indicated that; 'Finally the Bill contains provisionsfor 
the extension of mutual assistance to like minded Government of States outside the 
Commonwealth by means of regulations made under the Act pursuant to bilateral arrangements 
to he concluded with such governments. 265 This seems to represent an unequivocal 
statement that parliament intended to extend mutual assistance in criminal matters to 
countries other than the Commonwealth by including the appropriate provisions in the 
Regulations that would give effect to any relevant bilateral arrangement that was made 
between SVG and any other foreign country. Accordingly, it raised the question as to 
whether, insofar as the treaty was concerned, the MACM Act had no power to 
implement any provision with which it is not compatible. 
The first major inconsistency is provided under Article I paragraph 3 which provides 
that: 
"Except as otherwise provided in this Treaty, assistance shall be provided without 
regard to whether the conduct which is the subject of the investigation, prosecution, or 
processing in the Requesting State would constitute an offence in the Requested State. " 
263 Shaw M., "Intemational Law, " Cambridge, 5 th edn. 2003 at p. 820 where he stated that: "Ratification 
in the case of bilateral treaties is usually accomplished by exchanging the requisite instruments... 264 Article 14 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 
265 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 16 th December, 1993 at p 44. 
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Under the MACM Act 1993 assistance may be granted where the Requesting State has 
either reasonable grounds for believing 266 or in some instances reasonable grounds for 
suspecting 267 that the assistance is relevant to a criminal proceeding 268 and for the 
location and identification of a person or thing. Article I paragraph 3 of MLAT 1998 
seemed to have dispensed with having reasonable grounds to believe or suspect or even 
ignoring the fact that the assistance should be relevant to a criminal proceeding. It is 
clearly inconsistent with the provisions of the MACM Act 1993. Moreover, pursuant to 
Section 4 of the MACM Act 1993, the central authority 269 for SVG must be designated 
by order and published in the gazette. This was done on II th May, 1999 wherein the 
Director of Public Prosecutions was designated the central authority for SVG with 
retroactive effect to August 1994.270 It is noteworthy that Article 2 paragraph 2 of the 
MLAT 1998 designated the Attorney General or a person designated by the Attorney 
General as the central authority of SVG. There are several other areas of inconsistencies 
between the provisions in the MACNI Act 1993 and the MLAT but the scope of this 
chapter does not permit any further elaboration in that regard. However, despite those 
inconsistencies, by executing the MLAT with the USA, SVG had shown its willingness 
to cooperate with the USA in order to apprehend and convict those who are involved in 
criminal activities. 
3.15 Conclusion 
SVG's legislative efforts to combat money laundering commenced during the same year 
but shortly before the conclusion of the Vienna Convention 1988. The emphasis of 
SVG's earlier legislation was against laundering the proceeds of drug trafficking. It is 
not difficult to see the reason for such emphasis, especially when there were allegations 
266 See Sections 7,8,9,10,11 of the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1993 
267 See Sections 15,16 and 17 of the MACM Act 1993 
268 Section 2 of the MACM Act 1993 defines Criminal proceeding to mean ; "(a) for the purposes of Part 
11, proceedings certified by the central authority for this State to be criminal proceedings which have 
been, or could be, instituted in this State; or 
(b) For the purposes of Part III, proceedings certified by the central authority for any 
Commonwealth country making a request for assistance under this Act to be criminal 
proceedings which have been, or could be, instituted in that country, 
In respect of an offence committed, or suspected on reasonable grounds to have been committed, against 
the law of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines or, as the case may be, of the Commonwealth country 
making the requestfor assistance; " 
269 Section 2 of the MACM Act 1993 defines central authority to mean; 
"(a) in relation to this State, the person or authority designated pursuant to section 4: or 
(b) in relation to any Commonwealth country, the person or authority designated by that countryfor the 
purposes of transmitting and receiving requests under the scheme; " 
270 Regulation 2 of the MACM (Central Authority Designation) Order, 1999 
145 
Chapter 3. "The Supervisory and Regulatory Framework- Prior to the Blacklisting 
of SVG. " 
that SVG was used as a transhipment point for cocaine originating in Latin America and 
when there appeared to have been an increase in drug trafficking in SVG. Moreover, 
drug trafficking was heralded by many countries as the basis and in most instances, the 
life blood of organised crime. The philosophy at the time was that organised criminal 
activities would be significantly reduced if the profit incentive of drug trafficking was 
inexorably undermined. This was to be done by; (a) criminalising the proceeds of crime 
such that persons who knowingly benefited from those proceeds had committed 
criminal offences and; (b) confiscating the proceeds of crime so as to deprive those 
convicted of a drug related offence from deriving any benefits from his criminal 
conduct. 
The articles of the Vienna Convention reflected those sentiments and encouraged the 
parties to the Convention to implement measures that would criminalise drug money 
laundering, confiscate the proceeds of drug trafficking and cooperate with each other to 
investigate, prosecute, convict and where relevant extradite those persons that traffic in 
drugs and psychotropic substances. It appears that the laws of SVG effectively 
implemented the Vienna Convention and even went further by extending the 
criminalisation of money laundering beyond the boundaries of drug related crimes. The 
money laundering process is fluid and different typologies arise especially after the 
ingenuity of the launderer has been discovered. Accordingly, anti-money laundering 
legislation needs to be sufficiently flexible but also abundantly clear and reasonably 
certain in order to apprehend the transgressors. SVG demonstrated its willingness to 
join in the universal fight against money laundering. This seemed to be the central focus 
of the parliamentary debate during the passage of the legislation discussed above. 
The regulatory framework of the OFSS may not have been archetypal or even a panacea 
for today's money laundering problems. But which country can proudly boast that its 
legislation has significantly impacted on its money laundering activities? However, 
within the context of organised criminal activities in SVG which were virtually non- 
existent the regulatory and supervisory framework appeared to be adequate. Prior to its 
being blacklisted SVG had never experienced a money laundering scandal. In the 
money laundering rankings of the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 
271 between 1993 and 1996 SVG was ranked as low to medium risk . 
In 1999, about a 
27 ' Griffith I., "Drugs and Securi! y in the Caribbean Sovereignty under Seige" Penn State Press, 1997 at 
pp 110-111. 
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year prior to being blacklisted by the FATF, SVG was once again ranked relatively low 
by John Walker as a destination that is favoured by money launderers. 272 There was no 
evidence of any organised criminal activities in the country and neither had anyone been 
tried or convicted of a money laundering offence. 
Nonetheless, the plethora of laws that were passed endeavoured to prohibit money 
laundering activity but most importantly, it created the legislative environment for other 
countries to obtain assistance in their efforts to monitor the activities of an offender and 
prosecute him successfully. It is concluded that, in terms of the formal law at least, SVG 
had done all that was required to provide for safeguards against its OFSS being used for 
criminal activities, without too seriously preventing the industry from competing 
effectively in the international financial market. The manner in which the legislation 
could have been of such assistance will be further discussed in the following chapters. 
The next chapter will however assess the reasons that were given by the FATF for the 
blacklisting of SVG. 
272 Walker J., "How Big is Global Money Laundering, " JMLC, 1999, Vol. 3, No. I pp. 25-37 at p. 30 
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4.0 Introduction 
In June 20001 the FATF included St. Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG) on the list 
(blacklist) of 15 countries that it considered to be non-cooperative in the fight against 
money laundering. The FATF conducted its review of SVG in accordance with its 25 
assessment criteria for determining whether countries have the ability and capacity to 
cooperate at the international level in the fight against money laundering. It concluded 
that SVG met 17 out of the 25 criteria for assessing non-cooperative countries and 
territories (NCCTs). In its report 2 on SVG, the FATF stated that in carrying out its 
examination, it took steps to collect all relevant facts, including the country's 
legislation. 3 Although the legislation to which the FATF referred was stated in the 
report, no mention was made about the facts that the FATF considered to be relevant to 
the review process. Therefore, in assessing the accuracy of the FATF's conclusions, it 
is necessary to evaluate the regulatory and supervisory framework of the financial sector 
against the 25 assessment criteria of the FATE In conducting the evaluation it will be 
argued that the FATF; (a) did not conduct an accurate assessment of the regulatory and 
supervisory framework of the financial system in SVG; (b) was not consistent in the 
manner that it carried out its assessment; (c) did not review all the relevant legislation 
and; (d) did not recognise international legal principles of non-intervention and the 
sovereign equality of States. Accordingly, it will be concluded that the regulatory and 
supervisory framework of SVG adequately supported effective cooperation with other 
States in an effort to combat money laundering activities. 
4.1 THE FATF's CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING NCCT's 
In its report on SVG the FATF stated that: 
"There is ... a 
lack of either any formal national policy against money laundering or 
sustained commitment to implement properly the FATF and CFATF 
recommendations. ,4 
1. FATF Report, "Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories: Increasing The 
Worldwide Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures", June 2000. 
2 FATF- "Report on St. Vincent and the Grenadines Against the Criteria for Assessing Non-Cooperativ 
Countries" -2 O'h June 2000. 3 The legislation included: DTOA 1993; MACM Act 1993; IBA 1996; ITA 1996; CRPA 1996; IBC Act 
1996; The PCA 1997 and the; MFA 1997 and 1998. 
4 FATF- "Rgport on St. Vincent and the Grenadines Against the Criteria for Assessing Non-Cooperative 
Countries "-20th June 2000., pI 
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This statement is wrong. SVG does have a formal national policy against money 
laundering. Moreover, as will be demonstrated later in this chapter, the government had 
taken steps to implement the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) 
recommendations. It is not quite clear which FATF recommendations SVG did not 
implement properly since there was no record to that effect. The June 2000 report was 
the result of the first review that was conducted by the FATE Representatives of SVG 
met with officials of the FATF in Miami, USA on 8 th June, 2000 to discuss SVG's 
regulatory and supervisory framework. There is no available record of any further 
dialogue between SVG and the FATF after the meeting on 8 th June, 2000 and before 
publication of the FATF's Report that blacklisted SVG. Therefore, apart from the 25 
assessment criteria against which the legislation of SVG was assessed and bearing in 
mind that SVG was (and still is) not a member of the FATF, there remains some 
uncertainty as to which FATF recommendations SVG did not properly implement. 
It is also not altogether clear what the FATF meant by 'formal national policy against 
money laundering "5 Therefore an examination of this term is necessary to support the 
contention that, contrary to the FATF's pronouncement, SVG did at the time of the 
blacklisting and still does have a money laundering policy. The Oxford dictionary 
defines 'formal' as "used or done or held in accordance with rules, convention, or 
ceremony. "' It defines 'national' as, "of or common to a nation or the nation. "' 'Policy' is 
also defined as "a course or principle of action adopted or proposed by a government, party 
business or individual etc. " When those definitions are applied to the measures that were 
taken by the government of SVG, the inaccuracy of the statement will be accentuated. 
In chapter 3.1 9 mention was made of the DPMA 1988 wherein the government of SVG 
declared its intention to combat money laundering activities, albeit for crimes relating to 
drug trafficking. ' 0 This intention was further reinforced in 1993 with the passing of the 
5 FATF- "Report on St. Vincent and the Grenadines Ajzainst the Criteria for Assesfinjz Non-Cooperative 
Countries "-20h June 2000., p1 
6 Oxford English Reference Dictionary 2 nd edn. 2002, at p 544 
lbid at p 963 
lbid at p 1120 
9 See Section 17 of the DPMA 1988 
10 Section 28(2) of the DPMA 1988 provides that: "Without prejudice to subsection (1), where a person is 
convicted of a drug trafficking offence the court shall, in passing sentence, order forfeiture to the Crown 
of- 
(a) any article; 
(b) any money; or 
(c) any valuable consideration, 
relating to the offence. 
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DTOA 1993. During the parliamentary debate on the Drug Trafficking Offences Bill 
1993, the government was in no doubt as to its policy to eradicate drug trafficking 
through SVG by making unlawful certain conduct which included dealing in the 
proceeds of crime. A government Minister, Hon Jeremiah Scott referring to the Bill 
retorted that: 
"... it has not come a minute too soon, however I feel that it is just a little too 
late ... regardless to what 
draconian measures come to this House, I don't think the 
matter (referring to drug trafficking) is getting better. This is why I don't want to Qffer 
any kind of compromise siluationfor the offending persons in this regard There should 
be no compromises, when they (meaning drug traffickers) are held they should he held, 
Mr. Speaker, even as far as I am concerned without bail. "' 1 
Some of the provisions in the DPMA 1988 which relate to the laundering of the 
proceeds of crime are almost repeated verbatim in the DTOA 1993. For example, 
Section 17(l) of the DPMA 1988 is pari materia with Section 21(l) of the DTOA 
12 1993 . This provision clearly represented the government's position not only on 
drug 
trafficking but also on the laundering of the proceeds of drug trafficking. The DTOA 
1993 like its precursor the Drugs (Prevention of Misuse) Act 1988 13 penalised persons 
who assisted the drug trafficker to retain the benefit of drug trafficking. It also went 
further to penalise those, including the drug trafficker, who concealed, disguised, 
converted or transferred the proceeds of drug trafficking (see chapter 3.6). 1 4 Moreover, 
in an effort to curtail the activities of drug trafficking parliament also made provisions 
in the DTOA 1993 for the seizure and detention, forfeiture and confiscation of the 
proceeds of drug trafficking (see chapter 3.6). 
Section 28(3) provides that: "Forfeiture under this section shall extend- 
(a) to any property which there is reason to believe has been obtained from the proceeds of 
anything relating to the offence for which a person is convicted under this Act or to a 
conspiracy to commit any such offence; or 
(b) to anything into which any such property has been converted. 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debates 16" December, 1993 pp 30-31 
Section 21 (1) of the DTOA 1993 provides that; Subject to subsection (3), an 
,v 
person who, after the 
date of coming into operation to this Act enters into or is otherwise concerned in an arrangement 
whereby - 
(a) the retention or control by or on behaýf of any other person, in this section referred to 
as "A, " o)fproceeds of drug trafficking isfacilitated (whether by concealment, removal 
ftom thejurisdiction, transfer to nominees or otherwise); or 
(b) "A "'s proceeds of drug trafficking are used- 
W to secure thatfunds are placed at "A "'s disposal or 
(i i) for "A "'s benefit to acquire property by way of investment 
knowing or believing that "A " is a person who carries on or has carried on drug trafficking or 
has at any time received any payment or other reward in connection with drug trafficking 
carried on by him or another, is guilty of an offence. 
13 Section 17(l) 
14 Section 22(l) and (2) of the DTOA 1993 at note 29 in Chapter 3.6 
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In 1996, members of parliament in the parliamentary debate on six new pieces of 
offshore legislation 15 was insistent that steps should be taken to ensure that issues 
concerning the ubiquitous money laundering problem should not tarnish the OFSS. In 
that regard the Prime Minister Sir James Mitchell cautioned that: 
"We recognise that there are certain clouds that tend to hover over qffshore operations. 
One is the question of money laundering of sources coming fto m drugs or ftom 
terrorism orftom weapons trading. We want to ensure asfar as we can that we do not 
become a vehiclefor any of that kind of activity... 1116 
Sir James Mitchell further stated that: 
"Our coqfidentiality will be aimed at asset protection, not money laundering and 
people want to preserve their assets for all kinds of legislative processes and all kinds 
of disputes. We also want to ensure that we do not become a haven for an ,v 
fraudulent 
conversion and we will do our best about that, so we have got to make sure that our 
image is as clean as possible. " 17 
Money laundering has always been opposed by the government. Prior to 1997 there was 
no specific money laundering legislation that criminalised dealings in and with the 
proceeds of crime. However, as was stated above the DPMA Act 1988 and the DTOA 
1993 contained provisions that criminalised the assisting, concealing, disguising, 
converting and transferring the proceeds of crime. With the introduction of the new 
offshore legislation, the government's position on the use by criminals and money 
launderers of the opportunities that were created was clear and unequivocal. Investors 
were welcomed to its shores to engage in the investment opportunities that were 
available but they were not expected to be criminals or to engage in money laundering 
activities. 18 This position was enunciated by Prime Minister Sir James Mitchell when he 
presented the welcoming address at a Caribbean Offshore Conference in Puerto Rico on 
May 21", 1997. He stated that: 
"... Indeed, many aspects of our new package of legislation represent strategic 
movements into new frontiers of offshore finance and include careful refinements of' 
traditional administrative practices. We intend to be efficient and extremely caulious. 
No doubt the world will be taking note of St. Vincent and the Grenadines as a 
responsible leader in the offshorefinance industry. As such, we will rigorously mainlain 
our deep respect for the rule of law. Money Laundering. from drug trqfficking and 
trading in illegal weapons will not be tolerated in the administration of ou r vely strict 
laws. As we launch our campaign for new opportunities in the internationalfinance 
sector, we unequivocally warn that we will defend against international crime as 
vigorously as we protect against unwarranted intervention into the privacy of the 
financial affairs of the operations of which are governed by our offshore legislation. It 
15 See Chapter 3.11. 
16 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 27th June, 1996 p 22 
17 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 27th June, 1996 p 26 
'8 Mitchell J., "The Rebirth of an Offshore Jurisdiction, " Offshore Investment Journal, February 1997, 
Issue 73, at p. 34 
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is our solemn intention to build up a tradition of cleanliness, and to become a haven, 16i, 
honest men so that they and their families can eqýoy theftuits (? f their labour. To that 
end, we will not accommodate any individual or institution that will contaminate tile 
hygienic. financial environment that we strived so hard to encourage and we tire now 
endeavouring to maintain. "19 
This statement and previous statements of a similar nature were indeed portentous. The 
money laundering problem was no longer going to be addressed within the regime of 
the drugs legislation. Plans were afoot to widen the ambit of the legislative fight against 
money laundering activities. 20 These plans culminated with the passing of the PCA on 
28 th August, 1997 21 which made provisions for the circumstances under which a person 
may be convicted of money laundering and the likely consequences of such a 
conviction. In chapter 3.12 it was shown that the PCA 1997 not only made money 
laundering an indictable offence 22 but it also criminalised the possession of property 
23 24 derived from unlawful activity and organised fraudulent activities and provided for 
the forfeiture 25 or confiscation 26 of tainted property. 27 Moreover, the Act imposed on 
financial institutions the obligation to retain records of financial transactions for a 
'" Mitchell J., "A Season of Light-A series of Messages on Development in St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, " Concept Publishing Inc, Waitsfield, Vermont 2001 at pp 61-62. 
2" The Proceeds of Crime Bill was introduced to the House of Parliament about three years before it was 
finally passed on 28 1h October, 1997: See St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 28th 
August, 1997 p 69- Hon Carl Joseph "... this Bill has been aroundfor about three ' vears, tit 
least two to 
three 
' vears, and 
it was sent to a select committee and has been receiving the attention oj'a select 
committee for about two and one haU'Years. 
21 See Chapter 3.12 
22 Section 59(3) 
21 Section 60 (1) provides that: "A person who, after the commencement of this, 4et, receives. possesses. 
conceals, disposes qj, ' or brings into St. Vincent and the Grenadines an 'v 
mone ' 
v. or other property that lie 
. 
ýe C and s knows or ought reasonably to know to he the proceeds oj'crime commits (in indictable (Y n -e i 
liable, on conviction, to - 
(c) afine not exceeding two hundred andfifty thousanddollars or imprisonmentfi)r a period 
not exceedingfive years, or to both suchfine and imprisonment: or 
(d) afine not exceedingfive hundred thousand dollars in the case of a bot4- corporate. 
24 Section 61(l) provides that: "A person who engages in organisedftaudcornmits an indictable q1jence 
and is liable on conviction to - 
(q) afine not exceedingfive hundred thousand dollars or imprisonmenijbi- a period Plot 
exceeding twenlyfive years, or to both suchfine and imprisonment: or 
(d) afine of one million dollars if body corporate. 
Section 61(2) provides that: "A person shall he deemed to engajge in oryanisetiftaud it"he engages, qfier 
the commencement of this Act, in acts or omissions- 
(c) that constitute three or more publicftaud (Yfences: and 
(d) from which he derives a bene/it. 
25 Section 8 of the PCA 1997 (repealed on 21 st November, 200 1 
26 Section 16 of the PCA 1997 (repealed on 21 st November, 200 1) 
27 Section 2 of the PCA 1997 (repealed on 21 st November, 200 1 ); Tainted property is property derived 
from illegal activity. 
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prescribed period 
28 
and a duty to disclose information about financial transactions to 
29 law enforcement authorities in certain circumstances . 
The FATF in its report on SVG did mention that it reviewed the DTOA 1993 and the 
PCA 1997, yet it still reported that 'there is no formal national policy on money 
laundering. ' Those Acts together with the Drugs (Prevention and Misuse) Act 1988 
have undoubtedly established a formal policy on money laundering. They established 
rules (laws) for the criminalisation of money laundering. Together with the anti-money 
laundering pronouncements that were made by the members of parliament, the laws 
established a course of action that was proposed by the government for the entire nation. 
This therefore amounted to a formal national policy on money laundering. The policy is 
crystal clear, "money laundering... will not be tolerated in the administration ofour 
strict laws qfthe country. -30 
4.2 Criterion 1 31 
The FATF concluded that SVG fell within this criterion due to the deficiencies in the 
32 OFSS . The 
domestic financial services sector was however absolved from any 
criticism in this regard, mainly because the FATF was satisfied with the Fastern 
Caribbean Central Bank's (ECCB) 33 money-laundering guidelines and guidance notes. 34 
The FATF formed the view that the ECC13 was responsible for licensing, regulating and 
supervising the domestic financial services sector and therefore, the guidance notes and 
guidelines did not apply to the OF SS. 35 In the absence of such notes and guidelines the 
28 Section 49 of the PCA 1997 (repealed on 21 st November, 200 1) 
29 Section 51 of the PCA 1997 (repealed on 21 st November, 200 1) 
'0 Mitchell J., "A Season of Light-A series of Messages on Development in St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, " 2001 at p. 6 1. 
" Criterion 1: Absence or ineffective regulations and supervision for all financial 
institutions in a country or territory, onshore or offshore, on an equivalent basis 
with respect to international standards applicable to money laundering. 
32 FATF- Report on St. Vincent and the Grenadines Against the Criteria for Assessing Non-Cooperative 
Countries, " 20'h June 2000 at p. 2. 
" The ECCB is the Central Bank for the OECS territories. These include Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines. 
34 FATF- Report on St. Vincent and the Grenadines Against the Criteria for Assessini, Non-Cooperative 
Countries, ' 201h June 2000 at p. 2. 
35 The International Banks Act 1996 was amended in 2002 to include the ECCB in the supervision of 
international banks. The amended Section 4(2a) provides as follows: '*The Ojfthore Finance Inspector 
shall review the application to ensure that it contains the required iqlormation and is accompanied bY the 
prescribedjee and shall thenforward completed applications to the A uthorilýy 
(a) submitting an application to the Central Bankfi)r its review: 
(h) conducted any inquiries that may be considered necessaty: 
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FATF suggested that the regulatory and supervisory framework of the OFSS fell short 
of international standards. But what were the international standards to which the FATF 
referred? If the FATF considered that its 25 criteria for assessing non-cooperating 
countries and territories and or its 40 Recommendations were in essence, the 
international standards to which it referred, it will be argued in chapter 6 that those 
criteria and the FATF's money laundering initiative as a whole did not establish any 
international standards to which SVG should conform. It will also be argued in this 
chapter and in chapter six that SVG by maintaining its regulatory and supervisory 
framework was not in breach of its international obligations to any of the FATF member 
countries. Moreover, the FATF also charged that the staff at the Offshore Finance 
Authority (OFA) was inadequate and the controls on offshore institutions were 
rudimentary. 
The reasons that were proffered by the FATF in arriving at its conclusions appeared to 
be mere conjecture and for the most part untenable. They will therefore be examined 
and refuted by arguing on a tripartite platform. Firstly, the ECCB was not responsible 
for the licensing, regulation and supervision of the domestic financial services sector. Its 
supervisory and regulatory powers were restricted to the operations of domestic 
commercial banks. 36 Insofar as the licensing process was concerned, the ECCB 
investigated 37 each application for a banking licence then made recommendations 38 to 
the Minister of Finance who was authorised by law to issue banking licenses. 39 During 
the period that the FATF conducted its review, there were seven domestic commercial 
banks in SVG . 
4() Furthermore, there were three major Credit Unions, one Building 
Society and thirteen Motor and General Insurance Companies located in the domestic 
financial services sector. 41 These institutions were housed within the domestic financial 
(c) communicaling with any persons, bodies or authorities as required. " 
Section 15 of the IBA 1996 is amended and the new Section 15(2c) provides: "Copies qI'the audited 
accounts and quarterly returns must he submitted to the Central Batik, through the A uthorin'. " 
The Offshore Finance Authority is responsible for the administration of the offshore financial services 
sector by virtue of Section 8(l) of the SVGOFA Act 1996. 
16 http: // www. eccb-centralbank. org/Who_We_Are. asp 
37 Section 4(2) Chap 63 of the 1990 Revised Laws of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
Section 4(3) Chap 63 of the 1990 Revised Laws of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
Section 4(4) Chap 63 of the 1990 Revised Laws of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
40 National Commercial Bank, Barclays Bank p1c, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Bank of Nova 
Scotia, Royal Bank of Trinidad and Tobago, St. Vincent Cooperative Bank and First St. Vincent Bank 
Ltd. 
41 www. stvinccntoffshore. com/offshore indus. htm - 
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services sector. However, none of these institutions was specifically licensed, regulated 
and supervised by the ECCB. 
The Cooperative Societies Act 199942 which regulated Credit Unions, accorded powers 
to the Registrar of Cooperatives to register and supervise Cooperatives (including credit 
unions). 43 The Building Societies Act 1941, as amended, empowered the Registrar of 
the High Court to register 44 and supervise 45 the conduct of Building Societies. The 
Insurance Act (IA)1970, as amended, accorded a wide array of powers to the Registrar 
of Insurance and the Minister of Finance 46 to regulate 47 and supervise the conduct of 
Insurance operations. There is no mention of the ECCB in any of those Acts. 
Accordingly, to say that the ECCB "is responsihle for the licensing, regulation and 
supervision of the domestic financial services sector 4N is inaccurate. It is clear from the 
legislation that the ECCB's regulatory and supervisory responsibilities were restricted to 
the commercial banking sector. Therefore, the system (e. g. the money laundering 
Guidance Notes and Guidelines) that the ECCB introduced was destined for the 
commercial banks. If they were adopted by any of the other aforementioned financial 
institutions it would have been on a voluntary basis, in the same way that an offshore 
42 Section 2 of the Cooperative Societies Act 1999 defines a Cooperative or Cooperative Society as "a 
body corporate registered under this Act which consists of a group of people small or large, with a 
commitment to joint action on the basis of dcmocra(, y and self-help in order to secure a service or 
economic arrangement that is both socially desirable and beneficial to all taking part. " 
" Section 5(l) of the Cooperative Societies Act 1999 provides that: "There shall he a Registrar oj' 
Cooperatives Societies who shall have such professional, administrative and other staff as are necessary 
to assist him in the execution of hisjunctions under this A ct " 
Section 5(2) provides: "The Registrar shall perji)rm theJbIlowingfinctions: 
(a) the registration of all societies, - 
(h) the supervision of all societies; 
(C) to liaise with all societies; 
(d) the stimulation of community awareness 
(e) the initiation and encouragement of organised activitiesfor the development societies; 
44 
(f) the management of the Department of Cooperatives 
Section 8 of the Building Societies Act 1941 (or Chapter 324 of the 1990 Revised Laws of St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines) provides as follows: "The persons intending to establish a societv under this Act 
shall transmit to the Registrar two copies of the rules agreed upon by themfi)r the government oj'the 
society, signed by three ofsuch persons and the intending secretary or other of 
. 
'ficer, and the Registrar, i/' 
hefinds that the rules contains all provisions setforth in section 7, and that they are in coti/brinily with 
this Act, shall return one copy of the rules to the secretary or other officer (? I*Ihe socieiýv. with a certi c te 
of . incorporation, and shall retain and register the other copy. 
" Section 8 which relates to the amendment of rules, Section 8 concerning combinations of Building 
Societies and amalgamations; Section 28(30) regarding the submission of annual accounts; Section 30 
confirming by endorsement the discharge of a mortgage 
'6 Sections 49-63 of the IA 1970 (or Chapter 103 of the 1990 Revised Laws of St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines) 
47 Sections 6 of the IA 1970 (or Chapter 103 of the 1990 Revised Laws of St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines) provides that: "An applicationfor registration as an insurer shall he accompanied by such 
documents as may be prescribed " 
" FATF- Report on St. Vincent and the Grenadines Against the Criteria for Assessing Non-Cooperative 
Countries-201h June 2000. p2 
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entity may have voluntarily adopted them as well. It is however important to note that 
one of the fundamental differences between the domestic commercial banks and the 
international banks is that residents were precluded from ordinarily doing banking 
business with an international bank. The International Banks Act (IBA) 1996 as 
amended provided that: 
"The holder of a Class I or a Class II Offshore Banking Licence shall not, without the 
written approval of the Authority, carry on tiny banking business with any Resident 
except in connection with the rendering of offishore banking services firom within the 
Slate or as expressly provided herein or in other laws governing the operation and 
activities of the licensee. , 49 
Secondly, it is rather uncanny that the FATF expressed satisfaction with the money 
laundering guidelines and guidance notes in the domestic financial services sector but 
identified their absence in the OFSS as a problem. 50 Prior to the blacklisting of SVG 
there were 30 international (offshore) banks registered with the OFA, of which 2 were 
licensed in 1997,10 in 1998,11 in 1999,4 in 2000 and 3 that were brought forward 
from the regime prior to 1997 .51 Those were the only financial institutions that were 
registered by the OFA. None of those interriational banks had correspondent banking 
relationships and therefore they opened accounts with domestic commercial banks 
through which they transacted their international banking operations. 52 Effectively, 
deposits to and withdrawals from the offshore banks were transacted through the 
accounts that they held at the respective domestic commercial banks. In this way the 
international banks were customers of the domestic commercial banks. The accounts 
held by international customers in the international banks were affected depending on 
whether the transaction was a deposit or a withdrawal and the relevant adjustment was 
made by the domestic commercial bank on the account of the international bank. 
In those circumstances the staff at the international banks merely recorded transactions 
of deposits and withdrawals in the international customers' accounts but did not have 
any direct contact with the issuing or receipt of cash. 53 All physical monetary 
transactions were executed in the domestic commercial banks on behalf of the 
international banks. With this sort of structure in place the international banks could not 
49 Section 9 of the IBA 1996 as amended. 
'0 Note here that the IBA prohibited any such interference from the ECCB e. g. "Section 28(l) provided 
thar "Except as expressly provided herein, the Banking Act ('ap 63 shall not app4i, to an 
"v 
compan 
,I 
carrying on an offshore hanking hissiness... " Chapter 63 of the 1990 Revised Laws of St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines is the legislation that governs the domestic commercial banks. 
" Records from the Offshore Finance Authority. 
52 Information obtained by the Offshore Finance Authority from international banks. 
5' Interview with Banks. 
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have functioned separately and distinctly from the domestic financial services system. 
They were for this purpose essentially one and the same sector. Therefore, by following 
the money laundering guidance notes and guidelines, domestic commercial banks were 
actually subjecting their international customers to the same scrutiny as their domestic 
counterparts. In that regard the convergence of the two sectors coupled with the 
satisfactory application of the money laundering guidance notes and guidelines meant 
that the financial system in SVG had complied with international standards. To 
dichotomize the two sectors in that way to facilitate the making of pronouncements 
favourable to the domestic financial services sector and unfavourable to the OFSS, has 
cast some doubts on the credibility of the FATF's review. 
Thirdly, the FATF alleged that the human resources at the OFA were limited since there 
were only eight members of staff. The government of SVG responded 54 to this 
allegation in the following manner. 
"The Offshore Finance Authority (OFA) has recognised the need to increase and 
improve its human resources as the regisIration of offshore entities increase. In 
addition to the current staff level of eight (8) members provisions are alrea(ýv being 
made for the appointment of two more persons during the month oj'June, 2000.11 is 
also important to note that the Offshore Finance Authority has installed a 
Computerised Registry System which significantly obviates the needfor manual inputs 
into certain aspects of the registration process. -5-5 
The government's response further stated that: 
"The Qffshore Finance Authority has also engaged the services oj*a banking consultant 
to train staff in banking supervision and to establish a supervisoryframework. "J" 
In the light of the fact that criterion I of the 25 criteria for assessing non-cooperative 
countries and territories relates to ineffective regulations and supervision, cognizance 
should be given to the number of entities that were registered by the OFA at the time of 
the FATF's Report. In this way a more meaningful and satisfactory assessment could 
have been made to determine whether the staffing complement at the OFA was 
inadequate. Prior to the blacklisting of SVG the OFA had 30 international banks on its 
register, 4 57 of which had acquired their licenses a few weeks earlier58 and II of which 
54 Response of Government Of St. Vincent and the Grenadines To Report On St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines Against The 25 Criteria For Assessing Non- Cooperative Countries, 6'h May, 2000. 
55 Response of Government Of St. Vincent and the Grenadines To Report On St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines Against The 25 Criteria For Assessing Non- Cooperative Countries, 6'h May, 2000, p5 
56 Ibid 
5' The records of the St. Vincent and the Grenadines Offshore showed that the 4 banks were Bank Net 
and Finance Inc., Baltic Bank Ltd., Pacific Bank A. G and Interriational Trade and Investments Bank Ltd- 
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were issued licenses the previous year (1999). The IBA 1996 required a licensee to 
submit its audited annual accounts to the OFA within three months from the end of its 
financial year . 
59 Therefore, unless in exceptional cases 60 (which appeared not to have 
arisen), onsite inspections 61 would not have commenced for banks that were licensed in 
1999 and 2000 since they would have been operating for less than a year. 
The main issue that required some consideration was whether the existing staffing levels 
could have adequately supervised the remaining fifteen international banks? Of the nine 
( the 8 staff members abovementioned did not include the Offshore Finance Inspector) 
staff members, six were designated a supervisory role. The Offshore Finance Inspector 
(OFI)62 was a Barrister-at-Law and Chartered Accountant. The Banking Examiner held 
an Honours Degree in Economics and Management and was completing the Chartered 
Association of Certified Accountants course. He had over six years experience as an 
auditor with the auditing firms of Coopers and Lybrand, now Price Waterhouse Coopers 
and Parnell Kerr Forster. The Registrar had twenty five years experience in the 
commercial Registry and held the position of Deputy Registrar of the High Court. The 
Assistant Registrar held a Bachelor of Laws (LLB) Degree. The other two persons were 
the Electronic Data Processing Officer and a Registry Clerk. Together with the Banking 
Consultant those five persons arguably could have adequately supervised the operations 
of those fifteen international banks. 
The Computerised Registry System enabled Registered Agents to submit applications 
for registrations of offshore entities and to carry out other transactions online, thus 
significantly reducing the time that the OFA's staff spent recording transactions and 
dealing with queries. In the government's response(see above) to the FATF's Report, 
two more members of staff were to be recruited and a Banking Consultant was already 
'8 The records of the St. Vincent and the Grenadines Offshore showed that the licenses were issued as 
follows: Bank Net and Finance Inc. on 18'h February, 2000, Baltic Bank Ltd. On 5'h May, 2000; Pacific 
Bank A. G on 16 th May, 2000 and International Trade and Investments Bank Ltd. on 25'h May, 2000- 
59 Section 15 (2) of the IBA 1996 as amended in referring to licensees provides that: 
"The audited accounts shall beforwardedto the Authority within three monthsftom tile end of 
thefinancial year of the licensee, unless prior written approvalfor an extension has been 
granted by the Authority. " 
"0 Where the OFA received unfavourable reports about the activities of a bank or where some clarification 
is required about the information submitted by a bank. 
6' Actually visiting the bank and conducting enquiries of bank staff and records. 
62 Section 8(2) of the St. Vincent and the Grenadines Offshore Finance Authority Act 1996 described the 
Offshore Finance Inspector as the person who is "subject to the supervision and control of the A uthoriýv 
Board, manage the day-to-day business of the Authority and of the Authority Board and be responsible 
for the proper discharge of the duties of the Authority that are delegated to him by the A uthority under 
this Act and under other offshore legislation. " 
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engaged by the OFA for the purposes of improving banking supervision in the OFSS. 
SVG it would appear was making every effort to improve its regulatory and supervisory 
framework. Accordingly, rather than being accused of falling within criterion I due to 
non-compliance with undefined and abstract international standards, it should have been 
encouraged and commended for its efforts. This perfunctory approach by the FATF at 
such an incipient juncture in the review process was imperious and demonstrated 
intolerance. It concealed the virtues of an otherwise plausible initiative and justifies the 
cynical attention that it received from the countries that were "blacklisted" and 
prominent writers. 63 
4.3 Criterion 2 64 
The FATF concluded that IBCs are permitted to conduct international banking business 
and are also permitted to issue bearer shares. Accordingly, it leads to the possihilitvfi)r 
individuals to operate or control a financial institution without having been identified. To 
the extent that an IBC is permitted to issue bearer shares the FATF's conclusion would 
be accurate. However, as will be demonstrated below it did not automatically follow 
that a bearer share company could have been issued with an international banking 
license. The IBA 1996 prohibited the transacting of any international banking business 
within SVG unless it was conducted by an "eligible company. -66 It defined an "eligible 
company" as: 
eligible company " means a body corporate 
(a) having at least one director who is a resident, 
(b) which is incorporate, subsisting or continued under the Companies Act 1994 or 
under the International Business Companies Act, 1996, and 
(c) whose objects or business activities are restricted to banking business. 
63 Levi M and Gilmore W- "Terrorist Finance, Money Laundering and the Rise and Rise of Mutual 
Evaluation: A New Paradipm for Crime Control? " a chapter in Peith M., "Financing - 
Terrorism" Kluwer 
Academic Publishers 2002 at pp 100-101; Hinterseer Kris, "Criminal Finance, The Political Economy of 
Money Laundering in a Comparative Legal Context, " Kluwer Law International, -1002, at p 244 64 Criterion 2: Possibility for individuals or legal entities to operate a financial 
institution without authorisation or registration or with very rudimentary 
requirements for authorisation or registration. 
65 FATF- Report on St. Vincent and the Grenadines Against the Criteria for Assessing Non-Cooperative 
Countries-20'h June 2000. p2 
66 Section 3(l) of the IBA 1996 provides as follows: 
"No offshore banking business may be transactedfrom within the State, in whole or in part, 
except by an eligible company which is in possession of a license granted hereunder to that 
company to carry on such an offshore banking business. 
67 Section 2 of the IBA 1996. 
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Under the Act both a domestic company which is incorporated under the Companies 
Act 1994 and an IBC, provided that they satisfied the other two conditions, could attain 
the status of an eligible company and apply for an international banking license. The 
mere fact that the incorporation of a company occurred before an application was made 
to the OFA for an international banking license appeared to have presented a problem 
for the FATF. The main problem related to the possibility of a bearer share company 
applying for and obtaining an international banking license. For this purpose a bearer 
share is a share that is issued to the bearer. On the face of the bearer certificate the 
owner of the share is recorded as the bearer and not the name of the person who 
acquired it. The implication of such a situation was that anyone into whose possession 
the share certificate fell became the owner of the share unless it could have been proven 
otherwise. Effectively, the share certificate is prima facie evidence of title. 68 In Re 
Bahia and San Francisco Riv Co it was held that: 
"The power ofgiving certificates is therefore for the benefit of the company in general, - 
and it is a declaration by the company to all the world that the person in whose name 
the certificate is made out, and to whom it is given, is a shareholder in the compan. v and 
it is given by the company with the intention that it shall he so used hy the person to 
whom it is given, and acted upon in the sale and transfer of shares "" 
Although that case was not about bearer shares, it supports the proposition that a share 
certificate is prima facie evidence of title. Bearer share certificates possess the attraction 
of being negotiable M but may facilitate the money laundering process if they fall into 
the hands of criminals (see chapter 2.4.2). 
The Companies Act 1994 prohibits the issuance of bearer shares .71 However, the IBC 
Act 1996 permitted the issuance of bearer shares 72 and has further provided that, "A 
share issued to bearer is transferable by delivery of the certificate relating to the share. "-' This 
undoubtedly compounded the problem since a bearer share could have been transferred 
from one person to another just by passing it over to the other. Since an IBC, provided 
6' Farrar 1, Hannigan B, Furey N, Wyllie P., "Farrar's Company Law" Butterworths, 4'h edn., 1998 at p. 
248. 
69 (1868) LR 3 QB 584 at 595 
'0 Re Harvard Securities Ltd. [ 199712 BCLC 369 
71 Section 29(2) of the Companies Act 1994 provides: "No company may issue bearer shares or bearer 
share certificates. " 
72 Section 19( 1) of the I BC Act 1996 before it was amended provided as follows: 
"A company incorporated under this Act shall cause to be kept one or more registers to be known as 
shares registers containing: 
... 
(g) in the case ofshares issued to bearer, the total number oj'each class and series oj*shares issued to 
bearer and outstanding at any given time... 
73 Section 22 of the I BC Act 1996 
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that it satisfied the conditions outlined under Section 2 of the IBA 1996, could have 
attained the status as an eligible company, the temptation was to conclude that by 
extension, a bearer share IBC could have applied for and be issued with an international 
banking license. That conclusion was however, unfounded since the IBA 1996 and the 
IBR 1996 made provisions for the disclosure of the identities of owners and managers 
of international banks (see below). Section 4(2) of the IBA 1996 provided as follows: 
"An application under subsection (1) shall befiled with the Offshore Finance Inspector, 
shall contain the particulars set out in the schedule hereto, and shall be accompanied 
by thefee prescribed in the regulations hereunder... " 
Under the paragraphs numbered 3,4 and 5 of the schedule to which Section 4(2) 
referred, the names and addresses of all directors, shareholders and officers and 
managers must be submitted with the application for an international banking license. 
Moreover, the hegemony of the (113R) 1996, in relation to the application for an 
international banking license, should have been considered seriously since it set out in 
greater detail and further clarified what was required under the IBA 1996 for the 
licensing of international banks. Section 26 of the IBA 1996 provided as follows: 
"The Minister acting on the advice and recommendations (? f the Authoriýv, make 
regulations generallyfor carrying the purpose and provisions of this Act into efjýcl and 
specifically, for thefollowing purposes - 
(a) prescribing anything by this Act authorisedor required to beprescribed; 
(b) controlling theform of advertising by licensees; and 
(c) exempting any person or business, or class of person or business ftoln anY 
provisions of this Act. " 
The IBA 1996 therefore empowered the Minister to make Regulations which are a form 
of delegated legislation. Such legislation is described as "the body of legal rules created hY 
subordinate or statutory bodies which have specific powers to do so because parliament has 
delegated that power to them. , 74 Regulations are usually created by government 
departments 75 and approved by the Cabinet of Ministers. 76 Therefore, like Acts of 
Parliament, Regulations serve as a legal source, endowed with the force of law and legal 
authority. Accordingly, the IBR 1996 formed part of the legislation that governed the 
international banking sector. Under paragraphs 5,6 and 7 of the First Schedule of the 
IBR 1996, the applicant for an international banking license was required to submit the 
names and addresses of all its shareholders, directors and officers and managers 
respectively. The identification requirements that were prescribed in the schedule and 
74 Antoine R., "Commonwealth Caribbean Law and Legal Systems" Cavendish Publishing Limited 1999 
at p. 173. 
71 Ibid 
76 Oxford Reference English Dictionary revised 2nd edn. at p. 202 wherein the Cabinet of Ministers was 
defined as, "The committee ofsenior ministers responsiblefor controlling government's policy. " 
161 
Chapter 4. "An Evaluation of the Reasons for the Blacklisting of SVG by the 
FATF. 99 
referred to under Section 4(2) of the IBA 1996 were identical to those required under 
paragraphs 5,6 and 7 of the IBR 1996. Moreover, Section 12 of the IBA 1996 provided 
that: 
"No shares or other interests, whether legal or equitable, in a licensee shall be issued 
transferred, or otherwise disposed of without the prior written approval of the 
Authority... " 
Section 17(2) provided that: 
"Unless exempted by the Authority pursuant to subsection (3) a licensee shall, prior to 
the appointment of a director or other senior officer, apply to the Authority for its 
written approval of the appointment " 
The applicant was therefore required to submit the names and addresses of all its 
shareholders, directors and officers to the Authority. If the application was successful 
and a license was granted, the licensee was also required to seek the approval of the 
Authority before any transfer of its interest could have been executed or for the approval 
of the appointment of directors and senior officers. In this way the Authority was 
supposed to be at all times informed about the names and addresses of all the 
shareholders and directors of the licensee. The purpose of the bearer share is to conceal, 
for whatever reason, the identity of the owner of the share and by extension the 
company. But as was demonstrated above, the laws demanded the disclosure of the 
identities of the owners and directors to the Authority. By omitting to consider the IBR 
1996 among its list of legal sources that was used in the review process, the FATF was 
limited in its assessment of the international banks' licensing procedure. Accordingly, it 
erroneously concluded that individuals were able to operate or control an international 
bank without having been identified. 
77 4.4 Criterion 3. 
The FATF concluded that SVG fell within the captioned criterion. It reported that: 
"... nothing in the International Banks Act 1996, provides measures to guard against 
holding of managementfunctions or control or acquisition of a significant investment in 
financial institutions hy criminals or their confederates. - 7S 
77 Criterion 3: Absence of measures to guard against holding of management 
functions and control or acquisition of a significant investment in financial 
institutions by criminals or their confederates. 
78 FATF- Report on St. Vincent and the Grenadines Against the Criteria for Assessing Non-Cooperative 
Countries-20th June 2000. p2 
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Under the schedule to the IBA 1996 the applicant is required to submit character 
references in writing together with evidence in the form required by the Authority, that 
neither the applicant nor any director or officer of the applicant has a criminal record. 79 
Further references were also required, including one from an internationally recognised 
bank. 80 The first schedule of the IBR 1996 also contained similar provisions .81 To 
ensure that the applicant entertained a reluctance to submit false information to OFA, 
the IBA 1996 further provided that: 
"A licensee or applicant for a license under this Act, or any director or officer of a 
licensee or applicant who knowingly or wilfully supplies false or misleading 
information to the Authority shall be guilty of an offence... , N2 
The other provisions of the IBA 1996 which regulated the transference of interests in 
the licensee 83 and appointment of directors and senior officers 84 have already been 
discussed above. There was also a general provision in the IBA 1996 that required 
notification from the licensee of any change in the particulars that were submitted in the 
application for the license. 85 These legislative measures were undoubtedly prescribed to 
prevent criminals from participating in the opportunities offered in the OFSS. During 
the parliamentary debate on the International Banks Bill 1996 the Prime Minister Sir 
James Mitchell again expressed the government's position on money laundering (see 
above at 4.1). 86 
The FATF appeared to be guided by this impercipient notion that because a bearer share 
IBC could also be an "eligible company, " pursuant to Section 2 of the IBA 1996, that it 
could legally acquire an international banking license without having to disclose the 
identities of its ownership and management. That fallacy with its confuted conclusions 
has already been extensively discussed above and requires no further elaboration. It is 
therefore not surprising that the FATF compounded its erroneous conclusion in criterion 
3 by repeating the tenuous arguments proffered in criterion 2. 
79 Paragraph II 
go Paragraph 15 
1 Paragraphs 14 and 15 
2 Section 23(l) 
83 Section 12 of the IBA 1996 
84 Section 17(2) of the IBA 1996 
85 Section 6 of the IBA 1996 provided as follows: "Where a change occurs in the particulars oj'a licensee 
as set out in the applicationfor the license, the licensee shall, as soon as possible there after, inform the 
Authority in writing of the nature and circumstances of the change - 
86 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 27th June, 1996 p 22 
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4.5 Criteria 4 87 and 588 
The FATF concluded that SVG fell within this criterion. It further stated that nothing in 
the laws examined "seem to prohibit the existence of anonymous accounts or accounts in 
ohviouslyfictitious names. "" The FATF's conclusion is correct. Neither the Banking Act 
Cap 63 of the 1990 Revised Laws of SVG nor the IBA 1996 contained any provisions 
that expressly prohibited the existence of anonymous or fictitious accounts. The 
government of SVG responded that as a matter of practice SVG's domestic commercial 
banks did not open anonymous accounts or accounts in fictitious names. 9() Whereas that 
may be true and each individual bank may have had its own guidelines for opening 
accounts, in the absence of any legal prohibition, the possibility of opening anonymous 
accounts did exist. This problem was more chronic in the OFSS where the laws by 
implication encouraged the opening of anonymous accounts. It was evidently the 
position under the IBA 1996 where it was provided that: 
"For the purposes of subsection (3), the Offshore Finance Inspector shall have access 
to the name or title of an account of a depositor and any other confidential information 
about or in the possession of a licensee only pursuant to an order of the court made 
under the circumstances set forth in the Confidential Relationship Preservation 
(International Finance) Act 1996 on the ground that there is no other way to obtain the 
information required "91 
The subsection (3)92 to which the aforesaid section referred empowered the Offshore 
Finance Inspector to have access to books and records of any licensee and to request 
97 Criterion 4- "Existence of Anonymous accounts or accounts in obviouslyfictitious names. " 
'8 Criterion 5 -Lack of effective laws, regulations, agreements between supervisory authorities and 
financial institutions o seff regulatory agreements among financial institutions on identy1cation by 
thefinancial institution of the client and beneficial owner of an account. 
-no obligation to verify the identify of the client; 
- no requirement to identt& the beneficial owners of where there are doubts as to whether the 
client is acting on his own behay, ý 
- no obligation to renew identification of the client or beneficial owner when doubts appear as 
to their identity in the course of business relationships; 
-no requirementforfinancial institutions to develop ongoing anti-money laundering training 
programmes. 
'9 FATF- Report on St. Vincent and the Grenadines Against the Criteria for Assessing Non-Cooperative 
Countries-20'h June 2000. p3 
90 Response of Government Of St. Vincent and the Grenadines To Report On St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines Against The 25 Criteria For Assessing Non- Cooperative Countries, 6, h May, 2000, p7 
"' Section 13(4) 
9' Section 13(3) of the IBA 1996 provided as follows: 
"In the performance oftisfunctions under this Act and subject to the confidentiality provisions 
in this Act and elsewhere under the laws of the Stale, the Offshore Finance Inspector may at all 
reasonable times and solelyfor the purpose of carrying out the requirements of this Act and at 
the reasonable requests and directions of the A uthority- 
(a) have access to books, records, vouchers, documents cash and securities of any licensee: 
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any information that confirmed or denied that the licensee contravened the IBA 1996. 
However, once the enquiry pertained to accessing the identity of account holders, an 
Order was required from the court in accordance with the circumstances prescribed 
under Section 4 of the Confidential Relationships Preservation (International Finance) 
Act (CRPA') 1996 which provided: 
"Whenever a person intends or is required to give evidence in or in connection with, 
any proceeding being tried, inquired into, or determined by any court, tribunal or other 
authority (whether within or outside of the State) of any confidential information within 
the meaning of this Act, he shall before so doing applyfor and await directionsftom the 
court. " 
Essentially, the order, may only have been granted if the information required was to be 
used as evidence in a court proceeding or any similar tribunal. This was indeed a 
stringent restriction on the Inspector of international banks. Moreover, it did not sit 
easily with the anti-money laundering pronouncements that were made by 
parliamentarians during the parliamentary debate on the International Banks Bill 1996 
(see above). The existence of the possibility that anonymous and fictitious accounts 
could have been established with the international banks required urgent attention. It 
may not have been proportionate to blacklist SVG and decry such a deficiency. Further 
dialogue may well have achieved better results. The FATF encountered this deficiency 
before when Austria (one of its member territories) failed to comply with 
Recommendation 1093 of the FATF's 40 Recommendations, by refusing to abolish 
(b) request any information, matter or thingftom any person who it has reasonable 
grounds to believe is carrying on an offshore banking business in the State in 
contravention with this Act; and 
(C) demand of the Registered Agent of a licensee any reasonable information or 
explanation as to the offshore banking business being conducted by a companyfi)r 
which it serves as Registered Agent, for the purpose of enabling the Authority and the 
Minister to perform itsfunctions under the A ct; 
but in no event, except as expressly provided by law, may the offshorefinance inspector or tile 
Authority or any person or entity acting under or with either of them, remove, communicate, 
send or in any manner transmit any such information, documents, or related material out of the 
State. " 
93 FATF Recommendation 10 "Financial Institutions should not keep anonymous accounts or accounts in 
obviously fictitious names: they should be required (by law. by regulations, by agreements, between 
supervisory authorities and financial institutions or by self regulatory agreements among financial 
institutions) to identfý on the basis of an official or other reliable identifying documents, and record lite 
identity of their clients, either occasional or usual, when establishing business relations or conducting 
transactions (in particular opening up of accounts or passbooks, entering into fiduciary transactions, 
renting of safety deposit boxes, performing large cash transactions). In order to fulfil identification 
requirements concerning legal entities, financial institutions should, when necessary, take measures: (/) 
to verify the legal existence and structure of the customer by obtaining either ftom a public register or 
ftom the customer or both, proof of incorporation, including information concerning the customer's 
name, legalform address, directors and provisions regulating the power to bind the entity: (11) to verift 
that any person purporting to act on behalf of the customer is so authorised and identify that person. - 
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anonymous passbooks for Austrian residents. 94 Rather than invoking Recommendation 
21 95 immediately, Levi and Gilmore stated that: 
"The presidentfirst wrote to the Austrian Government about this matter, but when this 
did not lead to change, a high level mission was dispatched to Vienna without success. 
The taskforce invoked Recommendation 2 1... , 96 
It was as a result of this diversity of treatment of countries that the FATF's anti-money 
laundering initiative was seen as lacking fairness. Peith has also observed the 
inconsistency of the approach that is taken with non-member countries and territories as 
compared with FATF member countries when he stated that; 
"It is, however, significant that the FATF was not really in the position to give more 
detailed guidance between 1990 and 1999 on customer due diligence. All the excitement 
about the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories process, the blacklisting and 
partial delisting of so called 'NCC` Ts, ' has overshadowed the fact that many FA TF 
core- members were not ready to implement even basic customer due diligence 
standards at the levels already defined in the 1990 recommendations. "9' 
4.5.1 Criterion 5 98 
Non-bank financial institutions, for example, Cooperative Societies and Building 
Societies, contrary to the FATF's findings, do have legal requirements for customer 
identification. Only members 99 were pen-nitted to be customers of those Societies. 100 
94 Levi M and Gilmore W., "Terrorist Finance, Money Launderinp, and the Rise and Rise of Mutual 
Evaluation: A New Paradigm for Crime Control? " in Peith's M., "FinancinR Terrorism" 2002 Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2002 at pp 100- 10 1. 
95 FATF Recommendation 2 1: "Financial Institutions should give special attention to business relations 
and transactions with persons, including companies andfinancial institutions, from countries which do 
not or insufficiently apply these Recommendations. Whenever these transactions have no apparent 
economic or visible lawful purpose, their background and purpose should as far as possible, be 
examined, the findings established in writing, and be available to help supervisors, auditors anti law 
enforcement agencies. " 
96 Levi M and Gilmore W., "Terrorist Finance, Money Laundering and the Rise and Rise of Mutual 
Evaluation: A New ParadiRm for Crime Control? " in Peith's M., "Financing Terrorism" 2002 at pp. 100- 
101. 
97 Peith M., "Financing Terrorism: Following the Moneyý in Peith M., "Financinv, Terrorism" 2002 at p. 
122. 
98 Criterion 5 -Lack of effective laws, regulations, agreements between supervisory authorities and 
financial institutions of sey' regulatory agreements among financial institutions on identtfication ky 
thefinancial institution of the client and beneficial owner of an account: 
-no obligation to verify the identity of the client; 
- no requirement to identify the beneficial owners of where there are doubts as to whether the 
client is acting on his own behalf, - 
- no obligation to renew identification of lite client or beneficial owner when doubts appear as 
to their identity in the course of business relationships; 
-no requirement forfinancial institutions to develop ongoing anti-money laundering training 
programmes. 
'9 Section 2 of the Cooperative Societies Act 1999 defined a member to include "... a person or registered 
societyjoining in the application for the registration of a society, and a person or registered society 
admitted to membership after registration in accordance with this Act and by-laws. " 
166 
Chapter 4. "An Evaluation of the Reasons for the Blacklisting of SVG by the 
FATF. " 
Obtaining membership included a process of identification such as ascertaining the 
prospective member's name, address, occupation, date of birth and a recommendation 
from an existing member. The process of membership also entailed the issuance of 
registered (not bearer) shares to members. 101 Those share certificates provided evidence 
of membership. Effectively, there was no other way of determining who was a member 
of those Societies unless a process of customer identification was initiated. Deposits to 
and withdrawals from accounts that were held by those societies were only permitted 
with the authority of the members who were the account holders. Those transactions 
were effected only if the signature of the member could be authenticated by the staff of 
the Societies. Essentially, a signature must accompany a name and an address must be 
attached to the name for communication purposes. If this infon-nation was not held by 
the Societies then it is difficult to imagine how they could have a register of members as 
Section 2 also defined a registered society to mean "... a cooperative society registered under this Act 
'00 Section 12(l) of the Cooperative Societies Act 1999 provided that: 
"No Society may be registered or having been registered continued to be registered under this Act unless- 
(a) its membership consists- 
0) in the case offinancial cooperatives, of not less thanfifty members, and 
00 in the case of any other cooperative of not less than ten members... " 
Section 23(l) provided: "An applicationfor membership of a society shall be submitted to the Board in 
suchform as the Board approves. " 
Section I 0(l) provided that: "A registered society shall include in its by-laws provisions- 
(a) respecting conditions of membership, including- 
0) the rights ofjoint members, if any, 
(H) the qualification for membership and the withdrawal of members and 
transfer of membership; " 
Section 4 of the Building Societies Act Cap 324 of the 1990 Revised Laws of St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines provided that: "Any number ofpersons may establish a society under this Act, either 
terminating or permanentfor the purpose ofraising by subscriptions of the members stock orfundfor 
making advances to members out of thefunds of the society... 
Section 26 of the Building Societies Act Cap 324 of the 1990 Revised Laws of St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines provided that: "Any person under the age of eighteen years may be admitted as a member of 
a society under this Act, the rules ofwhich do not prohibit such admission, and may give all necessmy 
acquittances. 
'0' Section 4 of the Building Societies Act Cap 324 of the 1990 Revised Laws of St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines provided that: "... And any society under this Act shall, sofar as is necessaryfor the said 
purpose, have power to hold land, with the right of foreclosure and may raisefunds by issue of shares of 
one or other denominations, either paid zip in full or to be paid by periodical or other subscriptions, and 
with or without accumulating interest, and may repay suchfunds when no longer requiredfor the purpose 
of the society... " 
Section 5 also provided that: "The liability of any member of any society under this Act in respect of any 
share upon which an advance has been made shall be limited to the amount actually paid or in arrear on 
such share, and in respect of any share upon which an advance has been made shall be limited to the 
amount payable thereon under any mortgage or other security or under the rules of the society. " 
Section I 0(l)(a)(v) of the Cooperative Societies Act 1999 provided that: "A registered society shall 
include in its by-laws provisions respecting conditions of membership, including ... the minimum value of 
shares that may be held by each member. " 
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prescribed by law, 102 issue shares in the names of its members, issue loans to its 
members and carry out other financial transactions on behalf of its members. 
There is very little, if any, difference between the long standing practices and traditions 
of the Societies and any legislation that would include such practices and traditions. 
What really mattered was that those practices and guidelines were implemented. There 
was no evidence that enacting such practices and traditions would ensure greater 
adherence. In any event the human element would dictate whether those practices and 
traditions were implemented, irregardless of whether they were enacted or not. The 
FATF in relation to the identification procedures of domestic commercial banks 
expressly indicated that "... the CFA TF mutual evaluation indicates that these requirements 
have not heen effectively implemented 403 To the extent that such was an accurate 
assessment of the evaluation process then this deficiency should have been discovered 
and addressed by the ECCB during its examination of domestic commercial banks. 
However, it would appear that the alleged ineffective implementation of the customer 
identification requirements by domestic commercial banks could well have been due to 
the inefficiency of responsible employees which no doubt could have been remedied by 
closer supervision of senior officers of the respective banks. Accordingly, in so far as 
customer identification procedures were concerned, there were mechanisms in place 
both in the banking and non-banking financial institutions to identify beneficial owners 
of accounts. 
The FATF under Criterion 5 ftirther concluded "... Nor is there any regulation regarding 
the identification of beneficial owners in the offshore licensed institutions. " "'To the extent 
that this conclusion related to international trusts and IBCs, it was correctly stated, 
although to a lesser extent with regard to international trusts. It was however, otherwise 
incorrect. The other entities that were registered, licensed and operated within the OFSS 
were international banks, international trusts, international insurances and mutual funds. 
The inaccuracy of the FATF's conclusion as it related to international banks had already 
102 Section 18(2) (c) of the Cooperative Societies Act 1999 provided that: "Without Prejudice to 
subsection (1), there shall be made available at all reasonable times at the registered office of the 
society ... the register of members. 103 FATF- Re 
, 
Xort on St. Vincent and the Grenadines Against the Criteria for Assessing Non-Cooperative 
Countries-20 June 2000. p3 
104FATF- Report on St. Vincent and the Grenadines Against the Criteria for Assessing Non-Cooperative 
Countries-20th June 2000. p3 
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been demonstrated in the discussion above, under criterion 3. The same will be argued 
for those entities that were registered under the other offshore legislation. 
4.5.1.1 International Trusts 
The International Trust Act (ITA) 1996 defined an international trust as: 
"... a trust in respect of which 
(i) the settlor is not a resident at the time of the creation of the trust and at such times as 
the settlor adds new property to the trust 
(ii) the trust is evidenced by a writing signed by the settlor or his nominee and a 
Registered Trustee, 
(iii) at all times at least one of the trustees is licensed under the Registered Agent and 
Trustee Licensing Act, 
(iv) no beneficiary is a Resident at the time of the creation or settlement of the trust or 
at such times as the settlor adds new property to the trust, and 
(y) the trust property does not include any real property situate in the State or an 
interest in any property so situate. 105 
By prescribing the characteristics of an international trust, the ITA 1996 had imposed 
upon the Registrar of Trust ("Registrar") a duty to ascertain the residency status of the 
settlor and beneficiary at the time that the trust was created. Moreover, it also required 
that their must be written documentation which contained the signature of the settlor or 
his nominee. In order to effectively carry out this duty the Registrar was required to 
know the identity of the settlor and the beneficiary. By requiring a nominee to sign on 
behalf of the settlor was indeed problematic, since the signature of the settlor, which 
may well have been an important form of identification, may have been absent. 
Nonetheless, the duty to determine the identification of the settlor was undoubtedly 
imposed on the Registrar by law. A different picture would however emerge if the 
settlor was an IBC. 
Under the ITA 1996 a settlor was defined as "a person who makes a disposition Qfproperty 
on or to a trust. , 106 A person was ftirther described by the Act as "a natural person or a 
company, partnership, limited partnership or other body corporate. , 107 Therefore, under the 
ITA 1996 a company could have been a settlor. Apart from the obligation to ascertain 
that the settlor was not resident at the time that the trust was created or any dispositions 
were made to the trust, the ITA 1996 did not expressly impose ftirther obligations on the 
105 Section 2 
106 Section 2 
107 lbid 
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Registrar to ascertain the identity of the beneficial owners of a corporate settlor. 
Nonetheless, a duty was imposed on the Registrar to secure the signature of the settlor. 
Where the settlor was a company, the signature should have been that of a director'08 or 
a secretary. 109 In this way the Registrar would have been in a better position to ascertain 
who comprised the management of the IBC but may still have been oblivious to the 
identity of the true owners since no duty was imposed by the ITA 1996 to obtain their 
signatures. 
A ma . or problem arose when either or both the settlor and the beneficiary' 10 were IBCs. 
As in the case of the settlor, the ITA 1996 did not impose any obligation on the 
Registrar to ascertain the identification of the corporate beneficial owner of the trust. 
This was a particularly significant omission, especially when, as noted above, IBCs 
were permitted to have bearer shares. It was therefore very easy for criminals to hide 
behind bearer shares IBCs in order to become settlors and or beneficiaries of what 
initially appeared to have been a perfectly legal structure. Although the IBCs could have 
been incorporated and registered at the OFA in SVG they would not have been 
considered to be resident"' for the purposes of international trusts. This meant that the 
108 John Shaw & Son (Salford) Ltd v Shaw [ 193 5] 2 KB 113 at 134 per Greer LJ, CA: "A company is an 
entity distinct alike from its shareholders and its directors, Some of its powers may, according to its 
articles, be exercised by its directors, certain other powers may be reserved for the shareholders in 
general meeting. If powers of management are vested in the directors, they and they alone can exercise 
these powers. The only way in which the general body of shareholders can control the exercise of these 
powers vested by the articles in the directors is by altering the articles, or ... 
by refusing to re-elect the 
directors of whose actions they disapprove. They cannot themselves usurp the powers which by the 
articles are vested in the directors any more than the directors can usurp the powers vested by the 
articles in the general body ofshareholders. " 
109 Panorama Developments (Guilford) Ltd v Fidelis Furnishinjz Fabrics Lt [1971] 3 All ER 16 (CA) as 
per Lord Denning . ..... A company secretary is a much more important person nowadays than he was in 
1887. He is an officer of the company with extensive duties and responsibilities. This appears not only in 
the modern Companies Act, but also by the role which he plays in the day to day business of the company 
and enters into contracts on its behaýf which come to within the day to day running of company's 
business. So much so that he may be regarded as held out as having the authority to do such things on 
behaý'qf the company. He is certainly entitled to sign contracts connected with the administrative side of 
a company's affairs, such as employing staff and ordering cars, and so forth. All such matters come 
within the ostensible authority of a company secretary. " 
110 Section 2 of the ITA 1996 defined beneficiary as: ".. a person entitled to benefit under a trust, or in 
whosefavour a power to distribute trust property may be exercised, and includes a body corporate.. 
... Section 2 of the ITA 1996: "Residency means, for the purposes of this Act, 
(1) a natural person who is ordinarily resident in the State under general 
principles ofState income taxation, 
(2) any trust, company, partnership, limitedpartnership, or other body, 
incorporated, established, formed or organised in the State under the laws 
of the State, the majority ofshares, beneficial interests or other indica of 
ownership of which is legally or beneficially owned, directly or indirectly, 
by persons who are resident under the provisions of subparagraphs (1) 
and (3) hereof or by the State, or 
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qualification that the settlor or beneficiary should not be a resident, did not apply to 
IBCs. Accordingly, in situations where either the settlor or the beneficiary or both were 
IBCs there was no legal obligation to ascertain the identity of the beneficial owner. 
This anomaly in the law warranted some remedial attention from the SVG government. 
4.5.1.2 International Insurance 
Under the International Insurance Act (IIA) 1998, an applicant had a choice of five 
classes 112 of insurance licenses from which to choose, depending on the type of 
insurance business that the applicant intended to operate (see chapter 3.11.4). Pursuant 
to Section 14 of the IIA 1998: 
"An application for a license under this Act shall be made in writing to the 
Commissioner in the form and containing information as may be prescribed in the 
regulations... " 
The regulations to which the Act referred were the IIR 1999. Regulation 4(l) provided 
that; "... Every application. for a license to carry on international insurance husiness made 
pursuant to section 14 of the Act shall be made on Form AIL, the form of which is set out as 
(3) any other trust, company, partnership, limited partnership or other entity, 
which is a resident of, or ordinarily resident or domiciled in, the State 
under the Income Tax Act Cap 312; 
providedfor the purposes hereof the term "Resident - shall not include (i) any 
charity under the charities Act Cap -(h) any International Trust that complies 
with the tax exemption provisions of the Act, or ifregistered under the Trust 
Authority Act, the tax exemption provisions of that Act; (iii) any international 
business company that complies with the tax exemption provisions of that 
Act 
... so 
long as and to the extent that such compliance continues by such 
112 
entity under the provisions of the applicable Act; 
Section 12(l) of the 11A 1998 provided as follows: "A person intending to carry on an international 
business in orfrom within the State, may make application under this Actfor one of thefollowing Classes 
of license which, if issued to the person as provided in this Act, shall allow that person to carry on the 
form of international insurance business described in such license so long as such license shall be in 
effect: 
(a) Class I Unrestricted License permits the insurer to carry on any international 
insurance business, including long term insurance business. 
(b) Class II General License permits the insurer to carry on general international 
insurance business, but not long- term international insurance business. 
(C) Class III Association License permits the insurer to carry on general international 
insurance business and long-term international insurance business, with two or 
more owners of the insurer, and their affiliates, and to carry on no more than thiqv 
percent (30%) of its international insurance business (based on net premiums) with 
persons who are not owners of the insurers or their affiliates. 
(d) Class IV Group License permits the insurer to carry on any international insurance 
business, including long-term international insurance business, with a single owner 
of that insurer and its affiliates, and employees of the owner or its affiliates. 
(e) Class V Single License permits the insurer to carry on any international insurance 
business, including long-term international insurance business, with the sole owner 
of the insurer, if a company, or with the beneficial owners of the insurer, if a trust. " 
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Exhibit I to these regulations. " Additionally, Regulation 4(3) provide that "... Every 
Director, controller, Manager andlor Promoter (as such terms are defined in Form PQ) of a 
person that applies for a license under the Act or who submits an application for consent to 
register under Section 15 of the Act must complete and submit to the Commissioner, along with 
application for a license or consent, a Personal Questionnaire, which shall be made on Form 
PQ, theform which is set out as Exhibit 3 to these regulations. " 
Essentially, every applicant for an insurer's license, irrespective of the choice of license 
being sought, was required to complete Form AIL and Form PQ. The Form AIL 
required information to be submitted about the names and addresses of all directors, 
shareholders and officers and managers. The Form PQ on the other hand, required quite 
a lot of personal information about those who were controllers or prospective controllers 
of the applicant, including their names, addresses and nationalities. Both forms also 
required information on the reputation and character of the beneficial owners, directors 
and officers and managers of the applicant. Interestingly, paragraph 6 of the Form PQ 
provided that, "neither the UK Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 nor any analogous 
legislation of other countries applies. " What this meant effectively was that no insurer's 
licence would have been issued to an applicant whose senior manager or controller was 
convicted of an offence. The period of time since the conviction, was irrelevant. 
The IIA 1998 also provided that the Commissioner of Insurance should be notified 
about any changes to the particulars that were submitted along with the application for 
the license. 113 Regulation 4(9)" 4 of the IIR 1999 imposed an additional responsibility 
on the insurer to seek approval for any changes that it implemented. It also referred to a 
letter which required the insurer to notify the Commissioner of the changes that were 
made and to seek the approval of the Commissioner for those changes. In this way, any 
attempt to include a criminal into the insurance business operations subsequent to the 
acquisition of the license, was effectively thwarted by Section 22(3) of the IIA 1998 and 
Regulation 4(9) of the IIR 1999, since the Commissioner's approval of the change was 
mandatory. 
113 Section 22(3) of the 11A 1998 provides that; "An insurer may only carry on an international insurance 
business in accordance with and based upon the information contained in its original application for a 
license, as an insurer and shallforthwith provide notice to the Commissioner of any material change in 
such information, in theform provided in the regulations. " 
114 "Pursuant to Section 22(3) of the IIA 1998, insurers are under a continuing duty to inform the 
Commissioner of changes in information contained in anyfiling made tinder the Act or these regulations. 
Insurer shall promptly notify the Commissioner of any such change on Form NCP, Notice of Change of 
Particulars, theform of which is set out in Exhibit 12, to these regulations " 
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4.5.1.3 Mutual Fund 
The Mutual Funds Act (MFA) 1998 provided for the registration of three types of 
Mutual Funds; the Public Fund, the Private Fund and the Accredited Fund (see chapter 
3.13). The Accredited Fund was also considered to be a Private Fund and in that regard 
shared an identical registration procedure. Regulation 10 of the MFR 1999 required a 
Public Fund to submit an application for registration on Form RPF and Fonn PQ. 
Whereas Form RPF focussed on the information required about the prospective fund, 
Form PQ concentrated on personal details concerning the directors, controllers, 
promoters and officers and managers. The infon-nation required under the Form PQ 
used in an application for an international insurer's license was identical to that required 
under the Form PQ for a Public Mutual Fund. Therefore, the arguments that were 
proffered for the international insurance and which directly related to the Form PQ are 
equally relevant for the Public Mutual Fund. Essentially, Regulation 10 of the MFR 
1998 instituted a procedure for identifying the promoters, directors, controllers, and 
managers of the Public Fund. 
Although an application for a Private Fund (which included Accredited Funds) required 
the submission of information about the prospective Fund on the application form, PAF, 
it did not require the submission of personal details on a Form PQ. Accordingly, there 
was no legal requirement for the Registrar of Mutual Funds to ascertain the identities of 
the owners and managers of a Private Fund. The fundamental difference between a 
Private Fund and a Public Fund was that private individuals could have pooled their 
resources for investment purposes but the Fund was not authorised to request 
subscriptions from the public at large as could the Public Fund. Therefore, the Public 
Fund required greater legislative attention, especially for the protection of investors. 
The absence of legislative provisions for the identification of owners and managers of 
Private Funds pervaded the Private Fund market and was in evidence in the legislation 
of other jurisdictions that were reviewed by the FATF and not blacklisted. ' 15 This did 
not however, justify the absence of procedures to identify owners and managers of 
Private Funds. What was however equally crucial was the need to ensure that the 
"' See the British Virgin Islands and Bermuda. 
173 
Chapter 4. "An Evaluation of the Reasons for the Blacklisting of SVG by the 
FATF. 99 
sources of the funds that were received for investment purposes were legitimate and 
lawful. There needed to have been a legislative imposition of responsibility on the 
managers and administrators of Funds to identify the persons from whom the monies 
were received. If the absence of such identification procedures did not warrant the 
blacklisting of countries or territories that were culpable then on that basis the 
blacklisting of SVG could not have been justified. It is also noteworthy that the OFA 
conducted due diligence on the owners and managers of the applicants for financial 
institutions. Incidentally, no international insurance or mutual fund licenses were 
granted when the FATF's review was conducted and at the time of the blacklisting of 
SVG. 
4.6 Criterion 61 16 
The FATF concluded that SVG fell within this criterion. In that regard it stated that, 
"... no legal requirement nor prudential guidelines have heen issued to non-hank financial 
institutions relating to record keeping. There is also a lack of regulation in that respect 
applicahle to offvhore financial institutions (including offshore hanky). "I" Once again the 
FATF's conclusions were wrong. There was legislation which provided for the retention 
and maintenance of records in the non-bank and offshore financial institutions since 
1979 and thereafter. Section 86 of the Income Tax Act (ICTA) 1979 (or Cap 312 of the 
1990 Revised Laws of St. Vincent and the Grenadines) required every person carrying 
on any business to maintain 118 and preserve 119 proper records or books of accounts 
which reflected the operations of the business. Section 2 of the ICTA 1979 defined a 
person to include "an individual, a trust, the estate of a deceased person, a company, a 
partnership and every otherjuridical person. " The section did not make any distinction 
between onshore companies and offshore companies. Neither did any of the offshore 
116 Criterion 6: "Lack of a legal or regulatory obligation for financial institutions or self-agreements 
among financial institutions to record and keep, for a reasonable and sufficient time (live years), 
documents connected with the identity of their clients as well as records on national and international 
transactions. 
, tport 
on St. Vincent and the Grenadines Against the Criteria for Assessing Non 1" FATF- Re -Cooperative 
Countries-20t June 2000. pp 3-4 
118 Section 86(1) (Cap 312 of the 1990 Revised Laws of St. Vincent and the Grenadines) provided that: 
"Every person carrying on any business shall keep, in the English Language, such records or books q/' 
accounts as are necessary to reflect the true andfull nature of the transactions of the business, regard 
being had to the nature of the activities concerned and the scale on which they are carried out. " 
119 Section 86(4) (Cap 312 of the 1990 Revised Laws of St. Vincent and the Grenadines) provided that: 
"Subject to subsection (5) and (6), every person to whom this section applies shall preserve all books and 
of account and other records which are essential to the explanation of any entry in such books oJ'account 
of that business for a period of seven years after the end oj'the basis period to which such hooks of 
account or records relate. " 
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laws exclude the application of the ICTA 1979. The ITA 1996,120 IBC Act 1996,121 IBA 
1996,122 IIA 1998123 and MFA 1998124 exempted their respective entities from income 
tax provided certain conditions were met but did not exclude the ICTA 1979 altogether. 
It is however important to note that pursuant to Section 16(l) of the International 
Companies Act 1982 the Comptroller of the Inland Revenue Department was 
empowered to request from a local representative information about an international 
company so that the Comptroller could determine whether the company is entitled to the 
tax exemption under the International Companies Act. Pursuant to Section 113 of the 
IBC Act 1996 125 companies that were registered under the former ICA 1982 were 
allowed to exist under the former Act for a maximum of five years after the effective 
date of the IBC Act 1996. By the date of the FATF's review and blacklisting over two 
thousand former Act companies were still to be continued under the new IBC Act. 126 
Therefore, in the event that any offshore entity failed to comply with the conditions for 
income tax exemptions, they immediately fell to the incidence of tax. Therefore, Section 
86 of the ICTA 1979 applied to offshore entities, as well. 
120 Section 62 (1) ITA 1996 provided that: "Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary contained in 
the Income Tax Act Cap 312, all income, profit or gain realised or received hy a trust or ally beneficialy 
of a trust shall not be subject to income tax by the State... " 
121 Section 99(l) of the IBC Act 1996 provided that: "Notwithstanding any provision oJ"lhe Income Tax 
Act- 
(a)An international business company which complies with this Act shall not he subject to an ,V 
corporate lax, income tax, withholding tax, capital gains tax or other like taxes hased upon or measured 
by assets or income originating outside the State or in connection with matters of company administration 
which may occur in the State. " 
122 Section 20(l) of the IBA 1996 provided that: "No income tax capital gains tax or other direct tax shall 
be levied by the State or any political subdivision upon the profits or gains or earnings of a licensee in 
respect of its offshore banking business. " 
123 Section 48(l) of the 11A 1998 provided that: "Notwithstanding any provision or rule of law in the 
State to the contrary- 
(a) an insurer which holds a valid and subsisting license in any class tinder this Act shall not be subject 
while such license is in effect to any corporate tax, income tax, withholding tax, capital gains tar or other 
like taxes based upon or measured by assets or income originating outside the Stale or in connection with 
matters of administration or management which may occur or be performed in whole or in part in or 
from within the State; " 
124 Section 39(l) of the MFA 1997 as substantially amended in 1998 provided that: "Notwithstanding any 
provision or rule of law in the State to the contrary- 
(a) An mutual fund which holds a valid and subsisting license in any class tinder this Act shall not be 
subject while such license is in effect to any corporate tax, income tax, withholding lax, capital gains tax 
or other like taxes based upon or measured by assets or income originating outside the State or in 
connection with matters of administration or management which may occur or be performed in whole or 
in part in orfrom within the State; " 
125 Section 113(l) of the IBC 1996 provided as follows: "Subject to the remaining provisions of this 
section and of section 112, and notwithstanding the provision of section 71 of this Act, a compaqv 
incorporated and in good standing under the former act may continue in existence for a period offive 
years after the effective date of this Act so long as such company continues to comply with the provisions 
of theformer act. At the end ofsuchfive year period any company that has not been continued tinder this 
Act or otherwise dissolved or wound-up shall be struck from the former Register of International 
Companies. " 
126 From the records at the Offshore Finance Authority. 
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The FATF accepted that the 1995 ECCB Guidance Notes required onshore banks to 
maintain record keeping for a minimum period of 5 years. 127 It also concluded that 
Section 30 of the DTOA 1993 required banks to retain for different periods, documents 
relating to the opening of accounts and accounts operations but failed to acknowledge 
that those requirements also extended to non-bank and offshore financial institutions. 128 
Why did the FATF conclude that Section 30 only related to onshore banks when the 
DTOA 1993 clearly stated otherwise? An appreciation of the definition of financial 
institutions may well clarify the fallacy of the FATF's conclusion. Section 32 of the 
DTOA 1993 defined financial institutions as follows: 
"For the purposes ofSections 30 and 31 of the Act 
(a) a bank licensed under the Banking Act; 
(b) any financial institution of whatever kind registered licensed or otherwise 
regulated by any Act contained in Title V of the Revised Edition (ýf the Laws: 
(c) a trust company, finance company or deposit taking company, recognised bv the 
Minister responsiblefor Finance as such. " 
Offshore Banks and non-banking financial institutions clearly did not fall under 
Sections 32(a) and (b). Section 32(a) referred to the Banking Act which effectively was 
the Banking Act Cap 63 of the 1990 Revised Laws of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
That Act regulated the domestic (onshore) banking activities. The Title V to which 
Section 32(b) referred listed 17 Acts 129 which regulated the activities of financial 
institutions. The Banking Act Cap 63 was included on that list but none of the Acts 
regulated the activities of non-bank and offshore financial institutions. The major issue 
for consideration is whether Section 32(c) referred to non-bank and offshore financial 
institutions. This section accorded to the Minister of Finance the discretion to determine 
which institutions should be categorised as financial institutions for the purposes of the 
DTOA 1993. In making such a determination and before exercising the discretion, the 
Minister of Finance needed to appreciate the characteristics of a financial institution 
within the context of the requirements of the law. 
127 FATF- R! Xort on St. Vincent and the Grenadines Against the Criteria for Assessing Non-Cooperative 
Countries-20 June 2000. p3 
128 Ibid 
129 The list of Act as were: Agricultural and Cooperative Bank St. Vincent and the Grenadines; 
Agricultural and Cooperative Bank (Merger with Development Corporation); Alien Banks, Bank 
Undertaking (The Royal Bank of Canada Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Operations) Vesting, 
Banking; Banks (Special Deposits); Caribbean Development Bank, Caribbean Investment Corporation, 
Development Corporation; Eastern Caribbean Central Bank; Hayward Agriculture Credit Bank; Housing 
and Land Development Corporation; International Financial Organisations, Land Settlement and 
Development Board (Dissolution and Transfer of Property and Functions); Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines Agricultural Development Corporation (Dissolution and Transfer of Assets and Liabilities); 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Marketing Corp; Savings and Deposit Banks. 
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Accordingly, Section 32 referred to Sections 30 and 31 in deten-nining the meaning of 
financial institutions. Pursuant to Section 30 a financial institution was required to retain 
documents that related to financial transactions carried out by the institution for certain 
periods, depending on the transaction for which the document was retained. 130 The 
relevant provisions of Section 31 on the other hand pertained to the release of 
documents and the maintenance of the registry for the documents that were retained. ' 31 
The transactions to which Section 30 referred related to the opening and closing of 
accounts and safety deposit boxes, the transfer of funds and applications for loans. 
Moreover, during the debate of the Drug Trafficking Offences Bill 1993 in the House of 
Parliament, the Attorney General in presenting the Bill stated that: 
"The Bill confers power to require the production of documentary material relevant to 
investigations being made by the police into drug trqfficking and money laundering 
offences; requires banks and otherfinancial institutions to keep andpreserve records 
financial transactions... , 132 
That was the only mention of the phrase "financial institutions" throughout the entire 
debate. It was however interesting to note that the Attorney General referred to banks. 
130 Section 30 of the DTOA 1993 provided as follows: "(I)Suhject to this section, and to section 31, a 
financial institution shall retain, in its original form for the minimum retention applicable to the 
document, 
(a) a document that relates to a financial transaction carried out b, v the institution in the 
capacity as a financial institution and, without limiting the generality of this, includes a 
document that relates to 
0) the opening or closing by a person of an account with the institution: 
(ii) the operation by a person of an account with the institution; 
NO the opening or use by a person of a deposit box held by the institution: 
(iv) the telegraphic transfer offunds by the institution on behalf (? I'a person to 
another person; 
(v) the transmission offunds between this State and aforeign couniq or between 
foreign countries on behalf of a person; or 
(v i) an application by a person for a loan from the institution, where a loan is 
made to the person pursuant to the application; and 
(b) a document that relates to afinancial transaction carried out by the institution in its 
capacity as a financial institution that is given to the institution by, or on behalf of'the 
person, whether or not the document is signed by or on behalf of the person. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, the expression "minimum retention period" means- 
(a) Where the document relates to the opening of an account with the institution, the period of 7 
years after the day on which the account is closed; 
(b) Where the document relates to the opening by a person of a deposit box held b, v the 
institution, the period of 7 years after the day on which the deposit ceases to be used b, v the 
person; and 
131 
(c) in any other case, the period of 7 years after the day on which the transaction takes place. 
Section 31 of the DTOA 1993 provided that: " (/) Where thefinancial institution is required b, v law to 
release the original of a document before the end of the minimum retention period applicable to the 
document, the institution shall retain a complete copy of the document until the period has ended or the 
original document is returned, whichever occursfirst. 
(2) A financial institution shall maintain a register of documents released under subsection (1) 
"' St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 16'h December, 1993 p 27 
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He did not distinguish between offshore and onshore banks. This was indeed 
understandable since the Act related to both the onshore and offshore sectors in the 
country. 133 When the extract from the Attorney General's presentation coupled with the 
requirements in Section 30 of the DTOA, 1993 were taken together, it was clear that an 
offshore bank, and for that matter any institution that opened or closed accounts and 
effected transfers into and out of those accounts, could be considered to be a financial 
institution. Accordingly, insurance companies (onshore and offshore), mutual funds, 
international banks, building societies and cooperative societies together with domestic 
banks were all placed into the category of entities that were financial institutions. 
Mutual Funds were permitted to take deposits and execute withdrawals. Insurance 
companies took deposits and issued loans and so did Building Societies and Co- 
operatives. Not only was it abundantly clear that those entities were financial 
institutions, there was no doubt that they, by extension, fell within the ambit of the 
DTOA 1993, contrary to the conclusion of the FATE Moreover, four years later, the 
PCA 1997 maintained the same retention periods for documents that were generated as 
a result of financial transactions that were effected by financial institutions. The 
wording of that section was pari materia 134 with Section 30 of the DTOA 1993. 
On the basis of the foregoing, there was an abundance of legislation that regulated the 
maintenance and preservation of records and books of accounts related to financial 
transactions. The FATF obviously did not consider it necessary to review them or seek 
clarification. If it had done, a more favourable conclusion would have been drawn from 
their evaluation of SVG's efforts to eradicate money laundering. The FATF's findings 
exemplified the perfunctory manner in which the review was conducted and the 
inaccuracies that pervaded the entire Report. This approach undoubtedly vitiated an 
otherwise plausible initiative against crime and emphasised the unfortunate insidious 
nature of the initiative and its attack on offshore financial services. 
133 The DTOA Act 1993 was cited as: "An Act to make provisionfor the recovery of the proceeds of illicit 
drug trafficking andfor matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. " Note that the Act did not 
restrict its application to any sector in the country and therefore all transactions in the country relevant to 
the Act were governed by the Act. 
134 Section 72(l) of the PCA 1997 provided that: "This Act is pari materia with the DTOA, 1993 and 
notwithstanding the provisions of section 5(a) of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1993, the provisions 
ofsection 15 relative to the penaltyfor the enforcement offines shall apply to this Act. - 
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4.7 Criteria 10135 and 11136 
These criteria relate to the mandatory reporting of suspicious or unusual transactions 
and the lack of any criminal or administrative sanctioning mechanism for non- 
compliance. Suspicious transactions reports (STRs) provide vital pieces of evidence 137 
which enable law enforcement agencies to detect criminal conduct at the placement 
stage 1 38 of the money laundering process and monitor the activities of those who are 
suspected to be involved in criminal conduct. The size and frequency or even 
infrequency of transactions may give rise to further questions concerning the source of 
funds, answers to which may provide very crucial links between licit and illicit 
transactions or vice versa. The absence of a STRs mechanism increases the chances of a 
jurisdiction being used as a facilitator of the money laundering process. Moreover, such 
absence restricts the flow of information between law enforcement agencies and 
impedes the chances of apprehending and bringing to justice those involved in money 
laundering and its predicate offences. 
The FATF concluded that SVG fell within criteria 10 and 11. The issue that requires 
serious consideration is whether SVG had in place an efficient and mandatory system of 
reporting dubious transactions. In that regard the FATF issued the following statement. 
"Notwiihstanding the already mentioned ECCB Anti-Money Laundering Guidelines 
Notes (applicable only for domestic banks), there is currently no efficient nor 
mandatory system in St. Vincent and the Grenadines requiring onshore financial 
institutions to report suspicious financial transactions. There is also no requirement to 
report suspiciousfinancial transactions applicable to offshore financial institutions. "13" 
It will however be argued that generally, SVG has in place an efficient and mandatory 
transactions reporting system. 
"' Criterion 10: "Absence of an efficient mandatory system for reporting suspicious or unusual 
transactions to a competent authority, provided that such a system aims to defect and prosecute money 
laundering. " 
Criterion 11: "Lack of monitoring and criminal or administrative sanctions in respect to the obligation 
to report suspicious or unusual transaction. " 
137 Stessens G., "Money Laundering, A new international enforcement model, " Cambridge, 2000, p 159 
where Stessens referred to suspicious transactions reports as "... one of the pillars of the preventative anti- 
money laundering system 138 See Chapter 2.4.1 
139 FATF- Re 
, 
Xort on St. Vincent and the Grenadines Against the Criteria for Assessing Non-Cooperative 
Countries-20 June 2000. p4 
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Under the DTOA the reporting of suspicious transactions was not solely restricted to the 
domestic financial services sector. It included the OFA as well. The preamble of the 
DTOA 1993 provided that the DTOA was; "An Act to make provision for the recovery of 
the proceeds of illicit drug trafficking and for matters connected therewith or incidental 
thereto. " The reporting mechanism under the DTOA was drafted in the passive tone as 
opposed to the active tone and therefore did not impose any obligation to report. For 
example section 21(3) of the DTOA provided that: 
"Where a person discloses to a police officer of the rank of Inspector or above a 
suspicion or belief that anyfunds or investments are derivedfrom or used in connection 
with drug trafficking or any matter on which such a suspicion or belief is based... - 
Section 21(3) was in effect an encouragement to those, to whom persons involved in 
drug trafficking turned for assistance. 140 The section essentially absolved persons who 
assisted the drug trafficker, from the commission of a criminal offence under section 21 
of the DTOA, provided that the offence was reported to the police as soon as it was 
reasonable for the person to do so or where the act was carried out with the consent of 
the police. 14 1 The reach of the DTOA was limited for two reasons. Firstly, it only related 
to drug trafficking offences and offences incidental thereto. Secondly, there was no 
legal obligation to report such offences and accordingly no penalties were imposed for 
non-disclosure but it served as a timely reminder that failure to report could have led to 
140 Section 21(l) of the DTOA 1993 provided as follows: "Subject to subsection (3), anY person who. 
after the date of the coming into operation of this Act enters into or is otherwi . se concerned in an 
arrangement whereby - 
(a) the retention or control by or on behalf of any other person, in this section referred to ai; -A, - (Y' 
proceeds of drug trafficking is facilitated (whether by concealment, removal ftom the 
jurisdiction, transfer to nominees or to otherwise); or 
(b) "A's" proceeds of drug trafficking are used - 
0) to secure thatfunds are placed at "A's " disposal or 
(h) for "A's " benefit to acquire property by way of investment, 
knowing of believing that "A " is a person who carries on or has carried on drug trajficking or has 
anytime received any payment or other reward in connection with drug trajjicking carried on by him or 
another, is guilty of an offence. " 
141 Section 21(3) of the DTOA 1993 provided that: "Where a person discloses to a police officer of tile 
rank of Inspector or above a suspicion or belief that anyfunds or investments are derivedftom or used in 
connection with drug trafficking or any matter on which such a suspicion or belief is based- 
(a) the disclosure shall not be treated as a breach of any restriction upon the disclosure 
information imposed by contract or by any law; and 
(b) if he does any act in contravention of subsection (I)and the disclosure relates to the 
arrangement concerned, he does not commit an offence under 1hiv section if the disclosure is 
made - 
0) before his does the act being an act done with the consent of such Police Qflicer: 
or 
(H) after he does the act, but was made on his initiative and as soon as it was 
reasonablefor him to have made it. " 
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convictions for having assisted the drug trafficker pursuant to Section 21(l) 142 and/or 
Section 22(l )[43 of the DTOA 1993 and those offences carried harsh penalties. 144 
Section 21(3) of the DTOA, was a deterrent to those who contemplated assisting the 
drug trafficker. It criminalised any arrangement in circumstances where those involved 
knew or believed that the arrangement involved the proceeds of crime or that there was 
no reasonable excuse for not disclosing the matter to the police., 45 Moreover, it also 
criminalised those who assisted in disguising, concealing transferring or converting the 
proceeds of crime to avoid prosecution or the enforcement of a confiscation order. In 
essence, it afforded those who knowingly assisted 146 the drug trafficker, the opportunity 
to gain reprieve by disclosing to the police their suspicion or belief that funds were 
200derived from or used in connection with drug trafficking. It criminalised those who 
may have facilitated drug trafficking or money laundering and failed to report their 
suspicions, thus effectively encouraging the reporting of suspicious transactions. Given 
that globally, drug trafficking accounted for a disproportionate amount of the monies 
laundered, 147 Section 21(3), even though its governance was restricted to drug 
trafficking, established the foundation for a system of reporting suspicious transactions. 
It provided the avenue for assisting law enforcement officials to conduct investigations 
into drug money laundering offences. 
142 See note 140 above 
14-' See note 29 under chapter 3.6 
'44 Section 22(6) of the DTOA 1993 as amended on 27th June, 1996 provides as follows: "A personguil(v 
of an offence under this section and under section 21 is liable - 
(a) on summary conviction - to a fine not exceeding $5,000 or to imprisonment fi)r a term Plot 
exceeding two years or to both; 
(b) on conviction on indictment - to a fine without limit or to imprisonment for a term not 
exceedingfourteen years or to both. " 
145 Section 21(4) of the DTOA 1993 provided that: "In proceedings against a personfor an ojjýnce under 
this section, it is defence to prove on the balance ofprobabilities that - 
(a) he did not know or believe that the arrangement related to any person's proceeds (? fdrug 
trafficking; 
(b) he did not know or believe that by the arrangement the retention or control b, y or on behall'(? f 
"A " of any property was facilitated or, as the case may be that bv the arrangement any properýv 
was used as mentioned in subsection (1); or 
(c) he intended to disclose to the police officer such a suspicion or belief that there is reasonable 
excusefor hisfailure to make such a disclosure. 
146 Assisted in this context also included acquiring, concealing or disguising property derived from drug 
trafficking or in some way connected thereto. 
147 Lilley P., "Dirty Dealing- The Untold about Global Money Laundering, International Crime and 
Terrorism. " Kogan Page 2 nd edn. 2003 p3 where it was stated that; - ... it has been estimated that the illicit drugs industry is worth 400 billion per industry. It has 400 million regular customers. $200 billion 
is successfully laundered across the world each year. And that total is one part of the global money 
laundering process. 
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The mere fact that Section 21(3) does not criminalise failure to report dubious 
transactions may not be fatal. There is no evidence to support the contention that people 
would be more inclined to report dubious transactions more quickly than they would in 
the absence of a legal obligation. For example, in England and Wales, although an 
offence of failing to disclose drugs money laundering was introduced in Section 52 of 
the Drug Trafficking Act 1994, only 15 convictions 148 were recorded each year up to 
2000. During the three years prior to 1994 the total convictions were higher at 16,411 
each year. It is difficult to conjure up the circumstances in which a person who is not 
involved in drug trafficking money laundering can be convicted for failing to report 
knowledge or suspicion of drug money laundering. It would appear that anyone 
(especially in the context of the Vincentian society) who failed to report suspicion or 
knowledge of drug money laundering is actually facilitating the process and, if he is in 
some way involved, he may be penalised under Sections 21(l) or 22(2) or (3) of the 
DTOA. Without more it is difficult to justify the effectiveness of an offence of failing to 
report knowledge or suspicion of drug money laundering. 
The PCA 1997, as amended, had a more far reaching effect than the DTOA which was 
restricted to drug trafficking offences, since it governed "the forfeiture or conjiscation 
of the proceeds of certain crimes andfor connected or related matters. "150 Section 51 
of the PCA 1997 established a bipartite reporting mechanism. It required financial 
institutions to report to a police officer or the Director of Public Prosecutions, 
information that it had reasonable grounds to believe warranted an investigation or 
facilitated the enforcement of the PCA itself. 15 1 The section was subsequently amended 
to include mandatory reporting of cash transactions in excess of ten thousand United 
States Dollars or its equivalent to the Offshore Finance Inspector, where the institution 
was an offshore company or to an anti-money laundering unit or an official designated 
by the Minister of Finance in all other cases. 152 Both reporting systems required 
148 Alldridge P., "Money Laundering, ' Hart, 2003 at p 205. 
149 lbid 
150 The preamble of the PCA 1997 (now repealed) 
... Section 51 (1) of the PCA 1997 (as amended) provided that: "Where a financial institution has 
information about an account held with the institution and the institution has reasonable grounds fi)r 
believing that- 
(a) the information may be relevant to an investigation of or the prosecution of a person fi)r an 
offence; or 
(b) the information would otherwise be of assistance in the enforcement of this Act or alýv 
regulations made there under, 
the institution shall give the information to a police officer or the Director of Public Prosecutions. 
152 Section 51(2) as amended provided that: "Where a financial institution has information about an ,Y 
cash transaction with the institution that relates to single deposit, withdrawal or transfer of an amount of 
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mandatory disclosure to the relevant authorities, although it was essential that in the 
former system the financial institution carried out an assessment of the information prior 
to making the disclosure. 153 
By limiting the legal obligations to disclose, merely to financial institutions, the PCA 
1997 appeared not to have required the disclosure of information by other 
intermediaries, including lawyers, accountants and other financial advisors. 
Intermediaries also provide services that could have facilitated the money laundering 
process. They could have been privy to information that would have greatly assisted law 
enforcement officials to further investigate the reasons for dubious transactions. But 
note that in England and Wales professionals such as accountants and lawyers 
accounted for an average of 2.6% 154 of the suspicious activity reports from the period 
1995-1998. This represented a very small portion of the approximately 14,000 
suspicious activity reports that were received by the National Criminal Intelligence 
Service (NCIS) each year. However, the apparent absence of a legal obligation to report 
dubious transactions does not totally absolve intermediaries from criminal liability. Any 
failure to report can be otherwise interpreted as a violation of either Sections 59,60 or 
61 of the PCA 1997 155 which can result in a charge being made for a money laundering 
offence. The possibility of a conviction, along with its draconian penalties' 56 could have 
created an incentive on the part of the intermediaries to make a disclosure of dubious 
transactions. 
money in foreign currency being in excess of ten thousand dollars United States currenty or its 
equivalence inforeign currency, the institution shall report the information- 
(a) in the case of a cash transaction by a company registered with the St. lincent and the 
Grenadines Offshore Finance Authority, to the Offshore Finance Inspector: and 
(b) in the case of all other cash transactions to a special anti-money laundering unit or qfficial 
designated by the Minister of Finance " 
153 This assessment was required to be carried out by the financial institution in order to establish whether 
there were reasonable grounds for believing that the information may have been relevant to an 
investigation or the enforcement of the provisions of the PCA 1997. 
154 Alldridge P., "Money Laundering, " 2003, at p 261. 
155 See notes 22,23 and 24 above 
116 Section 59(2) of the PCA 1997 provided as follows: "A person who, after the commencement 
Act, engages in money laundering commits an indictable offence and is liable on conviction, to - 
(a) afine not exceedingfive hundred thousand dollars or imprisonmentfor a period not exceeding 
twenty years, or both such fine and imprisonment; or 
(h) afine not exceeding one million dollars in the case of a body corporate. 
Section 61 (1) of the PCA 1997 provided: "A person who engages in organisedftaud commits (in 
indictable offence and is liable on conviction, to - 
(a) afine not exceedingfive hundred thousand dollars or imprisonmentfor a period not exceeding 
twentyfive years, or to both suchfine and imprisonment; or 
(b) aftne of one million dollars if a body corporate. 
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Moreover, it could be argued that the definition of financial institutions may well have 
created a lacuna through which offshore financial institutions could have escaped the 
legal obligation to report dubious transactions. It may also have been for that reason 
why the FATF concluded that offshore financial institutions were excluded from 
reporting suspicious transactions. It will however, be argued that the reporting 
mechanism under the PCA 1997 did include offshore financial institutions. Section 46 
of the PCA 1997, defined a financial institution as follows: 
"For the Purposes of section 47 to 52, jinancial institution' means - 
(a) a hank licensed under the Banking Act (Cap. 63); 
(b) a building society registered under the Building Societies Act (Cap. 324), - 
(c) a credit union registered under the Cooperative Societies Act (Cap 325); 
(d) a trust company, finance company or deposit taking company, recognised b. v the 
Minister responsiblefor Finance as such. " 
Pursuant to Section 46(d) the Minister of Finance was given the discretion to determine 
whether a particular institution in one of the stated categories should be treated as a 
financial institution for the purposes of the PCA 1997. This discretion may be restricted 
to institutions that could be considered to be trust companies, deposit taking companies 
or finance companies. 157 Therefore, unless intermediaries, fell within one of those 
categories it is arguable that they may not have been required by law to disclose 
information even if they formed the belief or their suspicions were aroused that a 
transaction involved the proceeds of criminal conduct. It is nonetheless important to 
note that the section did not make any distinction between offshore and onshore 
financial institutions. Therefore, it can be construed 158 to include registered agents, 
mutual funds, international insurance and international banks into the categories of trust 
company insofar as a Registered Agent is concerned and deposit taking company or 
157 Quazi v Quazi [1980] AC 744 ; See Harris J., "Legal Philosophies" Butterworths, 2"d edn. 1997 at p 
160 where Harris Stated that: "The maxim expression unius est exclusion alternis perml . is orie to iq/er 
that, where one of a natural collectivity of items is expressIv mentioned. tile legislature must have 
intended not to have included the rest. The courts may took at the rest of the law, and lake. judicial notice 
of anyJacts of common knowledge when the statute was enacted. To resolve an -ambiguitv, - theY min, 
look at the statutes long title, the preamble (if any), and its cross headings and side notes. 
158 River Wright Comr v Adamson (1877) 2 App Cas 743 at 764-765 "1 believe that it is not disputed 
what Lord Wensley used to call the golden rule is right, viz, that we are to take tile whole statute together. 
and construe it altogether, giving the words their ordinary signification. unless when so apptv file 
,v 
produce an inconsistency, or an absurdity or inconvenience so great as to convince tile court that the 
intention could have been to use them in their ordinary signification, andjustify the court in putting oft 
them some other signification, which, though less proper, is one which the court thinks the words will 
bear. ": See also A-G v Lockwood (1842) 9M&W3 78 at 3 98 where it was stated that: " The rule (? /" 
law, I take it, upon the construction of all statutes ... is whether they 
be penal or remedial, to construe 
them according to the plain, literal, and grammatical meaning of the words in which the ,Y are expressed, 
unless that construction leads to a plain and clear contradiction oj'lhe apparent purpose oj'the. 4 cf. or to 
some palpable and evident absurdity. " 
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finance company with regard to mutual funds, international banks and international 
insurance. 
A Registered Agent is a person licensed 159 by the OFA pursuant to Section 5(3) of the 
Registered Agent and Trustee Licensing (RATL) Act 1996 160 to conduct the business of 
offshore representation. 16 1 This included amongst other services, acting as trustees and 
or financial fiduciaries 162 for international trusts. Pursuant to Sections 5( 1)163 and (2)164 
of the RATL Act 1996 a registered agent and trustee licence may only be issued to a 
natural or a juridical person, provided that the application is proper and that the fon-ner 
is a citizen of SVG and the latter is ultimately, beneficially owned or controlled by a 
citizen of SVG. Essentially, a corporation that was licensed by the OFA to conduct the 
business of offshore representation could have been classified as a trust company. ' 65 But 
individuals are also eligible to be licensees as well. Will they therefore fall within the 
category of trust company? To proffer the argument that a natural person who 
conducted such business could also have been classified as a trust company is tenuous, 
'59 Section 2 of the RATL Act 1996 as amended defined a licensee as; ".. a person holding a current and 
valid license to undertake the business of offshore representation. " 
160 Section 5(3) of the RATL Act 1996 as amended provided as follows: "1j'the Authoriiy. on the advice 
ftom the Offshore Finance Inspector, is satisfied that an applicantfor a license meets the requirements ol" 
this Act and the applicant is qualified to carry on the business of Offshore Representation. it may ! ýranf 
the application and issue to the applicant a license subject such terms and conditions as it shall direct, 
any. 
161 Section 2 of the RATL Act 1996 as amended defined Offshore Representation to: "... include one ol 
more of thefollowing acts or activities: 
(a) acting as agent or representative in the establishment, registration, renewal or continuation 
company under the International Companies Act or the international Business Companies Act 
1996 or the registration of a trust pursuant to the St. Vincent Trust Aiithoriýy Act or /he 
International Trusts Act 1996; 
(b) providing registered office or registered agent services in the statefor companies incorporated. 
licensed or continued under the International Companies A ct, - 
(c) providing or appointing nominee directors, nominee shareholders or nominee ojjicers jor 
companies incorporated under the International Companies Act or the IBA. 1996: or 
(d) acting as a local trustee orfiduciaryfor a trust that has or seeks exempfionftoin 1, Lvation under 
the Saint Vincent Trust Authority Act or the International Trusts Act, 1996 whether or not such 
trust is registered or to be registered under either act. " 
162 Section 2 of the RATL 1996 as amended defined financial fiduciaries to include: "... a licensee who 
engages or intends to engage in activities as a trustee, nominee, intermediary, or manager with respect to 
the money, securities or financial assets or instruments of a client or customer in the course oj"stlch 
licensee's business of Offshore Representation. " 
161 Section 5(l) of the RATL Act 1996 as amended provides that: "Subject to file discretion ql'the 
Authority, a license may be issued to a natural person who is a citizen oj'the State or to a compan ,v 
that 
is incorporated and in good standing under the Companies Act, who or which makes proper application 
therefore to the Authority, and who or which provides the information and the materials specifed in the 
schedule to this Act. " 
164 Section 5(2) of the RATL Act 1996 as amended provides that: "No conipan 
,v 
shall he issued a license 
under this Act unless that company is ultimately, beneficial4v owned or controlled hy a citizen oj'1he 
State. " 
165 Martin J., "Hanbu! a and Martin Modem Equi! y" Sweet & Maxwell, 16 1h edn. 2001 at p 508 
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since a company is a juridical person distinct and separate from its owners. 166 However, 
for the purposes of construction, it may appear absurd that a juridical person and a 
natural person conducting the same business should be distinguished in this way. Of the 
30 registered agents that were at the time of the blacklisting licensed by the OFA, less 
than 1% were natural persons who were mainly lawyers and about 90% were companies 
that were owned or managed by lawyers and accountants. 167 Therefore excluding, those 
intermediaries should not be construed as the state of affairs that parliament intended. 
At the time when the PCA was passed 168 in the House of Parliament, three licensed 
offshore banks 169 were already operating in SVG and the OFSS was established 21 
years previously. None of those three banks had a correspondent banking relationship 1M 
with any foreign banks and therefore, they opened accounts at domestic banks in which 
they deposited the funds that they received from their customers and transacted business 
that was related to their banking operations. They were therefore customers of the 
domestic banks just as any individual would be. The domestic banks, in accordance 
with Section 46(a) of the PCA 1997 were legally obliged to report any information that 
was relevant to an investigation, prosecution of a person or to facilitate the enforcement 
of the PCA itself. 171 In this way it could be argued that the activities of offshore banks 
were nonetheless subject to scrutiny even though Section 46 did not expressly require 
them to disclose. 
Furthermore, being a deposit taking company, Section 46(d) empowered the Minister of 
Finance with the discretion to categorise offshore banks as financial institutions. Should 
the section be construed to mean that offshore financial institutions were automatically 
excluded until the Minister of Finance ruled otherwise? Such a construction can be 
sustainable in the absence of parliamentary pronouncements which clearly indicate to 
'66 Salmon vA Salmon & Co Ltd. [18971 AC 22 at 51 as per Lord MacNaghten, "The Compan ' 1, 
is tit law 
a different person altogetherftom the subscribers to the Memorandum, and although it mal, be that qjier 
incorporation the business is precisely the same as it was before and the same persons are manaýgers, and 
the same hands receive the profits, the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or trustees fi)r 
them. Nor are subscribers as members liable, in any shape or form, except to the extent and in the 
manner provided by the Act. That is, I think, the declared intention of the enactment. 
167 Information obtained from records at the OFA. 
168 The PCA 1997 was passed in the House of Parliament on 28 August, 1997 and assented to on 19 'h 
November, 1997. 
169 Records from the St. Vincent and the Grenadines Offshore Finance Authority showed that the three 
banks were, New Bank Ltd, Nano and Sons Private Bankers Ltd and Security Bank and Trust Company 
Ltd. 
170 Information obtained from interview with offshore banks. 
171 Section 51 (1) of the PCA 1997 
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the contrary. In Pepper v Hart 172 the House of Lords ruled effectively that the spirit 
and the letter of the law should be considered when construing statutes to find the 
intention of parliament. This would include reliance on statements made by ministers 
which led to the enactment of the Bill, "where the legislation is ambiguous or obscure 
or the literal meaning leads to an absurdity. " 173 It is beyond doubt that literally, section 
46 can be interpreted to exclude offshore entities unless the Minister of Finance 
exercised his discretion to the contrary. But to so interpret section 46 will undoubtedly 
lead to an absurdity, since such an interpretation is likely to contradict with the intention 
of parliament and the reason for the introduction of the Bill in the first place. 
The OFSS provided an avenue through which international investors were able to 
minimise the payment of taxes and maximise their retums in a commercial environment 
of privacy and confidentiality. The sums therein invested were usually substantial when 
compared to investments that were made in the domestic sector' 74 and the probability of 
the funds invested representing the proceeds of illicit activities was much greater in the 
OFSS than the domestic financial sector. The purpose of the PCA was to combat crime 
by taking the profits out of crime. It did not matter whether the crime was committed by 
an offshore entity or investor or a local person ( juridical or natural). It is widely 
accepted that transnational and organised crimes are so rampant that they are menaces 
to society. It has also been reported that offshore finance centres are potential, if not 
actual facilitators of money laundering. It would not seem plausible for the Act on the 
one hand to penalise the criminal conduct of offshore entities and individuals and on the 
other to exclude the means (reports from offshore financial institutions) by which it is 
likely to convict those involved in criminal conduct. In essence, this would have been 
inefficacious. 
During the passage of the Proceeds of Crime Bill in the House of Parliament the 
Attorney General's opening remarks were as follows: 
"Mr. Speaker, St. Vincent and the Grenadines is party to the Vienna Convention which 
sets out to deal with drugs. Over the years, this country in honour of its obligation 
under the Vienna Convention has passed into law a number of different pieces of 
legislation which I would just note, Mr. Speaker. This Parliament has passed file 
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, it ah; o passed the Drug Trafficking 
Offences Act. St. Vincent and the Grenadines has also entered into an Ertradition 
Treaty with the United States of America ... 
Now the Proceeds of Crime Bill, Mr. 
172 [19931 AC 593 
173 Harris J., "Legal Philosol2hies" Butterworths, 2 nd edn. 1997, p 166. 
174 Information from the records of the OFA and compared with GDP of SVG. 
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Speaker is about the last bit of legislation which will complete our obligation tinder the 
Vienna Convention. 475 
All of those enactments to which the Attorney General referred were measures relating 
to international cooperation (see below) and the fight against transnational crime. This 
effort should not be overlooked because it established in an unequivocal manner 
parliament's 1 76 attitude to crime in general and transnational crime in particular. 
Therefore, parliament could not have intended to exclude offshore financial institutions, 
or its anti-money laundering mantra 177 would not have been euphonious and this would 
have vitiated the apparent intended synthesis between the offshore legislation and the 
money laundering initiative. Since Pepper v Hart the courts are more inclined towards 
the purposive approach to the interpretation of statutes. This will also include an 
assessment of the general context of the statute and the purpose it is intended to serve in 
its quest to find what Parliament intended. In seeking Parliament's intention the court 
has in the past interpreted the statute by inserting certain words that would remove any 
absurdity arising from its literal interpretation. To remove any absurdity of the 
definition of financial institution prescribed under Section 46 of the PCA 1997 the court 
may consider inserting 178 the words 'or any other financial institution' recognised as 
such by the Minister of Finance. 
The amendment that was made to Section 51 179 of the PCA 1997 in 1999 further 
established the context within which the offshore sector was considered by parliament. 
It not only supported the argument that offshore financial institutions were to be treated 
as financial institutions pursuant to Section 46 of the PCA 1997 but also that there 
existed in SVG an effective mandatory reporting mechanism. That amendment ( Section 
51(2)) proceeded as follows; 'where a financial instilufion... ' and then went on in 
"' St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 28 th August, 1997 p 32 
176 The Attorney General Hon Carl Joseph expressly indicated as follows: -This Bill, therefore Mr. 
Speaker, seeks to impose upon institutions that deal with money, the obligation to answer questions about 
any sums of money that may have been deposited with them, to divulge such inji)rmation either through 
examination of records or let it be done orally ... to 
the authorities. " Note that the Attorney General 
referred to 'institutions that deal with money' but did not distinguish between onshore and offshore 
institutions 
177 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 28" August, 1997 at pp. 33 and 5 1: St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 27 th June, 1996, at pp. 22,25,26 and 45 where anti-money 
laundering sentiments were expressed by Members of Parliament promoting the Bill. 
178 Maior and St. Mellons Rural District Council v Newport Co! pn [1950] 2 All ER 1226 at 1236 as per 
Denning LJ, in reference to the interpretation of statutes "We sit here to find out the intention of 
Parliament and of the Ministers and carry it out, and we do this better by filling in the gaps and making 
sense ofthe enactment than by opening it up to destructive analysis. 
"9 See note 151 above 
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subsection (i) to provide for the mandatory reporting of cash transactions in excess of 
$USIO, 000.00. The mention of financial institutions in the amended Section 51(2) of 
the PCA 1997 brought offshore finance entities within the definition of financial 
institutions prescribed in Section 46 of the PCA 1997. Therefore, the argument that the 
OFSS was excluded from the STR system could not be easily sustained. 
The criteria placed emphasis on the word "suspicious -180 whereas Section 51 (1) of the 
PCA 1997 made reference to "reasonable grounds for believing. " The tenn 
"suspicious" as the mens rea for certain crimes has firmly taken root as a novel 
development in the English Criminal Law. 181 It gained universal acceptance during the 
1990's when the FATF's initiative on money laundering begun to take effect and most 
recently, after the terrorists destruction of the twin towers in the USA on II 'h 
182 September, 2001 . The question that 
befuddled exponents of the global money 
laundering initiative was just what was suspicion? ' 83 In a Privy Council case it was held 
that suspicion should be given its ordinary meaning and that it represented 'a state of 
conjecture or surmise in the ahsence of proof 184 The word suspect was defined in the 
Oxford English Reference Dictionary to include, "doubt the genuineness or truth (? /. -`" 
Wherever such a doubt existed, it should be based on a substratum of fact, even where it 
appears insignificant, and just not on mere speculation. 186 
Following the Privy Council decision there was still uncertainty and lack of clarity as to 
the precise definition of suspicion. Accordingly Barry Rider suggested that suspicion is 
4&an alternative ingredient of the mens rea. """ That suggestion was made in order 'Io cover 
the situation where a person deliberately chooses not to carry out an investigation into the 
source of the funds. Obviousl , it must be proved that he was suspicious in the first place tis to Y 
the status of the person with whom he is dealing... "" But that approach seems to confuse 
knowledge 189 with suspicion. Essentially, it expresses the 'doctrine of wilful blindness' 
180 Note also that Section 21(3) of the DTOA 1993 required reporting if a suspicion was formed that a 
transaction was dubious. 
18 1 Howard C., "Butterworth Money Laundering Law, ' 2001 p 3/77 para 195 
18' Freeland C, "How Can Sound Customer Due Diligence Rules Help the Misuse of Financial Institutions 
in the Financing of Terrorism? " at pp 41-48, a chapter in Mark Peith's - "Financing Terrorism" 2002 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Wadsley J., "Money Laundering, Professionals as Policeman; - The Conveyancer (1994) at p. 284. 
Hussein v Chong Fook Kam [ 19691 ALL ER 1626 
195 p 1453 
186 Walsh v Loughman [ 199112 VR 3 51 
187 Howard C., : "Butterworth Money Laundering Law, " 2001 p 3/77 
188 Rider B., "Fei Chien Laundries: the pursuit of Flying Money (Part 11)" (1992) 1 (3) J Int P 144 
'89 WestminsterCijy Council v Crovalrange [1986] 2 All ER 353 
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which Sirnester and Sullivan indicated "... applies where the defendant intentionalýy chooses 
not to enquire whether something is true because he has no real doubt what the answer is going 
to be. Its effect is to attribute knowledge of the circumstances to the defendant. In other words 
where the wiffiul blindness doctrine applies, the law will treat the defendant as having actual 
knowledge... "19" 
Turning to "reasonable grounds to believe, " pursuant to section 51 (1) of the PCA 1997, 
the term reasonable introduced an objective standard into the reporting mechanism. The 
mens rea of a reasonable person is substituted for that of the person responsible for 
disclosing the information. 191 If in the light of the surrounding circumstances a 
reasonable person would have believed that a transaction was dubious and therefore 
should be reported, then that state of mind would be attributed to the person whose 
responsibility it was to make the disclosure. Belief on the other hand is something short 
of knowledge, 192 whereas suspicion may be considered to be a state of conjecture. The 
term "believe" connotes the existence of fewer doubts than would be expected where 
there is a suspicion and would require further analysis of the transaction before making 
a disclosure. 193 But as Howard enquired, how detailed would the information have to be 
before an individual could satisfy himself that he should (or in fact must) disclose a 
belief? 194 It is arguable that since belief requires fewer doubts than suspicion, "'s 
introducing "reasonable grounds to believe" would restrict the number of dubious 
transactions which would otherwise have been reported where the duty to report was 
based on suspicion. 196 But in reality is that argument sustainable, especially where there 
is a lack of clarity with the meanings of knowledge, belief and suspicion? 197 
190 Simester A., & Sullivan G., "Criminal Law, theorv and doctrine" Hart Publishing 2000, pp 138-139 
191 Cordas v Peerless Transportation Co 27 NYS 2d 198- where the objective test was expressed as failure 
to demonstrate "care and caution which a reasonable and prudent person ordinari4V Would e-Vercise 
under like circumstances. " 
192 Hall ( 1985) 81 Cr App R 260, at 260 where the court held: "A man mqy he said to know that goods tire 
stolen when he is told by someone, with first hand knowledge (someone such as the thiqf or tile burglar) 
that such is the case. Belief of course, is something short of knowledge. It may be said to be the state (? /* 
mind of a person who says to himsel(- 'I cannot say I knowfor certain that these goods are stolen but 
there can be no other reasonable conclusion in the light of all the circumstances, in the light of all that 
have heard and seen. '" 
193 Howard C., "Butterworths Money Laundering Law, " 2001 at p 3/85, paras 200-2 10 
194 Ibid at p 3/585, para 813 
195 Ibid at p 3/585, paras 815-820 
196 Alldridge P., "Money Laundqrjqgý: 2003, at pp 182-183 
197 Simester A., & Sullivan G., "Criminal Law, theo! y and doctrine" 2000, at p. 487 where in response to 
the distinction between belief and knowledge in the offence of handling; "But those distinctions are 
without great value. It is generally impossible to know anything with utter certaintv: even the evidence qJ' 
one's own eyes may occasionally be doubted... 
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It is interesting to note that the use of the phrase 'reasonable grounds to believe' instead 
of reasonable grounds to suspect or even suspicion in Section 51 (1) of the PCA 1997 is 
a classic situation of the application of particular jurisprudence. 198 Jeremy Bentham 
observed that laws should be drafted to fit local conditions when he stated that: 
"Thus in the case of Penal Law. Of the genera of Offences, as distinguished or 
distinguishable by their generic names -Murder, Defamation, Theft, Robbery and so 
forth -definitions for the most part are the same all the world over. But for particular 
species, occasion may be afforded by particular local circumstances... """' 
Twining also stated that: 
"It is one thing to claim that a thick description of any society or culture or social 
practice must depend on local knowledge and hence be particular: it is another to claim 
that a society or culture or practice can only be described, interpreted or explained 
solely in its own terms. Most writing by historians and social anthropologists is 
particular and local, because they tend to study events and phenomena that are unique 
in important respects; but those writings are based on theories, methods and concepts 
that have some claim to generality - and some may be unknown locallv. Converselv, it 
is a truism, accepted by both Hart and Dworkin, that to give an adequate account of a 
particular social practice or legal system typically involves taking into account the 
internal point of view ofparticipants in that practice or system, including their concepts 
andlanguage. , 200 
Essentially, suspicion to the ordinary person is a "gut " feeling about something or 
someone. The feeling may be good or bad, right or wrong, justified or unjustified. it 
could have been informed by knowledge of the surrounding circumstances (e. g. the 
person, the level of transaction, nature of business operations etc. ) 201 or by sheer 
prejudice. Whatever the reason for the suspicion, it is reasonable to assume that the 
employees at financial institutions may not have been exposed to the minutiae of the 
'lego-technical' and philosophical nuances of the term suspicious. In a country where 
the people were avid for scandal, their definition of suspicious was likely to be based on 
their culture, knowledge of the surrounding circumstances, their prejudices and their 
beliefs and law enforcement officers being products of the society are empowered to 
arrest any person whom they have reasonable grounds to suspect has committed an 
offence. 202 During a parliamentary debate on the Drug Trafficking Offences Bill 1993, 
'"Twining W., "Globalisation & Leval Theojy" Butterworths 2000, at pp 12- 13 "Particular 
Jurisprudence focuses on the general aspects of a single legal system or order and is constituent 
rhenomena. 
99 Bentham J., -"Letter to James Madison, le October, 1811, -8 Correspondence 182-215 (ed S. 
Conway 1988) included in Twining W., "Globalisation & Legal Theo! ýf 2000, at p. 19 
200 Twining W., "Globalisation & Legal Theo[y" Butterworths 2000, p 43 
201 Howard C, "Butterworths Money Laundering Law, " 200 1, at p 3/5 86 para 821 
202 Pursuant to Section 30(l)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code of the 1990 Revised Laws of St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines: "Any police officer may, without an orderfrom a magistrate and without a warrant. 
arrest - 
(a) any person whom he suspects upon reasonable grounds of having committed an indictable olfence: 
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in referring to the characteristics and traits of the people of SVG, a government 
Minister, the Honourable Carlyle Dougan retorted that: 
"I haven't even completed building my house. It is a fairly big house and malicious 
people in this country are even telling me that they say 'that boy there, thatfellow there, 
that guy Dougan there is trafficking in drugs... 'you wouldn't even believe ... the so 
called middle class in this country would go asfar as to think that. ' 2113 
Therefore, when deciding to make a disclosure of a financial transaction, for the most 
part it would be highly likely that belief and suspicion would conflate, thus confusing 
any distinction between suspicion, knowledge and belief. Where such a situation 
existed, for the purposes of disclosure, suspicion and belief would bear little or no 
distinction for those charged with the responsibility for determining whether or not to 
report a particular transaction. Interestingly, there have been some concerns expressed 
about the ease with which a suspicion can be proved and the difficulties in refuting it. 204 
Even the suggestion to replace knowledge with the belief, as the mens rea for a money 
laundering offence in order to procure more easily money laundering convictions, was 
to jUStif . 
205 considered to be difficult y 
In addition to the suspicious transaction reporting system pursuant to Section 21(3) of 
the DTOA 1993 and the reporting mechanism provided by Section 51 of the PCA 1997, 
as amended, SVG also made legislative provisions for the monitoring of accounts that 
were thought to have been the repositories for the proceeds of crime. 206 Under the PCA 
1997 ex parte applications 207 could have been made to the Court by a police officer for 
monitoring orders to monitor the activities of accounts where there were reasonable 
grounds to suspect that those accounts were used to transact the proceeds of crime. The 
effect of the order required a financial institution to disclose the activities of an account 
to the police. 208 This was indeed a powerful weapon in the armoury of law enforcement 
officials, since the holder of the account to which the application related and for which 
the order was granted, was unaware of the order and those with knowledge of the order 
203 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate Wh December, 1993 pp 32-33 
204 Howard C, "Butterworths Money Laundering Law, " 200 1, at p 3/585 para 814 
205 McCormack G., "Money Laundering and Banking Secrecy, " The Company Lawyer, Vol 16 No. 1, 
1995, at p. 8 
206 Section 47 (1) of the PCA 1997 provided that: "A police office of or above the rank ofAssisiant 
Superintendent may apply to a Judge in Chambers in accordance with subsection (2) for an order (in this 
section called a "monitoring order ") directing afinancial institution to give information to a police 
officer. - 
207 Section 47 (2) of the PCA 1997 provided that: "An application tinder subsection (10 shall be made ex 
parte and shall be in writing and be accompanied by an affidavit. " 208 Section 47 (3) of the PCA 1997 provided that: "A monitoring order shall direct afinancial institution 
to disclose information obtained by the institution about transactions conducted through an account held 
by a particular person with the institution. " 
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were prohibited from disclosing the information, unless certain conditions existed. 209 
However, before an order could have been issued the Judge had to be convinced and 
satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the account holder was 
engaged in or facilitating criminal conduct. 210 
A monitoring order with its emphasis on reasonable grounds to suspect simplified the 
investigative process under Section 47. The application could have been initiated as a 
result of a suspicion or knowledge or belief that was formed and reported either by law 
enforcement of SVG or another country or from civilians of SVG or another country. A 
monitoring order was not too difficult to obtain since all that was required was for the 
judge to be satisfied 211 that the information particularised in the affidavit would have 
aroused a suspicion that the account holder was about to or in some way involve in 
criminal conduct. 212 Reasonable grounds meant that from the information provided a 
reasonable person would have become suspicious of the activities of the holder of the 
account for which the application was made for a monitoring order. Moreover, the 
Criminal Procedure Code also provided that: 
"Any police officer may, without an order from a magistrate and without a warrant, 
arrest; 
(a) any person whom he suspects u on reasonable grounds of having 
committed an indictable offence... 
23 
In the light of the fact that a money laundering offence was an indictable offence, 
together with Section 30(1 (a) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the monitoring order was 
a very powerful tool for law enforcement officials in the fight against money 
laundering. 
209 Section 48(l) of the PCA 1997 provided that: "Aftnancial institution that is, or has been, subject to a 
monitoring order shall not disclose the existence or the operation of the order to any person except - 
(a) an officer or agent of the institution, for the purpose of ensuring that the order is complied with: 
or 
(b) an attorney-at-law, for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or representation in relation to the 
order; or 
(c) the Commissioner or police office authorised in writing by the Commissioner to receive the 
information. " 
210 Section 47(5) of the PCA provided that: "A Judge shall not make a monitoring order unless he is 
satisfied that there are reasonable groundsfor suspecting that the person in respect of whose account the 
information is sought - 
(a) has committed, or is about to commit a scheduled offence; 
(b) was involved in the commission , or 
is about to be involved in the commission of a scheduled 
offence; or 
(c) has benefited directly or indirectly, or is about to benefit directly or indirecitv. 
from the 
211 
commission of a scheduled offence. " 
212 
Section 47(5) of the PCA 1997 (now repealed) 
Section 47(2) of the PCA 1997 (now repealed) 
Section 30(l)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code Chapter 125 of the 1990 Revised Laws of St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines. 
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Further encouragement to report dubious activities by offshore customers was provided 
under Section 3(3) (b) (iv) of the CRPA 1996. That section authorised an offshore bank 
to disclose confidential information to anyone if the interest of the bank was threatened. 
Such an interest may also have been threatened if the bank failed to disclose. 
Although failing to report dubious activities does not in itself attract any criminal 
liabilities apart from that which was provided under section 22(6) of the DTOA 1993 
and which relates to Section 21(3) of the said Act, there is no evidence that it has 
reduced the number of transaction reports. The only recorded evidence of suspicious 
reports pertained to drug related activities. This showed that over the past 10 years the 
highest number of reported drug related crimes was 528 and that was in 1997. Since 
then there was a steady decline every year to 459 in 2002.214 On the basis of the 
foregoing the legislative framework may not have created the best regime there is for 
the reporting of suspicious transactions but it was nonetheless adequate. 
4.8 Criterion 12215 
This criterion assessed whether SVG had implemented measures that enabled 
authorities to determine the principals of commercial entities. In that regard the FATF 
concluded that; "The registration requirements for quite all types of legal entities in St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines are completely inadequate, allows bearer shares or nominee or do 
not require any kind of identification of the beneficial owners. ""' This statement evidently 
highlighted the unsubstantiated and scathing generalizations of the FATF's conclusions. 
The FATF in the introductory section of its report provided a liSt217 of the legislation 
that it reviewed during its assessment of SVG. That list did not contain legislation 
relating to the registration of domestic entities such as banks, cooperative societies, 
building societies and insurance companies. Therefore the FATF could not have 
effectively assessed the regulatory and supervisory framework of those entities. 
Accordingly, on what grounds can the FATF substantiate the conclusion that "all types 
214 Royal St. Vincent and the Grenadines Police Force Crime Statistics 215 Criterion 12: "Inadequate means of identifying, recording and making available relevant 
information related to legal and business entities (name, legal form, address, identity of directors, 
r visions regulating the power to bind the entity). " 01 
FATF- R! gort on St. Vincent and the Grenadines Against the Criteria for Assessing Non-Cooperative 
Countries-20 June 2000. p 4. 217 FATF- R! Rort on St. Vincent and the Grenadines Against the Criteria for Assessing Non-Cooperative 
Countries-20 June 2000. p 1. 
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of legal entities in St. Vincent and the Grenadines are completely inadequate, allows 
bearer shares or nominee directors or do not require any kind of identification of the 
beneficial owners? " The fallacy of the FATF's conclusion has already been emphasised 
above under the sections that discussed criteria 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 and needs no further 
elaboration in that regard. 
Moreover, the FATF concluded that; "This is especially the casefor International Business 
Companies (see sections 3,9 and 12 of the IBC Act) andfor International Trusts (see sections 
52 to59 of the International Trusts Act), which are designedfor international business andfor 
which no kind of registration of name of settlor nor of beneficiary is required - Insofar as 
IBCs are concerned, Section 3 218 only permitted persons who were sui juris to be 
involved in the formation of a company. Section 9 permitted the issuance of bearer 
shares and Section 12 219 prescribed the procedure that the Registrar of companies 
should follow on the receipt of an application for the registration of an 113C. The FATF 
did not however review the International Business Companies Regulations (IBCR) 1996 
219 Section 3(1) of the IBC Act 1996 provided: "Subject to the requirements of this Act, one or more 
persons may incorporate an international business company by signing and sending Articles to the 
Registrar in accordance with the provisions of this Act, so long as such articles have been subscribed by 
a registered agent. " 
Subsection (2) provided: "No individual who 
(a) is less than 18 years of age; 
(b) is of unsound mind and has been sofound by a tribunal in the State or elsewhere; or 
(c) has the status of a bankrupt 
shallforin orjoin in theformation of an international business company. 219 Section 12 (1)of the IBC Act 1996 provided that : "The Registrar shall not register the Articles 
delivered to him unless he is satisfied that all requirements of this Act in respect ofregistration have been 
complied with and 
(a) a solicitor acting information of the company or 
(b) the registered agent named in the Articles as registered agent, 
certifies in writing that the requirements of this Act in respect of registration have been complied with, 
and the written certification delivered to the Registrar is sufficient evidence of compliance: provided, 
however, if a solicitor acts in the formation of the company, such company must still appoint and 
maintain a registered agent as provided in this Act. " 
Subsection(2): "Subject to subsection (1), the Registrar shall retain and register the Articles submitted to 
him in a Register to be maintained by him to be known as the Register of International Business 
Companies. - 
Subsection (3): "Upon the registration of the Articles, the Registrar shall issue a certificate of 
incorporation under his hand and seal certifying that the company is incorporated as an international 
business company. - 
Subsection (4); "The Minister, on advice of the Authority, may direct that the Registrar maintain one or 
more Branch Registers either within or outside of the State; provided that any such register shall he 
maintained under the supervision of the Registrar and the Offshore Finance Inspector and shall he 
managed by a citizen of the State; provided further, if a Branch Register is maintained outside oJ'the 
Stale, all information received or residing at such Branch Register shall be made secure against 
disclosure or intervention by any person or government authority under procedures acceptable to the 
Authority. - 
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which set out Further procedures t'Or the registration of' IlWs. Regulation 4 pro%, Idcd 
that, "Piti-suant to Section II of the Act tilt applicant to register an international hissiness 
companY sha// subinit to the Regisireir in thplicate a completed of Form 3... - Form 3 
required in addition to other pertinent matters (e. g. name and address of company), the 
Submission ofthe names and signatures of' the initial members of' the company. Those 
members were legally required to appoint the directors of* the company. 2211 
The implications of bearer shares were valid concerns of the FATF. Those concerns 
have already been discussed under criterion 2 above and do not require further 
elaboration. F. qually, the ability to conceal the names ot'directors because there %%, as no 
legal duty to disclose that information to the Registrar may have also created some 
221 concern. But it was rather uncanny that there were other jurisdictions with similar (III 
some cases identical) legislative registration requirements fOr lBCs as those enacted In 
SVG yet they were never blacklisted or were removed from the blacklist bel'Ore SVG. 
Moreover, at the time ofthe release ofthe blacklist on which SVO was included, those 
jurisdictions (e. g. including BVI, Belize, Cayman Islands) pernlitted bearer shares and 
still pen-nit the issuance of bearer shares. 
With regard to international trusts, it had already been argued above (see criterion 5) 
that contrary to the conclusion of the FATF, the names of' both the settlor and 
beneficiary were required to be submitted to the Registrar ot"Frusts when an application 
was made for the registration of a trust. Where, however, the settlor or beneticiary or 
both were corporations (as discussed above under criterion 5) it was conceded that 
remedial measures needed to be implemented to ensure that the identities of" the 
beneficial owners of corporate settlors and beneficiaries were disclosed to the OFA. It is 
nonetheless noteworthy that whereas OFCs were being narned and shamed 1'()r allegedl) 
lacking adequate mechanisms for identifying beneficial owners ofentities, the record of' 
FATF countries in that regard had been worse, yet they had not been named and 
shamed. As Levi and Gilmore observed, 
"A sense qf grievance is especialýv like4v when FA TF inember countries art- not 
sanctioned jbr the same practices that would lead less poweý1111 nations to he 
blacklisted This ma 
,v 
be politicalýv tempting but it looks like the sort of (qfit-n 
unconscious) prýferencejbrsymbolic victories over real impact that has bedevilled the 
220 Section 30(l) of the IBC Act 1996 provided: "Thefirst directors ol"tin interntitiontil business com1wPly 
, vil, ill 
be selected b'v the persons who htivefiormed tile coinpanýv and thereqfier. tile directors shtill he 
elected on an annual hasis bY shareholders for such term(s) as tile shareholders or directors maY 
determine. " 
221 Some of these jurisdictions include the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands etc. 
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'war on drugs'since its inception: ýfthe UK, US and other powers tire aHowed not to 
identýfý henýficial owners, bul the OGBS and sinaller economics tire required to 
identýfy thein on pain qfeconontic sanctions, how can a claim to 
as a motivation or as tin bejustýfied' . 
fi! ct 
4.9 Criterion 13 223 
Whereas it is correct to state that the bearer share concept can create obstacles to 
identification for financial institutions, the FA, ri., was not justified in describing the 
registration procedures of offshore entities as rudimentary (see argument under criterion 
5 above). 
Although bearer shares were (and still are) expressly permitted pursuant to Section 9 of 
the IBC Act 1996 (see above), there was no expressed permission or prohibition of 
nominees in the IBC Act 1996, although under the RATL 1996, Registered Agents were 
224 
permitted to and are still permitted to hold such positions . Any financial institution 
wishing to do business with an IBC could have requested of that IBC any intlorination 
that it needed to establish a business relationship with the 113C. 225 There was (and still 
is) no legal requirement prohibiting a financial institution from obtaining the identities 
222 Levi M., & Gilmore W, "Terrorist Finance, Money Laundering and the Rise and Rise of Mutual 
Evaluation: A New Paradiý,, rn for Crime Control? " at p. 110, a chapter in Peith M., "Financing Ferroris-1-11" 
2002 atp. 110 
223 Criterion 13: Obstacles to identification by financial institutions of the beneficial owner(s) and 
directors/officers of a company or beneficiaries of legal or business entities. 
224 Section 2 of the RATL Act 1996 provides that:; "(Y1.4tore Representalion ineans and inchid'-s one or 
more ql'thefillowing acts or activilies. - 
( c) providing or appointing nominee directors, nomince shareholders or nonitnee officers for 
companies incorporated tinder the International Conipanies. -Ict or the IBA I VQ6- - 
221 Section 105 (I )of the 113C Act 1996 provides that; - The Registrar shall. tipon requesi bY anv person, 
issue a certijicale ofgood standing under his hand and seal certiji-inji: that it compain- incorporated under 
this Act is oj'good standing if'lhe Registrar is satisfied that 
(a) the name of the company is on the Register: and 
(h) the company has paid allfees, licencefees andpenallies dtieandpayable. 
(2) the certificate ofgood standing issued tinder the subsechon (/) midst contain a statement as to whether 
(a) the company is in the process oj'heing wound up and dissolved: or 
(h) any proceedings to strike the name oj'the compant, oll'the ReKister have heen itistituted 
Section 106 (1) of the IBC Act 1996 provides that; "Ercept as provide(I in subsection (2) (? / section -/ a 
person mqy -- 
(a) upon showing a proper purpose, inspect tile Register kept b'v, the Registrar pursuant to this Act, 
(h) require a certijicate of incorporation, merger. consolidation. arrangement. continuation, 
dissolution or good standing (? f a compan 'v 
incorporated under this A ct, or a copy or an extract 
of an 'v 
such document of which lie has custot4% it) be certýlied bl, tile Registrar: and 
(C) require a certificate duly certified ýy tile Registrar showing such then-current iql6rination 
available to it concerning a compan 'v 
incorporated under this Act as the Registrar and the 
Authority may thinkfit to provide. 
(2) A document or a copy or an extract of"an 'v 
document or all 'v part oj"a 
document cerlýfied b. V tile 
Registrar under subsection (1) is admissible in evidence in any proceedings as il'it were the original 
document. " 
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of' the beneficial owncrs, (firectors/officers of' a coiiipaný. It' the HIC rel'uscd to submit 
the particulars rCLIIICStCLI by the financial Institution, that institution had the option of' 
doing or not doing busincss with thc IBC. Nloreo%, cr, it' the financial institution 
SLISpected, knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the SLIppresslon of' 
information by the HIC was a means of'concealing criminal conduct, then It had a legal 
cluty to rcport that HIC to the relevant authoritics pursuant to Section 21(3) of' the 
DTOA 1993 and Scctlon 51 ot'llic PCA 1997 as amended. 
The nature ofoll'shorc business %%, as such that IBCs required local representation in the 
fimn of' local (persons residing in SVG) or alternate22t' directors to be able to function 
effectively and with alacrity. It was important to bear in inind that the OFSS %%as 
designed to encourage non-resident investors by according to thein tax exemption 
benefits and privacy in return 1`6r their investments in the OFSS. Those rion-residents for 
the most part were usually resident thousands of' miles away(e. g. the I IS and Furope) 
1'rom SVG. Contacting thcrn Frequently to carry out the flinctions of' the IlWs %%, as not 
only time consurning and costly, it was also an inconvenient and inefficient %%-a), to 
conduct business, especially when the oflice was located in SVG Accordinglý. 
sorneone or persons needed to be located at the oil-ice to manage the day to day affairs 
of' the IBCs. In those circumstances local directors were appointed. Fhe IBC Act 1990 
did not expressly permit nominee directors and neither did it expressly inqX)se a 
prohibition. I lowever, in order to open a bank account, tile IBC %%-as required to submit 
the names, addresses and signatures ofthe directors to the bank at which the application 
was made. 
Once again the hypocrisy of* the FATF is being demonstrated against SVO without 
regard to the efforts that it has been making. The review process it' it is to gain 
cooperation and efflicacy must be Cair and just t'or all countries concerned irrespective of' 
their economic or military power. But unflortunately, it would appear that I'airness and 
justice depended on the size ot'a country's economy and not its compliance with the 40 
Recommendations or the 25 assessment criteria. Accordingly, "... questions have been 
raised about the svillingness (? I'FATF to qppýv consistent principles to more I)osverful nations 
than Turkey and Austria. - the printe canthdate here is the USA, is, hose 1991" and subsequent 
22" Section 39(l) of the IBC Act 1996 provides that: "Subject to the. -Irticles or Bylim-s a thrector mqw, bi, 
it vivritlen instrument appoint an alternate who neecl not be it ifirector. 
Slibsection (2) provides thal: " An alternulefi)r it director al)pointed un, ler subsection (1) is entillell to 
attend meetings in the ahsence (? I* the ilirector who appointeil him and to vote or consent in the 
the director. " 
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CV(dualions 111ýlzhl appeal. to incrit mort, treatment Own it ha% receiv, "I ore over, 
during the time that the USA issued the Financial Advisory against SVO, some of' its 
owri states, including Montano, Colorado and Delaware, had in place banking privacy 
legislation which was advertised (e. g. Colorado) as a virtue of' doing business in the 
state. 22' 
Prior to June 2000 the FATF not only imposed upon NC(A's a more stringent anti- 
nioney laundcring regime than v%, hat was internationally required, its double stanthirds 
were also reflected in the extent to which the FATF required greater due diligence from 
NC("Fs than from its own member States. As Prol'essor Gilmore has pointed out: 
dit, criteria lineaning flit, 25 assessment cracrial art, tit) doubt (tind to 
clainied hY FATP) consistent with the FAIT 40 Recommendations. in a number of 
obvious respects they go beyond flit, slanihirds set in thein. Ilti. % is wc// illustrated bv 
crileria 13 and 14 relating to lack ofidentification offht' btIII(IfiCial owiters oflegal wid 
business entities. While there is a gr"wing appreciation ofilte praclical imporiance on 
this matter, and a ividespread acknowletkenient ol flit, need to develop and enlorce 
appropri . ate standards, the NC( 7criferia in question project sve// bevond the . %cope 0/ 
Recommemkilions 9. /1 and 25 and flit, relewint interpretwive notes as presepith, 
worded "- '29 
Similarly, whilst NCCTs were being assessed against the 25 assessment criteria, FATF 
member countries were only required to ascertain the extent to which tile), were in 
compliance with the 40 Recommendations by conducting selt"assessment exercises of' 
their anti-money laundering regimes. 230 Moreover, despite the findings of* deficiencies 
in the anti-money laundering regimes of' Argentina, Brazil and Mexico tile FATF 
nonetheless admitted them as members. 2" In this regard Prol'essor Gilmore observed 
that: 
227 , Fhe Economist, 23 June 200 1, at p 801 repeated in Levi M& Gilmore W, - FerrOrist Finance, M-one) 
Launderim,, and the Rise and Rise Of Mutual Evaluation: A New Paraditzin for Crime-Con-trol'. "-' in Peith 
M., "FinancingTerrorism" 2002 at p. 101. 
22K Ilay R., "Information Exchange and OfTshore Finance Centres - Part 1- Private Client Business, 2002, 
2,88-97 at p. 96 
221) Gilmore W., "Changes to the Global Reginic, " a chapter in Clark A., & Burrell P., -A Practitioner's 
Guide to International Money Laundering Law and Regulation. " City & Financial Publishing, 2003 at p. 
286. 
2w lbid While non-members have been assessetl against the N(VTcriteria, F, 4 7T aKreed in Septemher 
2001 merely to carry out a seq-assessment exercise among its own members iii Oriler to iletermine their 
level of'compliance. The results oj'lhat exercise will (at hest) he jOrmulateil iluring the 2002-2003 rossiftl 
o4TA TFactivilies. " 
2, www I. oecd. org/fatf/M Laundering 
_en. 
htm 
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-/I shouhl be noted that the criteria used to pii4iýe states ond tcrrttori, -. N cauKht ip 
within the NO Tprocess were filr MOIT eVoCting thall thast, uwtj /? I lit,, to 
flill membership ofthe Itisk Force ol Aiwenfina. Bricil and Aft-vico in June 2000 .. 
1he 
substantive hunflejor membership was, however, set tit a rchitiveh- /ow /evel, being tied 
to the salisfilction ol 11 limited raniýc of *11indamental prmclplc. ý. ' Ac. %c included, ill 
addition to the requisite political commilment to implement the Reco"imenthilions 
within a reasonable time fi-ame. that the jurisdiction had alreath crimmalised Illont-1, 
laundering (bel'01)(I drug trqffickipig) and had made it manihitorv lOr financial 
institutions to identill, their customers and to report siopicious transtit-tion. v. Ihe bitill 
American assessments appear to have been copithicted with sensitivin, andflevibilitv. 
hol/I of which iiiialifies Wep*tl secmingýv needed in arriving (it a positive outcome. fliese 
attribules are ? lot, however. normally associated vs-ith the earIv wilges of tilt' N( '( T 
, -2 2 /)?. ()( -ess. 
4.10 Criteria 15 233 and 16 
234 
Criterion 15 emphasises the need for international exchange ofinforniation. The money 
laundering problem is ubiquitous. It is widely accepted that no one country can 
et'l'ectively combat the prolitleration of' money laundering activities, due in part to 
technological improvements, the freedom of' movernent of capital and the ea-se with 
which money can be transl'erred universally. 23 S Countries are theref*ore rCLluired to 
cooperate with each other by exchanging inl`6rmation that will be pertinent to the 
prosecution and conviction of' those involved in criminal conduct. Whereas, it is 
accepted globally that the exchange of' Information is vital in the fight against nioney 
laundering, there are some differences as to the circumstances under which inforniation 
should be given and the stage of the investigative process at which intlonriation should 
be disclosed. These difTerences vary among countries according to their experiences of 
the money laundering phenomena and their legal Framework. Notwithstanding, the 
foregoing, the significance ofcommunication amongst law enfOrcernent officials within 
and without geographical boundaries cannot be overstated. 
The FA, n., concluded that within SVG there were barriers to the international exchange 
of information. Accordingly, those barriers prohibited international cooperation bý 
212 Gilmore W., "Changes to the Global Regime, ' a chapter in Clark A., & Burrell P., -AlIr-actitioner's 
Quide to International Money Laundering Law and Regulation, " 2003 at pp. 286-287. 
2,1 Criterion 15: Laws or regulations prohibiting international exchange of information between 
administrative anti-money laundering authorities or not granting clear gatewaVs or subjecting 
exchange of information to unduly restrictive conditions. 
214 Criterion 16: "Prohibiting relevant administrative authorities to conduct investigations or 
enquiries on behalf of, or for account of their foreign counterparts. " 
2" Ilinterseer K., "Criminal Finance, The Political Economy of Money Launderink,! in a Comparativ 
Legal Context, " Kluwer Law Intemational, 2002 at p 387 where he observed that: "Today, inonev is able 
to inove through Qferent markets, economies. andjurisdictions at spee& litnited onlY bY the abditv 
inji)rmalion to he communicatedfroin one place to another. " 
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administrative authorities. It referred to Sections II and 22 ofthe IIIA 1990 as amended 
and Section 3(3)(b)(iii) of the URPA 1996, as amended, its the three niain provisions 
that prohibited the international exchange ofinformation. The implications ofsection 13 
have already been discussed mider criteria 4 and 5 above and no further claboration will 
provide assistance on this matter. I low, evcr, an examination of the other two provisions 
will be conducted in order to ascertain the extent to which they prohibited the 
international exchange ofinforniation. Section 22 ofthe IIIA 1996 provided as follows: 
Subsection ( I). - -Sitýjccf to subsection (2), neither the Minister nor the Authoriti, nor 
anYperson or entiIII, acting under the authoritY o/ either. incluthng the (Vshore Finance 
hispector, V/1(11/ disclose or tit unY vv((v remove ftom or transmit out ofthe State, am. 
in/ormatiopy relating to 
00 any (pplication inade to him fi)r license under this Act. 
(b) the qffilirs ofil licensce: no matter hovs- vitch inli4mation is gained, or 
(c) Mc identil 
,v or (iffifirs ofa customer qfa 
licensce. 
which the Authority or any person or enti . ly acting under the authoritY o/ the Awhorav 
has acquired in the course ot'his or its dutie. v or the evercist, o/ his or its Junctions 
under this Act. " 
Subsection (2): "Suhsection (1) does not limit the restrictions on thsc/o. vure set jorth in 
the ( 'op? 1itkittial Relationships Preservations (haernational Finance) Act /996. 
Section 22 essentially imposed a severe restriction not only on the international 
exchange of' intlormation with other law entlorcernent authorities but also Oil the 
regulatory body, (the OFA) itself'. In order to provide assistance to other law 
enflorccinent authorities and to ensure that only reputable and desirable persons were 
permitted to participate in the opportunities that were available under the offshore 
banking operations, the OFA needed to acquire further inf'orination about the principals 
ofthe applicant. The acquisition of' such inforniation required further enquiries to, (a) 
check the veracity of the infori-nation contained in the references that were submitted by 
the principals of the applicant, and (b) conduct further due diligence in order to 
determine the bona tides of' the principals and ascertain whether they had criminal 
records. Not surprisingly, the OFA, did not observe the restrictions imposed by Section 
22(l) and conducted due diligence enquiries on the applicants for offshore banking 
licenses (and for applications for insurance and mutual funds licences) in the manner 
aforesaid . 
236 For the most part this required communicating with persons in other 
countries and transmitting particulars of the principals to individuals and authorities 
overseas. Although such was the practice of the OFA, it still was not precluded from 
issuing offshore banking licenses without having conducted the relevant enquiries into 
the character and reputation of the applicants and the source of funding for the banking 
216 An examination of the records at the OFA revealed that due diligence enquiries were conducted on all 
the applicants for offshore banking licenses. 
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operations. The OFA would have been actimý lawfully ifit conducted no enquirics about 
applicants. This situation waS Untenable and severely handicapped international efforls 
in the light against money laundering. 
III SVG's response oil 6"' June, 20002 17 to tile FATF's assessment, It . vas acknowledged 
that cons iderat I oil was being given to amending Sections 1 3)(4) and 22 and that the 
,4 Th amendments were going to be made at tile next sitting of' parlianient. 2 ' ose 
amendments were ef6ectively passed in tile House of' Parliament on 20"' July, 2000 in 
tile case of' the latter section, and 15 th September, 2000 in tile case of' the former (see 
next chapter 1or Further discussion). The mere fact that tile next sitting of* parliament 
was in July (exactly one month aller SVG was blacklisted), 2000 and section 22 %%-as 
amended by parliament at that sitting, was an unequivocal demonstration of* SVG's 
et I'orts to cooperate in the light against money laundering. It also highlighted not only 
the urgency by the FATF, 11or whatever reason, to name and sharne SVG, but amplified 
its apparent disrespect Ior SVG's economic sovereignty and status as a sovereign nation 
(see chapter 6 t1or further discussion). It raises the questions why there was [lot any 
dialogue with SVG on the amendment that was necessary and/or why there %%-as not an 
acknowledgement of' SVUs continued efforts to assist the international COIIIIlILIDIty III 
the tight against money laundering'? In the sarne way that dialogues were held with 
Turkey 239 and Austria to comply with the standards established by the FATF, why there 
217 At pp I 1- 12 where it was stated that: ", imuigements litive alreat4, been made to relwal suhsection 
(a)(b) and (0 ol'section 22 ofthe Iff-I /996 tit the next sittitkiz qI'lurliament. - 
7he similar provision rejerre(I to in the reportlmetjiiiniý the F. -I IT relmril is section 13(4) o/ Ihe Iff 1 
1996. Thalsection is also under considerationjor amendment("i *v 
emphasis athIed) - 
Section 13 (4) of the 113A was amended to provide as 11611ows: "For the I)urI)oseN ol sithsection (3) the 
-Ior shall have access to the name or title oftin account ot a customer tim/ am. . 
J. ýhore Finance /Rispec 
other coqfitlential inf6miation about the customer which is iii the I)ossession o/ a licensee Wid am, 
account esiablishe(I bY a licensee on behalt'of'anY customer shall state the Piame and address o/ III, - 
customer and or the betieficiary oj'the account. " 
Section 22(l) IBA 1996 was amended to provide as follows: -Subject to subsection (21, neaher the 
Minisler nor the Authorit 
,v 
nor any person or entity acting under the anthorin, ol either. including the 
(YlWiore Finance Inspector, shall disclose or in anv, st-al, remove Jýom or transmit out ol the State. J. -; I- 
information relating to the identitY or q1jairs (? /'it customer of a licensee, 
which the A uthorily or an ,v 
person or entiiy acting under the authoritv ofthe .4 uthoritY 
has acquired in the 
course oj'his or its duties or the exercise oj'his or itsJunctions under Ihis. -Ict. " 
21" Levi M., & Gilmore W., "Terrorist Finance, Money Laundering and the Rise and Rise of' Mutual 
Evaluation: A New Paradigm for Crime Control? " in Peith M., "'Financing Terrorism- 2002 at 1). 100 
".. When this lactic j6r increasing peer pressure fifils additional steps inay he taken. as happened wilh 
Turkey in / 995-96. Its failure, inter alia, even to enact basic anti-mone 
,v 
laundering legislation had 
placed it in a position of'serious non-compliance with the recommendations. Accorditkizýv the FAIT 
presidenifirst wrote to relevant ministers in that member counity expressitkfZ concern. Subsequenth-, a 
high level mission was sent to Ankara to encourage the government to take urgent action or 
- 
jace Ihe 
possibility (? f having more serious steps taken against it. Final4v. on Wh September, 1996, the FATF 
issued a public statement in which it invoked its so- called recommendation 21 procedure agai . nst a 
memberfi)r thefirst time. " 
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was not such a dialogue between the FATF and SVG. concerning the alleged negative 
impact of those provisions of its laws on the international anti-nioney laundering 
activities'? 
The other section to which the FATF rel'erred . vas Section 3(3)(b)(iii) of' the CRIIA 
1996. That section provided as follows: 
"Ais Act has no application it) the seeking, divitking or obtaining of confidential 
in1brination - ... h) b. v or to - 
(i) the Q/ e rill) 
, 
ýWiore Finance hispector or aState police officer ofth k 
of Inspector or above, specýficalýv authorised by tilt. Minister in 
that Connection, investigating (ill o#ýnce against the criminal laws 
qfanother State, other than (ill olknce under that other Sigite's tav 
or revenue /aws. committed outside the State which ollence, if it 
had been committed ill the State would have heen an ol/ence 
against its criminal laws. so long as the confidential infiwinafion 
sought, obtained or divulged is directlY relevant to the 
investigation o0he olknce. - 
The FAIT contended that because the Offshore Finance Inspector required tile prior 
approval of the Minister (in this case the Minister of Finance) before disclosing 
confidential information pursuant to a criminal investigation, that the approval in itself' 
represented a restriction "on tiny kintl ofinternational coo1wration it-ith the 0/1short, 
h'inance Inspeclor. , 240 Furthermore, by limiting the information to be disclosed directly 
to the offence under investigation, the FATF concluded that this was also a prohibition 
on international cooperation. It is difficult to justify the conclusions reached by tile 
FATF with regard to Section 3(3)(b)(iii) of the CRPA 1996. The Offshore Finance 
Inspector pursuant to Section 8(2) of the St. Vincent and the Grenadines Offshore 
Finance Authority Act (SVGOFA) 1996 is an employee of the OFA and his 
appointment had to be approved by the Cabinet of Ministers. 
241 Although, the OFA is a 
242 243 
statutory corporation , in that 
it could sue and be sued and had a certain degree of 
240 FA, rF- Rr 
, 
port on St. Vincent and the Grenadines Against the Criteria for Assessing Non-Cooperative 
Countries-20' June 2000. p5 
241 Section 8(2) of the SVGOFA 1996 provided that: "Subject to lite prior approval oO 'abinel, the 
A uthority may appoint any natural person to the position (? f* OJ). 0iore Finance Inspector under terms and 
conditions of, employment that the Authority deetris proper and necessary. The Qffýhore P'inance 
inspector shall subject to the supervision and control of the Authorit ,v 
Board. mantkiZe lite thiv to dal- 
business of the Authority and of the duties of the Authori4, that tire deleýgaled to him bv the Authori(I. 
under this Act and under other Offvhore Legislation. - 
242 Farrar J, Hannigan B, Furey N, Wyllie P., "Farrar's Company Law" 1998, at p 59. -. 4 slaluloýv 
corporation is a company that isformed by the passing ty'an Act oJ'Parliament. - 
243 Section 4(3) of the SVGOFA 1996 provided that: 
"The Authority may sue and be sued in its corporate name and mqw, borrow such monies as it 
may reasonably needftom time to time. Service upon the Authority (#'an, v notice, order or other 
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autonomy, 244 it nonetheless fell under the auspices of the Ministry ofFinaticc 110r which 
the Minister of Finance had the ultimate responsibility. 24i It is therefore stronglý 
arguable that the Minister of Finance, being a member of the legislature is a more 
suitable person to disclose the information, and that effectively, the Oftshore Finance 
Inspector was designated to make such disclosures on the Minister's behalf'. It' the 
Minister of Finance was fit to (a) supervise the activities of the OFA via his connections 
with the OFA's Board of Directors, (b) approve and to present to the Cabinet of' 
Ministers for its approval, the appointment of the Offshore Finance Inspector, and (c) 
present and debate in parliament any introduction of or amendment to the offshore 
finance legislation, it is rather strange that the seeking of his consent prior to the 
disclosure of confidential information should be seen by the FATF as a restriction to 
international cooperation. To the contrary, the seeking of the Minister's consent 
appeared to be consistent with the administrative structure ofthe OFA. 
The FATF's other concern was the requirement that the information to be disclosed 
must be directly relevant to the offence that was being investigated. It was not clear why 
the FATF concluded that providing information that only related to the ofl'ence under 
investigation was prohibitive in the fight against money laundering. The mere fact that 
Section 3(3)(b)(iii) of the CRPA 1996 permitted the disclosure of confidential 
information in order to facilitate an investigation into an offence was indeed a 
recognition of the necessity for international cooperation. Moreover, in the light ofthe 
document shall he executed by delivering the same to or sending it by registered post addressed 
to the Secretary of the Authority tit the o/fice of'the A tithorit. 11. 
244 Section 4(1) of the SVGOFA 1996 provided that: 
- The A uthority shall he a body corporate having perpetual existence in, / it common seal The 
rules and by-laws of the Authority Board shall he prepared b, v the Minister and approved by 
Cabinet. Such by-laws shall govern it// meetings. fiinctioning and operations (1/* the .4 uthori(v 
Board, and the provisions of'such h, vl-laws shall tit it// times he consistent with the provisions of 
this Act, with the procedures nornialýv governing hodies corporate cregued b*v the State. and 
with the duties of the Authority contained herein and elsewhere in the laws qfthe State. 
245 Section 4(4) of the SVGOFA 1996 provided that: 
"All annual operating expenses of the Authoritv, including salaries to he paid to ernplot-ees of' 
the Authority and to Authority Board memhers(ýf an , 
19. shall befiinded bV the Government o0he 
State pursuant to an annual budget provided to Cabinet bv the .4 uthorin, Board as it normal 
I 
part 
of the annual Government budget process... 
Section 9 of the SVGOFA 1996 provided that: 
"Each International Business Company, International Banking Compan 
, 
v, RegisteredAgent ty* 
International Trust registered under Ofj-ýhore Legislation shall pay all 
, 
fines, ftes andpenalties 
due to be paid by it under the terms of any Offshore Legislation to the Consolidated General 
Fund, marked as receivedfrom offshore services, and the registrar qj'International Business 
Companies and the Registrar of Trusts shall remit the same in such mariner. 
Section 10 of the SVGOFA 1996 provided that: 
"The Minister, after consultation with the Authority may make rulesfor the better carrying into 
effect ofthepurposes andprovisions ofthis Act. " 
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fact that the FATF under criterion 16 246 concluded that "this criterion is partiallY niel" 
without explaining why it was partially met, exemplified its own doubts as to its ability 
to substantiate its conclusion. 
4.11 Criteria18 
247 
and 22 
248 
Criteria 18 and 22 referred to the restriction that was imposed on the disclosure oftax 
related infon-nation and its impact on international cooperation. Although, criterion 18 
specifically referred to the reporting of tax related suspicious transactions and criterion 
22 dealt with the cases involving tax related offences, they are basically synonymous in 
their content. Accordingly, it seems appropriate to deal with both criteria 
simultaneously since the responses will be virtually identical. 
The FATF concluded that SVG met both criteria 18 and 22. It justificd the conclusions 
in the following identical manner: 
"The Section 3(3)(h)(iii) of the Confidential Relationships Preservation (International 
Finance) Act 1996 specifically prohibits disclosure qfiqlbrmation related to the mont-Y 
laundering qffence with possible tar implications. 
The FATF was essentially objecting to the prohibition on the disclosure of confidential 
information which related to tax and revenue law matters as prescribed by Section 
3(3)(b)(iii) of the CRPA 1996. To consider the justification for the conclusion, it is 
important to examine whether, by excluding tax matters, Section 3(3)(b)(iii) %%, as 
inconsistent with legal principles that were recognised under international law or that 
the intention of the SVG parliament was to blatantly encourage the violation of the 
revenue laws of another State. 
246 The FATF concluded that criterion 16 was partially met and justified that conclusion in the following 
manner: "There is no explicit provision on this point, but all the powers ql'investigation qj"the 011. ýhore 
Finance Inspector related to offences against the lmv of*afi)reign State are subject to prior authorisation 
of the Minister of Finance. In addition, possible investigation on a possible ojjýnce are striell ,v 
limited to 
the seeking of confidential information directly relevant to the investigation qf1hat qftnce ( see the 
Section 3, (3), b, (iii) of the Confidential Relationships Preservation (International Finance) .4 ct o/'I 996. 
As a consequence, such kind of co-operation is only possible under ven- restrictive conalitions. " See the 
FATF- Report on St. Vincent and the Grenadines Against the Criteria for Assessing Non-Cooperativc 
Countries-20'h June 2000. p6 
247 Criterion 18: "Restrictive practices in international cooperation against money laundering 
between supervisory authorities or between FlUs for the analysis and investigation of suspicious 
transactions, especially on the grounds that such transactions may relate to tax matters. " 
2411 Criterion 22: "Refusal to provide judicial cooperation in cases involving offences recognised as 
such by the requested jurisdiction especially tax on the grounds that tax matters are involved. - 
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There has been a plethora ofcourt judgments supporting the principle that a state is not 
bound to recognise and enforce foreign revenue or penal laws. 249 Such was tile position 
since the pronouncement by Lord Mansfield that -no country takes nofice of the rtwenue 
hill's of (Inother -, "' This principle, as North and Fawcett indicated, --rentained (i htl/e 
nebulous -` t1or sometime until the decision of' the I louse of' Lords in Covernment of 
India v Taylo wherein it was rcintlorced as a well established principle under 
English law. Thereafter, it was widely accepted and applied by both Friglish and 
Ibreign coin nionweal th23' Courts alike. The principle %%, as so entrenched that elTorts to 
indirectly enflorce 2i4 matters relating to Coreign revenue laws were thwarted by tile 
courts. In the case of Peter Buchanan Ltd and Mucharp- v McVev-255 it %%, as stated 
that; 'In ei, erv case the substance ofthe claim must he scrutinised. and i0i then appears that it 
is really a suil broughtfior the purpose qfrollecting the 41ebts ql'ti/oreign ret-enue, it must he 
rejecled"" Accordingly, by excluding tax and revenue matters from the requirements 
under which confidential information should be disclosed, the parliament of' SVG was 
reinforcing by way of statute a well established principle of private international law. 
This principle by being enshrined in statue, apparently obviated any discretion that the 
court previously had under common law, in dealing with a request ot'a revenue nature, 
made by a foreign State and relating to an offshore entity. Within recent times courts 
have resiled somewhat from this principle in the furtherance of' a harmonious 
relationship among States. 
257 Understandably, it does not augur well for the deepening 
2" Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 34 1; Government of India v Taylor [ 19551 AC 49 1: Re Lord-Cable 
1997] 1 WLR 7: A-G (New Zealand) v Orti [ 19841 AC I-* We (Io not sit to collect tares JOr another 
countrv or to inflict punishmentsfior it. 'as per Lorcl Denninjiý p 20): Williams and I lumbert I. td vW&II 
Trade Marks (Jersey) Ltd [ 1986] AC 368 : Re State of Norway's Applications (Nos. I and 2 [199011 AC 
723; [ 19891 1 All ER 745: United States of America v Inkley [ 19891 QB 255 
2'0 Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 34 1, at 343 
25 1 North P., and Fawcett J., " Cheshire and North's Private International Law.  Butterworths 13'h edn. 
1999, atp. 108 
252 [ 1955] AC 491 or[ 195511 All ER 292 
25' Re Lambert and Pinto Sup Ct, Bahamas, Case No. 962 of 1986 : A-G (UK) v Heinemann Publisher, 
Australia Pty Ltd (No. 2) (1988) 165 CLR 30 A-G for the United Kinpdorn v Wellinvton Neý%sp -- s Ax- rs 
Ltd [ 19881 1 NZLR 129: Clapham v Mesurier 1990-911 JLR 5: Stutts v Premier Benefit Capital Trus 
[1992-93] CILR 605, where the Cayman Islands courts applied the principle in the following manner, 
"The rule that the courts of no country execute the law oJ'another applies not onl " 
V, to... crintes ... 
but to till 
suits in favour of the State for recovery of pecuniary penalliesfir any violation qfstatutes fi)r the 
protection of its revenue... awl to al1judgmentsfor such penalties. 
... Brokaw v Seatrain UK Ltd [ 197112 QB 476 
255 [19551 AC 516 
"' Peter Buchanan Ltd. And Macharg v McVey [ 1955] AC 516 at 529 
257 Re State of Norway's Applications (Nos. I and 2)[199011 AC 723; [ 19891 1 All ER 745- - it-here an 
English court assisted Norway aforeign State in obtaining evitlence against one oj'its tar puyers. " See 
also Rv Charlton [ 19931 JLR 360 where the offshore jurisdiction of Jersey has followed the decision of' 
Re State of Norway' Applications by declaring that requests for documents perlaining to revenue matters 
may not be considered in the same way as assistance to another country to collect taxes. 
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of relationships and international cooperation in the light against international crime, 2NIS 
it'States by applying the principle, blatantly encourage the violation ofthe revenue laws 
of other States. 2 59 1 Mis was evidently not the intention of the parliament of SVG but 
instead what was considered to be the norin in 01-Vs. 2"" Interestingly, the State of' St. 
Kitts and Nevis was removed from the FATF blacklist even though Section 34(l ) (d) 01' 
the St. Kitts and Nevis PCA 2000 empowered the Comptroller of Inland Reventie to 
refuse assistance flor information relating to floreign revenue law matters. As Antoine 
observed; "To a hirge extent, qfl. ýhore activin, is aitned ta achict-itkg efficient Ita in-oidance ()r 
i(Lv planning ineasures and not tax evasion. ' . 261 
With the rapid improvement in modern technology whi II ch has ficilitated greater 
mobility ofcapital, labour and services and which has also been a source ofvigour and 
gusto for organised crime and its attendant evils, States rather cooperate more fully and 
extend greater hands of friendship in order to apprehend and eradicate criminal elements 
from their respective societies. The principle of' non-enforcement and non-recognition 
of foreign revenue laws, though well grounded in its jurisprudential traditions is now 
perceived as a hindrance to international cooperation, but it is yet to be placed into the 
annals of legal history as no longer good law. As North and Fawcett observed, -The rille 
that no action tOll lie tit the instance of"afin-eignState to eilfim-e a revenue hits, does not mean, 
clespile Otat Lord Mansfield said in Holman %,. Johnson, that such a lavs- is it) he totally ignored 
Rý111. Val to enforce it applies no disclaimer ofits hiiýfid existence. and circitinstances inal, 
require that its existence be recognised. -21-, Accordingly, whilst the principle still remains 
good law, SVG could not be said to be under any legal obligation to assist a foreign 
country in revenue matters. It is also interesting to note that even it' Section 3)(3)(b)(111) 
was repealed the principle will still exist Linder common law and may be applied by the 
courts if after weighing the consequences of disclosure the economic interests- of SV(; 
will be greatly affected 263 adversely. 
25' Re Tucker a Bankrup [ 1987-1988] Manx LR 8- disclosure was made about infinnnation concerninit 
a Jersey trust which was used in criminal conduct. GvS [1990-19911 CILR 341 at 354 where in 
response to a request for information in a drug related matter the courts held that in order to ascertain 
whether drug trafficking subsisted intheCayman Islands the request 
believing it to be in the public interest that the documents shoishl be prothice(z 
2"' Euro-Diam Ltd v Bathurst [ 199011 QB I at 39-40 
260 Art. 3 of the Antigua and Barbuda Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT), Art 19(3) ofthe 1990 
Cayman Islands MLAT with the USA where it provided that, -... anY conthict or matter it-hich relates 
directlv or indirectly to the regulation, imposition, calculation or collection qftares - will be excluded 
26 1 Antoine R., "Confidential i1y in Offshore Financial Law" Oxford 2002 p 46 
262 North P., & Fawcett J., "Cheshire and North's Private International Law. ' 1999. at p. 110 
26' Arawak Trust Co Ltd v Holden CA BVI, Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1994, decided I Vh and 12th September 
1994. 
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In determining whether to permit assistance in matters relating to l'oreign revenue laws 
the courts have at times carried out a balancing act. 264 - Fhey have been inclined to weigh 
up the interests of the country from whom the assistance is requested, against the public 
policy implications of refusing the assistance. Two of' the fundamental pillars upon 
which the OFSS is established are taxation and contidentiality/privacy. Providing 
revenue law assistance to a foreign country about its tax payer's participation in the 
OFSS can be seen as undermining the existence of the sector and defeating the purpose 
for which it was established in the first place. 265 Providing the assistance would require 
disclosure of confidential information (the weakening of'one pillar) and a violation of 
the reason t1or encouraging the investor to invest in the I irst place (tile removal of tile tax 
minimisation advantage)*, the overall effect being a loss in confidence in tile OFSS and a 
reduction in the number of investors that are likely to participate in the investment 
opportunities that are available. This will not be considered as an acceptable course of 
action since generally, taxpayers were permitted by law to arrange their aft'airs in such a 
way that even though they acted within the law, they nonetheless rnininlise the 
incidence of tax. 266 This proposition was also followed by a Jersey Court which actually 
permitted the avoidance of English tax by the use of a financial structure involving an 
offshore trust that was registered in Jersey. 
267 Due to the plenitude ofcourt judgments in 
support of tax avoidance and the facilitation of offshore entities as the ingredients of' 
offshore tax planning and financial engineering, the exclusion ofrevenue laws must not 
be seen solely within the context of offshore financial services as a cocktail or recipe for 
tax evasion. In this regard Antoine stated that: 
"In tar planning situations, the ethical issue concerning the use qfq#WIore hav to 
facilitate criminality is removed, thereb -v exposing 
the single issue qfnational econolnic 
survival. Where offshore law protects tax a-voidance1j)1anning activi(V, thus iklined. 
there is no legal basis upon which it call be questioned Such legaliýv assulnes tile 
morality and appropriateness of the offshore tav planning function. Coupled with tile 
lack of harmony infiscal laws between countries whi -h (! f . 
Tect parlicular. multinational 
2' Royal Bank of Canada v Apollo Development (1985) LRC (Comm) 66 as per Georgeg I. J; "The poliy 
ofpreserving bank secrecy in the Commonwealth as enshrined in its laws mustscrupulousli- he observed 
Of equal importance is the need to ensure that it does not become a screetifi)r. fij(. -ilittititkiz_tititttl- " 
2'5 Antoine R., "Confidentiality in Offshore Financial Law" 2002 at p. 50 where she stated that, "There. 
is therefore, no legal or moral obligation of offshore or onshore states to assist onshore states (to their 
own detriment), in harnessingfiscal revenue b, v undermininjg the eflýct of q1J. 0iore conjidentialitv laws. To 
the extent that this is a recognised principle of international law, oj). ýhore havs is-hich discouraKe 
cooperation on these matters cannot be easily criticiied The rule helps to uphold national interests and 
public policy in offvhore states. " 
2' Duke of Westminster v IRC (1935) 19 TC 490 at p 520 (as per Lord Tomlin); See also Ayr%-hir 
Pullman Motor Service v IRC (1929) 14 TC 754 at pp 763-764 (as per Lord Clyde) : IRC v Brchner 
(1967) 43 TC at p 718H (as per Lord Upjohn) 
267 In the Matterof MoodyJersey A Settlement [19901 JLR264 at 266 
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compatfies, this provides a lt*)r its evistenct, and purpose and the 
tools, such (is cotifidentialitY, whichseck to iphohl it. - "" 
Moreover, certain States do not impose taxes on entities (onshore and/or ol'I'shorc) and 
thcret'orc may not consider tax evasion to be a crime. 269 Understandably, those States 
may not be favourably inclined to a reporting regime which includes tile disclosure of' 
intlorrilation pcrtaining to Ioreigii revenue laws. 011'shore entities in SVG were exempt 
From the payment of taxes. 270 This therefore provided a cogent argument in suprX)rt of' 
the principle of'exclusion of foreign revenue laws. As was demonstrated in chapter 1.1, 
SVG Would have been threatening its own economic interest If it assisted another 
country to collect its taxes, since SVG did not impose any taxes oil investments in 
offshore entities. This also raises the issue of' non-intervent io, 127 I of' foreign States into 
the internal afTairs of another sovereign State (see chapter 6.1.2). 2 7 -' SVG is prohibited 
under international law From dictating the fiscal policies of' a 1`6relgn State. FqUally, 
under the law of'equality of States, 273 a foreign State is prohibited trorn intervening into 
the domestic economic policies of' SVG. This does not however accord to SVG carle 
blanche to implement laws that are grossly offensive to the well being of' another 
State 274 - such as encouraging tax payers to engage in tax Craud and tax evasion. 27i As 
2"" Antoine R., "Confidentiality in Offshore Financial Law- 2002 at p. 48 
269 Switzerland, Bahamas, Cayman Islands. 
2"' See Sections 99 and 100 of the IBC Act 1996: Section 20 of the IBA 1996 : Section 62 ofthe I FA 
1996 : Section 48 of the IIA 1998 : Section 39 ofthe MFA 1997 as amended in 1998 
271 Warbrick C., "States and Recognition in Intemational Law, " in Evans M., Internatio nal Law- O\f0rd 
2003 at p. 218, Cassese A., "International Law. - Oxford 2002 at pp. 98 -100 - Qtlre%hi A., '*In - 
terru 
- itional Economic Law- Sweet & Maxwell 1999 at pp. 34-38 : Beveridge F., -Therreatment and 
- 
I'a\ation of 
Foreign Investment Under International Law- Towards international discipline 
-- 
Juris Publishing 2000 at 
p. 5: Schermers H., "Different Aspects of Sovereignty' in Kreijen G., -State -Sovereignty and International Governance" Oxford 2002 at p. 185; Brownlie L. -ftjncýýhlic Internatiom Law" 
Oxford, 5"' edn. 1998 at pp. 289-290: 
272 Re the Matter of H[ 19961 CILR 237 at 243 
271 Brownlie I., "Principles of Public International Law- 1998 at p. 289 where it is stated ftw 17te 
principle corollaries of the sovereigtq and equalitV (? /' States are. - (1) it jurisdiction. pruria /acie 
exclusive, over territory anti the permanent population livitkiz there. - (2) a hl(V- of noll-intervention in tht, 
area oj' exclusive jurisdiction (? f other states: and (3) /he dt! pendenCe 0/- OhligallonS arising Iroln 
cusiomarv law and Ireaties on the consent ofthe obligor. - 
Art. 2 para 7 of the United Nations Charter provides: -Nothipkiý contained in the present Charter shall 
authorize the United Nations to intervene it) matters which tire essential4v within tit, - domestic juris, 14-tion 
of any Slate or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present charter. 
but this principle shall not prejudice the application qfeqlorcement ineasureý,; under Chapter 171 
27' Hinterseer K., "Criminal Finance- The Political Economy of Money Laundering in 
-4 
Co rnpýl tive 
Legal Context, " 2002 at p. 76; Commenting on the Economic Development Assistance Act 1995 in the 
Seychelles, Hinterseer stated that; "Under the EDAA individuals svith at /east SIO million were given Avo 
incentives to invest in the islands. First within the Se vchelles, investors ivi/l receive immuni(w-fto"I 
criminal prosecution brought against them by, till ,v paqv. 
However this did not qppýv to proceethrkgs 
initiated by the Seychellian authorities in relation to acts oj'violence or cases qfdrug tratjickinjiý w0thin 
the Seychelles. Second a guarantee that assets located in the Sevchelles would be immune from atýv 
confiscation or seizure order sought to be enjbi-ced against the investor by ajoreign government... 
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was demonstrated above that was never the intention ot'SVG Intercstingly, the Protocol 
to the MLAT which was executed by SVG and the USA on glh January, 1999 excluded 
assistance 'for civil and administrativc tax matters that are unrelated to an), criminal tax 
matter' but permitted the disclosure ol'criminal tax matters. It provided as follows: 
"Further although file Treat ,v 
has no general Aal criininali(v requi . re"ient, our 
governments understand United States hns. and tilt, lavs, of' St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines to be consistent with respect to criminalizing svilful. kainhilent Inisconduct 
ýv private persons in representations to /he government. As a result, flit- conduct 
underl ' ving (I 
United States government request to St. Vincent (Ind the Gremuhnes for 
assistance in (I criminal tax evasion case would in all likelihood also be criminalised 
under the has, qfS1. Vincent and the Grenadines. " 
Banking secrecy laws have traditionally restricted the disclosure of' tax int'onnation. 
Moreover, in certain countries tax evasion is not a crime. 27() , Fheret'Ore, It Would Ne 
excessive to make tax evasion a crime in a country where tax is exempt. Bearing in 
mind that a State's power is restricted to its subjects within its territory, instituting laws 
against tax evasion in a country or sector where tax is exempt can only but have an 
extraterritorial effect which is not only unacceptable under international law but also in 
the case of SVG otiose. 
277 Therefore, on the basis of the t1oregoing it is difficult to see 
how the conclusions of the FATF on criteria 18 and 22 cari be effectively substantiated. 
4.12 Criterion 23 
278 
This criterion assessed the adequacy of the human and technical resources that were 
necessary to conduct investigations. Insofar as SVG's resources were concerned the 
FATF concluded that: 
"The Offshore Finance Authoritv and the qffice ofthe (yl. 'vhore Finance Inspector tire 
.f 
memhers, which isfijr. fi-om sifflicient. lit accorthince with that jact, comprised of 8 sIqf 
the CFATF mutual evaluation report leads to the conclusion Mat St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines has devoted no human or material resources specifica/4%, to anti-money 
laundering 4jbrts. -2-1 
275 Controller and AG y Davison [1996] 2 NZLR 278-, Pete Marwick v Davison [199612 NZLR 319ý 
cases in which tax fraud required the disclosure to be niade. 
216 E. g. Switzerland 
277 Beveridge F., "The Treatment and Taxation of Foreign Investment Under International Law- Towards 
international discipline" 2000 at pp 51-53 
278 Criterion 23: Failure to provide the administrative and judicial authorities with the necessary 
financial, human or technical resources to exercise their functions or to conduct their 
investigations. 
27" FATF- Report on St. Vincent and the Grenadines Against the Criteria for Assessing Non-Cooperativc 
Countries-20t June 2000. p7 
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The issues raised under this criterion were discussed earlier in this chapter and require 
no further amplification except to say that once again the FATF failed to substantiate its 
claims. It concluded that the staffing complement of 8( it should have been 9 including 
the Offshore Finance Inspector) is 'Jarftom sufficient. " What was therefore the adequate 
level of staffing that was required'? How did the FATF determine that the staffing 
complement was insufficient? Whose responsibility was it to determine the desired level 
of staffing that was required? What were the difficulties that the OFA encountered as a 
result of the staffing complement of 9? How does a staffing complement of 9 affect 
international cooperation in the fight against money laundering? It is therefore grossly 
inaccurate to state that 'St. Vincent and the Grenadines has devoted no human or material 
resources specifically to anti-money laundering efforts. ' 
The OFA and the anti-money laundering unit to which cash transaction reports were 
submitted; the law enforcement officials who conducted further investigations on those 
reports and also received suspicious transaction reports and; the office of the Director of 
Public Prosecution that determined whether or not to proceed to trial on the basis of the 
evidence are they not human resources? Are they not remunerated for the functions that 
they perform? Those are the issues that the FATF should have addressed before arriving 
at its conclusion. Moreover, it is important to note that SVG was not perceived as a 
favoured money laundering destination and was therefore ranked as medium risk 
country in so far as money laundering was concerned (see chapter 3.15). 
In chapter 2.4 it was established that money laundering was rife in FATF member States 
and the criminal activities that generated the proceeds of crime actually occurred in 
those States as well. Nonetheless, the FATF did not consider it relevant to question the 
adequacy of the resources that were used by its member States to combat money 
laundering. In the light of the extent of the criminal and money laundering activities that 
were estimated to have taken place in FATF member countries, why did the FATF not 
question the adequacy of the resources, human, financial and otherwise that were 
utilised to combat crime? Had the FATF shown a willingness to treat each country fairly 
in its efforts to combat money laundering activities, its quest for international 
cooperation in the fight against global money laundering would have been more easily 
achieved. 
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4.13 Criterion 24 280 
This criterion addresses the issue of corruption in the institutions and the individuals 
that were responsible for the dispensation of justice and the governance of the anti- 
money laundering initiative. 
The separation of private sector individuals from public sector activities can be 
paramount in small countries such as SVG. There can be economic, social and political 
disadvantages arising especially where a private sector individual or institution may be 
as economically well off as the entire country itself. SVG experienced such 
disadvantages in 2000 when the OFA revoked 281 the offshore banking licenses of Nano 
and Sons 1146 Private Bankers Ltd and New Bank Ltd which were purported to have 
been owned by the Nano family. 282 In retaliation to the revocation of the licenses the 
putative owner Mr. Thierry Nano wrote to the OFA and the government demanding the 
repayment of the monies that it allegedly spent to finance the drafting of the 1996 
offshore legislation and accusing government officials of receiving monies from the 
283 bank prior to 1996 . The revocation of the banking licenses may well have been a 
major factor in the 2001 general elections campaign and which may have led to the 
government's defeat at the polls(see also chapter 5.13). 
284 The nature and size of some 
commercial entities have at times accounted for the extent to which they can influence 
the political directorate and by extension the economies of countries. As Stem has 
pointed out; 
"Moreover, transnational firms are major actors in the contemporary international 
relations, their importance being comparable to the economic weight of fnany, 5tates. As 
an example, it may be recalled that the annual turnover of ITT was higher than the 
Gross National Product of Chile at the time President Allende was overthrown. and it 
has been contended that ITT contributed to that evenL Even such an extreme outcome 
does not occur, it is quite clear that the power of multinational corporations competes 
with the power of States and can hamper, if not their political sovereignýv, (it leaw their 
economic sovereignty over their natural resources and economic wealth. -, "5 
"0 Criterion 24: Inadequate or corrupt professional staff in either governmental; judiciary or 
supervisory authorities or among those responsible for anti-money laundering compliance in the 
financial services sector. 
281 Information obtained from the Records at the Offshore Finance Authority. 
282 
WWWA! 
, s. net, 
"One Money-Laundering Case with Three Governments involved, " Geopolitical geodrug Drug Newsletter, No. 9- June 2002, pp. 1-4 at p. 24 for a history of the Nano family. 
283 [bid at p. 3 
284 lbid ; where it was stated that the Nanos contributed approximately one million dollars to the ULP 
campaign which was ridden with money. 
285 Stem B., "How to Regulate Globalisation? " in Byers M., "The Role of Law In International Politics. 
Essays In International Relations And International Law, " Oxford, 2001 at p. 248 
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One of the main concerns about organised crime is its infectious character. Whether 
through fear, cupidity, duress of circumstances or abject poverty, people are at times 
infected with the gains to be derived from criminal activity. In many instances they turn 
to crime because the opportunity presents itself and man's fallibility becomes tested. 286 
Although the anti-money laundering initiative is gaining currency worldwide, in this 
New International Economic Order 287 where modernization has taken root globally, 
there is still in existence a range of opportunities available to commit crimes. 288 Vold, 
Bernard and Snipes argued that; "These crimes, theref6re require the convergence in 
time and space of a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence ol'a capable 
guardian (police) to prevent the crime. " 
289 Criminologists from the Routine Activities 
School of Criminology argue that by removing the opportunity to commit crime there 
will be a lessening of its occurrence. 290 Criterion 24 sought to remove that opportunity. 
In that regard it provided a yardstick by which to assess the extent of any weaknesses in 
the regulatory and supervisory framework which could be exploited by those whose 
responsibility it is to uphold law and order and cooperate in the international anti-money 
laundering efforts. Accordingly, the FATF concluded that: 
"The Board of the Offshore Finance Authority, which is responsible fi)r the regulation 
and oversight of the St. Vincent and the Grenadines offshore financial services sector, 
includes four private sector representatives. This can lead to signiticant coqflicts of 
interest. It is unwise to involve at this level in the supervision process, and especiallv ill 
the control of the supervision process, individuals who are or can be suhject, (Ilse to 
their profession, to this supervision. " 
It is important to note from the outset that the OFA only had four directors (as opposed 
to five as stated by the FATF), two were from the public sector and two from the private 
sector. 29 1 Although SVG's response indicated that greater expertise in the offshore 
business was to be found in the private sector as opposed to the public sector, 292 the 
286 Lilly R., Cullen F., and Ball R., "Criminological theoKy-Context and Consequences, " Sage 
Publications, 3 rd edn. 2002 at p 234 ; "It has long been pointed out that even if offenders desire to commit 
crimes, they cannot do so unless the opportunity to break the law is present. - 
287 Qureshi A., "International Economic Law, " Sweet & Maxwell, 1999, at pp 35-36 para 2-07 
288 Cohen L., & Felson M., "Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach, ' 
American Sociological Review 44: 588-608(1979) 
289 Vold G., Bernard T., & Snipes J., "Theoretical Criminology. " Oxford, 5h edn. 2002 at p. 206. 
290 Ibid at p. 196 where it is stated that : "... in 1978 Cohen and Felson proposed the "routine activities 
approach, which argued that rationally calculating potential offenders respond to opportunities to 
commit crimes and that these opportunities are systematically related to the "routine activities " by which 
people live their lives. This concept led to policy recommendations to limit criminal opportunities rather 
than increase the deterrent effect of criminal of criminaljustice policies. " 
291 Caribbean Financial Action Task Force- Mutual Evaluation Report on St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
2 "d jUly, 1997, p 11 
292 "There are other aspects of the Authority's operations for example marketing, administration and 
finance that will require the expertise ofpersons who would have acquired very worthy experienceftom 
being in the Private Sector. Small Island economies like Saint Vincent and the Grenadines do not have 
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FATF's conclusion was not without merit. But it would have been more appropriate for 
the FATF to suggest an adjustment to the policy of Board appointments. Such a policy 
should have excluded from holding positions on the Board, those persons who were 
subject to the supervision of the OFA. To exclude persons from the private sector 
altogether, would significantly reduce the number of eligible and competent persons that 
were available to serve as Directors on the Board of the OFA. 
4.14 Criterion 25 
293 
Criterion 25 was introduced to assess whether there was in place an efficient mechanism 
for the collection, analysis and dissemination of suspicious transaction reports. In some 
countries the institution that processes suspicious transaction reports are referred to as 
Financial Intelligence Units (FlUs), whereas in other countries they are referred to by 
different names. For example, in England, the National Criminal Intelligence Service 
(NCIS) and in the USA, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Networks (FINCEN) 
function as FlUs. The name is not as important as the efficiency with which the entire 
system of reporting suspicious transaction operates and the effectiveness of the 
processing mechanism by the FIU. 
The FATF concluded that; "There is no central unit for the collection, dissemination anti 
analysis of suspicious transactions reports in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. " Accordingly, 
it 
was held that SVG fell within Criterion 25. The question that seems to warrant further 
clarification is, what does the FATF mean by a centralised unit'? Moreover, how does 
not having a so called centralised unit impede the anti-money laundering efforts? The 
FATF in its 40 Recommendations only made mention of 'competent authorities, 2144 but 
did not refer to FlU or even defined 
295 what was meant by FlU. A centra1296 unit297 
the luxury given the relatively small human resource base of restricting itself to the utilization QI'Public 
Sector Officials only in enhancing its ability to effectively manage the Offshore Finance Sector. -p 18 
293 Criterion 25 - Lack of a centralised unit (i. e., a financial intelligence unit) or of an equivalent 
mechanism for the collection, analysis and dissemination of suspicious transactions information to 
competent authorities. 
294 Stessens G., "Money Laundering-A New International Law Enforcement Model, " Cambridge, 2000, 
at p. 183. 
295 lbid p 184 where Stessens claimed that the definition of a FlU came from the Egmont Group which 
defined FlU as "A central national agency, responsible for receiving (and as permitted, requested), 
analysing and disseminating to the competent authorities disclosures, of financial information; (i) 
concerning suspected proceec& ftom crime or (d) required by national legislation or regulation, in order 
to counter money laundering. " 
296 Oxford Reference Dictionary revised 2 nd edn. 2002 ap 236 defines central to include: "Chief 
essential, most important" 
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within the context of the FlU is the main or chief institution or device for the collection 
of suspicious transactions from individuals, financial and other institutions, and the 
assimilation, processing and dissemination of such information where appropriate, to 
law enforcement officials. FlUs play a major role in the anti-money laundering efforts 
by determining to a large extent and from the reports received the evidence that is 
necessary for the monitoring and apprehension of those involved in criminal conduct. 298 
Pursuant to Section 21(3) of the DTOA 1993, persons who suspected or knew that funds 
were derived from or used in connection with drug trafficking were encouraged to 
report the matter to a police officer. Section 51(2) of the PCA 1997, as amended, also 
required a financial institution with infori-nation on an account to report that information 
to a police officer or Director of Public Prosecution where that institution had 
reasonable grounds to believe that the inforination in its possession may have led -to an 
investigation or prosecution of a person for an offence. ' Section 51(3) on the other hand 
required financial institutions to report cash transactions in excess of $10,000 to the OFI 
in cases involving an offshore company and to ýa special anti-inoney laundering unit or 
official designated by the Minister of Finance' in all other cases involving cash transactions. 
Essentially, except for the cash transactions reporting mechanism the regulatory 
framework in SVG required the reporting of dubious transactions to the police, which it 
is strongly contended was a central unit. Moreover, pursuant to Section 2 of the Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters (Central Authority Designation) Order 1999 the Director 
of Public Prosecution is designated the central authority for the purposes of the Mutual 
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1993. 
4.15 Conclusion 
The FATF's assessment of SVG was superficial. It did not consider all the laws that 
were implemented by SVG and SVG's continued efforts to ensure that money 
laundering activities did not take root. The plethora of laws that SVG introduced to 
combat organised crime and to meet its international obligations were given scant 
regard by the FATE A process of dialogue between the FATF and SVG would have 
been much more effective. In the same way that dialogue between the FATF and its 
297 lbid at p 1575 defines central to include; "a device with a speciftedfunctionforming part of a complew 
mechanism. " 
298 Mitsilegas V., "New Forms of Transnational Policing: The Emergence of Financial Intelligence Units 
in the European Union and he Challenges for Human Rights, " JMLC, Vol. 3, No. 2,1999, at pp 147-150. 
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member countries was a condition to ensuring satisfactory implementation of the FATF' 
40 Recommendations, further dialogue with SVG would have resolved the deficiencies 
that were identified in its assessment of SVG. For the most part the evaluation of the 
FATF's assessment of SVG was therefore factually unfounded, based on legal 
misapprehension and discriminatory. Moreover, some of the criteria were unnecessary 
and the responses thereto were exaggerated. Accordingly, there was no justifiable basis 
for blacklisting SVG as an uncooperative jurisdiction in the fight against money 
laundering. 
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5.0 Introduction 
SVG continued revising its offshore and money laundering legislation following its 
inclusion on the FATF's list of non-cooperative countries and territories in June 2000. 
This chapter will only be concerned with those legislative revisions that were identified 
by the FATF as being necessary for SVG to make, in order for it to be removed from 
the FATF's blacklist. In that regard, only the relevant legislation that were introduced 
during the period after the blacklisting of SVG and up to I 9th June, 20031 when SVG 
was removed from the FATF's blacklist, will be given consideration. Incidentally, SVG 
was removed by the OECD from its list of uncooperative tax havens on 18'h April, 2002 
after having given a commitment2 to the OECD to address what the OECD considered 
,, 3 to be "harmful tax practices. 
Amendments were made to the IBA 1996, the IBC 1996, the CRPA 1996 and the ITA 
1996. Ultimately, the PCA 1997 and CRPA 1996 were repealed. They were replaced by 
the Proceeds of Crime and Money Laundering (Prevention) Act (PCMLA') 2001 and 
the Exchange of Information Act (EIA) 2002 respectively. Further legislative measures 
established a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), the regulatory powers of which were 
outlined in the Financial Intelligence Unit Act (FIUA) 2001. Each of the aforesaid 
legislative measures will be discussed not only to ascertain their effectiveness to the 
money laundering initiative but also to examine whether there were any significant 
departures from the legislative regime which was in existence prior to June 2000 when 
SVG was placed on the FATF's blacklist. 
In that regard, it will be argued that the regulatory and supervisory regime which led to 
the removal of SVG from the FATF's blacklist was not substantially different from the 
regime which was in existence prior to the blacklisting of SVG. Moreover, some of the 
legislative differences that were introduced after the blacklisting were already scheduled 
to be done and it was communicated to the FATF that they were to be introduced at the 
next sitting of parliament 4 which was approximately one month after the publication of 
the FATF's blacklist. It will also be argued that due to the intense pressure from the 
FATF and the adverse economic and other implications which ensued from being 
1 FATF Report, "Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories: Increasing The World- 
Wide Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures, " 2003. 
2 See chapter 6.4 and 6.5.7 
3 www. oecd. org 
4 See chapter 4.10 
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blacklisted, SVG appeared to have gone too far in its legislative efforts to satisfy the 
FATF's anti-money laundering requirements. Certain provisions of the PCMLA 2001 
were not consistent with the 1979 Constitution. Accordingly, it will be demonstrated 
that the FATF's blacklisting of SVG could not have been justified in the first place 
when the changes that SVG made to be removed from the blacklist were mainly 
cosmetic. 
5.1 Amendments to the IBA 1996 
The IBA 1996 was amended in 2000 during two sittings of parliament. During the 
parliamentary debate on 20th July, 2000 (one month after SVG was blacklisted) 
amendments were made to Sections 4(2) and 22 of the IBA 1996. The other 
amendments (e. g. Section 13(4)) were made on 15th September 2000. SVG in its 
response to the FATF's assessment at a meeting in Miami5 had expressly indicated to 
the FATF that it had already commenced the process of drafting legislative amendments 
to Sections 13 and 22 of the IBA 1996 and that those amendments were going to be 
6 introduced to the House of Parliament the following month . 
It kept its promise but the 
FATF apparently was not interested in the intentions of a country to which it evidently 
had the power to dictate. The amendment to Section 4(2) empowered the OFA to 
ascertain, by making the relevant enquiries, any information that it required about an 
applicant for a banking licence. 
7 Although the previous legislative regime did not 
impose an obligation on the OFA to conduct such due diligence enquiries before, during 
and after a license was granted, the OFA was nonetheless conducting those enquiries 
8 
for all applications for the licensing or registration of offshore financial institutions. " In 
essence, the amendment to section 4(2) of the IBA 1996 only provided a statutory 
requirement for what was already a standard practice in the processing, regulating and 
supervision of offshore financial institutions. 
' See chapter 4.1 
6 See criteria 15 and 16 in chapter 4.10 
7 The amended Section 4(2) of the International Banks Act provided that; "An application under section 
(1) shall befiled with the Offshore Finance Inspector, shall contain the particulars set out in the Schedule 
hereto, and shall be accompanied by the fee prescribed in regulations hereunder. The Offshore Finance 
Inspector shall review the application to ensure it contains the required information and is accompanied 
by the properfee and shallforward the complete application to the Authority after, 
(i) conducting such enquiries as maybe considered necessary; 
(ii) communicating with such persons, bodies or authorities as required, - 
notwithstanding the provisions in this or any other legislation. 
See criteria 15 and 16 in chapter 4.10. 
Offshore financial institutions are international banks, international insurances and mutual funds. 
1 
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The amendment to Section 22 of the IBA 1996 removed the restriction that was 
imposed on the disclosure of information concerning a licensee and an applicant for a 
licence. 10 Instead, the restriction on the disclosure of information was now limited to the 
disclosure of information about "the identity or affairs oj'a customer of a licensee. "I I 
The amendment to Section 13(4) 12 essentially granted permission to the OFI to have 
access to the names and titles of the accounts of customers of licensees. Prior to that 
amendment the OFI only had access to those records pursuant to an order of the court. 13 
Those two amendments were significant to the anti-money laundering efforts of the 
FATF but it is nonetheless important to note that SVG had decided to make those 
amendments prior to it being blacklisted and the FATF was aware of that decision prior 
to the publication of its blacklist in June 2000. 
Further amendments were made to the IBA 1996 on 30th April, 2002 and 29h May, 
2002 to introduce house keeping requirements. The most significant and 
relevant 14 amendment was the inclusion of the ECCB 15 in the licensing and supervision 
of offshore banks. 16 Moreover, section 2 of the IBA was amended to expressly indicate 
that bearer share companies were not eligible to apply for a banking license. Even 
without that amendment such companies could not have applied for and be granted an 
international banking license due to the application requirements that were stipulated in 
the schedule to the IBA 1996 and the IBR 1996.17 
5.2 The Financial Intelligence Unit 
The Financial Intelligence Unit Act (FIUA) 2001 became effective on 18 th December, 
2001. It provides for "the establishment of a Financial Intelligence Unit which will be the 
national centralised unit in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines for the collection, analysis and 
See chapter 4.10 
Section 22 of the IBA 1996 (as amended) provided that: "Subject to subsection (2), neither the Minister 
nor the Authority nor any person or entity acting under the authority of either, including the Offshore 
Finance inspector, shall disclose or in any way removefrom or transmit out of the State. any information 
relating to the identity or affairs of a customer of a licensee. 
12 See note 232 in chapter 4 
" See criteria 4 and 5 in chapter 4.5 
14 i. e. relevant to the FATF money laundering initiative. 
'5 See note 33 in chapter 4.2 
16 Section 4(2a) of the IBA 1996 (as amended) provided that: "The Offshore Finance Inspector shall 
review the application to ensure that it contains the required information and is accompanied by the 
prescribedJee and shall thenforward completed applications to the Authority after; 
(a) submitting an application to the Central Bankfor its review... 
Section 15(2c) of the IBA 1996 (as amended) provided as follows: "Copies of the audited accounts and 
the quarterly returns must be submitted to the Central Bank through the Authority. 
" See discussion in chapter 4.3 under the paragraph headed criterion 2. 
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dissemination of the suspicious transaction information to competent aulhorities. 'I" The 
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) is charged with the responsibility of collecting 
suspicious transaction reports from financial institutions and persons that were engaged 
in relevant business activities, as required under the Proceeds of Crime Money 
Laundering (Prevention) Act (PCMLA) 2001.19 It can be categorised under the 
independent mode120 of FlUs because of its independence from the police and from the 
financial institutions and relevant business activities that were required to provide it 
with infori-nation .21 The 
FIU may demand from any financial institution or person 
engaged in relevant business activity, information that it considered relevant to the 
commission of a relevant offence. 22 Any person who fails to provide the information 
requested has committed an offence punishable by imprisonment of a maximum of two 
years and or a fine not exceeding $50,000.23 
The responsibilities of the FIU also extend to executing agreements with other FlUs but 
it is nonetheless required to obtain the advice of the Minister of Finance before 
disclosing information to foreign FlUs. 24 It seems rather strange that the FIU was 
introduced because of the requirements of the FATF's initiative, 25 yet it has retained a 
similar restriction that was imposed on the Offshore Finance Inspector under Section 
3(3)(b)(iii) of the Confidential Relations Preservations (International Finance) Act 
26 ('CRPA') 1996 . 
The FATF concluded that due to that restriction, criterion 16 was 
partially met. 27 The restriction under the FIUA 2001 provides as follows: 
"Without limiting the foregoing and notwithstanding any other law to the contrary tile 
Financial Intelligence Unit... 
(e) may provide information relating to the commission (? f an qffence to anv 
Foreign Financial Intelligence Unit. Suhject to any conditions (is may be 
considered appropriate by the Director on the advice of the Minister. 
(t) may enter into any agreement or arrangement in writing. with a Foreign 
Financial Intelligence Unit which the Director on the advice of the Minister 
considered necessary for the discharge of the functions of the Financial 
Intelligence Unit. , 28 
18 The preamble of the Financial Intelligence Unit Act 200 1. 
'9 Sections 40) and 4(2)(a) 
20 Mitsilegas V., "New Forms of Transnational Policing: The Emergence of Financial Intelligence Unit 
in the European Union and the Challenges for Human Rights, ' JMLC, vol. 3 No. 2.1999, at pp 147-150. 
21 Section 4(l) of the FIUA 2001 
22 Section 4(2)(b) and also section 2(2) of FIUA 2001 where it is provided that relevant offence and 
relevant business activity have the same meaning that was given under the PCMLA 200 1. 
23 Section 3 of the FIUA 2001 
24 Section 4(2)(f) of the FIUA 2001 
25 See chapter 4.14 
"' See chapter 4.10 
17 See discussion below under the Subheading Exchange of Information Act and see also the discussion in 
chapter 4 under paragraph headed criteria 15 and 16. 
28 Sections 4(2)(e) and (f) of the FIUA 200 1. 
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Essentially, the section prohibits the disclosure of confidential information to a 
foreign 
State in connection with a criminal investigation without the authorisation of the 
Minister. It is difficult to see how sections 4(2)(e) and (f) of the FIUA 2001 differ from 
section 3(3)(b(iii) of the CRPA 1996 in so far as the disclosure of information to a 
foreign State is concerned. The requirement that the prior advice of the Minister of 
Finance must be obtained before any information is disclosed to a Foreign Financial 
Intelligence Unit also extends to circumstances where infon-nation relating to the 
commission of an offence is to be disclosed to the Commissioner of Police. 
29 This 
further reinforces the independence of the FIU and distinguishes its functions from 
those of the police. 
Under section 3(l) of the FIUA 2001 the Minister of Finance is empowered to appoint 
the staff of the FIU which should include, the Director, an attorney at law, a public 
accountant, an indeterminate number of police officers and any other person as the 
Minister of Finance considers suitable. It is arguable that the staffing requirement 
consequent upon the establishment of the independent model FIIJ is no different from 
the staff that existed prior to the introduction of the FIUA 2001. Although the HU 
currently has a Director, it is important to note that the person holding that office was 
the former Assistant Director of Public Prosecutions. 30 Moreover, the attomey-at-law 
was also transferred from the Department of Legal Affairs. There is no public 
accountant on staff but the FIU seeks the services of one when it is necessary to do so. It 
therefore appears that had the police model of FIUs been maintained the staffing 
compliment would have effectively been the same, since the Assistant D. P. P, the 
attorney-at-law and the police officers would still have been involved in the process of 
determining whether or not a money laundering charge should be proffered. 
Since the establishment of the FlU in 2001, and up to the June 2003 (when SVG was 
removed from the FATF's blacklist) no one has been convicted of a money laundering 
offence but 100,068.00 Eastern Caribbean Dollars (US$37,225.00 equivalent) was 
forfeited. The FIU had also received 190 suspicious transaction reports. 31 It is however 
difficult to form any conclusions on the state of affairs in SVG due to those statistics. In 
" Section 4(2)(d) of the FIUA Act 2001 provided that: "Without limiting the foregoing and 
notwithstanding any other law to the contrary the Financial intelligence Unit; 
(d) shall provide information, subject to such conditions as may be determined by the Minister to the 
Commissioner of Police where the information may relate to the commission of an oflýnce. 
information from records of the FIU. 
information from records of the FIU. 
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chapter 3 SVG was mentioned as a low to medium priority country for money 
laundering and the figures appeared to be consistent with that conclusion. This 
strengthens the argument that the FATF's blacklisting of SVG was not only unjustified 
but also premature to say the least. 
When the FIUA 2001 is compared with what previously existed, it is noticeable that 
there is little difference. A FIU department 32 was previously established in the police 
force for the purposes of reviewing reports of suspicious transactions from financial 
institutions pursuant to Section 51 of the PCA 1997.33 Under the amended Section 51 of 
the PCA 1997 34 financial institutions were required to submit reports on cash 
transactions in excess of 10,000 United States Dollars or its equivalent. These reports 
were required to be submitted to and analysed by the OFA and where appropriate the 
anti-money laundering unit or an officia, 
35 who was designated by the Minister of 
Finance. 36 If after having analysed those reports there was a suspicion that money 
laundering was involved, they were transferred to the police to commence the 
investigation process. 37 In this way the police were not lumbered with a large number of 
unnecessary reports. Moreover, the expertise at the OFA and the anti-money laundering 
unit was more suited to the type of analysis that was required to be conducted on the 
reports. 38 
One of the fundamental differences between the two systems is that the previous 
structure was somewhat of a hybrid 
39 but it substantially followed the police mode140 of 
FlUs. This meant that the police with the assistance of the office of the DPP collected 
and analysed the details of the reports that were not cash transactions reports and 
determined whether there was sufficient evidence to further investigate or proffer 
32 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 27h August, 1999 at p 45. 
33 See chapter 4.7 
31 See chapters 3.12 and 4.7 
35 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 27fl' August, 1999 pg 46 where the Attorney 
General briefly explained the process through which cash transactions traverse before any further 
investigation is conducted. 
36 lbid: See also Section 51(2) of the PCA 1997 (as amended) (now repealed) 
37 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 27h August, 1999 pp 45- 46 where the Attorney 
stated referring to the OFA and the Anti-money laundering Unit that: "The intention is that these reports 
will be looked at by this unit... and put their collective wisdom and experience together to determine 
whether these transactions look like money laundering transactions, and if that was determined then the 
matter would be investigated by the prosecuting authorities. " 
38 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 27 th August, 1999 pp 45- 46 
39 This was because some reports went to the police and some to the anti-money laundering unit and the 
OFA (Offshore Finance Authority). 
40 Mitsilegas V., "New Forms of Transnational PolicinR: The Emerizence of Financial Intellipence Unit 
in the European Union and the Challenges for Human Rivhts, " JMLC, Vol. 3 no. 2.1999, at p 151 
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charges. There was however no legislation which determined how the department 
should function. It was established as another department in the police force. It was 
essentially akin in structure to the National Criminal Intelligence Service in England. 41 
5.3 PCMLA 2001 Money Laundering Offences 
The PCMLA 2001 was passed in the House of Parliament on 21" November 2001 and 
came into effect on 28 th December, 2001. It effectively repealed the PCA 1997 but 
surprisingly retained the offences that were provided under sections 59,60 and 61. The 
reasons for repealing the PCA 1997 were mentioned by the Prime Minister Dr. Ralph 
Gonsalves during the parliamentary debate of the Proceeds of Crime Money Laundering 
(Prevention) Bill (PCMLB) 2001. He stated that: 
"... it is well known that St. Vincent and the Grenadines is on the so-called FA TF 
blacklist and there are many reasons why we are on the black list. There are matters of 
legislation which do not quite capture the offence of money laundering and associated 
offences, also there is in the view of the FA TF a regulatory ftamework both in its legal 
character and in its day to day practical manifestation that this regulatoryftamework is 
not of a quality which measures up to international standards. All these are among tile 
reasons given, originallyfor the blacklisting. There are many more details ... that would 
no doubt emerge in the debate ... Suffice to say ... that this blacklisting has been detrimental to St. Vincent and the Grenadines. There are some who do not mind the 
blacklisting because the conditions of the wild-west favours them, well that inqv be so 
but it does notfavour St. Vincent and the Grenadines. -12 
It seems clear from the statement that the reason for the repeal of the PCA 1997 and the 
introduction of the PCMLA 2001 was to facilitate the speedy removal of SVG from the 
FATF's blacklist. This objective will be examined later in the chapter when discussing 
issues relating to the enforcement of the money laundering legislation. It was also 
significant to the extent that it may well have justified the presumption that reluctant 
compliance with the FATF's initiative may well have been viewed as a precondition to 
the preservation of economic aid from certain FATF member countries. Essentially, the 
government of SVG may well have instituted legislative and other changes not because 
it felt that it was the right thing to do or because it considered that its regulatory and 
supervisory framework was inadequate but because it may well have been fearful of 
losing economic aid. Whether or not the strict enforcement of the provisions of the 
PCMLA 2001 is as significant as the reasons for its implementation is still very much 
under consideration. 
41 lbid 
42 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate Wednesday 21" November, 2001 at p 3. 
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As was noted above the PCMLA 2001 was introduced because the former PCA 1997 
was considered to be inadequate and was therefore ineffective in dealing with the 
money laundering phenomenon. The confiscation and enforcement measures in the 
PCMLA 200 143 have remained basically the same as they were under the PCA 1997 . 
44 
The forfeiture provisions have nonetheless been scaled down considerably from thirteen 
relatively long sections in the PCA 
45 which outlined the procedure to just one section in 
46 the PCMLA 2001. There are other administrative amendments but except for the 
change in the forfeiture procedure which may be exposed to a challenge under the 1979 
Constitution (see below), there is nothing that substantially or radically changes what 
existed under the PCA 1997. The major changes were heralded as the new money 
laundering offences which amounted to five in total. Section 41 provides for the 
concealment and transference of the proceeds of criminal conduct; 
47 section 42 provides 
for the arrangements made with another to retain and control the proceeds of criminal 
. 48 conduct of the other person for the purpose of benefiting that person, section 44(2) 
requires the disclosure of information about drug money laundering; 49 Tipping off fell 
" See Sections 6-34 of the PCMLA 2001 
44 See Sections 16-22 of the PCA 1997 
45 See Sections 3-15 of the PCA 1997 
46 See Section 50(l) of the PCMLA 2001 
47 Section 41 (1) of the PCMLA 2001 provides: "A person commits an offence if he 
(a) conceals or disguises any property which is, or in whole or in part directiv or indirect& 
represents, his proceeds of criminal conduct, or 
(b) converts or transfers that property, brings it into or moves it from Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines; 
for the purpose of avoiding prosecution for a drug trafficking or relevant offence or the making or 
enforcement in his case of a confiscation order. " 
Section 41(2) - "A person commits an offence if knowing or having reasonable grounds to suspect that 
any property is, or in whole or in part directly or indirectly represents, another person's proceeds of' 
criminal conduct, he 
(a) conceals or disguises that property, or 
(b) converts or transfers itftom Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; 
for the purpose of assisting any person to avoid prosecution for a drug trafficking or relevant offence or 
the making or enforcement of a confiscation order. " 
Section 41(3)- "In this section the references to concealing or disguising any property include references 
to concealing or disguising its nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership or anv rights 
with respect to it. " 
48 Section 42 (1) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "Subject to subsection (1), a person commits UPI 
offence if he enters into or is otherwise concerned in an arrangement whereby 
(a) the retention or control by or on behatf of another person ("A ") of A's proceeds of criminal 
conduct is facilitated (whether by concealment, removal firom the jurisdiction, tramfir to 
nominees or otherwise); or 
(b) A's proceeds of criminal conduct 
0) are used to secure thatfunds are placed at the disposal at A's disposal; or 
(ii) are usedfor A's benefit to acquire property 
and he knows or suspects that A is a person who is or has been engaged in or has benefiledfrom 
criminal conduct. " 
49 Section 44(2) of the PCMLA provides that: - "A person commits an offence if 
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under Section 45; and Section 46 required financial institutions to maintain proper 
records and report suspicious transactions. SVG was removed from the FATF 
blackliSt5o because it was considered by the FATF to have done sufficient, legislatively 
and otherwise to be seen as a jurisdiction which cooperated internationally in the fight 
against money laundering. The 'so called' new offences will be examined to ascertain 
whether they represented a significant departure from the former PCA 1997. 
Under the PCMLA 2001 money laundering was defined as doing any act: 
(a) "which constitutes an offence under section 43,44 or 45; or 
(h) which would constitute such an offence if done in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
andfor these purposes, having possession of any property shall be taken to be doing an act 
in relation to it. -51 
The definition of money laundering included the offences under sections 43,44 and 45. 
If those were the only three offences that could be committed by doing an act which 
related to money laundering, what was the meaning of the second limb(b) in the 
definition of money laundering? Surely, the acts which would give rise to those three 
offences were expected to be carried out in SVG. Moreover, the first limb(a) by stating 
the offences which would result from the 'doing of any act' obviated the need to repeat 
that the doing of the act would constitute an offence if done in SVG. That being the 
case, the second limb appeared to be otiose and contributed nothing further to the 
definition of money laundering, except to emphasise that extraterritorial money 
laundering was included. 
Although in the definition of money laundering no mention is made of Sections 41,42 
and 46 they are nonetheless listed under Part V of the PCMLA 2001 as money 
laundering offences. Accordingly, further analysis will be conducted of those offences 
to ascertain whether any substantial changes have been made to the former PCA 1997 or 
any relevant legislation that was in existence prior to the blacklisting of SVG. 
(a) he knows or suspects that another person is engaged in money laundering which relates to any 
proceeds of drug trafficking: 
(b) the information, or other matter, on which that knowledge or suspicion is based came to his 
attention in the course of his trade, profession, business or employment; and 
(c) he does not disclose the information or other matter to a police officer as soon as is reasonabkv 
practicable after it comes to his attention. " 
50 FATF 2003 Report- "Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories"-Executive 
Summary 
" Section 2 of the PCMLA 2001 
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5.4 Acquisition of Property derivedfrom the Proceeds of Criminal 
Conduct 
Under Section 43(l) of the PCMLA 2001,52 any person who knowingly acquires, 
possesses or uses property that is derived from the proceeds of the criminal conduct of 
another, commits an offence. The words 'acquires' and 'uses' are significant in 
determining whether the offence has actually been made out but the PCMLA 2001 has 
not provided a definition for those terms. The ordinary meaning of the term 'acquire' 
refers to 'gain by andfor oneself- ' 'obtain, ' or 'come into possessl . on. ý53 The Black's Law 
Dictionary provided further definitions which included, 'to gain possession or control of- 
'to get or obtain. 54 In SVG the Fire Arms Act 1996, defined 'acquire' to 'mean hire, 
accept as a gift or borrow. '55 In Congreve v IRC 
56 Cohen J suggested that; 'As used by 
lawyers the word 'acquired' has long covered transactions of a purely passive nature and 
means little more than receiving... 1j7 If Cohen J's judgment were to be accepted then a 
person could acquire property by just receiving it and without having to engage in any 
positive action to achieve it. 
A different perspective was given to the meaning of 'acquire' in Re Fago Plumbing & 
Heating Supplies Ltdr8 wherein 'acquire' was distinguished from 'accrual' in that 
acquire' contemplates some form of positive action on the part of the person acquiring 
the property. 'Accrual' on the other hand connotes inactivity on the part of the person to 
whom property is attributed. Essentially, there is required to be some sort of positive 
action flowing from the person acquiring the property. Support for this contention can 
be gleaned from the definition of possession under the PCMLA 2001 where it is 
provided that possession of property for the purposes of the PCMLA 2001 'shall be taken 
to be doing an act in relation to it. '5' In essence the person must know that he was in 
possession of the property. 
60 As Lord Scarman enunciated in the case of Rv Bovesen, 61 
52 Section 43(l) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "A person commits an offence if knowing that any 
property is, in whole or in part directly or indirectly represents another person's proceeds of criminal 
conduct, he acquires or uses that property or has possession of it. " 
5' oxford English Reference Dictionary, Revised 2 nd Edition, 2002 at p 12 
54 Garner B., "Black's Law Dictionary, " Abridged 7h Edition, 2000, at p 19 
55 Section 2 
56 [194711 All ER 168 
57 lbid at 178 
58 [ 197211 OR 259 at 262, Ontario Supreme Court as per Houden J. 
59 Section 43(6) of the PCMLA 2001 
' Warner v Metropolitan Police Comr [ 196812 AC 256 at p 305 as per Lord Pearce "I think that the term 
'possession' is satisfied by a knowledge only of the existence of the thing itself and not its qualities, and 
that ignorance or mistake as to its qualities is not an excuse. This would comply with the general 
understanding of the word 'possess... ' 
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'Possession is a deceptively simple concept. It denotes a physical control or custody of a thing 
plus knowledge that you have it in your custody or control. You may possess a thing without 
knowing or comprehending its nature; but you do not possess it unless you know you have it. 
But acquisition and possession are not the only treatment of the property that can result 
in the commission of the offence. The person who 'uses' the property may be held 
culpable as well. The term 'use' was defined as 'The application or employment of 
something; esp., a long continued possession and employment of a thing for the purpose for 
which it is adapted, as distinguished ftom a possession and employment that is merely 
temporary or occasional. " Both Malcolm Cj64 and Pidgeon j65 in the case of Rv 
Rintel 66 adopted a definition for 'use' that is similar to the definition given above in 
Black's Law Dictionary. Essentially, a person does not necessarily have to be in 
physical possession or control of the property or even apply it for his benefit in order to 
be considered as having used it. Provided that the property has been applied or 
employed by that person, for whatever reason, with the knowledge that it was derived 
from criminal conduct, the offence would have been committed. 
Therefore, any one who supplied goods and/or services and had collected property in 
return, could be deemed to have knowledge that it represented the proceeds of criminal 
conduct. The lawyer, doctor, accountant, green grocer, builders merchant, financial 
institution, retail outlet and a host of other commercial entities can all be caught by this 
offence. If, however, everyone investigated every customer, patient or client from 
whom property was received in order to ascertain the provenance of the property, there 
would be a serious disruption of the smooth processing of transactions. Moreover, it 
would impose a tremendous burden of unimaginable proportions and in the final 
analysis will be administratively unworkable. Accordingly, provisions were made to 
absolve from the offence those persons with plausible reasons for the acquisition, 
possession or usage of property which represented the proceeds of criminal conduct. 
61 [1982] 2 All ER 161, House of Lords. 
62 Ibid at p. 163 
63 Garner Brian "Black's Law Dictionajýý, " , 2000, at p 1249 64 (1991) 52 A Crim R 209 
65 (1991) 52 A Crim R 209 at p 212 
66 (1991) 52 A Crim R 209 
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The law provides that, once a person acquires, uses or possesses the property for 
adequate consideration 67 then he has a defence to the charge of committing the 
offence. 68 Consideration refers to the price that was paid for goods or services. The 
price in this context is not restricted to mere cash it could also be the provision of 
contractual services or an exchange of goods. 69 If however the goods or services 70 
provided have assisted any one in the furtherance of criminal conduct, those goods or 
services would not be accepted as consideration for the purposes of the offence .71 The 
defence appears to be rather bizarre. It seems to suggest that a person with knowledge 
that a property represents the proceeds of crime could nonetheless acquire that property 
and escape criminal liability if the consideration that was given for the property is 
adequate. Graham, Bell and Elliot suggested that the defence essentially covered those 
who 'supply ordinary goods and services' because they are not under any obligation to 
question the provenance of the funds that they received in return. 72 
That suggestion was only accurate to the extent that; (a) the criminal conduct from 
which the property was derived could be attributed to a relevant offence 73 as opposed to 
a drug trafficking offence 74 and; (h) the business of supplying goods and services could 
67 Section 43(3) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "For the purposes ofsubsection (2) - (a) a person does not acquire propertyfor adequate consideration if the value of the consideration 
is significantly less than the value of the property; and 
(b) a person does not use or have possession of the property for adequate consideration if the value 
of the consideration is signiticantly less than the value of his use or possession. " 
Section 43(2) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that; - Subject to subsection (4) it is a defence to a charge 
of committing an offence under this section that the person charged acquired or used the property or had 
possession of itfor adequate consideration. " 
69Morris- Cotterill, N., "How not to be a Money Launderer-The avoidance of fraud and money laundering 
in your organisation" Silkscreen Publications, 2 nd edition, 1999, at p 89. 70 Rees E., & Hall A., "Blackstone's Guide to The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, ' Oxford University Press, 
2003, at p 105 where it is stated that; "... a supplier of a getaway car to be used in a robbery, who is paid 
from the proceeds of an earlier robbery, will not he availed by an argument that the vehicle was sold at, 
or possibly above, the market price. - 
71 Section 43(4) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "The provisionfor any person of services or goods 
which are of assistance to him in criminal conduct shall not be treated as consideration for the purposes 
ofsubsection (2) " 
72 Graham T., Bell E., & Elliot N., 'Money Laundering, ' Butterworths, 2003, at p 47 73 Section 2 of the PCMLA 2001 defines 'relevant offence' as: 
"(a) any indictable offence or an offence triable both summarily or on indictment in Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines ftom which a person has benefited as defined in section 7(3) of this Act, other than a drug 
trafficking offence; 
(b) any offence listed in Schedule 2 to this Act; 
(c) any act or omission which, had it occurred in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, would have 
constituted an offence as defined in paragraph (a) or paragraph (b); " 
74 Section 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Money Laundering Act 2001 defines drug trafficking offence as; 
"(a) an offence as defined in the Drug Trafficking Offences A ct, - 
( b) under the sections 41,42 or 43 of this A ct which relates to the proceeds of drug trafficking: 
or an offence under the Criminal Code constituting an attempt, incitement or conspiracy to commit a 
drug trafficking offence; " 
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not be classified as a financial institution or relevant business activity .75 If the criminal 
conduct constitutes a drug trafficking offence it appears that those who supply goods 
and services will be under a duty to disclose their knowledge or suspicion about the 
provenance of the property to a police officer (see below). 76 Any failure to make such a 
disclosure constitutes an offence. 77 It is also noteworthy that where the business activity 
can be classified as a financial institution or relevant business activity as iternised under 
Schedule I of the PCMLA 2001, an obligation to report any suspicious transaction is 
78 imposed upon that business by Section 46(3) of the PCMLA 2001. 
Therefore, lawyers, accountants and financial intermediaries, due to the fact that they 
are listed as relevant business activities, would run the risk of being caught by this 
section. It is however very interesting to see how the law enforcement officials will deal 
with the situation where a lawyer received legal fees from a drug trafficker for services 
rendered in his defence. The effect of the defence is that a person who for adequate 
consideration knowingly acquired, used or possessed property which represented the 
proceeds of drug trafficking would not be committing a section 43(l) offence. 
However, that person may be committing the offence of failure to disclose his 
knowledge or suspicion to a police officer under Section 44(2). If however the property 
did not represent the proceeds of drug trafficking and the business in which he was 
engaged could not be classified as a financial institution or relevant business activity 
then he would be completely absolved from Section 43(l) and 44(2) offences. 
It would appear that a person not being classified as a financial institution or a relevant 
business activity will be given more latitude to transact with persons that are engaged in 
criminal conduct. Rees and Hall have justified the latitude given to those persons by 
suggesting that; 'in order to protect those such as retailers who meq he paidfor ordinary 
consumer goods with funds they are suspicious of the provision only bites where persons 
acquired or used or had possession of the property for less than adequate consideration. "9 
" See Schedule I of the PCMLA 2001 for entities that arc listed as financial institutions and relevant 
business activities. 
76 Section 44(2)(a) of the PCMLA 2001 
77 Section 44(2)(c ) of the PCMLA 2001 
78 Section 46(3) of the PCMLA 2001 provides as follows: "Upon suspicion that the transactions 
described in subsection (2) could constitute or be related to money laundering or the proceeds of criminal 
conduct, a financial institution or person engaged in a relevant business activity shall report the 
suspicious transactions to the Financial Intelligence Unit in aform specified in the Regulations, as soon 
as reasonably practicable, and in any event, within fourteen days of the date the transaction was deemed 
to be suspicious as relating to money laundering or the proceeds of criminal conduct. - 
79Rees E., & Hall A., "Blackstone's Guide to The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, " 2003, at p 105 
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Therefore, persons not being financial institutions or engaged in relevant business 
activities who are charged with a section 43(l) offence and who have provided adequate 
consideration for the property will be encouraged to contend that their knowledge only 
extend to criminal conduct as it related to a relevant offence and not as it related to drug 
trafficking. Such a representation is likely to absolve them from any criminal liability 
and diminishes the possibility of law enforcement officials procuring a conviction under 
this section. 
A further defence to the charge was provided to a person who was caught under section 
43(l). Such a person must however prove; (a) that he intended to inform the police of 
his belief that the property represented the proceeds of crime that arose out of another 
person's criminal conduct and; (b) that he had a reasonable excuse why he was unable 
to make such a disclosure to a police officer prior to dealing with the property. 80 By 
disclosure the person was required to state 81 or inform or communicate 82 to the police 
officer his suspicion or belief that another person was engaged in drug money 
laundering. It was however advisable that the person making the disclosure did so in 
writing since he may subsequently need to adduce the evidence to show that he did 
make a disclosure. In the light of the fact that it was quite possible that he may be 
reporting what the police officer already knew the court may favourably consider the 
fact that he made the disclosure and disregard the prior knowledge of the police officer 
as irrelevant to ascertaining whether a defence had been made out. 83 Information was 
not defined in the PCMLA but may be understood to relate to any data requested 
80 Section 43(7) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "In proceedings against a person for an offence 
under this section, it is a defence to prove that 
(a) he intended to disclose to a police officer such a belief or matter as is mentioned in subsection 
(5), but 
(b) there is reasonable excusefor thisfailure to make any such disclosure in the manner mentioned 
in subsection(5)(b). - 
, 5ection 43(5) of the PCMLA 2001 provides, " Where a person discloses in goodfailh to a police office a 
belief that any property is, or in whole or in part directly or indirectly represents, another person's 
proceeds of criminal conduct, or any matter on which such a belief is based 
(a) the disclosure shall not be treated as a breach qI'any restriction upon the disclosure of 
information imposed by statute or otherwise and shall not give rise to any criminal, civil or 
administrative liability; and 
(b) if he does any act in relation to the property in contravention ofsubsection (1), he does not 
commit an offence under this section if 
0 the disclosure is made before he does the act in question and the act is done with 
the consent of the police officer; or 
(ii) the disclosure is made after he does the act, but is made on his initiative and as 
soon as it is reasonablefor him to make it. - 
81 Warrington v Leake (1835) 11 Exch 304 at p 307 as per Pollock CB 
Federal Comr of Taxation v Westgarth (1950) 81 CLR 396 at 407 as per Latham CJ 
lbid 
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verbally or otherwise. This may include any knowledge no matter how it was 
acquired. 84 
It was suggested by Morris-Cotterill that this offence was introduced to ostracise those 
who engage in criminal conduct from law abiding citizens. 85 Therefore, spouses, 
parents, relatives and friends were the persons who should thread cautiously since they 
were more likely to benefit from the proceeds of another person's criminal conduct. If 
any of those persons was given a house, a car, jewellery, clothes or any other property 
or used or possessed any of those items in the knowledge that they represented the 
proceeds of criminal conduct, he may well be committing the offence unless he could 
successfully avail himself of one of the defences. 
5.5 Reporting Knowledge or Suspicion of Drug Trafficking 
Section 44(2) imposes a legal obligation on every person involved in a trade, profession, 
business or employment to disclose to a police officer any information obtained in the 
course of his trade, profession, business or employment which led to his knowledge or 
aroused his suspicion that another person is engaged in laundering the proceeds of drug 
trafficking. 86 Any person who fails to disclose knowledge or suspicion of drug money 
laundering activity to a police officer as soon as reasonably practicable after he acquired 
that knowledge or forined that suspicion is committing an offence. It was however 
suggested that a person who obtained the information other than in the course of his job 
(e. g. at a social or sporting event) would not be committing the offence if he failed to 
disclose information to a police officer. 87 A person may be held to have committed the 
offence if the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that he knew or suspected 
that another person was engaged in drug money laundering. 
84 Re Stewart and Ofivant and Seadons Contract [ 1896] 2 Ch 328 CA 
"5 Morris- Cotterill N., "How not to be a Money Launderer-The avoidance of fraud and money laundering 
in your organisation" , 1999, at p 
89. 
86 Section 44(2) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "A person commits an offence if 
(a) he knows or suspects that another person is engaged in money laundering which relates to any 
proceeds of drug trafficking; 
(b) the information, or other matter, on which that knowledge or suspicion is based came to his 
attention in the course of his trade, profession, business or employment; and 
(c) he does not disclose the information or other matter to a police officer as soon as is reasonably 
practicable after it comes to his attention. " 
87 Howard C., "Butterworths Money Laundering Law" 200 1, at p 3/582, para 792 
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The obligation to report is not however imposed on a professional legal adviser who 
came by the information in privileged circumstanceS88 but an obligation will however be 
imposed where the inforination was received or given for the purpose of furthering 
criminal conduct. 89 Section 44(4)90 makes provision for a defence to the charge if there 
was a reasonable excuse for failing to disclose the infori-nation to a police officer. The 
accused will therefore be required to prove on a balance of probabilities9l that he had a 
reasonable excuse for failing to disclose the information. The law appears to have 
attributed greater stigma to the offence of drug trafficking than to any of the relevant 
offences. At a time when organised criminal activity has infiltrated a wide variety of 
legitimate and illicit activities to attribute a lesser stigma to relevant offences seems 
untenable. 
5.6 Tipping Off 
The offence of tipping off is provided under Sections 45(l) and (2). Under Section 
45(l) the offence is committed when a person knows or suspects that a police officer is 
about to start or has started a money laundering investigation but has nonetheless made 
92 
a disclosure to another person which is likely to prejudice the investigation. This 
" Section 44(3) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "Subsection (2) does not make it an offence for a 
professional legal adviser to fail to disclose any information or other matter which has come to him in 
privileged circumstances, - 
89 Section 44(6) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "For the purposes of this section, any information or 
other matter comes to a professional legal adviser in privileged circumstances if it is communicated or 
given to him 
(a) by, or by a representative of a client of his in connection with the giving by the adviser of legal 
advice to the client; 
(b) by, or by a representative of a person seeking legal advicefroin the adviser; or 
(c) hyanyperson- 
0) in contemplation of or in connection with, legal proceedings; and 
(ii) for the purpose of those proceedings; 
but no information or other matter shall be treated as coming to a professional legal adviser in privileged 
circumstances if it is communicated or given with a view tofurthering a criminal purpose. - 
90 Section 44(4) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "It is a defence to a charge of committing an offence 
under this section that the person charged had a reasonable excuse for not disclosing the information or 
other matter in question. " 
91 Section 63 PCMLA 2001 
92 Section 45(1) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "A person commits an offence if 
(a) he knows or suspects that a police officer is acting, or is proposing to act, in connection with an 
investigation which is being, or is about to be, conducted into money laundering or the proceeds 
of criminal conduct; and 
(b) he discloses to any other person information or any matter which is likely to prejudice that 
investigation or proposed investigation. - 
Section 45(2) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "A person commits an offence if 
(a) he knows or suspects that a disclosure has been made to a police officer or to an appropriate 
person under section 41,42 or 43; or 
(b) he discloses to any other person information or any other matter which is likely to prejudice any 
investigation which might be conductedfollowing such a disclosure. " 
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restriction does not however apply to a professional legal adviser when he is providing 
legal advice to his client or to any other person in contemplation of legal proceedings. It 
nonetheless, covers any information that is disclosed to a professional legal adviser for 
the purpose of furthering criminal conduct. 93 The disclosure to which the section refers 
appears to be restricted only to money laundering. This means that it will be an offence 
to tip off the burglar's launderer that he is being investigated for money laundering but it 
will not be an offence to tip off an accessory to burglary that he is being investigated for 
94 the burglary. 
Any person who is charged with the offence of tipping off will be entitled to a defence 
if he can prove on the balance of probabilities 95 that he did not know or suspect that the 
disclosure was likely to be prejudicial in 'the way therein mentioned. ' 96 It is not clear 
what the phrase 'likely to be prejudicial' actually means, although two Australian 
cases9' have tried to clarify the word 'likely' to no avail. The lack of clarity of the word 
'likely' may present some difficulties for the accused especially if the prosecution 
adduce evidence to demonstrate the prejudicial impact of the disclosure on the 
investigation. 
The offence of Tipping off which was created under Section 45(2) is very badly drafted. 
It provides as follows: 
"A person commits an offence if 
(a) he knows or suspects that a disclosure has been made to a police officer or 
to an appropriate person under section 41,42 or 43; or 
(h) he discloses to any other person information or any other matter which is 
likely to prejudice any investigation which might be conductedfollowing such a 
disclosure. " 
113 Section 45(3) of the PCMLA 2001 provides "Nothing in subsection (1) or (2) makes it an offencefor a 
professional legal adviser to disclose any it? formation or other matter 
(a) to, or to a representative of a client of his in connection with the giving kv the adviser of a legal 
advice to the client; or 
(h) to any person 
0) in contemplation of or in connection with legal proceedings; and 
(ii) for the purpose of those proceedings; 
but this subsection does not apply in relation to any information or other matter which is disclosed with a 
view tofurthering any criminal purpose. " 
94 Howard C., "Butterworths Money Laundering Law" 200 1, at p 3/444, para 621 
95 Section 63 of the PCMLA 2001 
96 Section 45(4) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "In proceedings against a person for an offence 
under section (1) or (2), it is a defence to prove that he did not know or suspect that the disclosure was 
likely to he prejudicial in the way there mentioned " 
97 Australian Telecommunications Commission v Kreg Ente!: prises P! y Ltd (1976) 27 FLR 400 where it 
was held that 'likely' is synonymous with 'possible' so that there is an odds-on chance of the thing 
happening: See also Broughey v (1986) 65 ALR 609 at 611, as per Gibbs J where it was held that 
'likely' means 'probable' and not 'possible. ' 
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There are four obvious defects with that provision. Firstly, under section 41 no 
provision is made for the disclosure of information and therefore the inclusion of 
section 41 under the first limb is otiose. Secondly, the only person to whom a disclosure 
is required to be made pursuant to sections 43 and 44 is a police officer. The inclusion 
of the words 'to an appropriate person' is tautologous and therefore unnecessary. 
Thirdly, the first and second limbs are separate and distinct offences. Under the first 
limb it is an offence to know or suspect that a disclosure was made to a police officer. In 
effect a person with the requisite knowledge or suspicion is committing an offence for 
possessing such knowledge or forming such a suspicion. That offence is nonsensical 
and could not have been the intention of Parliament. Moreover, it is an offence to 
disclose to any other person information or any other matter which is likely to prejudice 
an investigation which might be conducted following a disclosure. The second limb 
creates an offence of strict liability. There is no requirement that the person making the 
disclosure should know, suspect or believe that it is likely to prejudice an investigation 
or proposed investigation. 
The consequences of section 45(2) can be grave since knowledge or suspicion of and 
even innocent utterances about any matter that may prejudice an investigation can result 
in the commission of an offence. Moreover, the defence that is available to the accused 
provides little help where he is required to prove on a balance of probabilities "that he 
did not know or suspect that the disclosure was likely to be prejudicial in the way 
therein mentioned. "98 This is so mainly because the mental elements of knowledge and 
suspicion are not required for the commission of an offence under section 45(2)(b). 
Moreover, under section 45(2)(a) anyone who has the knowledge or formed a suspicion 
that a disclosure was made to a police officer has committed an offence. Such a person 
cannot benefit from the defence under section 45(4) which solely relates to the 
disclosure of information which is prejudicial to an investigation. Bearing in mind that 
the accused appears to have little or no recourse to redress against those responsible for 
any injustices that he may have suffered" every effort should be made by the 
government of SVG to amend section 45(2). Essentially, section 45(2) will be more 
98 Section 45(4) of the PCMLA Act 2001 
99 Section 45(5) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "No police officer or other person commits an offence 
under this section in respect of anything done by him in the course of acting in accordance with the 
enforcement, or intended enforcement, of any provision of this Act or of any other statutory provision 
relating to criminal conduct or the proceeds of criminal conduct. - 
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meaningful if it provided an offence for the disclosure of information by any person to 
another, the knowledge or belief that a disclosure was made to a police officer under 
sections 42 and 43 and as a result of making the disclosure the conduct of any 
investigation is likely to be prejudiced. 
5.7 Concealing or Disguising the Proceeds of Criminal Conduct 
Sections 41(l) 100 and (2)101 have criminalised the concealment, 102 disguise, 
conversion 103 or transference 104 of property or removal from SVG of property that 
represents the proceeds of criminal conduct, provided that it was done for the purpose of 
avoiding a prosecution for a drug trafficking or relevant offence or the making of a 
confiscation order. This offence relates to the person who owns or possesses 105 the 
proceeds of criminal conduct as well as to any one who knows or entertains a 
reasonable ground to suspect that any property represents the proceeds of criminal 
conduct but nonetheless assisted 106 the owner of the property to avoid prosecution or a 
confiscation order. 
Pursuant to Section 41(l) the prosecution will be required to prove that a particular 
predicate offence has been committed if it is to be successful. For example, if the 
'00 Section 41 (1) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "A person commits an offence if he 
(a) conceals or disguises any property which is, or in whole or in part directly or indirectly 
represents, his proceeds of criminal conduct, or 
(b) converts or transfers that property, brings it into or removes iffrom Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines; 
for the purpose of avoiding prosecutionfor a drug trafficking or relevant offence or the making or 
enforcement of in his case a confiscation order. " 
10/ Section 41(2) of the PCMLA 2001 provides "A person commits an offence if knowing or having 
reasonable grounds to suspect that any property is, or in whole or in part directly or indirectly 
represents, another person's proceeds of criminal conduct, he 
(c) conceals or disguises that property, or 
(d) converts or transfers that property, brings it into or removes itfrom Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines; 
for the purpose of assisting any person to avoid prosecutionfor a drug trafficking or relevant offence or 
the making or enforcement of in his case a confiscation order. - 
102 London Assurance v Mansel (1879) 11 Ch D 363 at 363 as per Jessel MR where it was mentioned that 
concealment also refers to a failure to communicate-, See also Glicksman v Lancashire & General 
Assurance Co Ltd. [1927] AC 139, where concealment involved the application of measures designed to 
prevent others from acquiring knowledge or making certain observations. 
103 Stack v Church Comrs [1952] 1 All ER 1352, CA where conversion was taken to mean change: See 
also Wilkinson v Rogers (1863 12 WR 119 where conversion was referred to the alteration of form and 
structure. But in Re Evans Hewitt v Edwards [ 1940] Ch 629, conversion must be conscious and deliberate 
104 Lyle & Scott Ltd v Scotts Trustees [1959] 2 All ER 661 at 668 where Lord Reid stated that transfer 
essentially means, "to hand over or part with something ... with the context 
determining in what sense the 
word is used"' 
10' Section 41 (1) of the PCMLA 2001 
106 Section 41(2) of the PCMLA 2001 
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underlying ('predicate') offence is drug trafficking, the prosecution needs to firstly 
establish that the accused had committed that offence before any successful prosecution 
can be brought against the accused for laundering the proceeds of drug trafficking. The 
section is not only concerned with the cash that is obtained from criminal conduct, it is 
also concerned with other properties that have been acquired with the proceeds of 
criminal conduct. Once it is established that a drug trafficking or relevant offence has 
been committed, the prosecution only need to show that the property was acquired with 
the proceeds of those offences to complete the offence. Accordingly, the drug dealer 
who receives say $200,000 from his involvement in drugs and uses that money to 
acquire a property costing $450,000 may well find that the property becomes the subject 
of attack. 107 It does not matter whether someone else' money was also used to acquire 
the property, once it is established that the property that is concealed or disguised 
represents in whole or in part, directly or indirectly the proceeds of criminal conduct an 
offence has been committed. Finally, the prosecution will be required to prove that there 
was an 'intent"08 to avoid the prosecution for a criminal offence or the making of a 
confiscation order if it is to succeed. 
Section 41(2) creates an anomaly, in that a person can be convicted of the offence 
although no predicate offence has been committed. The prosecution is only required to 
prove that the person knew or had reasonable grounds to suspect that the property in 
whole or in part directly or indirectly represents, another person's proceeds of criminal 
conduct. The prosecution does not necessarily have to prove that a subject offence was 
committed. Provided that the court feels that the inforination to which the accused was 
privy was sufficient to arouse suspicion in a reasonable person (see below at 5.11) that 
the property in question represents the proceeds of crime, the accused will be convicted. 
Accordingly, a person can be convicted for believing that he is laundering the proceeds 
of crime even though the property being laundered may not have been unlawfully 
obtained. The question that falls to be answered is if the purpose for the money 
laundering legislation is to take the profits out of crime then this presumes that the profit 
directly or indirectly relates to criminal conduct, if there is no criminal conduct should a 
person be convicted for a money laundering offence? 
'0' Morris- Cotterill N., "Now not to be a Monev Launderer-The avoidance of fraud and mone 
laundering in your organisation" , 1999, at p 82 108 McCormack G., 'Money Laundering and Banking Secrecy' The Company Lawyer, vol. 16 No. 1, pp 
6- 10 at p 8: See also Howard C., "Butterworths Money Laundering Law" 200 1, at p 3/335, para 552. 
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5.8 Arranging to Retain, Control and Use the Proceeds of Criminal 
Conduct 
Section 42(1)1()9 on the other hand criminalises any situation whereby a person knowing 
or suspecting that another person has engaged in and/or benefited from criminal conduct 
has nonetheless made arrangements' 10 for that other person to continue benefiting from 
the proceeds of criminal conduct. '" Under this offence the prosecution is required to 
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused knew or suspected that the other person 
is engaged in, 'has been engaged in or has benefited from criminal conduct. ' Any 
person who provided such assistance is entitled to a defence under section 42(3), if he; 
(a) formed a suspicion or belief that the arrangement involved or was connected with 
the proceeds of criminal conduct and he informed and obtained the permission of a 
police officer prior to his involvement in the arrangement or; (b) if after he became 
involved in the arrangement he made the disclosure on his own volition 'as soon as it is 
reasonable for him to make it. 112 Section 42(4)" 3 also provides a defence to the 
109 Section 42(l) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "Subject to subsection (3), a person commits an 
offence if he enters into or otherwise concerned in an arrangement whereby 
(a) the retention or control by or on behaýf of another person (A) ofA's proceeds of criminal 
conduct isfacilitated (whether by concealment, removalftom thejurisdiction, transfer to 
nominees or otherwise); or 
(b) A's proceeds of criminal conduct 
N are used to secure thatfunds are placed at A 's disposal: or 
(h) are usedfor A's benefit to acquire property 
and he knows or suspects that A is a person who is or has been engaged in or has benefuedfirom criminal 
conduct. - 
110 Manning v Eastern Counties Rly Co (1843) 13 U EX 265 where it was held that arrangement 'is a 
very wide and indefinite one'. But see. Re British Basic Slag Ltd's ARreement [ 196312 All ER 807 at p 
814 CA where Wilmer LJ in describing arrangement stated: "Where each of the two or more parties 
intentionally arouses in the others an expectation that he will act in a certain way, it seems to me that he 
incurs at least a moral obligation to do so. An 'arrangement' is therefore something whereby the parties 
to it accept mutual rights and obligations. 'Accordingly, an arrangement connotes the meeting of minds 
and therefore does not exist in the absence of communication and expectations. A mere assistance does 
not amount to an arrangement. " 
111 Essentially this offence seeks to prohibit others from assisting the criminal to acquire property by way 
of investments, to buy shares, to take out insurance policies, to use other person's bank accounts etc. It 
also prohibits the banker who is aware that a person is involved in criminal activity from doing business 
with such a person. 
112 Section 42(3) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that, " Where a person discloses in goodfaith to a police 
officer a suspicion or belief that anyfunds or investments are derivedftom or used in connection with 
criminal conduct, or any matter on which such a suspicion or belief is based; 
(a) the disclosure shall not be treated as a breach of any restriction upon the disclosure of 
information imposed by statute or otherwise and shall not give rise to any civil liability; and 
(b) if he does any act in contravention of subsection (1) and the disclosure relates to the 
arrangement concerned, he does not commit an offence under this section if 
(i )the disclosure is made before he does the act concerned and the act is done with the consent 
of a police officer; or 
(h) the disclosure is made after he does the act, but is made on his initiative and as soon as it is 
reasonablefor him to make it. " 
... Section 42(4) of the PCMLA 2001 provides "In proceedings against a personfor an offence under 
this section, it is a defence to prove 
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accused if he can prove; (a) that he did not know or suspect that the arrangement related 
to another person's proceeds of criminal conduct; (b) that he did not know or suspect 
that his assistance facilitated the laundering of the proceeds of crime; or (c) that he 
intended to disclose' 14 to a police officer his suspicion or belief that the funds or 
investments represented the proceeds of criminal conduct; but (d) that his reason for 
failing to disclose is reasonably excusable in the circumstances. 
5.9 Reporting Suspicious Transactions 
Section 46(l) requires every financial institution' 15 or person that is engaged in relevant 
business activity 116 to pay special attention to large, unusual and even insignificant but 
periodic transactions. 117 If any of those transactions raises a suspicion that it is 
connected to or in some way involved in money laundering activity, a report should be 
made to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). "' Any financial institution or person 
(a) that he did not know or suspect that the arrangement related to any person's proceeds, of 
criminal conduct; 
(h) that he did not know or suspect that by the arrangement the retention or control by or on behalf 
ofA of any property wasfacilitaied or, as the case may be, that by the arrangement any property 
was used as mentioned in subsection (1)(b); or 
(C) that 
0) he intended to disclose to a police officer such a suspicion, belief or matter as is 
mentioned in subsection (3) in relation to arrangement, but 
(ii) there is reasonable excusefor hisfailure to make any such disclosure in the 
manner mentioned in subsection (3) (b) " 
Section 42(3) of the PCMLA 2001 provides "Where a person discloses in goodf: iith to a police 
of ficer a suspicion or belief that anyfunds or investments are derivedfrom or used in connection with 
criminal conduct, or any matter on which such a suspicion or belief is based 
(a) the disclosure shall not be treated as a breach of any restriction upon the disclosure of 
information imposed by statute or otherwise and shall not give rise to any civil liability: and 
(b) if he does any act in contravention of subsection (1) and the disclosure relates to the 
arrangement concerned, he does not commit an offence under this section if 
0) the disclosure is made before he does the act concerned and the act is done with 
the consent of a police officer; or 
00 the disclosure is made after he does the act, but is made on his initiative and as 
soon as it is reasonablefor him to make it. " 
... Financial Institutions are itemised in Schedule 2 to the PCMLA 2001 and include among other 
institutions offshore entities such as, a Mutual Fund, an International Bank, an International Trust, an 
International Insurance and a Registered Agent and Trustee. 
116 Relevant Business Activity is also iternised under Schedule 2 of the PCMLA 2001 and includes 
amongst quite a number of other institutions, trust and fiduciaries services, Investment Business, 
Barristers-at-Law, Solicitors and Accountants. 
117 Section 46(2) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "Every financial institution or person in a relevant 
business activity shall pay special attention to all complex, unusual or large transactions, whether 
completed or not, and to all unusual patterns of transactions, and to insignificant but periodic patterns of 
transactions, which have no apparent lawful purpose. - 
... Section 46(3) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "Upon suspicion that the transactions described in 
subsection (2) could constitute or he related to money laundering or the proceeds of criminal conduct, a 
financial institution or person engaged in a relevant business activity shall report, the suspicious 
transactions to the Financial Intelligence Unit in a form specified in the Regulations, as soon as 
reasonably practicable, and in any event, within fourteen days of the date the transaction was deemed to 
be suspicious as relating to money laundering or the proceeds of criminal conduct. " 
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engaged in relevant business activity who fails to disclose a suspicion that a transaction 
may well have been connected or associated with money laundering activity has 
committed an offence. ' 19 To facilitate the diligent scrutiny of transactions that are 
processed on a daily basis and to ensure that suspicious transactions are spotted, noted 
and reported, every financial institution or person engaged in relevant business activity 
has a legal obligation to institute a written compliance programme to monitor whether 
the institution is in compliance with the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) 
Regulations ('PCMLR') 2001.120 
5.10 Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Regulations (PCMLR') 
2001 
The PCMLR 2001 became effective on 22 "d January, 2002. It emphasises the need for a 
regulated institution 121 to know its customers and anyone with whom it proposes to 
engage in a commercial relationship. 122 The PCMLR 2001 imposes on regulated 
institutions responsibilities to maintain proper records 123 for varying periods of time 
depending on the type of record being kept. 124 It also requires regulated institutions to 
implement customer identification systems and reporting mechanisms without regard to 
the size of the regulated institution. This seems very ambitious considering that apart 
from banks and other financial institutions most of the other regulated activities are 
conducted by professionals such as lawyers and accountants. 125 All of those 
professionals have a very small complement of staff, in most cases only one secretary 
'19 Section 46(4) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "Failure to report a suspicious transaction as 
required by subsection (3) is an ojfence. " 
120 Section 46(6) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "Every financial institution or person engaged in a 
relevant business activity shall develop and implement a written compliance programme reasonably 
designed to ensure and monitor compliance with Regulations made under this Act. " 
12 1 Regulation 2(2) of the PCMLR 2001 provides that: "Regulated Institution "means a financial 
institution and regulated business activity as stated in Schedule I of the Proceeds o Crime and Money If 
Laundering (Prevention) Act 2001 and includes a trust settlement. 
122 Regulation 4 
12' Regulation 5 
124 Regulation 4(4) provides as follows: "For the purposes of this regulation, the minimum retention 
period in relation to a record held by a regulated institution is 
(a) if the record relates to the opening of an account with the institution, the period of seven 
years after the day on which the account is closed; 
(b) if the record relates to the renting by a person of a safety box held by the institution, the 
period ofseven years after the day on which the deposit box ceases to be used by the person; or 
( c) in any other case, the period of seven years after the day on which the transaction recorded 
takes place. 
But in any case where the Financial intelligence Unit has notified a regulated institution in writing that 
particular records are or may be relevant to an investigation that is being carried out, records shall he 
retainedpending the outcome of the investigation. - 
125 Information from discussion with OFA and Chamber of Industry and Commerce in 2000. 
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and an office attendant. To expect the majority of regulated institutions to implement 
training programmes and establish reporting mechanisms is very ambitious but lawful. 
The PCMLR 2001 is not drafted for the majority of regulated institutions. It appears to 
be the ideal guidelines for the commercial sector of developed countries with 
sophisticated financial centres but makes no provision for the size and nature of the 
operations of its local enterprises. For example, it is doubtful whether the majority of 
those professionals establish a business relationship with an overseas client more than 
twice a year at best. SVG does not have a vibrant financial services sector and there is 
very little if any foreign investment being conducted in the domestic financial services 
sector where most of the professionals ply their trade. ' 26 It is worrying that 
notwithstanding the paucity of business activity and the small size of the staff, harsh 
penalties 127 are imposed upon those who do not comply with the PCMLR 2001. It is 
very likely that the harshness of the penalties and the dearth of business opportunities 
may significantly reduce any attraction to participate in any business activity in SVO .1 
28 
The new money laundering legislative regime appears to frustrate commercial activity 
as opposed to furthering and developing it. 129 Such is the result of the FATF/OECD's 
initiative. 
5.11 Knowledge and Reasonable grounds to Suspect as Mens Rea 
elements 
In the previous chapter 130 ý suspicion' and 'belief' were discussed and therefore will 
require no further elaboration in this chapter. In the light of the fact that the principal 
money laundering offences have 'knowledge' as one of the mens rea elements, the 
concept of 'knowledge' will therefore be further examined. Knowledge under section 
43(l) is 'knowing. ' This requires the existence of the mens rea for all the elements of the 
offence. 131 In determining what constitutes knowledge the courts in Rv Harris 132 and 
126 Mitchell L., "A World of Opportunities, ". The Searchlight Newspaper, vol. 9 No. 40 Friday P 
October, 2003 at p 26 
127 Regulation 9 of the PCMLR 2001 provides penalties of ten thousand dollars for summary conviction 
and a maximum of one million dollars and/or three years imprisonment for a conviction on indictment. 
128 Information received from the Offshore Finance Authority shows that several offshore entities 
including banks, trust, IBCs and even Registered Agents have been surrendering their licenses. 
129 The drastic reduction in the offshore registrations bears ample testimony to fact that the new regulatory 
and supervisory regime is not seen as desirable by many investors. 
"0 See chapter 4.7 
"' Wings Ltd v Ellis [ 198413 All ER 577, House of Lords 
132 [ 1987] 84 Cr App Rep. 75 
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in the earlier cases of Rv Grange 133 and Rv Griffiths' 34 have all suggested that 
, knowledge' is a word to be applied by the tribunal of fact and it required no further 
embellishment. But even with that suggestion knowledge may still be somewhat 
difficult to establish. Unless there is direct evidence 135 which would create absolute 
certainty about the provenance of the property it may be difficult for the person to know 
and the prosecution to prove that he had knowledge that the property was a derivative of 
criminal conduct or that the person that he assisted actually benefited from criminal 
conduct. But Simester and Sullivan suggested that, "It is generally impossible to know 
anything with utter certainty: even the evidence of one's own eyes may occasionally be 
doubled. ""' 
Recognising the likely problems' 37 that the mens rea of knowing can create in procuring 
a conviction, the 1988 Vienna Convention suggested a more expansive approach to 
ascertaining whether a person had the requisite knowledge for the offence. In that regard 
it provided that; 'Knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element of an offence setforth 
in paragraph I of this article may be inferred ftom objective factual circumstances. 13' The 
wording of Article I of the 1991 EC Directive 139 is pari materia with that of the Vienna 
Convention. This is a clear indication from the international community that knowledge 
should not be confined to actual knowledge but may also be inferred from evidence of 
the surrounding circumstances. 140 This approach offers law enforcement officials an 
improved chance to procure convictions. In this way greater emphasis will be given to 
the evidence that was available to the accused at the time of his alleged involvement in 
the money laundering process. It is this evidence that the jury may examine to infer 
whether he possessed the requisite knowledge. In The Zamora 14 1 Lord Summer 
articulated the circumstances under which a person may be deemed to have knowledge. 
He stated that: 
"There are two senses in which a man is said to know something hecause he does not 
want to know it. A thing may he troublesome to learn, and the knowledge of it, when 
acquired, may he uninteresting or distasteful. To refuse to know any more about the 
subject of anything at all is then a wilful hut a real ignorance. On the other hand a man 
133 [1974] 1 All ER 928 (CA) 
134 (1975) 60 Cr App Rep 14 CA 
135 Smith J., "Criminal Law, " Butterworths, I 01h edn, 2002 at p 665 
"6 Simester A., & Sullivan G. R, "Criminal Law theoKy and doctrine, " Hart, 2000 at p 487 
137 Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele [200014 All ER 22 CA 
138 Article 3 para 3 
119 Article 1,91/308/EEC; "... knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element... may be inferred 
ftom objectivejactual circumstances. " 
140 Simester A., & Sullivan G. R., "Criminal Law theory and doctrine, " 2000 at p 137 
141 [1921] 1 AC 801 
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is said not to know because he does not want to know, where the substance (? f the thing 
is borne in upon his mind with a conviction that full details or precise proofs may be 
dangerous, because they may embarrass his denials or compromise his protests. In such 
a case heflatters himseýf that where ignorance is safe, 'tisfolly to be wise, but there he 
is wrong, for he has been put upon notice and his further ignorance... is a mere 
affectation and disguise. , 142 
Essentially, Lord Summer's statement falls within the doctrine of wilful blindness. This 
is where a person refrains from making enquiries into the provenance of the property 
because he is almost certain that it was derived from criminal conduct. ' 43 Simester and 
Sullivan suggested that the doctrine of wilful blindness is also applicable to the situation 
where 'the means of knowledge are easily to hand, and D realises the likely truth of the matter 
hut refrainsftom enquiry in order not to know. "" The doctrine of wilful blindness does not 
however, extend to cover every situation where a person deliberately refuses to satisfy 
his suspicions by conducting further enquiries. 145 If however it is successfully applied, 
the defendant will be deemed to have actual knowledge of the provenance of the 
property. There is indeed very little difference, if any in the current application of the 
doctrine of wilful blindness in ascertaining knowledge and the interpretation of 
knowledge that was suggested in Article 3 of the 1988 Vienna Convention and Article I 
of the 1991 EC Directive. 
In the offences where the mens rea requires both knowledge and suspicion Graham, 
Bell and Elliot argued that the inclusion of knowledge in the principal money 
laundering offences is academic. They provide two reasons in support of their argument 
with which this thesis concurs. 
"First, the mental element for each of the principal money laundering offences 
includes the element of suspicion, a lesser concept than knowledge. Secondly, the 
[PCMLA 20011 has introduced an objective mental element of reasonable grounds for 
suspicion, again a lower concept than knowledge. It is these two concepts which may be 
ofpractical importance (emphasis added). -146 
Reasonable grounds for suspicion, which is another mens rea element for the offence of 
concealing or disguising the proceeds of crime in order to avoid prosecution or the 
making of a confiscation order under section 41(2) of the PCMLA 2001, introduces an 
objective test in determining guilt. Essentially, if a 'reasonable person' being placed in 
the position of the accused would have suspected that the property in question 
142 [ 192111 AC 801 at p 812 
143 Westminster CC v Croyalgrange Ltd [1986] 2 All ER 353, at p 359 
144 Simester A., & Sullivan G., "Criminal Law theo[y and doctrine, " Hart, 2000 at p 137 
14' Griffiths (1975) 60 Cr App Rep 14 CA 
146 Graham T., Bell E., & Elliot N., "Money Launclýjý 2003, at p 38 
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represented the proceeds of another person's criminal conduct, the accused may well be 
taken to have formed such a suspicion and may be convicted accordingly. Therefore, 
under section 41(2) of the PCMLA 2001 a person can be convicted of an offence on the 
basis of the suspicion of a 'reasonable man' as opposed to his own state of mind. 
5.12 The 1979 Constitution and the PCHLA 2001 
In its continued efforts to be removed from the FATF's blacklist SVG appeared to have 
gone too far legislatively in certain aspects of its anti-money laundering provisions. 
Such a desire to demonstrate to the FATF that everything was done legislative and 
otherwise did not only adversely affect the OFSS but it also exposed certain offences 
under the PCMLA to challenges under the 1979 Constitution. In essence, such exposure 
dilutes the strength of the PCMLA 2001 and fortifies the argument against the repeal of 
the PCA 1997. 
5.12.1 Section 63 and the defence provisions 
The wording of Section 63 of the PCMLA is mainly responsible for the aforesaid 
exposure. It provides that; 
"Any question offact to he decided by a court in proceedings under this Act, except 
any question of fact that is for the prosecution to prove in any proceedings for an 
offence under this Act, shall he decided on the balance ofprobabilities. - 
Essentially, the section requires that a person who is accused of a money laundering 
offence must adduce evidence which will prove on a balance of probabilities the facts 
on which he relies for his defence. In Woolmington v DRP 147 it was held that; 
"Throughout the web of English Criminal Law one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is 
the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt . -14" 
The prosecution is therefore 
generally required to prove every element of the offence and to do so beyond reasonable 
doubt. This position appears to be restated by section 63. However, by requiring the 
accused to adduce evidence which will prove on the balance of probabilities the facts on 
which he relies for a defence, section 63 has essentially introduced a statutory exception 
to the presumption of innocence where previously there was only an established 
147 [1935] AC 462 
148 lbid at p. 481 
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common law exception 149 in existence. In that regard Emmerson and Ashworth pointed 
out: 
"In general, when a common law defence is in issue, the defendant bears no more than 
an evidential burden to raise the defence, and then the prosecution must disprove the 
defence beyond reasonable doubt. The imposition of a purely evidential burden does not 
inftinge the presumption of innocence ... But if insanity is the 
defence, the accused must 
go further than discharging an evidential burden, and must prove on a balance of 
probabilities that he or she comes within the MNaughten rules. -150 
In so far as a statutory reversal of the burden of proof is concerned Ernmerson and 
Ashworth also suggested that: 
11 
... a statute which imposed a persuasive burden, requiring the accused to prove, on a balance of probabilities a fact which is essential to his guilt or innocence, required 
further examination. The court should determine whether the legislative technique 
which had been adopted was mandatory or discretionary, and whether it related to an 
essential element of the offence, or merely to an exemption or proviso. A mandatory 
presumption of guilt on an important essential element of an offence would be 
inconsistent with the presumption of innocence. "5' 
On the basis of the aforesaid, section 63 does not require the accused just to raise the 
defence but to adduce sufficient evidence to prove on a balance of probabilities the facts 
on which he intends to rely for his defence. In effect, section 63 has reversed the burden 
of proof by requiring the accused to prove a persuasive burden 152 as opposed to an 
evidential one. 153 The reversal of the burden of proof has serious implications for the 
presumption of innocence. Not only has it circumvented the common law presumption 
of innocence, it also appears to be inconsistent with Section 8(2)(a) of the 1979 
Constitution which provides that; 
"Every person who is charged with a criminal offence ... shall be presumed to 
be 
innocent until he is proved or has pleaded guilty. " 
That the 1979 Constitution is the superior law of SVG and that all other law should be 
drafted in conformity with it is provided under Section 101 of the 1979 Constitution. 154 
149 The defence of insanity 
'50 Emmerson B., & Ashworth A., "Human Riahts and Criminal Justice, " Sweet & Maxwell, 2001, at p. 
299, para 11-13 
"' lbid at p. 270 para 9-44 
152 lbid, para 9-03 at p. 256; "A 'persuasive' burden ofproof requires the accused to prove, on a balance 
ofprobabilities an ultimatefact necessary to the determination ofguilt or innocence. " 
153 lbid, para 9-04 at p. 256 - "An evidential burden.... requires ... that the accused must adduce sufficient 
evidence to raise an issue before it has to be determined by the tribunal offact. Once the accused has 
adduced evidence sufficient to raise the issue, the burden ofproving (or disproving) that issue rests on the 
prosecution. " 
154 Section 101 of the 1979 Constitution provided that, "This constitution is the supreme law of St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines and, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, if any other law is 
inconsistent with this constitution, this Constitution shall prevail and the other law shall, to the extent of 
the inconsistency, be void - 
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Notwithstanding its superiority, the 1979 Constitution afforded the legislature sufficient 
flexibility to introduce legislation that requires the accused to prove particular facts in 
his case. In this regard Section 8(12)(a) provides that; 
"Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be 
inconsistent with or in contravention of - 
(a) subsection (2)(a) of this section to the extent that the law in question 
imposes upon any person charged with a criminal offence the burden of 
proving particularfacts. " 
This section, although it in effect legitimises section 63, it will be argued that it does not 
necessarily follow that a section 63 provision should be applicable to every case in 
which a defence is raised. In a Privy Council case Attorney- General for Hong Kong v 
Lee Kwong-kut 155 the court indicated that in order to ascertain whether a reversal of the 
burden of proof respected the presumption of innocence it was necessary to identify the 
essential elements of the criminal liability which were imposed by the offence. 156 In that 
regard Lord Woolf stated that: 
"There are situations where it is clearly sensible and reasonable that deviations should 
be allowedfrom the strict application of the principle that the prosecution must prove 
the defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Take an obvious example in the case of 
an offence involving the performance of some act without a licence. Common sense 
dictates that the prosecution should not be required to shoulder the virtual impossible 
task of establishing that a defendant has not a licence when it is a matter of 
comparative simplicity for a defendant to establish that he has a licence ... 
Some 
exceptions will bejustifiable, others will not. Whether they arejustfiable will in the end 
depend upon whether it remains primarily the responsibility of the prosecution to prove 
the guilt of the accused to the required standard and whether the exception is 
reasonably imposed, notwithstanding the importance of maintaining the principle which 
article I1 (1) enshrines. The less significant the departureftom the normal principle, the 
simpler it will be to justify an exception. If the prosecution retains responsibility for 
proving the essential ingredients of the offence, the less likely it is that an exception will 
be regarded as unacceptable ... 
If the exception requires certain matters to be presumed 
until the contrary is shown, then it will be difficult to justify that presumption unless as 
was pointed out by the United States (1969) 23 L. ED. 2d. 82, 'it can at least be said 
with substantial assurance that the presumedfact is more likely than not to flow from 
the provedfact on which it is made to depend 457 
On the basis of the aforesaid statement by Lord Woolf, the defences provided by 
sections 42(4)(a) and (b) (see 5.8 above) are exposed to a challenge under the 1979 
Constitution. Under those sections, by virtue of section 63, the accused is required to 
prove on a balance of probabilities that he did not form the suspicion or possess the 
knowledge that he was engaged in an arrangement which assisted another person to 
retain, control or benefit from the 'proceeds of criminal conduct. ' Due to the reversal of 
... [ 19931 A. C. 951 
156 lbid at 969C -970A 
117 lbid 
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the burden of proof that is mandated by section 63, the accused is exposed to being 
convicted in circumstances where the prosecution is unable to prove its case beyond 
reasonable doubt. A tribunal of fact that is in doubt about the accused's innocence or 
guilt may well convict him if he is unable to convince them that on a balance of 
probabilities he did not forin the suspicion or possess the requisite knowledge. 158 In 
those circumstances the persuasive burden that is imposed on the accused requires him 
to prove his innocence. It is therefore argued that this cannot be justified, especially 
where the prosecution bears the responsibility of proving the elements of the offence 
beyond reasonable doubt. 
Similarly, the accused, pursuant to section 42(4)( c) is entitled to a defence if he can 
prove on a balance of probabilities that he intended to disclose his suspicion or belief to 
a police officer but that 'there is a reasonable excuse for his failure' to make the 
disclosure. However, although it is easier for the accused than for the prosecution to 
adduce evidence in support of his reason for failing to make the disclosure within a 
reasonable time, for the reasons mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, it nonetheless 
appears to be unfair to impose a persuasive burden on the accused in all the 
circumstances. 
In response to a section 43(l) offence there are two defences. Section 43(2) absolves the 
accused from a section 43(l) offence if he can prove on a balance of probabilities that 
he provided adequate consideration for the acquisition, use or possession of property 
that represents the proceeds of criminal conduct. The other defence falls under section 
43(7) wherein the accused will be acquitted if he is able to prove on the balance of 
probabilities that pursuant to section 43(5) of the PCMLA 2001, he intended to inform a 
police officer about his belief that any property represented the proceeds of criminal 
conduct but that he has a reasonable excuse for not doing so as prescribed under section 
43(5)(b) of the PCMLA 2001. Although, it may well be easier for the accused than for 
the prosecution to show that he provided adequate consideration for the property, there 
are likely to be difficulties ascertaining what is or is not adequate in the circumstances. 
Similarly, the accused may encounter an uphill battle in his attempts to convince the 
court that his excuse for not reporting the matter to the police as prescribed by section 
43(5)(b) is a plausible one. A similar argument can also be extended to a section 
158 Rv Oakes 26 D. L. R (4h) 200 at p. 223 
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44(4) 159 defence which requires the accused to prove on the balance of probabilities that 
he had a reasonable excuse for not disclosing to a police officer his knowledge or 
suspicion that a person is engaged in drug money laundering. 
The defence that is provided under section 45(4) also demonstrates the unfairness of the 
burden that is imposed by virtue of section 63. Section 45(4) provides that; 
"In proceedings against a person for an offence under subsection (1) or (2), it is a 
defence to prove that he did not know or suspect that the disclosure was likely to be 
prejudicial in the way there in mentioned - 
The offences to which section 45(4) of the PCMLA 2001 relate are the tipping off 
offences that were discussed under 5.6 above, where it was noted that the drafting of 
section 45(2) is defective since it Penalises those with knowledge or those who formed 
the suspicion that a disclosure was made to a police officer under sections 41,42 or 
43.160 Section 45(4) will not offer any assistance to a person who is charged under 
section 45(2)(a) since the defence only relates to knowledge or suspicion that a 
disclosure was likely to be prejudicial to any investigation which might be conducted. 
At first appearance the section 45(4) defence provides some comfort to a person who is 
charged under section 45(2)(b) since he is entitled to show that he did not know or 
suspect that his disclosure was likely to prejudice an investigation. However, closer 
scrutiny of sections 45(2)(b) and 45(4) reveals that innocent persons are likely to be 
caught by section 45(2)(b) for reasons mentioned under 5.6 above. 
More important however, is that section 45(2)(b) appears to be a crime of strict liability 
and one which is untenable in any modem civilised democratic society. It criminalises 
the disclosure of information that is likely to prejudice an investigation without the 
necessity of establishing the mental state of the accused. If the state of mind is not 
required to commit a section 45(2)(b) offence then requiring the accused to prove that 
he did not know or suspect that the disclosure was prejudicial to an investigation in 
order for him to have the benefit of a section 45(4) defence is tantamount to prescribing 
that he should prove his innocence. All the prosecution will be required to do under a 
section 45(2)(b) offence is to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused 
159 Section 44(4) of the PCM LA 2001 provides that; "It is a defence to a charge of committing an offence 
under this section that the person charged had a reasonable excusefor not disclosing the information or 
other matter in question. " 
160 Section 45(2)(a) of the PCMLA 2001 
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disclosed information that is likely to prejudice an investigation. Once that has been 
established, the offence would be consummated and a conviction may ensue. 
Although a section 45(4) defenee is prescribed as a defence to a section 45(l) offence, 
the reversal of the burden of proof is still problematic. This is so because a tribunal of 
fact that entertains any doubts that the prosecution has proven its case beyond 
reasonable doubt may still convict an innocent person if he fails to convince the tribunal 
on a balance of probabilities that he did not know or suspect that the disclosure was 
likely to be prejudicial to an investigation. 
By virtue of section 8(12)(a) the legislature is granted some latitude to legislate in a 
manner that will assist law enforcement officials to more easily procure convictions. 
However, it does not provide carte blanche to the legislature to introduce legislation that 
will severely interfere with the right of the accused to a fair trial by undermining the 
common law and statutory presumption of innocence in the absence of any justification 
for so doing. 161 If section 8(12)(a) is otherwise interpreted, the 1979 Constitution will be 
contradicting itself and the presumption of innocence will bear little significance, if any 
at all. There will be times when it is justified for the legislature to interfere with the 
presumption of innocence. However, in those circumstances Lord Steyn suggested that 
,... a legislative interference with the presumption qf innocence requires justification and must 
not be greater than necessary. 162 An infringement of the presumption of innocence will 
usually be acceptable in circumstances where it is easier for the accused to adduce the 
evidence necessary to prove the issue than for the prosecution to do so. 163 Section 
8(12)(a) has provided for those circumstances. It is therefore difficult to accept that the 
section should be interpreted to apply to situations where the infringement of the 
presumption of innocence is unwarranted. Nonetheless, section 63 of the PCMLA has 
made it mandatory that the reversal of the burden of proof must be on the balance of 
probabilities. 
16 ' Attorney General for Hong Kong v. Lee Wong Kong-Ku [1993] AC at pp 969H-97OA: Rv Hunt 
[ 19871 AC 3 52 
162 Rv Lambert [2001] 3 All ER 577 
16' Rv Edwards [19751 Q. 13 27(CA) :Rv Hunt [19871 AC 352: Rv Schwartz (1988) 55 D. L. R (411) 1 
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC): See also Emmerson B., & Ashworth A., "Human Rights and Criminal 
Justice", Sweet & Maxwell, 2001 at p 262 para 9-23 where it is stated that; '... a presumption will be 
easier to justify ... 
if it relates not to a an essential element of the offence, but to a proviso, excuse, or the 
like. ' 
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The proliferation of organised criminal activities and acts of terrorism may require a 
limited interference with certain rights of the individual. The lifeblood of those 
activities is the money that is generated to sustain them. Unless persons are legally 
obliged to make disclosures and refrain from providing assistance that will conceal the 
provenance of the property, money laundering and organised crime will continue 
unabated. This will have deleterious effects for the international community. In those 
circumstances one may argue that there is a justification for legislation that is consistent 
with section 8(12)(a) of the 1979 Constitution. But the seriousness of the offence is 
what may nonetheless warrant the restriction on the fundamental rights of the individual 
and create a cogent challenge to the constitutionality of section 63 of the PCMLA 
164 2001 . As 
Langa J in the case State v Mbatha observed: 
"The issue before us... is not simply whether there is a pressing social need to combat 
crimes of violence-there clearly is-but also whether the instrument to be used in meeting 
the this need is itself fashioned in accordance with specifications permitted by the 
constitution... The presumption of innocence is clearly of vital importance in the 
establishment and maintenance of an open and democratic society based on freedom 
and equality. If in particular cases, what is effectively a presumption of guilt is to be 
substilutedfor apresumption of innocence, the justification for doing so must be clearly 
icult o prove that a established... There will no doubt be cases in which it will be dif I 
particular person against whom the presumption would have operated, was in fact in 
possession of the prohibited article. ýf that person was in fact guilty, the absence o the 
presumption might enable him or her to escape conviction. But this is inevitably a 
consequence of the presumption of innocence: this must be weighed against the danger 
that innocent people may be convicted if the presumption were to apply. In that process 
the rights of innocent persons must be given precedence. 165- 
The flexibility afforded to the legislature by section 8(12)(a) should therefore be 
construed as liberal but restricted by the presumption of innocence. In this regard Sachs 
J in the South African Constitutional Court in the case of State v Coetzee observed that: 
"There is a paradox at the heart of all criminal procedure, in that the more serious the 
crime and the greater the public's interest in securing convictions of the guilty, the 
more important do constitutional protection of the accused become. The starting point 
of any balancing enquiry where constitutional rights are concerned must be that the 
public interest in ensuring that a particular criminal is brought to book ... Hence the 
presumption of innocence, which serves not only to protect a particular individual on 
trial but to maintain public confidence in the enduring integrity and security of the legal 
system. Reference to the prevalence and severity of a certain crime therefore does not 
add anything new or special to the balancing exercise. The perniciousness of the 
offence is one of the givens, against which the presumption of innocence is pittedftom 
the beginning, not a new element to be put into the scales as part of a justificalory 
balancing exercise. If this were not so, the ubiquity and ugliness argument could be 
used in relation to murder, rape, car jacking, housebreaking, drug-smuggling, 
corruption... The list is unfortunately almost endless, and nothing would be left of the 
presumption of innocence, save, perhaps, for the relic status as a doughty defender of 
164 State v Coetzee [ 199712 LRC 593 at pp 677-678 para 20 
165 [ 199712 LRC 208 at pp. 215G to 222D 
249 
Chapter 5. IISVG's Legislative Efforts After the Blacklisting. " 
rights in the most trivial cases. The logic of this reasoning is inescapable. It is 
nevertheless right to say that in a constitutional democracy limited inroads on the 
presumption qf innocence may bejuslified ""6 
That statement of Sachs J has aptly supported the perspective that there may be 
justifiable reasons for a limited interference of the presumption of innocence. That is 
what section 8(12)(a) of the 1979 Constitution has facilitated. However, section 63 of 
the PCMLA 2001 seems to have gone too far. It has essentially provided that, 
irregardless of the circumstances of the case, the accused will be required to prove 
certain facts in issue on the balance of probabilities thus leaving no discretion to the 
courts. 
There is a preponderance of cases 167 in Commonwealth countries in support of the 
perspective that a reversal of the burden requires the accused only to raise an evidential 
issue (otherwise referred to as an evidential burden). Emmerson and Ashworth have 
stated that in situations where an evidential burden is required the accused; 
"--. must adduce sufficient evidence to raise an issue before it has to be determined by 
the tribunal offact. Once the accused has adduced evidence sufficient to raise an issue, 
the burden ofproving (or disproving) that issue rests on the prosecution. In the final 
assessment of guilt, the burden on the accused is thus no more than a burden to raise a 
reasonable doubt as to guilt. The imposition of an evidential burden on the accused is 
not incompatible with the presumption of innocence. "16N 
Moreover, in those cases 169 the courts have expressly indicated that it is highly probable 
that innocent people will be convicted in circumstances where it is more appropriate for 
the prosecution to bear the burden of proving all the elements of the case rather than the 
defendant being imposed with a persuasive burden. In the Canadian case of Rv Oakes 
Dickson J stated that: 
"In general one must, I think conclude that a provision which requires an accused to 
disprove on a balance of probabilities the existence of a presumed fact, which is an 
important element of the offence, in question, violates the presumption of innocence ... If 
an accused bears the burden of disproving on a balance of probabilities an essential 
element of an offence, it would be possible for a conviction to occur despite the 
existence of a reasonable doubt. This would arise i the accused adduced sufficient f 
evidence to raise a reasonable doubt as to his or her innocence but did not convince 
thejury on a balance ofprobabilities that the presumedfact was untrue. "' "' 
166 [1997] 2 LRC 593 at pp 677-678 para 20 
167 RvD. P. P ex parte Kebeline and others [199913 WLR 972 House of Lords :Rv Lambert [2001] 3 
All ER 577: Sheldrake v D. P. P [2003] EWHC 273: Rv Carcass [200211 WLR 1714 :Rv Whyte 64 C. R 
(3 rd) 123 (SCC): Rv Oakes 26 D. L. R (4 th ) 200 : State v Mbatha [ 199612 L. R. C 208 
168 Ernmerson B., & Ashworth A., "Human Rights and Criminal Justice, " 2001, para 9-04 at p. 256. 
169 See note 165 above 
170 Rv Oakes 26 D. L. R (4 th ) 200 at p 223 
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The cases that have, within recent times, examined the possible infringement of the 
presumption of innocence seem to conclude that a limited interference of the 
presumption of innocence is necessary (see above). However, they admit that it is only 
in exceptional circumstances that the accused may be required to prove certain facts on 
the balance of probabilities. It was noted above that Lord Woolf suggested that in 
determining whether the burden that is imposed on the accused should be evidential or 
persuasive the court should identify the essential elements of the offences. If having 
done so the accused is required to prove one of the essential elements of the offence 
then he should only bear an evidential burden. 17 1 That was a clear demonstration of the 
importance of the presumption of innocence in a democratic society. As Langa J 
observed: 
"The presumption of innocence is clearly of vital importance in the establishment and 
maintenance of an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality. If in 
particular cases, what is effectively a presumption of guilt is to be substitutedfor a 
presumption of innocence, the justification for doing so must be clearly 
established... There will no doubt be cases in which it will be dýfficult to prove that a 
particular person against whom the presumption would have operated, was in fact in 
possession of the prohibited article. If that person was in fact guilty, the absence o the If 
presumption might enable him or her to escape conviction. But this is inevitably a 
consequence of the presumption of innocence: this must be weighed against the danger 
that innocent people may he convicted if the presumption were to apply. In that process 
the rights of innocent persons must he given precedence. , 172 
In RvD. P. P e-x Parte Kebefine and Others 173 Lord Hope suggested that in 
determining whether it is justified to interfere with the presumption of innocence a fair 
balance should be struck between the demands of the general interest of the community 
and the protection of the fundamental rights of the individual., 74 He further suggested 
that in determining that balance three questions should be considered; (a) what does the 
prosecution have to prove to transfer the onus to the defence?; (b) what is the likely 
burden on the accused - does it relate to something which is likely to be difficult for 
him to prove, or does it relate to something which is likely to be within his own 
knowledge or to which he readily has access?; and (c) what is the nature of the threat 
faced by society which the provision is designed to combat?, 75 It is arguable that the 
defences provided under Sections 42(4)(c), 43(7) and 44(4) and which relate to 
reasonable excuses that are required from the accused may be difficult for the 
prosecution to prove. But note the pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Canada. 
17 1 Attomey -General for Hong Kong v Lee Kwonp, -Kut[1993] AC 951 at p. 973 
172 State v Mbatha [ 199612 L. R. C 208 at pp 215G to 222D 
173 [ 1999] 4 ALL ER 801 
174 lbid at p. 847. 
175 lbid at pp. 848-849 
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"The real concern is not whether the accused must disprove an element or prove an 
excuse, but that an accused may be convicted while a reasonable doubt exists. When 
that possibility exists, there is a breach of the presumption of innocence. The exact 
characterisation of afactor as an essential element, a collateralfactor, an excuse, or a 
defence should not affect the analysis of the presumption of innocence... It is the final 
effect of a provision of the verdict that is decisive. If an accused is required to prove 
some fact on the balance ofprobahilities to avoid conviction, the provision violates the 
presumption of innocence because it permits a conviction in spite of a reasonable doubt 
in the mind of the trier of thefacts as to the guilt of the accused. , 176 
That statement provides very strong obiter against the application of section 63 of the 
PCMLA 2001. Even more potent is the fact that sections 8(2)(a) and 8(12)(a) of the 
1979 Constitution are similar in substance to Sections II (d) and I of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section II (d) provides that; "Any person charged with 
an offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in afair 
and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal. " Section I on the other hand 
provides that the rights that are provided by the Charter are subject to '-such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can he demonstrablyjustified in aftee and democratic society. ' 
In spite of the three stage tests suggested by Lord Hope, it nonetheless appears that the 
test of necessity that was laid down in Rv Lambert 177 reflects the preference of the 
English courts. Clarke J in reference to the test observed that; "There have been a number 
of cases since Rv Carcass hut I do not read any of them as contradicting the conclusion that the 
test is one of necessity. '178 What is significant about Rv Laýbert and the other cases 
abovementioned is that the courts were trying to determine on the face of the statute 
whether or not an evidential or a persuasive burden should be imposed on the accused. 
With regard to the PCMLA 2001, Section 63 has actually imposed a persuasive burden 
on the accused no matter what the circumstances. It is noteworthy that the PCMLA 
imposes very heavy penalties on those who are convicted and they are also exposed to 
further penalties if they are served with a confiscation order. For example, pursuant to 
section 47 of the PCMLA 2001 a person who is convicted for a summary offence may 
suffer a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment or a fine of $500,000 or both. An 
indictable offence on the other hand carries a maximum penalty of twenty years 
imprisonment or an unlimited fine or both. 
In all the cases that have so far been considered the courts have demonstrated its 
concern for the likelihood of an innocent person being subject to such harsh penalties. 
176 Rv Wh3q (1989) 51 DLR (4 Ih ) 481 at 493 
177 [2001] All ER 577 
178 Sheldrake v D. P. P [20031 EWHC 273 para 45 
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In Rv Lambert a case in which the matter related to the possession of drugs, Lord 
Steyn stated that: "Taking into account that section 28 deals with the situation where the 
accused is denying moral blameworthiness and the fact that the maximum prescribe penalty is 
life imprisonment, I conclude that the appellant's interpretation to be preferred Itfollows that s 
28 derogates ftom the presumption of innocence. , 179 
In Canada and South Africa the Courts are inclined to impose an evidential burden 
unless it is justified to do otherwise. It has been shown that the seriousness of the crime 
and the severity of the penalty had a significant influence on the decision to prefer an 
evidential burden as opposed to a persuasive burden. The Courts in England, including 
the Privy Council have also taken a similar position to the Canadian and South African 
Courts (often quoting their judgments in the decisions) especially since the introduction 
of the Human Rights Act 1998. In the light of the fact that SVG is a member of the 
Commonwealth and the Privy Council is still its final Court of Appeal, the journey of 
the courts on matters relating to the presumption of innocence is heading in the opposite 
direction to section 63 of the PCMLA 2001. 
5.12.2 Forfeiture Orders 
The PCMLA 2001 did not retain the forfeiture provisions of its precursor the PCA 
1997. Under the PCA 1997 a forfeiture order could only have been made against a 
person after he had been convicted of any of the offences in the schedule to the PCA 
1997.180 The PCMLA has departed radically from the PCA 1997 by permitting a police 
officer to apply to the court of summary jurisdiction for a forfeiture order'81 for cash' 82 
which was detained by a police office above the rank of Inspector or a customs 
179 [2001] 3 All ER 577 
"'0 Section 8(l) of the PCA 1997 (now repealed) provided that; "Where the Director of Public 
Prosecutions applies to the court for a forfeiture order against property in respect of the conviction of a 
person for a scheduled offence and the court is satisfied that the property is tainted property, the Court 
may order that the property or such portion thereof as is specified by the Court in the order beforfeited 
to the Crown. " 
"' Section 50(l) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "A court ofsummaryjurisdiction may make an order 
ordering the forfeiture of any cash which has been seized under section 49 if satisfied on an application 
made by a police officer while the cash is detained under that section, that cash directly or indirectly 
represents any persons proceeds of or benefit from, or is intended by any person for use in. criminal 
conduct. - 
182 Section 51(4) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "cash means - 
(a) coins and bank notes in any currency: and 
(b) negotiable instruments " 
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officer. 183 Moreover, all that is required of the police officer is for him to satisfy the 
court that the cash that was seized and detained, directly or indirectly, represented the 
person's proceeds of criminal conduct or that it was used or is intended to be used to 
commit an offence. 184 In effect, a forfeiture order can be made regardless of whether or 
not any proceedings have been or were to be initiated against the person for an offence 
to which the cash is allegedly connected. 185 Essentially, a forfeiture order can only be 
made in this way if there is a presumption that the cash was connected to or intended to 
be used for criminal conduct. Such a presumption appears to be inconsistent with the 
presumption of innocence required pursuant to Section 8(2)(a) of the 1979 Constitution. 
Moreover, forfeiture orders historically were used to prevent crime by removing the 
'thing' or 'instrument' that may have been used or is intended to be used for the 
commission of a criminal offence. 186 Under the PCA 1997 forfeiture orders maintained 
the historical context but the PCMLA has departed somewhat, where no crime has been 
committed and where no one has been convicted. Section 6(l) of the 1979 Constitution 
provides that: 
"No property of any description shall be compulsorily taken possession of and, no 
interest in or right over property of any description shall be compulsorily acquired, 
except for a public purpose and except where provision is made by a law applicable to 
that taking of possession or acquisition for payment, within a reasonable time, of 
adequate compensation " 
By virtue of that section a person is protected from deprivation of property without 
compensation. There are however several exceptions. The relevant exception is section 
6(6)(ii) which provides that; 
"Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be 
inconsistent with or in contravention of subsection (1) ... 
by way ofpenaltyfor breach 
of any law orforfeiture in consequence of breach ofany law. " 
Essentially, section 6(6)(ii) permits the deprivation of property without compensation 
where there has been a violation of any law. It does not refer to an intention to break the 
183 Section 49(l) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "A police officer not below the rank of inspector or a 
customs officer may seize and detain, in accordance with this part, any cash which is being imported into 
or exportedfrom Saint Vincent and the Grenadines if the officer has reasonable grounds for suspecting 
that it directly or indirectly represents any person's proceeds of criminal conduct or is intended by any 
personfor use in any criminal conduct. 
184 Section 50(l) of the PCMLA 2001 
"' Section 50(2) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "An order may be made under subsection (1) 
whether or not proceedings are brought against any personfor an offence with which the cash in question 
is connected. - 
186 Alldridge P., "Money Laundering Law, " Hart, 2003, at p 59 
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law. But Section 50(2) of the PCMLA 2001 clearly stipulates that a forfeiture order may 
be made notwithstanding that there has not been a violation of any law and no 
proceedings have been brought against the person 'for an offence with which the cash is 
connected. ' This seems to be inconsistent with section 6(6)(ii) and is therefore exposed 
to a challenge under the 1979 Constitution. 
It is also noteworthy that no provision has been made in the PCMLA 2001 for the court 
to take into account that there has been the forfeiture of cash when it determines the 
extent of the punishment which should be imposed should there be a conviction. 
Provisions are made for the release of cash to enable the appellant ýto meet his legal 
expenses in connection with' an appeal' 87 against the forfeiture and the cash may be 
188 released if the court considers it appropriate to do So. Apart from those two 
circumstances the PCMLA 2001 does not otherwise provide for the release or set off of 
the cash forfeited against any previous or subsequent penalty. In effect the cash forfeited 
represents a penalty as opposed to a fine 189 which is imposed after the amount recovered 
under a confiscation order has been determined. A person who has been convicted for 
criminal conduct and had his cash forfeited may well find that he would have been 
punished twice for the same offence. Pursuant to section 8(5) of the 1979 Constitution; 
"A person who shows that he has been tried by a competent courtfor a criminal offence and 
either convicted or acquitted shall not again be triedfor that offence or for any other criminal 
offence of which he could have been convicted at the trialfor that offence save upon the order of 
a superior court in the course of appeal or review proceedings relating to the conviction or 
acquittal. - Section 8(6) of the 1979 Constitution also provides that a person who has 
197 Section 50(4) PCMLA 2001 provides that: "On an application made by the appellant to a court of 
summary jurisdiction at any time, that court may order the release of so much of the cash to which the 
forfeiture order relates as it considers appropriate to enable him to meet his legal expenses in connection 
with the Appeal. " 
'88 Section 50(2) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "An appeal under this section shall be by way of 
rehearing, and the court may make such order as it considers appropriate and, in particular, may order 
the release of the cash (or any remaining cash) together with any accrued interest. " 
1'9 Section 7(5) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "The Court shall then in respect of the principal 
offence- 
(a) order the defendant to pay the amount of the confiscation order within such period as it may 
speciJy; and 
(b) take into account the confiscation order before 
0) imposing anyfine on him, or 
00 making any other order involving any payment by him; but 
c) subject to paragraph (a), leave the confiscation order out of account in determining the 
appropriate sentence or other manner of dealing with the defendant. " 
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been pardoned for a criminal offence shall not be tried for the offence of which he was 
pardoned. 190 
Although the two sections do not mention punishment, it is herein argued that they 
should be interpreted as if punishment was also included to the extent it excludes double 
punishment for the same offence. A criminal conviction is generally followed by 
punishment and the purpose'91 of the double jeopardy provision in the 1979 
Constitution is to prevent a person being exposed to double punishment after he has 
been tried and convicted. To exclude punishment when interpreting those sections will 
result in a most unfortunate conclusion because the ultimate purpose of a trial is to 
ascertain culpability or determine innocence. The person who is culpable is generally 
punished. The innocent person obtains an acquittal. Therefore, one of the major 
concerns about trying a person twice for the same offence relates to the likelihood of 
that person being punished. Accordingly, the sections should be interpreted to mean also 
that a person should not be punished twice for the same offence. ' 92 Such is the 
perspective of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which 
provides that; "No one shall be liable to be tried or punished againfor an offencefor which he 
has already been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law andpenal procedure 
of each country. - 193 
It was mentioned above that no provision has been made to take into account the 
forfeiture of cash when deten-nining the punishment to be imposed for the conviction of 
an offence. Therefore, the convict will be accorded punishment for the principal 
offence 194 which will be separate and distinct from the cash that is forfeited and which 
is connected to the principal offence. In effect, the convict will be exposed to double 
punishment for the same offence. In this regard Alldridge observed that; "The 
'90 Section 8(6) of the 1979 Constitution of St. Vincent and the Grenadines provides that: "A person shall 
not he triedfor a criminal offence ifhe shows that he has been pardonedfor that oJfence. 
'9'PeppervHa [1993]AC593 
192 Rv Beedie [1998] QB 356 
'9' Article 14(7) 
194 Section 7(5) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "The court shall then in respect of the principal 
offence; 
(a) order the defendant to pay the amount of the confiscation order within such period as it may 
specify; and 
(b) take into account the confiscation order before 
0) imposing anyfine on him, or 
00 making any order involving any payment by him; but 
(c ) subject to paragraph (a), leave the confiscation order out of account in determining the 
appropriate sentence or other manner of dealing with the defendant. " 
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fundamental objection to forfeiture on conviction is that unless treated as a fine, it constitutes 
double punishment. " 195 Accordingly, the forfeiture provisions of the PCMLA 2001 are 
also exposed to challenges under section 8(5) of the 1979 Constitution. 
5.13 The PCMLA 2001 and the PCA 1997 
When the offence of money laundering in the former PCA 1997 is compared with the 
money laundering offences in the PCMLA 2001 there is noticeably little difference in 
the overall effect. Pursuant to Section 59(2) 196 of the PCA 1997 the offence of money 
laundering was created. Section 59(3) provided that; 
"A person shall he taken to engage in money laundering where - 
(a) the person engages, directly or indirectly, in a transaction that involves 
money or other property, that is the proceeds of crime: or 
(b) the person receives, possesses, conceals, disposes of or brings into St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines money or other property that is the proceeds of 
crime. 
and the person knows or ought reasonably to know, that the money or other property is 
derived, obtained or realised, directly or indirectly ftom some form of unlawful 
activity. " 
The other relevant offence under the PCA 1997 was provided under Section 61 which 
states that: 
" person who, after the commencement of this Act, receives, possesses, 
conceals, disposes, of or brings into Saint Vincent and the Grenadines any 
money, or property that he knows or ought reasonably to know to be the 
proceeds of crime commits an indictable offence... " 
"It is a defence to a charge for an offence against this section, if the person 
satisfies the Court that he did not know or had not reasonable grounds for 
knowing the property referred to in the charge was derived or realised, directly 
or indirectly, ftom someform of unlawful activity. " 
Essentially, Section 59(3) provided that any involvement by a person in money or 
property that represented the proceeds of crime was prohibited. The person so involved 
would have been guilty of the offence of money laundering. To be absolved from 
liability that person would have been required to show that he did not know or could not 
have reasonably known that the money or property was in some way derived from 
unlawful activity. In order to further appreciate what property was likely to be 
incriminating, the definitions of 'proceeds of crime' and 'unlawful conduct' were 
paramount. 'Proceeds of crime' was defined to include: 
195 Alldridge P., "Money Laundering Law, " Hart, 2003, at p 117 
196 Section 59 (2) PCA 1997 now repealed provided that; "A person who, after the commencement of this 
Act, engages in money laundering commits an indictable offence... " 
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(a) "proceeds derivedfrom the commission of scheduled offences; or 
(b) any property or benefits derived, obtained, realised, directly or indirectly, by any 
person from any act or omission that occurred outside St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
and would, if it had occurred in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, constituted a scheduled 
offence. , 197 
The definition of the proceeds of crime was admittedly a bit convoluted. The phrase, 
'proceeds of crime' was used in the wording of the money laundering offence without 
further clarification. However, when seeking clarification by examining its definition, 
one was required to go back to the offence of money laundering which was a scheduled 
offence to ascertain how the proceeds were derived. In spite of the somewhat circuitous 
definition of 'proceeds of crime, ' the money laundering offence, nonetheless, achieved 
greater clarity from the definition of 'unlawful activity. ' Section 2 of the former PCA 
1997 defined 'unlawful activity' as: 
'an act or omission that constitutes an offence against a law in force in St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines or against a law of any other country. ' 
Therefore, once an offence was committed any where, provided that it constituted an 
offence in SVG and the property 198 was derived from that offence, any involvement in 
or with such property could have constituted the offence of money laundering. In order 
to be guilty of the offence of money laundering the prosecutor was required to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused knew or ought reasonably to have known that 
the money or property to which he was connected was derived from unlawful activity. 
When Section 59(3) and 61 were taken together they seemed to have covered all the 
offences in the PCMLA 2001 except the offences of tipping off and failing to report 
suspicion of money laundering. 
Sections 41 and 42 of the PCMLA 2001 are in pari materia with sections 22 and 21 of 
the DTOA 1993 respectively. Apart from the extension of sections 41 and 42 to include 
offences other than drug trafficking there appears to be little difference in the mens rea 
elements which in the PCMLA 2001 is 'knowing or having reasonable grounds to 
suspect' whereas under the DTOA 1993 the mens rea element is 'knowing or having 
reasonable grounds to believe. ' The mens rea element of 'knowledge' was discussed 
above but 'reasonable grounds to believe' and 'suspicion' were discussed in chapter 4. 
It is noticeable that those two PCMLA 2001 offences are also captured under the two 
197 Section 2 of the PCA 1997 now repealed 
'98 Section 2 of the PCMLA 2001 defines property to include; "money and all other property real or 
personal, things in action and other tangible property. " 
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limbs of the money laundering offence under Section 59(3) of the PCA 1997. It is also 
important to note that whereas sections 41(l) and (2) of the PCMLA 2001 offences 
require the prosecution to prove that the accused concealed, disguised, converted or 
transferred the proceeds of criminal conduct with the intention of avoiding a prosecution 
or the making or enforcement of a confiscation order or assisting a person to do so, 
under sections 59 and 61 of the PCA 1997 no such proof was required. 
The lower threshold of 'reasonable grounds to suspect' under sections 41 and 42 of the 
PCMLA 2001 gives the appearance that it is much easier to procure a conviction than 
previously under 'reasonable grounds to believe. ' But note the observations of 
Alldridge: 
"In these offences both knowledge and suspicion are to be judged subjectively. It does 
not matter that there was reasonable grounds to suspect if infact the defendant did not 
suspect. This has led to complaints by prosecutors about the difficulties of proof 
imposed by this subjective requirement. The Cabinet Office claimed that the 
professional who 'turns a blind eye' avoids liability, and used this as the justification 
for the introduction of an objective test of reasonable grounds to suspect. This, 
however, is contentiousfor two reasons. First 'knowledge'in criminal statutes has been 
held to comprehend 'wifful blindness. 'Second, it would be inconsistent with the general 
understanding that negligence is not sufficientfor a convictionfor a serious crime. "199 
McCormack is also of the view that with regard to Section 41 of the PCMLA 2001 
introducing 'reasonable grounds to suspect' into the mens rea element may be otiose. He 
stated that "... if the prosecution managed to prove that a person had acted in order to assist 
some one to avoid prosecution it would he followed that that person must know or believe that 
the property he is dealing with is the proceeds of criminal conduct. To import into the definition 
the necessityfor having reasonable grounds to suspect appears to he somewhat nonsensical. 200 
There is case laW201 to support the perspective that not only must there be reasonable 
grounds for suspicion but that the accused must himself have formed the requisite 
suspicion. 202 Therefore, if he did not form that suspicion he ought not to be liable. 
Interestingly, in a country with a people that are avid for scandal it is highly probable 
that the requisite suspicion will be formed. It is nonetheless important to note that there 
has still not been a money laundering prosecution, let alone conviction since the PCA 
was introduced in 1997. Does that make any difference to reasonable grounds to believe 
or reasonable grounds to suspect in the practical sense? By extension, would the 
199 Alldridge P., "Money Laundering Law, " Hart, 2003 at p 183 
200 McCormack G., "Money Laundering and Banking Secrecy, 
- 
The Company Lawyer Vol. 16 No. 8, 
1995 at p8 
20 1 Nakkuda Ali v Jayaratne [ 195 1] AC 66 
202 Rv Harrison [ 193813 All ER 134 
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difference between reasonable grounds to believe or reasonable grounds to suspect 
encourage more investigations and prosecutions? The experience so far has not shown 
any difference. 
The offences that were created under sections 43(l) and 44(2) of the PCMLA 2001 are 
also captured under sections 59 and 61 of the PCA 1997. Although section 44(2) is an 
offence of failure to report drug money laundering the conduct that will offend section 
44(2) will also violate sections 59 and 61. For example, the requisite knowledge or 
suspicion must have been acquired through work etc. This therefore implies that there 
may well have been a transaction between the launderer and some one at the work place 
which will bring the transgression under the first limb of section 59(3). The offences of 
tipping off (section 45) and failing to report a suspicious transaction (section 46) are in 
effect the two new offences. Although they are welcomed additions to the money 
laundering legislation their absence was not pivotal to SVG being placed on the 
blacklist (see chapter 4) and the manner in which they were drafted may not be 
altogether helpful to SVG's anti-money laundering efforts. For example, the flaws in the 
wording of section 45(2) have essentially produced offences that should not be tolerated 
in any democratic society. In so far as section 46 is concerned the manner in which a 
legal obligation is imposed on persons to report on each other in a small country with a 
small population also has serious disadvantages which may well be counterproductive 
to the implementation of the money laundering legislation. 
Section 46(l) has in effect imposed upon financial institutions and any person who is 
engaged in a relevant business activity, the role and responsibility of law enforcement 
officials. An additional responsibility to ensure that compliance programmes are 
instituted and that staff are appropriately trained is also imposed. Together, these 
responsibilities, though important, can also be very onerous, 203 especially where in 
reality the majority of service providers are very small with very few staff members. 
Moreover, the dearth of commercial activity in SVG negatively impacts on the level of 
income that is earned by financial institutions and those involved in relevant business 
activities in particular. Therefore, the added cost of the compliance programme and the 
mechanism that is necessary to maintain effective vigilance of commercial activity may 
be a prohibiting factor for those who intend to provide financial and other relevant 
services. Similarly, those who are already providing the relevant services may find that 
203 Wadsley J., "Money Laundering: Professionals as Policemen, " The Conveyancer 1994, at pp. 286-287 
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the cost and time involved in order to comply may be so onerous that a greater portion 
of their time may be spent conjuring up ingenious ways that are likely to circumvent the 
requirements of section 46 as opposed to complying with that section. 
It is also noteworthy that section 46 was introduced at a time when no money 
laundering case had ever been brought before the court. Interestingly, even after the 
introduction of section 46 and up to the time that SVG was removed from the FATF 
blacklist, no one had ever been convicted of a money laundering offence. Essentially, 
the section encourages an invasion into the privacy of the affairs of individuals - both 
the criminals and law abiding persons. Such invasion is a serious impediment to the 
viability of the OFSS in particular and financial services in general since law abiding 
persons will undoubtedly be very reluctant to have their financial affairs exposed and 
placed under constant supervision 204 and therefore, may not consider SVG as a desirable 
investment opportunity. It is also very important to note that privacy is the bedrock on 
which offshore financial services was established. Any attempts to undermine the 
maintenance and preservation of privacy and confidentiality will undoubtedly have a 
detrimental effect on the OFSS in particular and the economy as a whole. Such a state 
of affairs was in evidence with the drastic reduction of offshore activity following the 
blacklisting of SVG. Mention of the adverse impact on the economy of SVG has 
already been made in chapter 1. 
In the previous chapter it was noted that when laws are being drafted, special attention 
should be paid to the culture of the people who are regulated by those laws and the 
persons who are required to administer the laws. It has also been noted in the previous 
chapter that the people of SVG are avid for scandal. Section 46 by requiring the 
formation of a mere suspicion as a prerequisite to the reporting of a transaction is 
essentially empowering those that are consumed with envy, jealousy, enmity and 
political aspiration to embarrass those who appear to be successful or against whom 
they bear a grudge by reporting them to law enforcement officials. This unfortunate 
situation is further compounded by section 46(5) of the PCMLA which grants immunity 
from prosecution for those who reported what they considered to be a transaction that 
they suspected to be involved in money laundering activity. 205 
204 Ibid at p. 287 
205 Section 46(5) of the PCMLA 2001 provides that: "When the report in subsection (3) is made in good 
faith, the financial institutions or persons engaged in relevant business activities and their employees, 
staff directors owners or other representatives as authorised by law, shall be exemptedfrom criminal, 
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SVG is a very small country with a very small population of approximately 117,000 
people. Most of its inhabitants are either likely to be blood related or closely connected 
in some other way. Therefore, any suspicious activity report that is made is likely to be 
against a friend, relative or an acquaintance. Similarly, any prosecution that is being 
brought is likely to be against a friend, a relative or an acquaintance. Therefore, making 
a report of a suspicious activity which turned out to be unnecessary and unwarranted or 
which did not result in a prosecution for whatever reason may have disastrous 
consequences for the person making the report. Yet if the report is not made the penalty 
for non-compliance can be severe and includes imprisonment. 
To encourage the residents of SVG to report against each other may not be productive, 
especially when the very reason for making the report is also responsible for increases 
in employment and poverty levels. The imposition of such responsibilities on civilians 
in SVG can also be seen as a result of the failure by FATF countries to control criminal 
activities within their borders. The question is whether it is fair and equitable for a small 
country like SVG to be lumbered with the unreasonable burden of assisting the FATF 
countries to fight the criminal activities that occur in those countries? It may be argued 
that it is only fair that SVG participates since it is also the beneficiary of the economic 
prosperity of FATF countries which enabled their residents to acquire the substantial 
sums of monies that are sent abroad in search of further investment opportunities in 
offshore jurisdictions like SVG. Further questions may be asked as to whether SVG 
could be of assistance without having to suffer economic difficulties? It can be argued 
that the manner in which section 46 was drafted was detrimental to the financial 
services sector in SVG since it had the effect of reducing the commercial viability of the 
sector. 
The government of SVG was forced by the OECD/FATF to introduce measures like 
section 46 which may well turn out to be counter productive as opposed to retaining 
section 51 under the previous PCA 1997 which did not criminalise the non-reporting of 
suspicious activity but instead encouraged financial institutions to report information 
that is relevant to an investigation or prosecution of an offence. The money laundering 
offences under the PCA 1997 could nonetheless have been used to charge a person who 
civil or administrative liability as the case may be, for complying with this section orfor breach of any 
restriction on disclosure of information imposed by contract or by any legislative, regulatory or 
administrative provision, regardless of the result of the communication. " 
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failed to report the aforesaid information as being directly or indirectly involved in the 
money laundering process and therefore it could be argued that criminalising the non- 
reporting of information was unnecessary. However, due to the extent of organised 
criminal activities in FATF countries and the significance of anti-money laundering 
activities as a deterrent to the preservation of international crime, SVG has a 
responsibility to ensure that its jurisdiction is not a safe haven for criminals. Suspicious 
activity reporting is necessary but within the context of SVG it is argued that the 
reporting should not be based on a mere suspicion but on reasonable grounds to believe. 
In this way criminalising the non-reporting of the relevant information would not appear 
to be counterproductive since in any event those who failed to report may also be 
captured under another money laundering offence as being either directly or indirectly 
involved in the money laundering process. 
It is however noteworthy that as a matter of fact the PCA 1997 was not criticised in the 
FATF's Report on its review of SVG. Interestingly, the manner in which the PCA 1997 
was drafted ensured that those who actually committed an offence and were prosecuted 
stood a greater chance of being convicted. It is also noteworthy that the three offences 
under the PCA 1997 were the only provisions that were retained under the PCMLA 
2001 by virtue of section 68 of the PCMLA 2001. No reason was however given for the 
retention of those three offences. That was rather strange especially in the light of the 
fact that the government had refused to apprehend a person 206 for whom a warrant for 
his arrest for money laundering charges was issued by the USA. 207 
Mr. Thiery Nano was the principal of two offshore banks in SVG. These were New 
Bank Limited and Nano and Sons 1146 Private Bankers Limited whose banking 
licenses were revoked in June 2000208 under the previous administration which lost the 
general elections in March 2001. A warrant for Mr. Nano's arrest was issue by a court 
in the Florida district in late 2001 following an investigation by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) . 
209 Although the law enforcement authorities in SVG received the 
warrant from the USA they failed to execute it and allowed Mr. Nano to leave the 
206 Mr. Thierry Nano 
207 www. geodrugs. net., "One Money -Laundering Case with Three Governments Involved, " Geopolitical 
Drug Newsletter No. 9- June 2002 at pp. 1-4 
20' Information from the Offshore Finance Authority of SVG. 
209 www. p-eodrugs. net., "One Money -Laundering Case with Three Governments Involved, " Geopolitical 
Drug Newsletter No. 9- June 2002 at p. I 
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country. 2 10 The Prime Minister Dr. Ralph Gonsalves (a lawyer), who had just taken 
political office a few months earlier, explained that the laws in SVG did not permit the 
law enforcement authorities to apprehend and/or extradite Mr. Nano for money 
laundering charges . 
21 ' That was a rather puzzling admission since section 59(3) of the 
PCA 1997 clearly criminalised money laundering which involved an unlawful 
activity 212 that occurred in any other jurisdiction. Moreover, section 30(l)(a) and (e) of 
the Criminal Procedure Code Chapter 125 of the 1990 Revised Laws of SVG provides 
as follows: 
"Any police officer may, without an order ftom a magistrate and without a warrant, 
arrest- 
(a) any person whom he suspects upon reasonable grounds of having 
committed an indictable offence; 
(e) any person whom he suspects upon reasonable grounds of having been 
concerned in any act committed at any place out of Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines which, if committed in St. Vincent and the Grenadines would have 
been punishable as an offence, and, for which he is under the fugitive Offenders 
Act, or any other law relating to extradition and in force in Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines, or otherwise liable to be apprehended and detained in Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines; " 
Pursuant to section 59(2) of the PCA 1997 money laundering is an indictable offence. 
Moreover, the receipt of a warrant from the USA law enforcement authorities is 
sufficient to raise reasonable grounds for suspicion that a money laundering offence had 
been committed. Section 30(l)(e) empowers a police officer to make an arrest without a 
warrant but in the case of Mr. Nano a warrant for his arrest was issued. There was also 
the 1996 Extradition Treaty between SVG and the USA (see chapter 3.10) which made 
money laundering an extraditable offence. Mr. Nano should therefore have been 
arrested by the law enforcement officials under the laws of SVG. It was therefore most 
unfortunate that inspite of the Prime Minister's pronouncement (see 5.3 above) in 
parliament to strengthen the money laundering laws of SVG, when it came to enforcing 
them against Mr. Nano, for whatever reason, they seemed to have been misinterpreted 
in favour of Mr. Nano. 
210 lbid at p. 2 211 lbid 
212 Section 2 of the PCA 1997 (now repealed) defined 'unlawful activity' to include, "an act or omission 
that constitutes an offence against a law in force in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines or against a law of 
any other country. - 
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It is however interesting to note that the government of SVG, shortly after it assumed 
office following the victory at the polls on 31s' March 2001, reinstated 213 the two 
aforesaid offshore banking licenses that were revoked by the previous administration. 214 
It was also noted in chapter 4.13 that there were allegations that the Nano family 
contributed substantial sums of money to the election campaign of the current 
administration which enabled it to secure victory at the polls. Essentially, the FATF's 
blacklisting appears not only to adversely affect the OFSS, it had political implications 
as well. Only time will tell how well the money laundering laws are likely to be 
manipulated and enforced to facilitate a political agenda. 
The mens rea element of "knowledge" under the PCA 1997 may not have been fatal to 
the procuring of a money laundering conviction, especially where the ambit of 
knowledge had been extended to include wilful blindness and where knowledge was 
also measured against that of a reasonable man as opposed to knowledge of the accused. 
Moreover, the PCA 1997 only provided one defence 215 to any of the three offences and 
that defence was available to the accused without the imposition of any mandatory 
burden of proving his lack of knowledge of an unlawful activity. The PCMLA 2001 on 
the other hand has made provisions for defences to all but two of the six offences 216 that 
it has created. The application of those defence provisions maybe inconsistent with 
certain requirements of the 1979 Constitution, especially because of the mandatory 
reversal of the burden of proof that is prescribed by section 63 of the PCMLA 2001. 
Other inconsistencies may also be derived from the forfeiture provisions of the PCMLA 
2001. By exposing those provisions to challenges under the 1979 Constitution, the 
effect of the PCMLA 2001 may be weakened. Alternatively, the inconsistency of the 
provisions with the 1979 Constitution may also result in human rights abuses. 
213 The lawyer that acted for the previous administration was removed and replaced by a lawyer appointed 
by the new administration. The new administration's lawyer and the lawyer for the offshore banks agreed 
by consent that there were insufficient grounds for revoking the banking licenses. Accordingly, a consent 
order was issued, reinstating the licenses. 
214 www. geodrugs. net., "One Money -Laundering Case with Three Governments Involved, " Geopolitical 
Drug Newsletter No. 9- June 2002 at p. 3 
215 Section 61(2) of the PCA 1997 (now repealed) provided that: "It is a defence to a charge for an 
offence against this section, if a person satisfies the Court that he did not know or had not reasonable 
grounds for the knowing that the property referred to in the charge was derived or realized, directly or 
indirectly, from someform of unlawful activity. 
216 Sections 41 and 46 of the PCMLA 200 1. 
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5.14 Amendments to the International Trust Act (ITA) 1996 
The ITA 1996 was amended on 13 th May, 2002 mainly for the purposes of 
housekeeping and according greater powers to the Registrar of Trust to request 
information from Registered Trustees. However, the concerns that the FATF expressed 
in its June 2000 evaluation report were not effectively addressed. It was noted in chapter 
4.5 that one of the FATF's main concern was the difficulty ascertaining the identities of 
the settlor, trustees and beneficiaries of the trust. No amendments were made in that 
regard. Instead there was an amendment to Section 63(l)(b) of the ITA 1996 which 
provided as follows: 
The Registered Trustee of an international trust created under this Act shall keep as 
confidential information in the territory of the State. -- (b) a register in which thefollowing information is set out 
(i) the name of the settlor and the name of the beneficiary or the 
beneficiaries and the names of the trustee or trustees and where 
applicable the name of the protector... " 
This amendment rather than making provision for the disclosure of the identities of the 
settlors, trustees and beneficiaries of an international trust it has effectively made it 
more difficult for those identities to be disclosed. Although the identities of the settlor 
and the trustees are required to be disclosed to the OFA when a trust is initially 
created, 217 there were nonetheless concerns about ascertaining the identities of settlors 
and beneficial owners that were IBCs. 218 Accordingly, the amendment did not solve the 
mischief that parliament should be trying to avoid. If those IBCs were bearer share 
companies then the ultimate beneficial owners (e. g. natural persons) should be 
ascertained. But note that the amended ITA 1996 reinforced the privacy and 
confidentiality of the identities of the settlors and beneficiaries. Although the amended 
ITA was not consistent with the FATI's assessment criteria SVG was nonetheless 
removed from the blacklist. Yet it was the concealment of the identities of the settlors 
and beneficiaries of an international trust that contributed to the blacklisting of SVG in 
the first place. 
217 See chapter 4.5.1.1 
"8 lbid 
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5.15 Amendments to the International Business Companies (IBC) Act 
1996 
The IBC 1996 was amended on 13 th May, 2002 in order to immobilise bearer shares. In 
effect bearer shares could still be issued by IBCs. However, the amendment imposed on 
Registered Agents the responsibility of retaining the bearer share certificate in their 
custody and prohibited them from delivering the share certificates to the owners of 
IBCS. 219 In this way transfers were not required to be made without the authorisation of 
the Registered Agent who in turn had a legal obligation to maintain proper records 
which contained the particulars of each bearer share holder. 
220 The IBC Act was further 
amended on 7 th November, 2002 to in order to penalise Registered Agents for any 
refusal to comply with the requirements pertaining to the custody of a bearer share 
certificate and the proper maintenance of records of the particulars of owners of bearer 
shares. 221 
It is interesting to note that prior to the meeting with the FATF in Miami, USA in June 
2000 the representatives of SVG and the British Virgin Islands (BVI) discussed a plan 
to retain bearer shares and the plan was to immobilise them in the manner as explained 
222 
above. Both the BVI and SVG discussed the plan with the FATF but the BVI with 
over 300,000 IBCs 223 at the time was not put on the blacklist but SVG with just about 
10,000 IBC S224 was blacklisted. It is also noteworthy that criteria 5 '225 
12 226 and 13,227 
of the 25 criteria for assessing non-cooperative countries and territories all had 
219 See also chapter 2.4.2 
220 Section 22(2) of the IBC Act 1996 (as amended) provided that: "Every registered agent shall maintain 
a record of each bearer certificate issued or deposited in its custody and the record shall contain the 
following information: 
(a) the name of the company issuing the bearer certificate; 
(h) the identification number of the bearer share certificate; 
(C) the number ofshares and the class ofshares in the company contained in the bearer certificate 
(d) the identity of the beneficial owner of the shares in the hearer share certificate, including but not 
restricted to the name, address, date of birth and other details of identification as may he 
prescribed by the Minister... " 
221 Section 22(4) of the IBC Act 1996 (as amended) provided that: "A registered agent who refuses or 
fails to comply with the provisions of this section other than subsection (8) commits an offence, and shall 
be liable on summary conviction 
N in the case of a company, to afine of twenty thousand dollars; or 
(ii) in the case of a natural person, to a fine of twenty thousand dollars or to a term of 
imprisonment not exceeding twelve months... 
222 Discussion with representatives from SVG. 
223 Records at the BVI Financial Services Authority 
224 Records at the St. Vincent and the Grenadines Offshore Finance Authority. 
225 See also chapter 4.5.1 
226 See also chapter 4.8 
227 See also chapter 4.9 
267 
Chapter 5. "SVG's Legislative Efforts After the Blacklisting. " 
implications for bearer shares and SVG was adjudged to have fallen within those 
criteria. The plan to immobilise bearer shares did not change, it remained the same, yet 
SVG was nonetheless removed from the blacklist. 
5.16 Exchange of Information Act (EIA) 2002 
The EIA 2002 was passed in the House of Parliament on 29th May, 2002 and became 
effective on 3 Oth May, 2002. The object of the Act was to 'make provision. for assisting 
overseas regulatory authorities to obtain information firom within Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines and other related matters. ' By virtue of Section 9 of the EIA 2002 the 
CRPA 1996 was repealed. During the Parliamentary debate on the Exchange of 
Information Bill (EIB) 2002, the Prime Minister Dr. Ralph Gonsalves expressly 
indicated that the EIB 2002 was introduced and the CRPA 1996 was repealed in order 
to comply with the requirements of the 25 criteria for assessing non-cooperative 
228 countries and territories. It is noteworthy that the FATF concluded categorically that 
under criteria 7 '229 
8 230 and 9231 of the 25 assessment criteria 'no secrecy provisions' 
were identified. What this effectively meant was that the CRPA 1996 in spite of its 
nomenclature was not in any way designed to impede the activities of law enforcement 
officials. 
The FATF expressed two concerns with the CRPA 1996.232 The first was that the 
Offshore Finance Inspector should not be required to obtain the prior approval of the 
Minister of Finance when providing assistance to a foreign state. 233 The second related 
to the restriction imposed by Section 3(3)(b)(iii) of the CRPA 1996 on the disclosure of 
information relating to tax and revenue law matters. 234 Both concerns were extensively 
discussed in chapter 4 in which the FATF's misconception was emphasised. Since those 
were the only concerns of the FATF it is difficult to reconcile the reason for the repeal 
of the CRPA 1996 with the requirements of the 25 assessment criteria of the FATE 
228 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate 291h May, 2002 at pages 30,35 and 36. 
229 FATF Criterion 7, "Legal or practical obstacles to access by administrative andjudicial authorities to 
information with respect to the identity of the holders or beneficial owners and information connected 
with the transactions recorded. " 
"0 FATF Criterion 8, "Secrecy provisions which can be invoked against, but not lifted by competent 
administrative authorities in the context of enquiries concerning money laundering. " 
23 TATF Criterion 9, - Secrecy provisions which can be invoked against, but not lifted by judicial 
authorities in criminal investigations related to money laundering. " 
232 FATF's Report on St. Vincent and the Grenadines Against the Criteria For Assessing Non- 
Cooperative Countries, 20th June, 2000 at pp 5-6 
233 See Criterion 16 and discussion thereon in chapter 4.10 
234 See Criterion 18 and discussion thereon in chapter 4.11 
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Under the CRPA 1996 once a person was charged with a criminal offence there was no 
restriction on the disclosure of infon-nation relating to the criminal investigation. 235 
Under the EIA 2002 there are five conditions which must be satisfied before 
information could be disclosed to a foreign regulatory authority. 236 Section 3(2) of the 
EIA provides that: 
"A regulatory authority shall not exercise the powers conferred by section 4 unless it is 
satisfied that; 
(a) the assistance is necessaryfor the purpose of enabling or assisting aforeign 
regulatory authority in the exercise of its regulatoryfunctions, - 
(b) the assistance requested by the foreign regulatory authority may he granted 
under any agreement to which Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and the 
foreign State requesting authority are parties; 
(c) the foreign regulatory authority requesting the assistance has given a 
written undertaking to provide corresponding assistance to an authority 
exercising regulatoryfunctions in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, - 
(d) the nature and seriousness of the matter to which the inquiries relate and 
the importance to the inquiries of the information sought in Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines warrant disclosure of the information; 
(e) the assistance cannot be obtained by other means; or 
(d) the relevant country or territory has enacted similar laws with relation to 
the exchange of information. " 
Admittedly those conditions do not restrict the type of information that can be disclosed. 
They nonetheless appear to be more restrictive than the provisions under the CRPA 
1996. The money laundering initiative seeks to deter serious crime by taking the profits 
out of crime. In that regard the CRPA 1996 could not be taken to be severely restrictive 
of the money laundering initiative. SVG appeared to be open to bilateral treaty 
negotiations. This was demonstrated with the execution of the MLAT with the USA in 
which there are provisions for the disclosure of criminal tax infon-nation . 
237 On that 
basis it was open to other countries to negotiate such terrns in a treaty arrangement with 
SVG. 
Moreover, under the EIA 2002, if the information that is requested raises an issue of 
public interest then the regulatory authority 238 from which the information was 
235 Section3 (3) of the CRPA 1996 now repealed 
236 Section 2 of the EIA 2002 defines foreign regulatory authority to mean 'a statutory authority which in 
a country or territory outside St. Vincent and the Grenadines, exercises fiinciions of a regulatory 
authority. ' 
237 See criteria 18 and 22 under chapter 4.11 
239 Section 2 of the EIA 2002 defines regulatory authority as "Regulatory Authority means any authority 
specified in the Schedule to this Act. Under the Schedule to the Act the following are regulatory 
authorities: The Attorney General, The Registrar of Companies, The Registrar of International Business 
Companies, The Registrar of Insurance, The Registrar of International Insurance, The Commissioner of' 
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requested is required to obtain 'written directionftom the Attorney General before providing 
the information requested. "' A further condition that did not exist under the CRPA 1996 
was the requirement that prior to the provision of assistance by the regulatory authority, 
the foreign regulatory authority should confirm in writing that it was prepared to 
contribute to the cost of providing the assistance. 240 Interestingly, the EIA 2002 
penalised any one who disclosed information that was obtained either from a foreign 
regulatory authority or 'by virtue of the exercise of powers under the A Ct. 24 ' But it is 
nonetheless perceived to be concerned primarily with the disclosure of information. The 
CRPA Act 1996 on the other hand also penalised those who disclosed confidential 
infon-nation contrary to the Act but it was perceived to be primarily concerned with 
banking secrecy and confidentiality. Essentially, the EIA 2002 permitted the disclosure 
of information provided certain conditions were satisfied, whereas the CRPA 1996 
restricted the disclosure of confidential information unless certain conditions were 
satisfied. 
The EIA 2002 provides the mechanism whereby regulatory authorities in SVG are able 
to obtain information about a foreign prospective investor or investor in order to check 
the veracity of any representation that person has made. Its provisions empower a 
regulatory authority to request from any financial institution information on the 
financial status of any of its customers . 
242 Any refusal243 by that financial institution to 
accede to the request constituted an offence 244 punishable by a fine of one hundred 
245 thousand dollars or two years imprisonment or both . The EIA 
2002 makes it easier 
for regulatory authorities to obtain information about the financial affairs of investors. 
Therefore, if the power that is reposed in those regulatory authorities is not managed, 
controlled and used sparingly and appropriately then it seems reasonable to presume 
that secrecy and confidentiality in financial affairs will fast become an endangered 
species. 
International Insurance, The Ministry of Finance, The Offshore finance Authority, The Registrar of 
Mutual Funch, The Registrar of International Trusts. 
239 Section 3 (3) of the EIA 2002 
240 Section 3(5) of the EIA 2002 
241 Section 5 of the EIA 2002 
242 Section 4(1) of the EIA 2002 
243 Section 4(2) of the EIA 2002 provides that; "if a person fails to comply with a request issued under 
subsection (1) within three days from the date of the request or such longer period as a regulatory as a 
regulatory authority may permit, the Attorney General at the request of the regulatory authority may 
2 4ýly 
to a Judge in Chambersfi a 
2r 
or an order requiring the person to comply with the request. 
24 Section 7 (1)of the EIA 2002 
245 Section 7(4) of the EIA 2002 
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It is therefore argued that the power granted to regulatory authorities under the EIA 
246 2002 was unnecessary. The MACM Act 1993, the MLAT, and the CRPA 1996 
together with the common law principles that were laid down in Tournier v National 
Provincial Bank 247 and which required banks to make disclosures under certain 
circumstances, provided an adequate legislative framework for the disclosure of 
information to foreign authorities. Moreover, following the decision of Robertson v 
Canadian Imperial Bank of C. ommerce 249 there seemed to be no such thing as 
banking confidentiality in SVG. In an environment where every one249 has a legal 
obligation to disclose information without the requirement of a court order, such a state 
of affairs does not encourage investment from both local and foreign investors alike. In 
essence, SVG went beyond what the FATF assessment required at the cost to its 
commercial attractiveness. 
5.17 Conclusion 
Although, there have been some administrative niceties in the confiscation and 
enforcement procedures that are outlined in the PCMLA 2001 they will only gain 
relevance and significance where there has been a conviction. Interestingly, apart from 
the defence to a charge under Section 61 of the PCA 1997 no other defences were 
provided under the PCA 1997. The defences outlined in the PCMLA 2001, due to the 
reversal of the burden of proof requirement under section 63, are indeed exposed to 
challenges under the 1979 Constitution. The forfeiture provisions are also vulnerable to 
challenges under the 1979 Constitution. Under the PCA 1997 fewer defences and loop 
holes meant that it may well have been more difficult to escape a conviction. Not 
246 See chapter 3.14 
247 [ 1924] 1 KB 461 where the court held that banking information should be defined in the following 
circumstances 
(a) under the compulsion of law; 
(b) in the public's interest 
(c) in thefurtherance of the interests of the banker; 
(d) with the express or implied consent of the customer 
248 St. Vincent, CA, Civil Appeal, No 4 of 1990, where it was held that disclosure under compulsion by 
law must not be frustrated by any duty of confidentiality. 
249 Section 4(l) of the Exchange of Information Act 2002 which provided that; "If in accordance with the 
requirements of section 3a Regulatory Authority is satisfied that assistance should be provided with 
respect to a request by aforeign regulatory authority, it may request in writing any person 
(a) to furnish it with information with respect to any matter relevant to the inquiries to which the 
request relates; 
(b) to produce any documents relevant to the inquiries to which the request relates; or 
(c) to provide it with any assistance in relation to the enquiries to which the request relates as a 
regulatory authority may specify. - 
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surprisingly the legislature seemed to have got itself into a muddle when drafting the 
legislation did by virtue of Section 68 retain the offences under Sections 59,60 and 61 
of the PCA 1997 but repealed the remainder of the Act. It has already been shown that 
there is very little that the PCMLA 2001 contains that was not already provided in the 
PCA 1997. Why therefore did parliament choose to repeal the PCA 1997 and introduce 
a totally new money laundering legislation? Wouldn't it have been preferable for 
parliament to amend the PCA instead? 
The legislative framework that was established after the blacklisting of SVG does not 
appear to represent any significant departure from that which was in existence before 
the blacklisting. Although, avenues for greater transparency have been created by the 
new legislation that does not necessarily mean that there is greater transparency. What is 
obvious is that greater powers are given to institutions to pry into the affairs of persons 
and businesses just on a mere 'reasonable grounds to suspect' and severe penalties are 
imposed on those who failed to report suspicious activities to the relevant authorities. 
Does SVG need to establish such laws against its own people? There is no doubting the 
fact that the legislative framework was not created to benefit SVG. The crime statistics 
do not suggest that SVG requires that level of policing of civilians. So far there is no 
evidence of any terrorist activities or organised crime in SVG and neither does the 
evidence indicate that money laundering is a problem. SVG seems to be demonstrating 
to the international community that it is a responsible country and that it is prepared to 
legislate against its peoples to mitigate the iniquitous and nefarious activities that are 
prevalent elsewhere. 
As was stated in chapter one unemployment and poverty are at unacceptable levels and 
there is very little hope if any that the economic circumstances will improve in the near 
future. Why therefore are the institutions required to incur expenses to implement 
training programmes and establish reporting systems to the extent that they are required 
under the PCMLA 2001 and PCMLR 2001? With such a high employment level and 
very few viable businesses and opportunities for lucrative investments, where does SVG 
get the money to launder such that it requires the legislative regime that empowers 
people to invade the privacy of individuals? The OFSS was growing steadily before the 
FATF/OECD' initiatives accounted for the substantial decline in the activities within 
that sector. Where are the alternative economic sectors that SVG should pursue? By 
instituting legislative measures that will assist other countries to apprehend and bring to 
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justice the criminal elements that reside in their countries what is the benefit to SVG? A 
decimated OFSS can hardly be seen as a benefit. The impact of liberalisation of trade on 
the bananas has been devastating for SVG and the OFSS has been experiencing 
significant decline. In spite of it all no country is offering an alternative. 
SVG does not manufacture the guns that kill and maim and greatly assist criminal 
elements to exercise, fear, power and dominion over those who dare to oppose them. 
There is no evidence that its residents are so deeply filled with hate for mankind that 
they would resort to terrorist activities. There is no trading in arms and ammunitions. 
From all reports it seemed to have never been a threat to the peace and security of any 
other country let alone the world. Although there is evidence of marijuana cultivation it 
has not created any international outcry that requires the steadfast attention of the 
international community. What then was the reason for naming and shaming SVG when 
the evidence clearly suggested that efforts were being made legislative and otherwise to 
deter criminals from investing? The Former Prime Minister Sir James Mitchell during 
his reign retorted: 
"... With all this talk about money laundering we should really look back on what is 
money laundering. It is a process of taking dirty moneyftom drugs dealing, illegal arms 
dealing, illegal dealing in biological warfare and chemicals and all that kind of thing 
and making it clean money. You can only make it clean money by investing it 
somewhere that continues to earn profit. Where in the Caribbean can you really 
launder money of any substance? -250 
The current Prime Minister during the time that he was on the opposition benches 
responded; 'that is the point I am making. 25' Those two statements give a clear indication 
about the perspectives of the political leaders. Yet it was the current Prime Minister who 
introduced the new legislative framework. That the FATF/OECD's agenda is sinister is 
a conclusion that most small countries have accepted. Sir James seemed to have 
summed it up in a succinct statement when in referring to the OECD he stated; "unto 
him that hath shall be given and unto him that hath not shall be taken away the little that he 
hath. 25' This was the perspective of the former Prime Minister and it would appear that 
it is (at least it was) also the perspective of the current Prime Minister. It is therefore 
interesting to see how the new money laundering regime will be implemented and 
administered. 
'50 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate on the Proceeds of Crime (Amendment ) Bill, 
27'h August, 1999, at p 46. 
251 ibid 
252 lbid at p 47. 
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6.0 Introduction 
"All peoples have an inalienable right to complete fteedom, the exercise of their 
sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory, and that, by virtue of that right, 
theyfteely determine their political status andfteely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development. "' 
Many of the countries 2 that have been listed by the OECD and the FATF as 
uncooperative tax havens and non-cooperative countries and territories in the fight 
against money laundering respectively have questioned the legal authority of those 
organisations to take those bold steps and to go further to recommend countermeasures 
without compunction. Those countries not only considered the initiatives of the OECD 
and FATF to be nebulous and sinister, they have also argued that the initiatives were 
designed to and did undermine their status as sovereign States. 3 Moreover, they have 
also retorted that the imposition of the OECD and FATF's initiatives was arrogate. 4 In 
this chapter it will be argued that the OECD and FATF were not legally empowered to 
dictate the economic policies of SVG and that their conduct was not in conformity with 
international law. To support that conclusion an examination will be conducted in order 
to ascertain; (a) whether there was an infringement of SVG's sovereign status; (b) the 
legal status, if any, of both the OECD and FATF; (c) whether SVG was legally bound to 
comply with the FATF and OECD' initiatives; and (d) the legality of their 
recommended defensive actions. 
1 General Assembly Resolution 213 1 (XX), UNGAOR, 20th Sess., suppl. 14(A/6220), 1965, p 11 
2 Hinterseer K., "Criminal Finance, The Political Economy of Money Laundering in a Comparative Legal 
Context, " Kluwer Law International, 2002, at p 244, "The initial response by the Caribbean leaders to 
the June 22,2000 Report was to holdfour days oftalks in St. Vincent to consider a united response. Most 
ofthe Caribbean leaders who attended, viewed the June 22,2000 Report as ajundamental threat not only 
to their sovereignty, but also to their economies. Sir James Mitchell, the Premier (should be Prime 
Minister), condemned the measures as a '... direct threat to the region's economic base and stability. 'Sir 
Mitchell emphasised, 'We in the Caribbean do not aspire to be the refuse for drug barons and money 
launderers. ' Rosie Douglas, the Prime Minister of Dominica, agreed, 'We will not give up our sovereign 
rights' although she (should be he) acknowledged that 'Some corrective measures are needed in 
Dominica' and that 'We know in a couple of cases there was money laundering and we can't have that. ' 
The reaction by Caribbean leaders is understandable given reports that Monaco was omittedfrom the list 
of third category countries following lobbying by France, while Gibraltar, Guernsey, the Isle of Man 
were omittedfollowing lobbying by the United Kingdom (emphasis added). 
3 lbid 
' Ibid 
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6.1 Sovereignty 
6.1.1 Territoriality principle 
SVG is a sovereign 5 State, which effectively means that it has the power 'to fteely and 
autonomously organise itself and to exercise a monopoly of legitimate power within its 
territory. ' Moreover it 'has the potential, or capacity to avail itself of all the rights and to be 
subject to all of the duties known to the international system. 7 Pursuant to Article 4 of the 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order; "Every 
country has a right to adopt the economic and social system that it deems to be the most 
appropriate for its own development and not to be subjected to discrimination of any kind as a 
result. " The OFSS was one of the areas in which SVG anticipated that it would secure 
some economic development, and it therefore legislated accordingly. 9 It is however 
accepted that although being a sovereign State does not automatically permit SVG to 
introduce measures that harm the economic well being of another State, 10 it also does 
not require SVG to forego its right to self-determination and governance. 11 
5 Island of Palmas Case (The Netherlands v United States) 2 R. I. A. A (1928) 829 where it was stated that; 
"Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion 
of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, thefunctions of the Slate. " 
6 Qureshi A., "International Economic Law,, " Sweet & Maxwell, 1999, at p 36: See also Article 4 of the 
Declaration of on the Establishment of a New Economic Order provides that, 
(d) Every country has the right to adopt the economic and social system that it deems to be 
the most appropriate for its own development and not to be subjected to 
discrimination of any kind as a result; 
(e) Full permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural resources and all economic 
activities... No State may be subjected to economic, political or any other type of 
coercion to prevent theftee andfull exercise of this inalienable right " 
7 Dixon M& McCorquodale R, "Cases and Materials on International Law " Oxford, 2003, at p 132 
8 General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-Vil), I" May 1974, adopted without vote, UNGAOR, 6 th Special 
Sess. Suppl. I (A/9559), 1974, p. 3. at p 4. 
9 Milita1y and Paramilita[y Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Merits, 
Judgement, ICJ Reports (1986), p 14, at para 202 where the court state that the principle of non- 
intervention "involves the right of every Sovereign State to conduct its affairs without outside 
interference. ": Article I of the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) which 
provides that; "Every State has an inalienable right to choose its economic system as well as its political, 
social and cultural systems in accordance the will of its people, without outside interference, coercion or 
threat in anyform whatsoever. " 
10 Paust J., & Blaustein A., "The Arab Oil Weapon: A Reply and Reaffirmation of lllegdityý 1977 at p. 
144, wherein it was pointed that, "Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht writes: Like independence, territorial 
supremacy does not give an unlimited liberty of action ... 
A State, inspite of its own territorial supremacy, 
is not allowed to alter the natural conditions of its own territory to the disadvantage of a neighbouring 
State 
... 
A State is bound to prevent such use of its territory as having regard to the circumstances, is 
unduly injurious to the inhabitants of the neighbouring State... ": See also Cassese A., "International 
Law- at p 98. 
11 Qureshi A, "International Economic Law, " 1999, at p 37 
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6.1.2 Principle of non-intervention 
That each State is equal 12 and therefore one state should not intervene in the internal 
affairs of another State is a fundamental principle of international law., 3 Professor 
Warbrick described the relationship between the State and international law in the 
following manner: 
"International law is mainly to do with States and, where it is to do with something 
else, it is because States have chosen to make it so, using their powers to hring any 
change ahout - hy creating international organisations, by conferring rights and 
imposing duties on individuals, hy acknowledging the legal character of claims of 
Peoples' of seýfldetermined units. Statehood is foundational of international law, not 
the other way round. States were the original and remain the primary actors in the 
international legal system. As the State system developed, States relied on international 
law for two ohjectives - to protect the integrity and identity of States and increasingly, 
to allow them to cooperate where they deemed it to he in their common interests to do 
,, 14 so. 
That statement forms the basis for the issues that will be examined and discussed in this 
chapter. It has made reference to the choices that can be made by States, especially 
when it is in their common interests so to do. But there are times when States are not 
free to make choices even if to do so will be in the best interest of their subjects. 15 
Whereas, the power of States to bring about change is paramount to the development of 
all States, that power may nonetheless be used to the detriment of the economies and 
peoples of weaker States. This was reflected in the approach that was taken by the 
OECD and FATF to promote the implementation of the harmful tax and money 
laundering initiatives. It was evident that despite the principle of non-intervention under 
international law 16 which prohibited the OECD and FATF from dictating the economic 
policies of SVG, those organisations nevertheless, threatened and applied defensive 
measures that were designed to force SVG to do exactly as they demanded. 17 
12 Brownlie I., "Principles of Public International Law" 2003 at pp 287-289 
Cassese A., "International Law, " at p 98. 
Warbrick C., "States and Recognition in International Law, " Evans M, "International Law, " Oxford, 
2003 at p 206 
5 Ibid at p. 208 
6 United Nations Charter Art 2(7); See also Schenners H, "Different Aspects of Sovereigg! yZ in Kreijen 
G., "State Sovereign1y and International Governance, " Oxford 2002, at p 187 where he stated that; 
"Neither other States nor the United Nations have any right to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domesticjurisdiction of the State. - 
" Militn and Paramilita! a Activities In and Against Nicarapua (Nicaragua v. United States), Merits, 
Judgement, ICJ Reports (1986), p 14, at para 204 where the court state that "intervention is wrongful 
when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must remainfree ones. - 
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6.1.2.1 OECDIFA TFs Initiatives- Policy perspectives 
The OECD argued that SVG possessed a fiscal regime that was harmful and which 
eroded the tax bases of its member countries. Accordingly, it commenced a crusade to 
eliminate what it considered to be harmful tax practices. In this regard it stated that: 
"To this end, the Committee will encourage non-member economies to associate 
themselves with the 1998 Report and to agree to its principles; and hold regional 
seminars that will encourage and assist non-member economies to remove features of 
their preferential regimes that are potentially harmful. This work programme should 
progress on a time table that wouldfacilitate the removal of harmful tax practices in 
non-memher economies by 31s'December, 2005. ""' 
The FATF on the other hand after having conducted its first review of non-member 
countries and territories and blacklisted those that it considered to be non-cooperative 
issued the following statement. 
"These jurisdictions are strongly urged to adopt measures to improve their rules and 
practices as expeditiously as possible in order to remedy the deficiencies identified in 
the reviews. Pending adoption and implementation of appropriate legislative and other 
measures, and in accordance with Recommendation 21, the FATF recommends that 
financial institutions should give special attention to business relations and 
transactions with persons, including companies andfinancial institutions, ftom the non- 
cooperative countries and territories mentioned in paragraph 64 and so doing take into 
account issues raised in the relevant summaries in Section II of the report. "'9 
Those statements encouraged member countries to infringe the principle of non- 
intervention under international law. It is contended that although SVG's fiscal policies 
may not have harmonised with the requirements of the OECD's harmful tax initiative, 
they were not in violation of international law; that the OECD's allegation was 
unjustified and that it undermined the sovereignty of SVG. It is also noteworthy to 
mention that the OECD never adduced any evidence that the fiscal measures that were 
taken by SVG actually caused any harm to the tax bases of its member Sates. Likewise, 
it was demonstrated in chapters 3 and 4 that the manner in which SVG was blacklisted 
by the FATF did not reflect the efforts made by SVG to improve its OFSS and to deal 
with the issue of money laundering. The OECD and the FATF appeared to have 
conducted their affairs as regulators of the international financial system. This raises 
questions about their legal authority to impose those initiatives on non-member States 
and whether those States are legally bound to implement the requirements of those 
initiatives. It is therefore contended that SVG could only have been bound by those 
initiatives if it; (a) entered into a treaty with the OECD and FATF (b) was estopped 
18 OECD Report, Towards Global Tax Co-operation, Progress in identifying and Eliminating Harmful 
Tax Practices. 2000, p 22 
19 FATF, Review to identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories: Increasing the World3vide 
Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (June 22,2000)" at p 12 
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from going back on a commitment to the OECD and FATF that it made and 
implemented or (c) if the requirements of the initiatives had evolved into international 
customary rules. 
6.2 Legal Status of the OECDIFA TF 
Before considering whether their initiatives were binding on SVG it is instructive to 
ascertain whether the OECD or the FATF is recognised under international law as being 
able to function on the international plane. In so doing it helps to clarify (a) whether 
SVG was required to acknowledge their existence and (b) whether the OECD, FATF or 
the member States should be held responsible for the conduct of the OECD and FATF. 
SVG may be required under international law to acknowledge the rights and obligations 
of the OECD or FATF if they are international organisations 20 which are endowed with 
international legal personality. 21 Dixon and McCorquodale described international legal 
personality to: 
11 ... entail the ability to 
bring claims before international tribunals exercising an 
I. nternational legal jurisdiction, to enjoy rights and be subject to international legal 
obligations, to participate in international law creation, to enjoy the immunities 
attaching to international legal persons within national legal systems, to participate in 
international organisations and to conclude treaties. , 22 
6.2.1 International legal personality 
Essentially, possessing 'international legal personality' creates within the international 
organisation a legal person under international law that is separate and distinct from its 
member States. Once 'international legal personality' has been established, there is a 
presumption that responsibility for the consequences of the harmful tax and money 
23 laundering initiatives will be attributed to the OECD or the FATF respectively. On the 
other hand, in the absence of 'international legal personality, ' responsibility for the 
20 Akande D., "International Orpanizations" in Evans M, "International Law, " Oxford 2003 at p 270 
where it is stated that; "In order to qualify as an international organisation an entity must be composed 
predominantly of States andlor other international organisations and be established under international 
law. International organisations are usually created by treaty but they can also be created by other 
means, such as resolution of another international organisation orjoint unilateral acts by States. " 
2' Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service for the United Nations 1CJ Reports (1949), p 174 at p 
185: where the court stated that; "... fifty states, representing the vast majority of the members of the 
international community, had the power in conformity with international law, to bring into being an entity 
possessing objective international personality, and not merely personally recognised by them alone. 
22 Dixon M& McCorquodale R, 'Cases and Materials on International Law, ' 2003, at p 132 
23 Akande D., "International Organizations, " in Evans M, "International Law, " Oxford 2003 at p 274 
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24 
consequences of those initiatives will be attributed to the member States . As 
Cassese 
has observed: 
"Asfor organisations that do not satisfy the ... tests, 
[meaning the two-fold test], it may 
be said that they act on behalf of all the member States. They are organs common to all 
those States, with the consequence that acts they perform may he legally attributable to 
all such States. By the same token, any wrongful act perpetrated by one of the organs or 
officials of the organisation is the responsibility of all the member States (my emphasis 
added). , 25 
In order to attribute responsibility for the conduct of the OECD and the FATF, it seems 
necessary to ascertain whether they are international organisations that are endowed 
with international legal personality. 
6.2.2 International Organisations 
International organisations were described as "subjects of international law which do not, 
unlike States possess a general competence. International organisations are governed by the 
Principle of speciality, ' that is to say, they are invested by the States which create them with 
powers, the limits of which are afunction of the common interests whose promotion those States 
entrusts to them. "" Under international law an intemational organisation is said to 
possess legal personality if it satisfies the two stage tests that was outlined in an 
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 1949 on Reparation for 
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations. Firstly, it should be clear that the 
OECD or FATF is established with sufficient autonomy so as to discharge its functions 
and duties independently of its respective member States. 27 Essentially, they must be 
endowed 'with the competence required to enable these functions to be discharged 
effectively. "' Secondly, that autonomy must actually be enjoyed and exercised by the 
OECD or FATF without any unnecessary intrusion or interference by member States. In 
the words of the ICJ, it is crucial that the organisation "... is infact exercising and enjoying 
functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the possession of a large 
24 Shaw M., 'International Law' Cambridge University Press, 2003, at p. 1202 where it is stated that; "An 
international organisalion created by States that does not itself possess legal personality cannot be the 
hearer of rights or obligations separate and distinctftom those of the member States. It thereforefollows 
that such organisations cannot be interposed as between the injured third parties and the member States 
ofthat organisation. 21 lbid at p 73 
26 Adviso[y Opinion on Legalijy of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, ICJ 
Reports ( 1996) at 78 para 25 
27 ICJ Reports (1949) at p 179 where it was stated that the organisation must be placed in "a position in 
certain respects in detachmentftom its Members. 29 Ibid 
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measure of international personality and the capacity to operate upon an international 
plane. , 29 
6.2.3 Legal status of the OECD 
The OECD currently comprises 30 countries and its establishment in its current form 
can be traced back to 1960 with the Convention on the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development ('Convention') which was executed by the founding 
members in Paris in 1960. It was primarily established to foster closer working 
relationships among member countries in the development of social and economic 
policies. 30 SVG is not a member of the OECD. 
The Articles of the Convention have clearly established the OECD as possessing 
'international legal personality. ' Under Article I of the Supplemental Protocol No. I to 
the Convention for European Economic Co-operation on the Legal Capacity, Privileges 
and Immunities of the Organisation ('Protocol I') the legal personality of the OECD 
was established as follows: 
"The Organisation shall possess juridical personality. It shall have the capacity to 
conclude contracts, to acquire and dispose of movable and immovable property and to 
institute legal proceedings. " 
Under the Convention the Secretary General and Staff are prohibited from taking 
instructions from any member State or any other body for that matter, except the OECD 
itself. 3 1 This was supported by the terms of Protocol I which not only accorded 
privileges and immunities to the representatives of the OECD 32 but it also immunised 
the property and assets of the OECD from any interference. 33 Moreover, Article 5 of the 
Convention empowered the OECD to take decisions that are binding on its member 
States and to enter into agreements with its member States, non-members States and 
international organisations. On the basis of the foregoing, the OECD will encounter 
little difficulty, if any, in establishing that it is an international organisation and 
satisfying the two stage tests that are necessary to establish whether an international 
organisation possesses 'international legal personality. ' 
29 ICJ Reports (1949) at p 179 where it was stated that the organisation must be placed in "a position in 
certain respects in detachmentftom its Members. " 
30 Article I of the 1960 of the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. 
31 Article II para 2 
32 Article 10 
33 Article 3 
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6.2.4 Legal status of the FA TF 
The FATF was established in 1989 by the G7 countries, the European Commission and 
eight other countries for a period of 4 years initially but which can be extended at the 
34 35 
end of every five year period . Its 40 Recommendations are not 
binding on its 
member States but are seen by them as best practices in the fight against money 
laundering. With reference to its 40 Recommendations the FATF stated that they: 
"*.. have been recognised, endorsed, or adopted by many international bodies. The 
Recommendations are neither complex nor difficult, nor do they compromise the 
fteedom to engage in legitimate transactions and threaten economic development. They 
set out the principles for action and allow countries a measure of flexibility in 
implementing these principles according to their particular circumstances and 
constitutional frameworks. Though not binding international conventions, many 
countries in the world have made a political commitment to combat money laundering 
by implementing the Forty Recommendations. , 36 
On the basis of the foregoing the FATF is not an international organisation and is 
therefore devoid of 'international legal personality. ' 37 There is no evidence that the 
founding members intended to accord an autonomous status 38 to the FATF. For 
example, under Article 4.1 of the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court the 
legal personality of the Court is crafted in the following manner; 'The Court shall have 
international legal personality. It shall also have such legal capacity as may be necessaryfor 
the exercise of its functions andfulfilment of its purposes. ' Similarly, Article I of the 1948 
OECD Protocol I also expressly declared the legal personality of the OECD (see 
above). 
Even though the FATF operates a small secretariat that is located at the OECD's 
headquarters in Paris, it is not pennanent and the organisational structure is such that 
there is no governing body entrusted with managerial tasks . 
39 The FATF has accepted 
that it is an independent body and not a part of the OECD. 40 Whilst this may be the case 
34 Gilmore W., "Di! U Money, The Evolution of Money Laundering Countermeasures, " Council of Europe 
Publishing, 1999 at p 79 See also hqp: /www I. oecd. org/fatf/AboutFATF en. htm 
" http: /wwwl. oecd. org/fatf/AboutFATF en. htm where it was stated that: "The 40 Recommendations set 
out the framework for anti-money laundering efforts and are designed for universal application. They 
provide a complete set of counter-measures against money laundering covering the criminal justice 
system and law enforcement, thefinancial system and its regulation, and international cooperation. 
36 http: //wwwl. oecd/fatf/AboutFATF en. htm 
37 Dixon M& McCorquodale R, Cases and Materials on International Law, 2003, at p 132: see also 
Cassese A., "International Law" 2003 at p 72 where he stated that "... not all international organisations 
possess international legal personality. 
38 ICJ Reports (1949) at p 179 
39 http: /wwwl. oecd. org/fatf/AboutFATF en. htm 
'0 lbid 
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in form it seems not to hold true in substance since the member States of the OECD are 
the same as those of the FATF .41 The FATF was also referred to as an 'ad hoc grouping 
of governments and others with a complex single agenda. 42 Moreover, the Head of the 
Financial Affairs Division of the OECD indicated that the FATF; '... is not a permanent 
international organisation nor a body managing a legally binding convention. 13 Interestingly, 
the FATF by its own admission accepted that it 'does not have a tightly defined 
constitution' and that its 40 Recommendations are "not a binding international 
convention. " 44 Accordingly, there is no constitutional document evidencing affirmation 
by the members of the FATF that they intended it to have legal status and its ad hoc 
organisational structure further supports the contention that there is no evidence of 
detachment from its member states. 45 
Unlike the OECD, the FATF does not have the power to conclude agreements on behalf 
of its member States. It is not endowed with privileges and immunities for its 
property, 46 assets or staff to ensure that it functions effectively. Moreover, the members 
of staff are not answerable solely to the FATF and neither is there any evidence that 
they are free from interference from member States. There seems to be little doubt, if 
any, that the FATF will not be able to satisfy the two-fold test and consequently will not 
be considered as possessing any legal personality under international law. In the 
absence of such status, it does not possess the 'international rights and obligations 
deriving ftom international customary rules 47 to which Cassese referred. Having 
established that the OECD possesses but the FATF is devoid of 'international legal 
personality' and the implications thereof, attention will now be drawn to the 
circumstances under which SVG could have been bound by their initiatives. 
41 Stessen G., "The FATF 'Blacklist' Of Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories" Leiden Journal of 
International Law 199-208 (2001) at p. 205 
42 Gilmore W., Di! V Money, The Evolution of Money Laundering Countermeasures, at p 82 
43 http: /wwwl. oecd. orv-/fatf/AboutFATF en. htm 
44 lbid 
45 Reparation for Iniuries, Adviso[y Opinion, ICJ Reports at p 17: See also Cassese Antonio, 
International Law, at p 73 
46 Akande D., International Organization in Evans M, International Law, Oxford, 2003 at p 273 
47 Cassese A., "International Law, ' 2003 at p 73-74 for example, "(q) the right to enter into international 
agreement with non-member States, (b) the right to immunityftom jurisdiction ofState courts (c) the right 
to protection for all the organisation's agents acting in the territory of a third State in the ofticial 
capacity as an international civil servant and (d) the right to bring an international claim with a view to 
obtaining reparation for any damaged caused ... to the assets of the organisation or to 
its officials acting 
on behalf of the organisation. " 
282 
Chap 6- "The Legal Authority Of The FATF/OECD - Issues of Sovereignty and 
Fairness. " 
6.3 Treaty 
According to White and Abass; 'Traditionally, States co-exist in a legal system that is 
essentially consensual. States, no matter their disparities in size or strength, are sovereign and 
equal. Obligations are accepted by States either in treaty or custom by consent, they are not 
imposed by any higher authority. "' There was no treaty 49 or agreement between the OECD 
and SVG which conferred powers on the OECD to dictate the fiscal policies of SVG 
and neither did SVG consent to the OECD's conduct of attempting to dictate its 
economic policies. Further, the FATF being devoid of international legal personality 
could not have entered into treaties on behalf of its member States. Therefore, no treaty 
could have existed between SVG and the FATF and there was no agreement that 
authorised the FATF to demand of SVG the implementation of a certain regulatory and 
supervisory framework for SVG's financial services sector. In the absence of a treaty no 
obligations or entitlements were imposed on SVG by the initiatives of the OECD and 
FATF. Support for this perspective can be found in the decision of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice (PCIJ) where it was stated that, 'a treaty only creates law as 
between States which are parties to it. 50 Moreover Articles 35 
51 and 36 52 of the 1969 
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties provide that third States are only bound by 
the terms of a treaty if they consented to the rights and obligations that were created by 
it. There is no evidence that SVG, for the purposes of the tax and money laundering 
initiatives consented to the rights and obligations of the agreement which created the 
OECD and FATF and therefore it could not have been bound to confirm to those 
initiatives. 
49 White ND & Abass A, Countermeasures and Sanctions in Evans M, International Law, Oxford, 2003 
at p 505 
49 Article 20)(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as 'an 
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, 
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation. ' 
'0 Certain German Interests in Poland Upper Silesia(Merits) PCIJ (1926) Ser A. no. 7, at p 29 
51 Article 35 of the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties provides that: "an obligation arises 
for a third State ftom a provision of a treaty ffthe parties to the treiVy intend the provision to be the 
means of establishing the obligation and the third State expressly accepts that obligation in writing. 
5' Article 36 of the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties provides that; 
1. "A right arises for a third State ftom a provision of a treaty if the parties to a tretuy intend the 
provision to accord that right either to the third State, or to a group ofStates to which it belongs, 
or to all States, and the third State assents thereto. /is assent shall be presumed so long (is the 
contrary is not indicated, unless the treaýy otherwise provides. 
2. A State exercising the right in accordance with paragraph I shall comply with the conditionsfor 
its exercise providedfor in the treaty or established in conformiýy with the treaty. " 
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6.4 Estoppel 
Turning to the issue of estoppel, the OECD and the FATF will encounter 
insurmountable difficulties if they were to contend that SVG had acquiesced to the 
initiatives and therefore should not be allowed to challenge them. 53 Professor Ian 
Brownlie has stated that, 'estoppel is a general principle under international law resting on 
principles of goodfaith and consistency. 5' In stipulating the essential elements that should 
be established in order to ascertain whether an estoppel has been consummated, he 
adopted Professor Bowett's three characteristics of an estoppel which are as follows; 
"(a) a statement offact which is clear and unambiguous (h) this statement must be voluntary, 
unconditional and authorised and; (c) there must be reliance in goodfaith upon the statement 
either to the detriment of the party so relying on the statement or to the advantage of the party 
making the statement. , 55 
There is no evidence that any statement was made by SVG to the OECD and FATF 
agreeing to their initiatives. To the contrary, SVG's position on the OECD's harmful tax 
initiative was reflected in its response which was unequivocal. It stated that: 
"At the outset, we are making it abundantly clear, that we are not in support of nor in 
agreement with, the contents of the Report, because we do not believe that ourfiscal 
incentive schemes can have the effect of eroding the tax base of OECD countries and 
undermine the fairness, neutrality and broad social acceptance of lay systems 
generally. , 56 
The only evidence that SVG was prepared to conform to the OECD's initiative was 
contained in a letter of commitment to the OECD which is dated 26th February, 2002. 
In that letter SVG stated that it was committed to 'the principles of the effective 
exchange of tax information in tax matters and transparency. ' Accordingly, SVG 
promised to exchange information on criminal tax matters from Is' January, 2004 and on 
civil tax matters by Is' January, 2006. But the manner in which the commitment was 
given does not accord with the essential elements that are fundamental to the creation of 
an estoppel. The commitment was conditional. One of the conditions included the 
removal of SVG from the OECD' list of uncooperative tax havens, together with the 
lifting of any defensive measures against SVG. The other conditions required SVG to 
51 Shaw M., "International Law" Cambridge 5h edn. 2003 at p 96 
54 Brownlie I., "Principles of Public International Law" Oxford, 6'h edn. 2003 at p 616.: See also AMCO v 
Republic of Indonesia 89 ILR , pp 
364,504 
is Ibid at p 615 
56 Statement by the St. Vincent and the Grenadines Delegation in Response to the Report, Harmful Tax 
Competition an Emerging Global Issue 31" August, 1999 p8 
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participate as an equal partner in the creation of internationally accepted standards and 
in that regard to ensure that in so doing there is in existence a level playing field. 
SVG was clearly afraid that prolonged defensive measures would have an adverse 
impact on its economy. Moreover, the OECD did not adduce any evidence that its 
reliance on SVG's compliance was detrimental to its interests. Therefore, it cannot be 
said that the commitment was made unconditionally and voluntarily and that there was 
detrimental reliance. Moreover, the letter was written almost two years after SVG was 
listed as an Uncooperative Tax Haven. In the absence of any commitment given in the 
past there could not have been a detrimental reliance since there was no statement on 
which to rely. Interestingly, the OECD will also encounter further difficulties 
contending that the letter of commitment establishes the foundation on which an 
estoppel has been created to prevent SVG from challenging its initiative in the future. 
Accordingly, there is no basis on which an argument in favour of estoppel57 can be 
successfully proffered. Therefore, SVG not being a member of the OECD or FATF 
could only have been under an obligation to conform to those initiatives if they were 
generally recognised as international customary rules. 58 
6.5 International Customs 
The practices which arose out of the OECD and FATF's initiatives could have been part 
of international law if they had evolved into international customary rules. Those rules 
have the effect of binding States within the international community. 
59 But they could 
only have so evolved if they 'amounted to a settled practice" and opinio juris siv, e 
necessilali. V61 could have been inferred from the conduct of States. 
62 International 
customary rules were defined 'as evidence of general practice accepted as IaW. 63 
57 Garner B., "Black's Law DictionaEy-Abridgedf 7 edn. 2000 West Group at p 452 defines estoppel as 
"A bar that prevents one ftom asserting a claim or right that contradicts what one has said or done 
before or what has been legally established as true. " 
59 Article 38 of the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties provides that a rule in a treaty may 
become binding on non-parties if it becomes a part of international custom. 
39 Cassese A., "International Law, " Oxford, 2003 at p 119. 
60 Nicaragua v United States (Military and ParamilitaU Activities in and Against Nicaragua Case ICJ 
Report (1986) 14, paras 108-109 where the court stated that: -In considering the instances of the conduct 
above described, the court has to emphasise that, as was observed in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases, for a new customary rule to be formed, not only must the Acts concerned 'amount to a settled 
practice, ' but they must be accompanied by the opinionjuris sive necessilatis. 
61 Cassese A., "International Law" 2003 at p. 119 refers to 'opinio juris sive necessitates "... law (opinio 
juris) or is required by social, economic, or political exigencies (opinio necessitatis). " 
62 Higgins R., "Problems and Process, International Law and How We Use It, " Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
2001 at pg 18 
6.1 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
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Essentially, those practices must be accompanied by a general acknowledgement by 
StateS64 as being obligatory. But practice on its own is not sufficient to establish an 
international customary rule. Accompanying such practices must be evidence that States 
are willing to be bound by the practice as a legal obligation. 65 This evidence is also 
referred to as opinionjuris sive necessitatis. Byers described opiniojuris sive necessitatis as 
representing 'a diffuse consensus, a general set of shared understandings among States as to 
the legal relevance of different kinds of behaviour in different situations. In short, only that 
behaviour which is considered legally relevant is regarded as capable of contributing to the 
process of customary international law. " Therefore, in determining whether or not the 
practices that were recommended by the OECD and FATF carried with them legal 
obligations the behaviour of States towards those practices is of significance. 
Under international law there appears to be two approaches to the evolution of 
customary rules. The first being that implicit in the generally recognised practice is 
opiniojuris sive necessitates, which effectively requires no further attempt to ascertain 
opiniojuris in order to maintain that a 'settled practice' had evolved into an international 
customary rule. 67 Essentially, engaging in the 'settled practice' is in itself a 
demonstration that States are willing to be bound by the practice. The second approach 
favours a dichotomous assessment of the existence of an international customary rule. 68 
With this approach the 'settled practice' is distinguished from the opiniojuris sive necessitalis 
because recognition is given to the fact that implementing a practice that is generally 
followed is not by itself sufficient evidence that those following the practice considered 
it to be binding or even intended to be bound by it. Cases such as the Lotus 
69 and the 
Northern Sea Continental Shelf; 70 have strongly favoured the dichotomous assessment 
to the establishment of an international customary rule. In the North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases the ICJ stated that: 
64 Fisheries Case ICJ Reports (1951), 191, where customary international law was defined as the 
neralisation of the practice of States 
Higgins R., "Problems and Process, International Law and How We Use _It" 2001 at pp 18-19 66 Byers M., "Custom, Power and the Power of Rules, " Cambridge, 1999, at p 19 
67 Ibid at p 130 
68 Ibid at p 130 
69 PCIJ Ser A, No. 10, (1927) p. 28 "Even if the rarity of'thejudicial decisions to befound among the 
reported cases were siffficient to prove in point qffact the circumstances alleged b, v the Agent for the 
French Government, it would merely show that 51ates had ojien, in practice , abstainedftorn instituting 
criminal proceedings, and not that they recognised themselves as being obliged to do so; for only if such 
abstention were based on their being conscious of a A4, to abstain would it be possible to speak of an 
international custom. The allegedfact does not allow one to infer that . 5iates have been conscious of having such a duty: on the other hand... there are other circumstances calculated to show that the 
contrary is true. " 
70 1 CJ Report ( 1969) 3, at para 77 
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"The essential point in this connection - and it seems necessary to stress it - is that 
even if these instances of action by non-parties to the Convention were much more 
numerous than they in fact are, they would not, even in the aggregate, suffice in 
themselves to constitute the opinion juris; for, in order to achieve this result, two 
conditions must be fulfilled Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled 
practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence 
of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law 
requiring it. The needfor such a belief, i. e., the existence of a suhjective element, is 
implicit in the very notion of the opinion juris sive necessitatis. The States concerned 
must thereforefeel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The 
ftequency, or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough. There are many 
international acts, e. g. in the field of ceremonial and protocol, which are performed 
almost invariably, but which are motivated only by considerations of courtesy, 
convenience or tradition, and not by any sense of legal duty... , 71 
This approach was further amplified in the case of Nicaragua v USA (Merits). 72 
Therefore, the initiatives of the OECD and FATF could only have been binding on SVG 
if two important conditions were satisfied. Firstly, it must be shown that the initiatives 
'amounted to a settled practice. ' Secondly, there must be evidence that those States that 
applied the initiatives considered them to be legally binding (opinion juris sive 
necessitatis). For the purposes of this chapter it seems appropriate to categorise the 
international customary rules relating to taxation under three headings, namely, the 
fiscal policy principle, the discriminatory principle and the confiscatory principle. 
6.5.1 Fiscal policy principle 
Under the fiscal policy principle every state has a wide discretion to regulate its fiscal 
policies in the most appropriate manner in order to meet its political, social, economic 
and cultural needs. In the Lotus Case the PCIJ held that; 
"Farftom laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the 
application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and 
acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion 
which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every 
State remainsfree to adopt the principles which it regards best anti most suitable. , '3 
71 ICJ Reports ( 1969) 3 at para 77 
72 ICJ Reports (1986) 14 paras 108-109 where it was stated that, "In considering the instances (? f the 
conduct above described, the court has to emphasise that, as was observed in the North Sea Continental 
Shetf Cases, for a new customary ruled to be formed, not only must the acts concerned 'amount to a 
settled practice, ' but they must be accompanied by the opinion juris sive necessitalis. Either the States 
taking such action or other States in a position to react to it. must have behaved so that their conduct is 
'evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. 
The needfor such a belief i. e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the veq notion of the 
01. ni . onj . urt . ssi . ve necessitatis. - TSS 
Lotus Case (France v Turkey) PCIJ Ser A (1927) No. 9 
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The width of the discretion is so extensive that the fiscal policies may even undermine 
the economy of another State. 74 Essentially, every State must be free to choose and 
implement its fiscal policies without any restriction being imposed upon it by another 
State. 75 Any such restriction is considered to be wrongful and the more serious the 
restriction the more likely that it will be perceived as an unlawful intervention. 76 
However, the width of the discretion may have its limitations in that a State is 
prohibited from enforcing its rules and decisions within the territory of another State 
without the consent of that State. 77 
6.5.2 Discriminatory principle 
Equally the discriminatory principle prohibits a tax regime which discriminates on the 
basis of race although such a prohibition should be applied cautiously. Beveridge 
questioned the generality of the prohibition in the following manner; 
"... it is insufficient to speak of a general principle of non-discrimination on the grounds 
of race, withoutfurther investigating whether the acts complained of are justified in the 
circumstances; 'whether a particular differentiation of aliens and nationals has a 
reasonable bases in the community interest of the larger community must ... 
depend not 
only upon the value primarily at stake in the differentiation but also upon many 
particular, and varyingftatures of the context in which the differentiation is made. """ 
On the basis of that statement it would appear that because evidence can be adduced to 
justify the discrimination or to prove otherwise, the prohibition on race may not be 
entirely absolute. Nonetheless, it was held to be a rule of jus cogens in the Barcelona 
Traction Case. 79 
" Beveridge Fiona, "The Treatment and Taxation of Foreipn Investment Under International Law 
Towards International Discipline. " Melland Schill Studies in International Law, 2000 at p. 76 
75 SS Lotus Case (France v Turkey PCIJ Ser A (1927) No. 9 where it was stated that: "International law 
governs international relations between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States 
therefore emanateftom their ownfree will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted 
as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between these co- 
existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon 
the independence ofStates cannot therefore be presumed " 
76 Milita[y and Paramilitaty Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), 
Merits. Judgment, lCJ Reports (1986), p. 14 at para 204 where the court held that; "... intervention is 
wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regards to such choices, which must remainfree ones. 
77 SS Lotus Case (France v Turkey) PC U Ser A (1927) No. 9: See also 
7' Beveridge F., "The Treatment and Taxation of Foreign Investment Under International Law, Towards 
International Discipline. " 2000 at p. 11 
79 Barcelona Traction Case(Second Phase), ICJ Reports (1970), 3 at 32 where in reference to states' 
obligation to the international community as a whole the court stated that; "Stich obligations derive, for 
example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and genocide, as 
alsoftom the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection 
ftom slavery and racial discrimination. " 
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6.5.3 Confiscatory principle 
The confiscatory principle also prohibits the expropriation of property of aliens without 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation. " It is accepted that States as a matter of 
public policy or expediency may need to acquire the property of a foreign investor and 
may expropriate it accordingly. In those circumstances the State has an obligation under 
international customary rules to adequately compensate the investor expeditiously. 
6.5.4 OECD's Proposed International Tax principles 
The OECD has not contended that SVG, by its conduct, acted inconsistently with the 
fiscal policy principle, the discriminatory principle or the confiscatory principle. Those 
are the principles that are derived from international customary rules and which are 
relevant under international law to the OECD's initiative. The OECD nonetheless and 
with some clarity has contended that jurisdictions which possess (a) a low or no tax 
regime (b) tax regimes that do not permit the effective exchange of tax information (c) 
tax regimes that lack transparency and; (d) a financial services structure that is 
indifferent as to whether foreign owned entities establish a substantial presence or 
prohibits foreign owned entities from having any commercial impact on the economy 
are eroding the tax bases and harming the economies of OECD member States. 
It has already been mentioned above that every country has a wide discretion to arrange 
its fiscal affairs in a manner that is most appropriate to its social, political, cultural and 
economic needs. Accordingly, any restriction of such a discretion by way of coercion 
will be considered as wrongful and amounts to an unlawful intervention. Therefore, 
SVG, by pursuing a no tax policy in the OFSS financial services sector, even though it 
may not have been considered to be transparent by the OECD, and by not mandating all 
offshore entities to have a substantive presence within its jurisdiction, has nonetheless, 
conducted its fiscal affairs in conformity with international law. With regard to the 
effective exchange of information, Beveridge contends that; "Many arrangements existfor 
the exchange of information, hut there are no customary international legal obligations to 
cooperate in such matters. ""' No international obligations were therefore imposed upon 
SVG to engage in the exchange of tax information with the OECD. Moreover, despite 
the multitude of double taxation treaties it cannot be said that any customary 
80 Beveridge F., "The Treatment and Taxation of Foreign Investment Under Intemational Law, Toward 
Intemational Discipline. " 2000 at p. 19 
8' Beveridge F., "The Treatment and Taxation of Foreign Investment Under International Law, Towards 
Intemational Discipline. 2000 at pp. 76-77 
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international law has evolved concerning the sharing of tax information. In that regard 
Beveridge has observed that; 
"... though many double taxation treaties have been concluded along the lines the 
OECD Model or the UN Model, thus producing patterns of similar provisions, there is 
no obligation to recognise the underlying practice and there are many variations within 
this body ofpractice as well as cases where such treaties have been concluded They do 
not therefore add up to a body of customary international law. The absence ofgenerally 
accepted obligations in the fiscal sphere underlie the Barclays Case ... and is also at the 
root of the problems presented by tax havens. , X2 
6.5.5 Evolution of the OECD's Proposed International Tax principles 
It may well have been as a result of the alleged problems with tax havens, to which 
Beveridge refers, that the OECD introduced the harmful tax initiative and attempted to 
enforce it without regard to issues of State sovereignty and fairness. The report on the 
harmful tax initiative was published in 1998 and SVG was placed on the list of 
uncooperative jurisdictions which was published two years later, in 2000. Could it be 
that the OECD concluded that between 1998 and 2000 the contents of its initiative had 
evolved into international customary rules that were binding on SVG and to which SVG 
did not conform? Can state practices evolve and crystallise into international customary 
rules within such a relatively short space of time? In the South West Africa Cases 
Judge Tanaka in his dissenting judgment made mention of the speed with which state 
practice may evolve into international customary rules when he stated that: 
"A State, instead of pronouncing its view to a few States directl concerned has the y 
opportunity, through the medium of organisation, to declare its position to all members 
of the organisation and to know immediately their reaction on the same "latter. In 
former days, practice, repetition and opinion juris sive necessitates, which tire the 
ingredients of customary international law might be combined together ill a vely long 
and slow process extending over centuries. In the contemporary age of highly 
developed techniques of communication and information, the formation of a custom 
through the medium of international organisalions is great4y filcilitated and 
accelerated... , 83 
Earlier in his dissenting judgment he referred to the impact of the improvement in 
telecommunications on the evolution of international customary rules when he 
acknowledged that it, "minimised the importance of the timejactor and has made possible the 
acceleration of theformation of customary international law. What required a hundredyears in 
former days now may require less than 10 years. -14 Essentially Judge Tanaka was 
advocating the advantages of the collective decision making process and its likely 
impact on the swift evolution of international customary rules. Since that judgment in 
2 lbid p. 77 
' South West Africa Cases ICJ Reports (1966) 248 at 291 84 lbid at p. 177 
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1966 there has been a much greater improvement in modem telecommunication 
services 85 and an obvious procession towards the economic integration of States and 
harmonisation of policies. 86 Could it be that the OECD member States have followed 
the dicta of Judge Tanaka in the development, promotion, implementation and 
enforcement of its harmful tax initiative? With the rapid improvement in technology and 
the growing tendency towards harmonisation of policies, can the 10 years in 1966 be 
realistically reduced to 2 years between 1998 and 2000? 87 In the past certain practices 
had evolved into international customs with such alacrity that an exponent of 
international law referred to the process as creating an 'instant custom. '88 Shaw has 
observed that; 
"... the customary law relating to a State's sovereignty over its airspace developed very 
quickly in the years immediately before and during the first World War. Similarly, the 
principle of non-sovereignty over the space route followed by artificial satellites came 
into being soon afier the launching of the sputniks. Bin Cheng has argued that in such 
circumstances repetition is not at all necessary provided the opinio juris could be 
clearly established Thus 'instant'customary law is possible. " '9 
Notwithstanding the foregoing and in the context of the OECD and FATF's initiatives, 
the evolution of customary rules will be required to traverse the process of establishing 
a 'settled practice' which must be accompanied by opinio juris sive necessitates. In that 
regard it is contended that the contents of the OECD's harmful tax initiative were not 
generally recognised as 'settled practice' and the response of SVG and a vast majority 
of States clearly demonstrated that they were not considered to be legally binding. 
Therefore, they could not have evolved into international customary rules. 
8' Held D., McGrew A., Goldblatt D. & Perraton J, "Global Trans formations Politics, Economics and 
Culture, " Stanford University Press, 1999 at p. 342 
8" Beveridge F., "The Treatment and Taxation of Foreign Investment Under International Law. Towards 
International Discipline. " 2000 at p. 51 where it was stated that, "The modern state is generally 
accepted to befounded on notions of community and consent and sovereignty as arisingftom the consent 
of the community. From this consent flows the right to govern throughout the communily, but within 
constitutional limits established by reference to that consent, albeit that these limits may be entirely 
notional, or perhaps, mythical. 
8' Shaw M., 'International Law' Cambridge 5 th edn. 2003 at p 74-75 "In new areas of law, customs can 
be quickly established by Mate practices by virtue of the newness of the situations, the lack of contrary 
rules to be surmounted and the overwhelming necessity to preserve a sense of regulation in international 
relations. " 
" Cheng B, "United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space, Instant International Customa! y Law? ' IJIL, 5 
1965), 23-24 referred to in Cassese A, "International Law. " 2003, at P. 120 8' Shaw M., 'International Law' 2003 at p, 74 
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6.5.6 Settled Practice or an embryonic rule? 
6.5.6.1 The OECD 
The practices prescribed by the 1998 OECD and June 2000 FATF Reports were 
intended to have universal application. The OECD instructed every State to implement 
the Recommendations that were outlined in its 1998 Report. 
SVG was not alone in its condemnation of the OECD's harmful tax initiative. Of the 47 
jurisdictions" that were evaluated by the OECD in 1999/2000,35 were listed, in the 
June 2000 Report 92 as Uncooperative Tax Havens. Accordingly, the OECD 
recommended that its member countries should take 'defensive action' 93 against the 
listed countries. It is noteworthy to mention that neither Switzerland nor Luxembourg 
which vehemently opposed the initiative was listed as uncooperative. Moreover, the list 
did not contain any of the other OECD member States despite the fact that in June 2000 
it was reported that 60 harmful tax preferences 94 and in a subsequent report 200 
preferential tax regimes 95 existed in OECD member territories. 
Moreover, the 1998 OECD Report 96 on the harmful tax initiative did not indicate the 
international tax standards that should be applied by States. Instead, it outlined the 
determinants of a tax haven and the characteristics of a harmful tax regime. 97 This lack 
of clarity on the part of the harmful tax initiative was reflected in SVG's response when 
it stated that: 
"Although the Report acknowledges that countries should beftee to determine 
their own tax systems and structures, it went on to indicate that suchfteedom is 
conditional upon those countries complying with internationally acceptable 
standards. The Report did not however mention what those standards are, 
there are any, and who will be responsiblefor establishing those standards. -9" 
90 OECD Report, Towards Global Tax Co-operation, Progress in identifyin. 2 and Eliminatinp, Harmful 
Tax Practices. 2000, at p 10 
9' lbid 17 
92 OECD Report, Towards Global Tax Co-operation, Progress in identifying and Eliminating Hannful 
Tax Practices, 2000 
9' lbid at p 24 
94Hay R., "OFCs: "The Supranational Initiatives, ' Private Client Business, 2001,2,75-91 at p. 84 
95 lbid 
96 OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition An Emerging Global Issue, 1998 
97 OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition An Emerging Global Issue, 1998 at pp, 19-28 98 Statement by the St. Vincent and the Grenadines Delegation in Response to the Report, Harmful Tax 
Competition an Emerging Global Issue 31" August, 1999 p 22 
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Could it be that those standards related to the factors that the OECD considered as 
demonstrating a country's unwillingness to cooperate in removing harmful tax 
competition? If so, was the OECD calling on all countries that traditionally or otherwise 
pursue a low or no tax policy to impose a tax or a higher rate of tax as the case may be? 
What rate of tax should those countries impose and for what reason should they impose 
taxes? Was it referring to the factors that should be considered in identifying a tax 
haven, such as, lack of an effective exchange of information mechanism, lack of 
transparency and lack of substantial activity? Whatever the standards to which the 
OECD refers, the mere fact that its initiative was directed against competition" redound 
against the existence of any general practice. It is therefore difficult to see how in the 
absence of an agreement by States generally that those factors could have been 
transformed into generally recognised practices which became binding on non-member 
States, especially when the low or no tax factor in particular, is so germane to the 
economic and social well being of a nation. 
The mere fact that a majority of States did not consent to the OECD's harmful tax 
initiative and due to the divergence of the fiscal policies of States, which will vary 
according to the state of their economies, it is difficult to see how in those 
circumstances a generally recognised practice could have been established. 100 But does 
inconsistency, lack of uniformity or dissent by a relatively large number of States 
prevent a practice from becoming a customary rule? In that regard the ICJ in the case of 
Nicaragua v United States of America stated that: 
"It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the application of the rules in 
question should have been perfect, in the sense that States should have reftained, with 
complete consistency, ftom the use offorce orftom intervention in each other's internal 
affairs. The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the 
corresponding practice must be in absolute rigorous conformity with the rule. In order 
99 OECD Report "Progress in Identifying and Elimination Harmful Tax Practices, " 2000 at p. 22 where 
the OECD's attitude to tax competition was stated as follows; "There is a significant risk that afailure to 
address these practices in parallel with the work in relation to Member countries will cause a shift of the 
targeted activities to economies outside the OECD area, giving them unwarranted competitive advantage 
and limiting the effectiveness of the whole exercise. " 100 The Asylum Case ICJ Reports (1950), at pp 276-277 "The party which relies on a custom ... must 
prove that this custom is established in such a manner that it has become binding on the other party ... that the rule invoked ... is in accordance with a constant and uniform usage practised by the States in question, 
and a duty incumbent on the territorial State. This follows ftoin Article 38 of the Statute of the Court, 
which refers to international custom 'as evidence of a general practice accepted as law. , 
Thefacts brought to the knowledge of the Court disclose so much uncertainty and contradiction, so much 
fluctuation and discrepancy in the exercise of diplomatic asylum and in the official views expressed on 
different occasions; there has been so much inconsistency in the rapid succession of conventions on 
asylum, ratified by some States and rejected by others, and the practice has been so much influenced by 
considerations ofpolitical expediency in the various cases, that it is not possible to discern in all this any 
constant and uniform usage, accepted as law... " 
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to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the 
conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of 
State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as 
breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule. If a State acts 
in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognised rule, but defends its conduct by 
appealing to exceptions orjustifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or 
not the State's conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that 
attribute is to conform rather than to weaken the rule. "'0' 
Although the lack of consistency or uniformity of practice may not be sufficient to deny 
the existence of a customary rule, that principle of intemational law does not apply to 
SVG in the instant case. There was no rule in existence to which SVG did not conform 
and of which the OECD was attempting to impose and enforce. Interestingly, the OECD 
was coercing SVG into avoiding an established rule in intemational law which provides 
that no state is bound to take notice of another State's revenue laws' 02 (see chapter 4). 
Moreover, it was also demanding that SVG should infringe individuals' right to privacy 
by disclosing civil tax information to their member countries on persons in whom they 
were interested. By not conforming to the OECD's harmful tax initiatives SVG was in 
effect applying the principles of international law. 
Therefore, it cannot be said that by opposing the harmful tax initiative the actions of 
SVG should be seen as endorsing the existence of generally recognised international 
practices to which it should conform. It is noteworthy that SVG' opposition to the 
OECD' initiative was not because it accepted that it represented international standards 
or practices but because SVG did not believe that: (a) the OECD was legally authorised 
to impose those initiatives; and (b) it had any legal basis to recommend and impose 
defensive measures in the way that it did. Accordingly, the OECD will encounter great 
difficulties to successfully contend that its initiative 'amounted to a settled practice. , In 
fact the OECD's initiative was struggling to take root even within its member countries 
and could only have been regarded as an embryonic rule that the OECD was still 
battling to gain universal recognition. 
'0' Milita[y and Paramilitaty Activities in and Against Nicaragua, ICJ Reports (1986) 14 at p 98 para 186. 
102 Homan v Johnson ( 1775 1 Cowp 341 at p 343 
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6.5.6.2 The FA TF 
Following the pronouncement that was made by Judge Tanaka in the South West 
Africa Cases' 03 the FATF although it does not possess international legal personality is 
nonetheless in a position to recommend and promote practices that may evolve into 
customary rules. The FATF considers its role to be one of a policy making body which 
works to generate the necessary political will to bring about national legislative and regulatory 
reforms "' in the areas of money laundering and terrorist financing. It has sought to do 
so by ensuring that its 40 Recommendations and 25 Assessment Criteria for Non- 
Cooperating Countries and Territories are implemented by States universally. The issue 
that needs to be considered is whether those recommendations have been widely 
accepted as 'settled practice. ' 
Following the FATF's evaluation of SVG, it alleged that the regulatory and supervisory 
framework in SVG fell within 17 out of the 25 assessment criteria (see chapter 4). In 
June 2000 SVG along with 14 other countries were blacklisted as countries that were 
non-cooperative in the fight against money laundering. It summarised the regulatory and 
supervisory system in SVG as follows: 
"St. Vincent and the Grenadines meets criteria 1-6,10-13,15,16 (partially), 18 and 
22-25. There are no anti-money laundering regulations or guidelines in place with 
respect to offshore financial institutions, and thus no customer identification or record 
-keeping requirements or procedures. Resources devoted to supervision are extremely 
limited. Licensing and registration requirements for financial institutions are 
rudimentary. There is no system to require reporting of suspicious transactions. IBC 
and trust law provisions create additional obstacles, and the Offshore Finance 
Authority is prohibited by law ftom providing international cooperation with respect to 
information related to an application for a license, the affairs of a licensee, or the 
identity of affairs of a customer of a licensee. InternationaIjudicial assistance is unduýv 
limited to situations where proceedings having been commenced against a named 
defendant in aforeignjurisdiction. -105 
The accuracy of the conclusions of the FATF has already been examined and discussed 
in chapter 4 and no further elaboration is necessary in this regard. What is however of 
significance in this chapter is whether the FATF's 40 Recommendations and 25 criteria 
for assessing non-cooperative countries and territories 106 4 amounted to a settled 
practice' to which SVG did not conform. The 40 Recommendations were developed 
10' South West Africa Cases ICJ Reports (1966) 248 at 291 04 http: //wwwl. oecd. org/fatf/AboutFATF_en. htm 
05 FATF, Review to identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories: Increasing the Worldwide 
Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (June 22,2000)" at p 10 106 The 25 Assessment Criteria for Assessing Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories are just a 
restatement of the 40 Recommendations of the FATE They are effectively one and the same thing in 
substance. 
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107 since 1990 and reviewed in 1996 and 2003 . 
During that period member States of the 
FATF have been subjecting themselves to peer reviews and multilateral monitoring as a 
means of assessing the, 'progress made by member governments in implementing the 
... Recommendations. 
"' There seems to be a strong commitment among members to 
implement the Recommendations. It is fair to say that among the FATF member 
countries the 40 Recommendations to which they have committed themselves have 
become a standard practice that is recognised by its members. This is reflected in the 
growth of its membership from 15 countries in the inception to its current membership 
of 33.109 
Insofar as the 25 assessment criteria are concerned the FATF has been evaluating the 
legislation in non-member countries in order to ascertain whether they were adequate to 
combat money laundering and in particular to cooperate with other countries by the 
sharing of information on financial and other transactions. ' 10 As was stated above the 
legislation in SVG was considered by the FATF to be inadequate. But did SVG consider 
the 25 assessment criteria as a 'settled practice' to which it should conform or which it 
had an obligation to implementT It is obvious that those non-member countries and 
territories that were blacklisted and are continued to be blacklisted"' by the FATF do 
not accept the 25 assessment criteria as any 'settled practice. ' 112 
The discriminatory practices of the FATF by omitting some countries from the blacklist 
whilst, 'naming and shaming' others do not only substantially weaken any case the 
FATF might have been able to proffer in support of the existence of an international 
custom, it appeared to have also revealed an insidious characteristic. This approach it is 
admitted will do very little to increase vigilance and encourage cooperation. 
The legislative steps that were taken by SVG over the 12 years prior to being blacklisted 
were mainly to meet its obligations under the Vienna Convention and to accommodate 
the vicissitudes of commerce and its attendant evils, such as money laundering. Very 
little legislative significance was directly attached to the 40 Recommendations or the 25 
: 07 http: //wwwl. oecd/fatf/AboutFatf en. htm 
08 fbid 
109 lbid 
"0 lbid 
III FATF, Review to identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories: Increasinp, the Worldwide 
Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures, 2001,2002 and 2003 
112 Hinterseer K., 'Criminal Finance-The Political Economy of Money Laundering in a Comparative 
Legal Context, ' 2002 at p. 244 ; see also note 2 above. 
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assessment criteria but the legislation in place reflected those requirements. As was 
discussed in chapters 3 and 4 it would appear that by implementing the terms of the 
Vienna Convention in its entirety very little else, if anything, was needed to be done to 
demonstrate that SVG provides adequate international co-operation in criminal matters. 
The FATF does not have the legal authority as was demonstrated above to dictate what 
laws should be legislated in SVG or any non-member country for that matter. 
Interestingly, as was shown above it does not even have the legal authority to do so for 
its own member States even where they had given commitments to implement the 
Recommendations. 
6.5.7 Opiniojuris sive necessitatis 
As was mentioned above a practice will evolve into international customary law if the 
behaviour of States can be considered to be legally relevant. Byers referred to legally 
relevant behaviour in the following manner: 
"In other words, States either support, are ambivalent towards, or oppose potential, 
emerging or existing customary rules and usually behave accordingly. Anything a State 
does or says, or fails to do or say, therefore has the potential to be considered legally 
relevant, and thus to contribute to the development, maintenance or change of a rule of 
customary international law. 413 
SVG and several other non-member States 114 did not recognise the contents of the 
harmful tax initiative of the OECD as establishing any 'settled practice' and neither did 
two of its members. 115 Interestingly, the most powerful member of the OECD, the USA, 
publicly opposed the initiative by declaring that it contemplated the harmonisation of 
tax policies and frustrated competition among States (see chapter 1). Essentially, the 
behaviour of non-member and member States alike clearly demonstrated that the 
OECD's initiative was not seen as having any legal force and was therefore not binding 
on those States. The mere fact that the OECD had to resort to recommending defensive 
action against the uncooperative tax havens provided potent evidence that there was an 
absence of any conduct on the part of those so called uncooperative tax havens which 
could have been interpreted as legally relevant behaviour. Accordingly, the OECD will 
be hard pressed to establish that opiniojuris sive necessitatis actually existed. 
... Byers M., Custom, Power and the Power of Rules, 1999, at p 19 
114 OECD Report, Towards Global Tax Co-operation, Progress in identifying and Eliminating Harmful 
Tax Practices, 2000, p 17, where 35 countries were listed as Uncooperative Tax Havens. 
1" Ibid at p5 see footnote where it stated that Luxembourg and Switzerland did abstained from 
participating in the Harmful Tax initiative 
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The letter of commitment to the OECD and which was executed on 26th February, 2002 
established two fundamental issues. Firstly, it clearly showed that SVG did not accept 
that the OECD's initiative 'amounted to a settled practice. ' Secondly, SVG was 
exercising its sovereign rights under undue influence. Interestingly, by accepting the 
commitment made by SVG, the OECD was also admitting that its initiative had not 
established any 'settled practice. ' Bearing in mind that SVG was listed as an 
uncooperative tax jurisdiction in June 2000 and the letter of commitment was written in 
February 2002, it cannot therefore be said that the OECD' initiative established any 
'settled practice' prior to February 2002. It cannot also be said that any settled practice 
was established subsequent to February 2002. As recent as October 2003 during a 
meeting which was convened in Canada on Global Forum on Taxation' 16 the OECD 
admitted that there was no level playing field existing in its harmful tax initiative. 117 
Moreover, it is said to have exempted Switzerland, Austria, Luxembourg and Belgium 
from the sharing of 'information on savings income tax, withforeign tax collectors. "" 
It is also noteworthy that other countries like Hong Kong and Singapore remain outside 
the OECD's initiative, 119 thus exacerbating the consequences resulting from the absence 
of a level playing field. It has been reported that the OECD during the meeting in 
Canada called on non-member States to assist its efforts in pushing for a level playing 
field. 120 That request was yet another indication that the OECD itself did not accept that 
a 'settled practice' had evolved. Insofar as St. Vincent and the Grenadines is concerned 
its commitment was made on the basis that there should exist a level playing field, 2' but 
that is currently not the case. Accordingly, SVG has stated that unless its conditions are 
met it would not honour the commitment that it made in its letter to the OECD on 26, h 
February, 2002.122 That statement is an unequivocal renunciation of any doubts that 
SVG accepted the OECD's initiative as 'settled practice' to which it is legally bound. 
116 http: //www. oecd. org 
117 The Searchlight Newspaper, "OECD Admits to Uneven Playing Field, ý St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, vol. 9 No. 43 Friday 24h October, 2003 at p 46 
1 "3 lbid 
119 Ibid 
120 Ibid 
121 Hay R., "Information Exchange and The Offshore Financial Centres-Part 1, Private Client Business, 
2002,2,88-97 at p. 95 
"' The Searchlight Newspaper, "OECD Admits to Uneven Playing Field. ý St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, vol. 9 No. 43 Friday 24" October, 2003 at p 46 
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Since its first review in June 2000 when SVG and 14 other countries were blacklisted 
the FATF continued on an annual basis to review and blacklist countries. 123 The process 
of review is in itself sufficient evidence that countries do not accept the FATF's 
initiative as legally binding on them. Moreover, in the light of the fact that by the 
FATF's own admission the 40 Recommendations are not meant to be international 
conventions 124 and therefore are not binding on member States 125 is potent evidence that 
they were not intended to invoke legally relevant behaviour among member States and 
by logical extension non-members States as well. This does not necessarily mean that 
non-binding decisions cannot evolve into international customary rules. 
126 However, 
given the absence of any generally recognised practice and the difficulties of 
establishing opiniojuris, the FATF will be hard pressed to successfully contend that its 
money laundering initiative had crystallised into international customary rules to which 
SVG should have conformed. The mere fact that a country is cajoled into complying 
with the FATF's initiative due to fear of economic reprisals ought not to be taken as 
acceptance on the part of the country that it is legally required to comply or that the 
FATF' initiative has legal force. That conduct does not conform to the process in which 
customs evolve and therefore can only be attributed to the process of deliberate law 
making as discussed below. 
6.6 Custom or deliberate law making? 
One of the salient features that distinguish a custom from a treaty is that whereas a 
treaty is formulated by the deliberate actions of States to introduce rules of conduct that 
will benefit the well being of their peoples, a custom is considered to be 'unconscious 
or unintentional lawmaking. 127 It does not generally gain legal significance as a direct 
result of the process of conscious and deliberate lawmaking. 128 The OECD and FATF 
initiatives both required some form of legislative reform for States to conform to their 
requirements. The statements made by the OECD and the FATF and the imposition of 
23 http: //wwwI. oecd. org/fatf/AboutFATF_en. htm 
24 fbid 
125 Ibid 
126 Legalfty of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Anned Conflict (Request by WHO), Advisoja 
Opinion 
, ICJ Reports (1996), p. 66 at para 70, where the court stated that; 
"... General Assembly 
resolutions even if they are not binding, may sometimes have normative value. They can in certain 
circumstances provide evidence importantfor establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an 
opinio juris. To establish whether this is true of a given General Assembly resolution, it is necessary to 
look at its content and the conditions of its adoption; it is also necessary to see whether an opiniojuris 
exists as to its normative character. Or a series of resolutions may show the gradual evolution oj'the 
01. ni . oi . uris requiredfor the establishment of a new rule. . 
P, 
Cassese A., "International Law, " 2003 at p 119. 
129 Ibid. 
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defensive measures on those who did not comply, are clear demonstrations that they 
were effectively requiring their initiatives to have immediate legal force. Accordingly, 
such approach can also be seen not as requiring the evolution or as in this case the 
revolution of international customary rules but the immediate introduction of 
international legal rules. Essentially, the OECD and FATF conducted themselves as 
international law making bodies with the consent of some of their member States but 
not that of the entire international community. Unlike the United Nations(UN) Security 
Council which possesses the competence to take binding decisions 129 that will affect the 
members of the UN, 130 binding decisions that are taken by the OECD only extend to its 
membership. SVG not being a member of the OECD is not obligated to conform to the 
OECD's initiative. Therefore, the conduct of the OECD represents a threat to the 
sovereignty of non-member States. 
6.7 Responses of the OECDIFA TF 
Having established that the OECD and the FATF's harmful tax and money laundering 
initiatives respectively, do not have the force of international law, it draws into question 
the legality of the defensive measures that were recommended and imposed by member 
States of those organisations against States like SVG that were alleged to have been 
non-compliant. Were the defensive measures in confortnity with international law? 
Elagab has suggested that every State has a right to adopt and institute its own economic 
measures and in so doing may 'sever trade relations with any other, ' subject to any 
international obligations to the contrary. 13 1 The defensive measures that were taken by 
the OECD and FATF did not go as far as severing trade relations with SVG. Instead, 
they were responses to what the OECD and FATF considered to be uncooperative 
policies and were designed to cease when those policies were removed. But what are the 
countermeasures that the OECD and FATF recommended to their member States to 
apply against their so- called uncooperative jurisdictions? 
"9 For example, Security Council Resolution 1373 (200 1) requires all States to prevent and suppress the 
financing of terrorism. 
130 Warbrick C., "The Jurisdiction of the Securijy Council: Original Intention and New World Order(s), " 
in Capps P., Evans M., & Konstadinidis S., "Asserting Jurisdiction-international and European Legal 
Perspectives. " 2003 Hart Publishing, at p. 127- "The Council, which is an organ of limited membership 
within the UN has the exceptional power as part of its authoritative competence to reach decisions which 
are binding on the whole of the membership of the UN and which take priority over their other 
international obligations. - 
"' Elagab 0.., "The Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures in International Law" Oxford, 1988 at 
p. 197. 
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6.7.1 Measures Recommended by the OECD and FA TF 
In addition to the countermeasures outlined on figure I the OECD also called on 
member States to take a common approach in the way the defensive measures should be 
implemented. In that regard it suggested as follows: 
"The Committee recommends a generalframework within which Member countries can 
implement a common approach to restraining harmful tax competition. Thisframework 
willfacilitate the ability of countries to take defensive measures swiftly and effectively 
againstjurisdictions that persist in their harmful tax practices. Defensive measures are 
important so that the adverse impacts from uncooperative jurisdictions can he 
addressed and so that these jurisdictions do not gain a competitive advantage over 
cooperative jurisdictions. In the application of the co-ordinated defensive measures, no 
distinction shall be made between jurisdictions that are dependencies of the OECD 
countries and those that are not. These defensive measures will be at the discretion of 
countries and taken under their domestic legislation or under tax treaties. Moreover, 
each country may choose to enforce the defensive measures in a manner that is 
proportionate and prioritised according to the degree of harm that a particular 
jurisdiction has the potential to inflict, and taking into account the effectiveness of its 
existing defensive measures. , 132 
The FATF on the other hand reported that: 
"These jurisdictions [meaning those that were blacklisted] are strongly urged to adopt 
measures to improve their rules and practices as expeditiously as possible in order to 
remedy the deficiencies identified in the reviews. Pending adoption and the 
implementation of appropriate legislative and other measures, and in accordance with 
Recommendations 21, the FA TF recommends that financial institutions should give 
special attention to business relations and transactions with persons, including 
companies and financial institutions, ftom the 'non-cooperative countries and 
territories mentioned in paragraph 64 and so doing take into account issues raised in 
,, 133 the relevant summaries in Section II of this report (my emphasis added) . 
OECD Report, "Towards Global Tax Co-operation, Prop-ress in identifvinp, and Eliminating Harmfu 
Tax Practices, " 2000, p 29 
113 FATF Report, "First Review to identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories, " 22 nd June, 2000 
at p 12, para 65. 
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Figure 1. The range of possible defensive measures identified to date by the OECD 
as a framework for a common avproach with regard to Uncooperative Tax 
Havens as of 31 July 2001 
1. To disallow deductions, exemptions, credits, or other allowances related to 
transactions with Uncooperative Tax Havens or to transactions taking advantage of their 
harmful tax practices. 
2. To require comprehensive information reporting rules for transactions involving 
Uncooperative Tax Havens or taking advantage of their harmful tax practices, supported 
by substantial penalties for inaccurate reporting or non-reporting of such transactions. 
3. For countries that do not have controlled foreign corporation or equivalent (CFQ 
rules, to consider adopting such rules, and for countries that have such rules, to ensure 
that they apply in a fashion consistent with the desirability of curbing harmful tax 
practices (Recommendation I of the 1998 Report). 
4. To deny any exceptions (e. g. reasonable cause) that may otherwise apply to the 
application of regular penalties in the case of transactions involving entities organised in 
Uncooperative Tax Havens or taking advantage of their harmful tax practices. 
5. To deny the availability of the foreign tax credit or the participation exemption with 
regard to distributions that are sourced from Uncooperative Tax Havens or to 
transactions taking advantage of their harmful tax practices. 
6. To impose withholding taxes on certain payments to residents of Uncooperative Tax 
Havens. 
7. To enhance audit and enforcement activities with respect to Uncooperative Tax 
Havens and transactions taking advantage of their harmftil tax practices. 
8. To ensure that any existing and new domestic defensive measures against harmful tax 
practices are also applicable to transactions with Uncooperative Tax Havens and to 
transactions taking advantage of their harmful tax practices. 
9. Not to enter into any comprehensive income tax conventions with Uncooperative Tax 
Havens, and to consider terminating any such existing conventions unless certain 
conditions are met (Recommendation 12 of the 1998 Report). 
10. To deny deductions and cost recovery, to the extent otherwise allowable, for fees 
and expenses incurred in establishing or acquiring entities incorporated in 
Uncooperative Tax Havens. 
11. To impose 'transactional' charges or levies on certain transactions involving 
Uncooperative Tax Havens. 
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The Recommendation 21 to which the FATF's statement referred provides as follows: 
"Financial institutions should give special attention to business relations and 
transactions with persons, including companies and financial institutions, from 
countries which do not or insufficiently qppýv these Recommendations [meaning the 40 Recommendations]. Whenever these transactions have an apparent economic or visible lawful purpose, their background and purpose should, as far as possible, be examined, 
the findings established in writing, and be available to help supervisors, auditors and law enforcement agencies(my emphasis added). " 
In an effort to apply Recommendation 2 1, FINCEN of the USA' Department of 
Treasury issued a Financial Advisory against SVG in July 2000. The Advisory stated as 
follows: 
"--. the legal, supervisory, and regulatory systems of St. Vincent and the Grenadines at 
present create significant opportunities and tools for the laundering and protection of 
the proceeds of crime and allow criminals who make use of those systems to increase 
significantly their chances to evade effective investigation or punishment. The structural 
weaknesses in St. Vincent and the Grenadines' laws increase the possibility that 
transactions involving hanks or other entities and accounts maintained in St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines will be usedfor illegal purposes. Thus, banks and other financial 
institutions operating in the United States should give enhanced scrutiny to any 
transaction originating in or routed through St. Vincent and the Grenadines, or 
involved entities organised or domiciled, or persons maintaining accounts, in St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines... " 
Moreover, the FATF made further recommendations to its members to; (a) impose 
customer identification obligations "with respect to financial transactions carried out 
with or by individuals or legal entities whose account is in a non-cooperative 
jurisdiction; 434 (b) "pay special attention to or to report financial transactions 
conducted with individuals or legal entities having their account at a financial 
institution established in a non-cooperative jurisdiction; , 135 (c) condition, restrict, 
target or even prohibit, '! financial transactions with non-cooperative jurisdictions. "136 
134 FATF' Report, "First Review to identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories, " Wh February, 
2000 at p. 7- The Report further provided that; "In order to make it dijficult for individuals and legal 
entities established or registered in non-cooperative jurisdictions to enter the financial systems in FA TF 
members, the latter should make sure that financial institutions within their jurisdiction fully satisfy the 
obligation to identify their clients before starting business relations. It should beforbidden to open an 
account if the applicant fails to supply really valid documentation enabling the financial institution to 
know without ambiguity the true identity of the ownerlbeneficial owner ofsuch account. " 135 Ibid - "Additional countermeasures could consist in requiring financial institutions to pay special 
attention to any transaction having a link to a country or territory previously identified as non- 
cooperative. It could also consist in requiring financial institutions to report systematically transactions 
to the financial intelligence unit or any competent body above a given amount at a financial institution 
established in countries or territories previously identified as unco-operative. These requirements should 
also make it possible to step up the vigilance offinancial institutions and to enrich considerably the 
information of1to financial intelligence units on transactions carried out with non-cooperative 
jurisdictions 
... they will put more pressure on the jurisdictions concerned, capable of convincing them to 
adopt necessary reforms and to co-operate better in thefight against money laundering. " 136 Ibid- "FA TF members should also consider determining whether it is desirable and feasible to 
condition, restrict, target or even prohibit financial transactions with such jurisdictions. Such measures 
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Additionally, the OECD and FATF's lists of uncooperative countries and territories 
were publicised in the international news media and via the internet as jurisdictions that 
were not cooperative in the fight against global crime and therefore were not considered 
as desirable financial services centres in which to invest. The impact of those measures 
on SVG was and still is detrimental and therefore required legal justification for their 
imposition. The question requiring further consideration is whether the defensive 
measures (be they economic coercion or countermeasures) taken by the OECD and 
FATF were in conformity with international law? 
It will be argued that the defensive measures that were taken by the OECD/FATF 
against SVG were unlawful under international law. it will not however 
be contended 
that economic coercion is an independent wrong in international law or that all 
economic measures that have effects on third States are unlawful. The argument will 
be 
based on the premise that measures that are specifically directed against an individual 
State, especially if taken concertedly by other States, will constitute an internationally 
wrongful act if their effects are so severe as to impose serious economic consequences 
on the target State and preclude it from taking significant political decisions as the price 
of avoiding those consequences. It is argued that this is precisely the position of 
SVG as 
against the measures taken by the member States of the OECD/FATF. 
In response to any claim that the action could be justified as countermeasures, 
it will be 
argued that SVG was not engaged in any unlawful act, which would justify any reprisal 
countermeasure by the OECDIFATF member States. Moreover, the argument will 
be 
buttressed with the International Law Commissions (ILC) Articles on State 
Responsibility as a means of contesting other aspects of a lawful countermeasure 
response. 
could serve as an ultimate recourse should a country or territory have decided to preserve laws and 
practices that are particularly damaging for the fight against money laundering. In the event that there 
was no legal basis for taking these measures, FATF members should consider adopting the relevant 
legislation. FATF members should also examine ways to prevent financial institutions located in 
identified non-cooperating countries or territories ftom using facilities ( for example, information 
technologYfacilities) located in the FA TF member's territory. " 
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6.7.2 Economic Coercion 
The OECD and FATF may wish to contend that their defensive measures amount to 
economic coercion and are therefore not inconsistent with international law. 137 
Economic coercion has yet to be accorded a precise and acceptable definition 138 in 
international law. 139 However, it represents measures that are usually taken by States to 
punish or pressure 140 other States to conform to a particular political or economic 
agenda. 141 Although, as Elagab pointed out, there is no specific legal regime under 
international law that governs economic coercion, this does not necessarily mean that 
the imposition of economic coercion by one State against another cannot amount to a 
violation of international law. 142 If the effect of the economic coercion is such that it 
results in serious human rights implications 143 or it undermines a country's freedom to 
choose its economic system then such a conduct will be seen as impermissible and 
therefore inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention 144 under international law. 
Therefore, it would appear that the effect that economic coercion may have on the 
injured State is relevant and significant in determining the legality of its imposition and 
not just the mere application of economic coercion per se. 
137 Elagab 0., "The Legalijy of Non-Forcible -Countermeasures In International La "1988 at p. 212 - "... there are no rules of international law that categorically pronounce either on the primajacie legality 
or prima facie illegality of economic coercion ... Nevertheless, it should not therefore 
be assumed that the 
tenor of international law is to leave the category of economic coercion as such unregulated even in clear 
violation of establishedprinciples. - 138 Submitted by Bolivia to the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, UN Doc A. C. 
66/L. 9,15 Sept. 1953 where economic coercion was defined as: ".. unilateral action whereby a State is 
deprived of economic resources derived from the proper conduct of international trade or its basic 
economy is endangered so that its security is affected and it is rendered unable to act in its defence or to 
co-operate in the collective defence ofpeace shall likewise be deemed to constitute an act of aggression. " 
Note however the criticisms of that definition by Elagab in Elagab 0., "The Legality of Non-Forcible - 
Countermeasures In International Law, " 1988 at p. 191 13, Elagab 0., "The Legality of Non-Forcible -Countermeasures In International Law, " 1988 at p. 196 "It is obvious that economic coercion is practised by virtually all States, powerful or weak Yet economic 
coercion as a concept does not lend itseýfto a definition that is both exact and comprehensive. - 140 White ND & Abass A, - "Countermeasures and Sanctions" in Evans M., "International Law, " 2003 at 
P. 519 "Powerful States do not always appear to be constrained by the niceties of the requirements of 
Countermeasures, they do not simply suspend obligations, they do not simply seek to remedy the illegality, 
what they seek is coercion and punishment by the application of sanctions often of'an economic nature, 
not countermeasures. - 
141 Ibid -where it is stated that the US unilaterally imposed sanctions against Cuba in 1960, Iran in 1979 
and the Soviet Union in 1980. 
142 Elagab 0., "The Legalily of Non-Forcible -Countermeasures In International Law, " 1988 at p. 212 - "Individual rules of international law may be applied to determine the legality of economic conduct on a 
given occasion. Thus, the issue of the legality will depend on the operation of particular rules of 
international law in particular contexts. 143 See chap 6.8 
144 Ibid at pp. 212-213- "For instance, in their protests against the sanctions imposed by the United States 
in connection with the Siberian gas pipeline, none of the aggrieved European Governments referred to 
these sanctions as 'economic coercion. ' Instead, they were challengedfor being inconsistent with the 
principle ofiurisdiction. - 
Chap 6- "The Legal Authority Of The FATF/OECD - Issues of Sovereignty and Fairness. " 
It is important to note that those measures are levied against persons who may not be 
able in any way to influence the political directorate to act in accordance with the 
requirements of the OECD/FATF's initiative 145 and this may have implications for 
employment and poverty levels. 146 Moreover, the defensive measures were 
implemented to restrict SVG's inalienable right to choose its own economic system, 147 
and to coerce it to carry out the political will of the OECD/FATF. 148 Essentially, the 
defensive measures were specifically introduced to hinder the exercise of that 
inalienable right149 and to punish SVG until its fiscal regime accorded with the 
requirements of the harmful tax initiative. In that regard Elagab pointed out; 
"Bowett argues that measures not illegal per se may hecome illegal upon proof of an 
improper motive or purpose ... He further points out that though the proposed criterion permits the protection of economic interests it does not legitimise economic coercion 
injurious to another State, when the motive is to further protect the State's political 
interests. , 150 
145 General Comment of the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1997) 8, 
para 16 "The inhabitants of a given country do notforfeit their basic economic, social and cultural rights 
by virtue of determination that their leaders have violated norms relating to international peace and 
securij)4 
146 Article 4 of the ICESR provides that: 
(1) "The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone to adequate 
standard of livingfor himself and hisfamily, including adequatefood clothing and 
housing and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will 
take appropriate steps to ensure the realisation of this right, recognising to this effect 
the essential importance on international co-operation based onfree consent. 
(2) The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognising thefundamental right of 
everyone to befireefrom hunger, shall take, individually and through international co- 
operation, the measures, including programmes, which are needed- 
(a) To improve methods ofproduction, conservation and distribution offood by 
makingfull use of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating 
knowledge of the principles ofnutrition and by developing or reforming 
agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient development 
and utilisation of natural resources; 
(b) Taking into account the problems of bothfood-importing countries, to 
147 ensure an equitable 
distribution of worldfood supplies in relation to need 
Article I of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States(CERDs) 1974 provides that: "Every 
State has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its economic system as well as its political, social 
and cultural systems in accordance with the will of its people, without outside interference, coercion or 
threat whatsoever. " 
14' The main text of The Declaration On the Inadmissibility of Intervention In Domestic Affairs of States 
And the Protection of Their Independence And Sovereignty, 1965 provides; 
"(2) No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political, or any other type of measures to 
coerce another State in order to obtainfrom it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or 
to securefrom it advantages of any kind. " 149 Article 4(d) and (e) on the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order 
provide that: 
(d) Every country has the right to adopt the economic and social system that it deems to be the most 
appropriate for its own development and not to be subjected to discrimination of any kind as a 
result; 
(e) Full permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural resources and all economic activities. 
[ 
... 
I No State may be subjected to economic, political or any other type of coercion to prevent 
thefree andfull exercise of this inalienable right. " 15" Elagab 0., "The Legah! y of Non-Forcible -Countermeasures In International Law, " 1988 at p. 195 
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This thesis concurs with Bowett's argument. There is no evidence that SVG caused any 
harm. to the economic interests of the OECD/FATF member countries. Moreover, it is 
difficult to see how the fiscal regime of a small and impoverished country such as SVG 
could have adversely affected the economies of the rich and powerful States of the 
OECD/FATF. Accordingly, the defensive measures even if they amounted to economic 
coercion cannot be said to be lawful. 
For small countries such as SVG those defensive measures may have devastating 
economic consequences. It is noticeable that the naming and shaming of SVG as an 
uncooperative tax haven and the issuing of threats of defensive measures have adversely 
affected the OFSS and the economy as a whole (see chapter 1.1.1). Even if the 
defensive measures are considered to be a form of economic coercion the impact that 
they can have on the economy of SVG will be disproportionate 151 to the purpose that 
they are trying to achieve and therefore may be considered to be reprisals or 
retorsions. 152 
Interestingly however, the developed countries were faced with a similar dilemma in 
1973 when the Arab nations introduced an oil embargo and other measures, 53 that were 
not favourable to those countries that supported Israel during the Arab, Israeli war. 
154 It 
was then argued by the developed countries that in addition to the oil embargo and the 
blacklisting of Pro-Israel or Pro-Jewish business firms, the Arab nations had formed an 
"51 Paust J., & Blaustein A., "The Arab Coercion: Background" in "The Arab Oil Weapon" 1977 at p. 77 
...... the principle ofproportionality requires that the use of coercion be limited in intensity and magnitude 
to what is reasonably necessary promptly to secure the permissible objectives ... under the established conditions ofnecessity. - 
152 White N., & Abass A., "Countermeasures and Sanctions" in Evans M., "International Law, " at p. 5 10- 
"Retorsion is conduct that does not involve the suspension of international obligations owed by the 
injured Slate to the responsible State, even though usually taken in response to unlawful acts on the part 
of the responsible State. Acts of retorsions may include the prohibition of or limitations upon normal 
diplomatic relations or other contacts, embargoes of various kinds or withdrawal of voluntary aid 
programmes. 
153 Paust J., & Blaustein A., "The Arab Coercion: Backpround" in "The Arab Oil Weapon" 1977 at p. 67- 
"On October 18'hl""I 
, just twelve 
days after thejoint Arab initiation of war against Israel, Saudi Arabia, 
the world's largest oil-exporting State, announced immediate cuts in oil production in an attempt to 
pressure the united States to reduce support for the State of Israel and also threatened to cut off all oil 
trade with the United States, i(Arab demands were not met. " '" Paust J., & Blaustein A., "The Arab Oil Wegpon: A Reply and Reaffirmation of llleggli! yý 1977 at pp. 
148-149 "Underscoring the threat ofpresident Sadat to use Arab money as a political weapon are recent 
efforts to blacklist business entities of the developed countries in order to coerce those allegedly are 
aiding Israel. Partially blacklisted companies such as Sony and Leyland were informed that blacklisting 
would cease upon conclusion ofpending agreements to establish operations in Arab countries. " 
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oil cartel'55 and that overall the conduct of the Arab nations violated Article 2(4) of the 
United Nations Charter which provides that: 
"All members should refrain in their international relations ftom the threat or use of force against the territorial integritýv or political independence of any State or in any 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of United Nations. " 
It was further argued that the use of oil as a weapon was not in conformity with 
international laW. 156 The OECD/FATF's initiatives appear to be similar in substance to 
the measures that were adopted by the Arab nations. This also raises the question as to 
whether the OECD/FATF member States are trying to form a cartel for the provision of 
financial services. If as the developed States argued during the Arab oil crisis that the 
conduct of the Arab nations was unlawful under international law then by extension the 
conduct of the OECD/FATF is also unlawful. If the OECD/FATF member countries are 
essentially engaged in a cartel arrangement for the provision of financial services, this 
May amount to a common law conspiracy 157 by the OECD/FATF member States to 
determine which States should and those that should not participate in the provision of 
financial services and this is tantamount to an unlawful intervention into the affairs of 
SVG. 
6.7.3 Countermeasures 
Countermeasures are non-forcible measures that are taken by an injured State against a 
State that is responsible for the breach of an international obligation to the injured 
State. 158 This does not however preclude a State that is not injured from applying 
countermeasures against the responsible State. Where the international obligation was 
155 Paust J., & Blaustein A., "The Arab Oil Weapon: A Reply and Reaffirmation of Illegality" 1977 at p. 
134-135 
156 Paust J., & Blaustein A., "The Arab Coercion: Background" in "The Arab Oil Weapon" 1977 at p. 85, 
where in. referring to the Arab oil embargo it was stated that "These attempts to controlforeign policies 
and conduct (international and domestic) of other States andpeoples and to affect theftee choice ofsuch 
States and peoples through a manipulation of resources. They constitute an interference in domestic 
affairs and a thwarting offundamental community policy... " See also Paust J., & Blaustein A., "The 
Arab Oil WeLLpon: A Reply and Reaffirmation of llleggfityý 1977 at p. 143; "Thus no sovereign may use 
its resources in any way it wants to use them-it must not use them so as to coerce other governments and 
peoples in an impermissible manner. This basic limitation on resource control and use is also 
recognisable in the sister and customary principle that "no State has the right to use or permit the use of 
its territory in such a manner as to cause injury ... in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein... " 
157 Smith J., "Smith and Hogan Criminal Law" 2002 at p. 386"Conspiracy was defined at common law as 
an agreement to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means; and the word unlawful 
included not only all crimes but also some torts, fraud, the corruption ofpublic morals and the outraging 
ofpublic decency whether or not the acts in question amounted to crimes... " 1 58 Gabcikovo 
. Nagymaras Pro*ect (Hung4M/Slovakia) ICJ Reports (1997) p. 7 at p. 55 para 83, where the court held that; "In order to bejustifiable, a countermeasure must meet certain ... 
In Mefirst place it 
must be taken in response to a previous international wrongful act of another State and must be directed 
against that State. " 
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owed to a group of States (e. g. OECD/FATF), including the injured State, any member 
State can take countermeasures for any international wrongful act to the group as a 
collective whole. 159 Countermeasures are required to be transient, 
160 and 
proportionate. 1 61 They are supposed to terminate when the alleged breach no longer 
exists 162 and 'are not intended as a form of punishment. 463 Similarly, they should not 
'relate to a number offundamental obligations (obligations under peremptory norms, human 
rights obligations etc). 164 Another feature of countermeasures is that their implementation 
should be preceded by some form of dialogue between the injured State and the 
responsible State, with a view to requesting of the responsible State, its compliance with 
the obligation that it has breached and 'issue notification of the decision to take 
countermeasures. ' 165 
The purpose of countermeasures is to induce the responsible State to comply with its 
international obligations. 166 But what were the international obligations that were in 
force at the time of the alleged breach 167 by SVG? The international obligations to 
which SVG is required to conform may be derived from treaty relationships, 
international customary rules, general principles of international law or a combination 
of a treaty and a unilateral act. 168 It has already been established in this chapter that the 
economic policies of SVG were implemented in conformity 169 with its international 
159 Crawford J., "The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibili1y, Introduction Text 
and Commentaries 2002 at p. 276 : See also ARSIWA Article 48 -i -f6O Ibi 
161 Ibid pp. 49-50 See also ARSIWA Article 51: Air Services Agureement of 27" March, 1946 (Unite 
States v France), R. I. A. A. vol. XVII (1978) 417 at p. 444, para 83 "it is generally agreed that all 
countermeasures must, in the first instance, have some degree of equivalence with the alleged breach: 
this is a well known rule... - 62 lbid p. 301 : See also ARSIWA Article 53 
63 lbid p. 294 
64 lbid p. 49: See also ARSIWA Article 50 65 ARSIWA Article 52: Gabcikovo. Nagymaras Proiect (HungW/Slovakia ICJ Reports (1997) p. 7 166 Crawford J., "The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibilfty. Introduction Text 
nI 160 Wry-, 
R. I. A. A, vol. 11 (1928) 829 at p. 845 
which states that: "Both parties are also agreed that ajuridicalfact must be appreciated in the light of 
the law contemporary with it and not of the law inforce at the time when the dispute in regard to it arises 
orfalls to be settled. ": See also ARSIWA Article 13 168 Crawford J., "The Intemational Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibili1y, Introduction Text 
and Commentaries, " 2002 at p. 126 
'" Elettronica Sicula S. p. A. (ELSI), LCJ Reports (1989), 15, at p. 50 para 70: See also Crawford J., "The 
International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibili! y, Introduction Text and Commentaries. " 
2002 at pp. 125-126, "In every case, it is by comparing the conduct injact engaged in by the State with 
the conduct legally prescribed by the international obligation that one can determine whether or not there 
is a breach ofthat obligation. The phrase "is not in conformity with" isflexible enough to cover many the 
many different ways in which an obligation can be expressed as well as the variousforms which a breach 
may take. " 
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obligations. 170 If the OECD and the FATF are contending that their respective initiatives 
imposed international obligations upon the members of the international community, 
then such a contention (see above and chapters 1,3 and 4) has not been made out. 
Moreover, they have not adduced any evidence that any injuries have been suffered by 
their member States. Therefore, what was the legal basis for the imposition of 
countermeasures? 
The OECD and the FATF removed SVG from their respective lists of uncooperative 
countries and territories although there were minimal, if any, changes in substance from 
the situation that existed prior to it being blacklisted. In August 1999 and June 2000 the 
OECD and the FATF respectively met with SVG. But those meetings served to inform 
the representatives of those organisations about the regulation of the financial services 
system in SVG and not to have a discussion about it. SVG, it would appear, was not in 
support of the OECD's initiative and did not consider that its supervisory and regulatory 
framework was so deficient that it was inconsistent with its international obligations to 
cooperate with other countries on criminal matters. As SVG was not in breach of its 
international obligations, any discussion with the OECD and the FATF as a means of 
satisfying one of the conditions for the imposition of countermeasures was otiose. It 
therefore follows that any notification of impending countermeasures was unnecessary. 
It would appear that the purpose of the defensive measures that are outlined under 6.7.1 
in the foregoing is to isolate the so called uncooperative tax havens from involvement 
in the provision of financial and other services to and commodity trading with entities 
and individuals from OECD/FATF member countries, by imposing very stringent 
requirements on its residents who engage in commercial transactions with persons from 
uncooperative tax havens. Similarly, the defensive measures are also designed to 
penalise commercial entities from uncooperative tax havens and non-cooperative 
countries that trade with or provide services to residents of OECD/FATF member 
countries. 
170 ARSIWA Article 13 
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6.7.4 Proportionality 
Even if the OECD/ FATF could have successfully contended (which does not seem 
likely) that SVG was in breach of its international obligations, they would be hard 
pressed to justify their responses on the basis of proportionality. It was stated in the Air 
Services Agreement Case that; 
"... countermeasures must in the first instance, have some degree of equivalence with 
the alleged breach -this is a well known rule ... 
It has been observed generally that 
judging the "proportionality " of countermeasures is not an easy task and can at best be 
accomplished by approximation ... 
it is essential in a dispute to take into account not 
only the injuries suffered by the companies concerned but also the importance of the 
principle in question. , 171 
The manner in which the OECD and FATF publicised SVG as an uncooperative 
jurisdiction was deleterious to its OFSS in particular and the economy as a whole (see 
chapter 1.1.1). The opportunities that were lost to the OFSS may never be regained, 
especially in the light of the growing competition among countries for the provision of 
international financial services. This loss should have been anticipated by the OECD 
and FATF, not only because they were aware of the volatility of the economy of SVG 
but also because it would appear that their responses were intended to have that effect. 
SVG placed emphasis on the financial services sector because it anticipated that the 
future of its economy depended on it (see chapter 1.1.1). The extent of the erosion of the 
OFSS which was attributed to the OECD and FATF's initiatives was considered to be 
substantial. Accordingly, it is contended that the measures that were taken by the OECD 
and FATF were not proportionate and may well be categorised as punitive in character. 
This may also give rise to human rights implications arising out of the violation of 
peremptory norms (see chap 6.8 below). 172 Essentially, the defensive measures that 
were taken by the OECD and FATF do not appear to be in conformity with international 
law. 173 They were in effect defensive measures that were taken unlawfully and with a 
view to restricting SVG's free choice to implement economic policies for the proper 
sustenance of its people. That is a clear and unequivocal breach of the principle of non- 
intervention under international law. 
17 1 Air Services Agreement of 27h March, 1946 (United States v France , 
R. I. A. A. vol. XVII (1978) 417 
at p. 444, para 83 
172 ARSIWA Article 50(l) 
173 Ibid Article 40(l) 
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The extent of the harm caused to the economy of SVG and the manner in which the 
defensive measures were implemented can be interpreted as a form of punishment for 
not confon-ning to the initiatives of the OECD and FATF. In this regard those measures 
can be construed as economic coercion not countermeasures. The purpose of 
countermeasures is not to punish States. To do so will be in violation of Article 49.174 
Although it is generally accepted that a State is free to take whatever actions it considers 
necessary and that restrictions on the independence of States must not be presumed 175 it 
is nonetheless contended that when taking those actions States should be mindful of 
their legal obligations under international law. In this regard Cassese stated that: 
"If two Or More States enter into an agreement providing for the impairment or 
restriction of the territorial integrity or political independence of legal equality of a 
third State, such an agreement is null and void before it is implemented, As soon as it is 
implemented, the States concerned incur international responsibility for breach of a 
fundamental rule of international law. This also holds true for the principle of non- 
intervention. "" 
6.7.5 Attribution of Responsibility 
In the light of the fact that the OECD and FATF encouraged their member States to 
impose the countermeasures, are they responsible for the violation of the principle of 
non-intervention? 177 The OECD having been endowed with 'international legal 
personality' is a separate legal person and will therefore be held responsible for its 
conduct. 178 The FATF on the other hand is not a separate legal person and therefore 
responsibility for its conduct will be attributed to its member States such that each State 
will be responsible for its own conduct. 179 This apparent total disregard for the principle 
of non-intervention and that of the law of the equality of States is likely to invoke an 
egregious example for international relations and promote delict in the interest of self, 
over a cohesive, symbiotic and harmonious relationship among States in the 
international community. The naming and shaming of SVG as an uncooperative tax 
haven and non-cooperative in the fight against money laundering, was unlawful. it 
jeopardises the already fragile condition of some small States in the interests of 
powerful States. It represents a movement towards an anarchic State of international 
nations, rather than fostering the cooperation on which successful regulation depends. 
174 
ARSIWA Article 49 
175 Lotus, (SS) Case (France v Turkey) PCIJ Ser. A (1927) No 9, Ser No 10 at p 18 176 Cassese A., "Intemational Law, " 2003 at pI 10. 
177 ARSIWA Article I "Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international 
responsibility ofthat State. " 
179 Crawford J., "The Intemational Law Commission's Articles on State Resp2nsihUbý, ýýý 
and Commentaries. " 2002 at p. 3 10 179 ARSIWA Article 47(l): See also Crawford J., "The Intemational Law Commissio i's Artide-LOIS= 
Responsibility, Introduction Text and Commentaries, " 2002 at p. 3 10 
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6.8 OECDIFA TFs Initiatives and international Human Rights 
Article I paragraph I of the 1966 International Convention on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) prescribes that 'all peoples have a right to self 
determination' and should therefore be allowed to freely determine, among other things, 
their economic development. That Article I should be recognised as a fundamental right 
was reflected in the dissenting judgment of Judge Tanaka in the South West Africa 
Case when he stated that, 'surely the law concerning the protection of human rights may be 
considered to belong to jus cogens. "0 It is not expected that States should derogate from 
those rights even during the time of war or other public emergency. 18 1 The ICESCR 
specifically requires States to promote and respect the right of self -determination. 
182 
The fiscal measures that were introduced by SVG since 1976 (see chapter 3) and revised 
to sanitise the OFSS in 1997 (see chapter 3) and thereafter were designed to alleviate 
some of the economic difficulties that were mentioned in chapter one. The lack of and 
in most instances the non-existence of natural resources coupled with the size of the 
country have left it with very few options economically to develop its economic base 
(see chapter 1). It was mentioned in chapter I that the banana industry has been 
decimated due to the liberalisation of trade. Except for bananas, SVG is not a 
commodity producing State and by all accounts will experience a tremendous amount of 
difficulties sustaining that industry subsequent to December 2005 (see chapter 
Therefore, the OFSS enabled SVG to produce a service in a market where the playing 
field appeared to be level, especially in an international market that favours free 
trade. 183 In such a market each State is encouraged to seriously develop its fields of 
specialisation' 84 to effectively compete with each other. The OFSS not only enabled 
SVG to develop a field of specialisation, it also enabled it to compete'85 in the 
international market on a level playing field. Quite understandably its fiscal measures 
190 ICJ Reports (1966) at p 298: Shelton D., "International Law and Relative Normativi! 3L in Evans M, 
"International Law, " 2003 at p 150 
"The theory ofjus cogens or peremptory norms posits that there are rules from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be amended only by a few general norm of international law of the same value. " 18' Advisory opinion on Westem Sahara, ICJ Reports 0 975 , 
12 at p 31 182 Art. I para 3 ICESCR provides that: "The States Parties to the Present Convention, including those 
having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote 
the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformiýv with the 
provisions of the Charter ofthe United Nations. " 183 Trebilcock M., Howse R., "The Regulation of International Trade. " Routeledge, 200 1, pp 5-6 '84 Held D., McGrew A., Goldblatt D., Perraton J., "Global Transformation. ' 1999 at pp 164-165 185 Trebilcock M., Howse R., "The Regulation of International Trade. " Routeledge, 200 1. pp 481483 
313 
Chap 6- "The Legal Authority Of The FATF/OECD - Issues of Sovereignty and 
Fairness. " 
were supportive in that regard. Any practice that is aimed at or appear to be aimed at 
destabilising the OFSS is not only adversely affecting that sector but is also 
undermining SVG's right to self-determination 186 and by extension seriously eroding its 
humanitarian efforts. In that regard the OECD and the FATF member States appeared to 
have ignored their obligation under Article I paragraph 2 of the ICESCR. 
187 
Moreover internal self-determination is accepted as a fundamental right. In the matter 
Reference re Secession of Quebec the Supreme Court of Canada stated that internal 
self-determination includes the pursuit of its political economic and cultural development 
within the ftamework of an existing State. """ Article I when taken in totality possesses a 
peremptory character' 89 from which States are not required to derogate. 
190 In this regard 
the countermeasures taken by the OECD and FATF are not in conformity with the legal 
regime that regulates them. 191 Accordingly, they appeared to have infringed the human 
fights of the people of SVG. 192 
The OECD will also be ignoring its responsibilities under Article I of the 1960 OECD 
Convention which requires it to contribute to sound economic expansion in member and 
non-member countries, and to the expansion of world trade on a non-discriminatory 
basis and in accordance with its international obligations. This includes encouraging 
greater competition. It is however noteworthy that the Treaty of Rome which 
established the European Economic Community was the first international agreement to 
186 Cassese A., "International Law, " 2003 at p 105 where - -self-determination meant that peoples and 
nations were to have a say in international dealings: sovereign powers could no longerfreely dispose of 
them, for example by ceding or annexing territories without paying any regard to the wishes of the 
population ofthe populations concerned, through plebiscites or referendums. Peoples were also to have a 
say in the conduct of domestic andforeign business; setf determination was advocated as a democratic 
principle callingfor the consent of the governed in any sovereign State; the people should always have 
the rightfreely to choose their own rulers. Furthermore, peoples and nations were entitled to befteeftom 
any external pressure, chiefly in theform of colonial rule. " 
187 Art. I para 2 of the ICESCR provides as follows: "All peoples may, for their own needs, fteely 
dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out (? f 
international economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefilt, and international law. In 
no case may a people be deprived of its own means ofsubsistence. " 
188 http: //www. lexuin. unmontreal. ca//csc-scc/en/pub/1998/vol2/htmi/1998/scr2-0217. html, para 126 
189 Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties refers to a peremptory norm as one 
which is "accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character. - 
190 Cassese A., "International Law, " 2003 at pI 11 
191 Crawford James "The international Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility. Introduction 
Text and Commentaries, " 2002 at p. 50: See ARSIWA Article 50(l) 
192 General Comment of the International Convention on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (1997) 8, 
para 16 "The inhabitants of a given country do notforfeit their basic economic. social and cultural rights 
by virtue of determination that their leaders have violated norms relating to 
international peace and 
security. 
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promote free trade in goods and services. 193 Given that 20 of the 30 members States of 
the OECD are based in Europe and the OECD pursuant to Article I of its Convention is 
required to encourage competition among trading partners, the harmful tax initiative 
represents a most unfortunate contradiction of the pillars upon which the OECD and the 
European Union were founded. 
The ICJ has held that the right to self-determination is a legal principle 
194 and not 
merely a political slogan. Accordingly, SVG has a cogent argument against the 
implementation of a practice that will not merely contravene the principle of non- 
intervention under international law but one that will further erode its own economic 
base, augment the current high unemployment level and significantly contribute to the 
rising level of poverty. This is not what was anticipated by Article II of the ICESCR 
which seeks to impose a responsibility on States to provide for their peoples an adequate 
standard of living, and by extension, a right to life pursuant to Article 6 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
6.9 Roles of WTO, United Nations and the IMF 
6.9.1 WTO 
The WTO is already responsible for promulgating and regulating the liberalisation of 
world trade in goods and services. 195 It has a dispute resolution mechanism 196 that 
193 Lowenfeld A., "International Economic Law, " Oxford, 2003, at p 112 
194 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) ICJ Reports (1971) 16 at p31; See also AdvisojY Opinion on Western 
Sahara, ICJ Reports (1975), 12 at pp 31-33 
195 The preamble to the GATT is concerned with the raising of living standards in its Member States to 
this end it encourages them to achieve this goal by entering into; 'reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade, and to the 
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce. That the WTO is a continuation of the 
GATT was exemplified in Article XVI(I) of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO which 
provides that; 'Except as otherwise provided under this Agreement or the Multilateral Trade Agreements, 
the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the 
contracting parties to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947. See 
Lowenfeld A., "International Economic Law, " 2003, at p 69. 
196 The dispute resolution mechanism is the process through which disputes that are brought before the 
WTO are settled. The Dispute Settlement Understanding is administered 
by the Dispute Settlement Body 
whose main tasks are to provide the panels that are hear the 
disputes and to implement the rulings and 
recommendations of the panels. The members of the panel are chosen 
by the Director General of the 
WTO and the countries that are parties to the dispute. Having received written and oral submissions 
from 
the parties concerned, the panel then circulates a draft report of 
its findings and subsequently an interim 
report to the parties concerned for their comments. The final report which contains 
the panel's decision 
and recommendations is then submitted to the Dispute Settlement 
Body and the parties concerned. Any of 
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effectively enables its member States to bring claims about States that have by their 
conduct violated the rules of fair trade. The General Agreement in Trades and Services 
(GATS) is a regulatory mechanism for the conduct of trade in services. ' 97 Under the 
GATS member States are required to promote by their conduct the liberalisation of 
trade in services. 198 They, with a few exceptions' 99 are not required to trade in services 
on more favourable terms with one country than another (otherwise referred to as the 
200 Most Favoured Nation (MFN) rule). 
The countermeasures of the OECD do not appear to be consistent with GATS since they 
discriminate against some countries in favour of others. Understandably, such measures 
are warranted if those countries against which the defensive measures were targeted had 
themselves violated the terms of the GATS. But this was not the case at all with SVG. 
The OECD did not complain that SVG's financial services system was inconsistent with 
the GATS and therefore the countermeasures were not at all consistent with the 
principles of free trade. It would be interesting to consider the OECD's conduct in the 
light of the terms of the GATS to ascertain whether SVG had any recourse to the WTO' 
dispute resolution mechanism as a result of the OECD's probable violation of the GATS 
most favoured nation (MFN) rules. 201 
the parties concerned may dispute the decision of the panel by submitting an appeal on points of law to 
the Appellate Body (it consists of 7 permanent members who reflect the WTO member countries - three 
of whom hear appeals on a rotating basis - all members serve for four years in any one term) who may 
uphold, modify or reverse the decisions and recommendations of the panel and submit its decisions to the 
Dispute Settlement Body for acceptance or rejection. 
197 The GATS structure imposes on members a dichotomy of obligations referred to as the General 
Obligations and Disciplines and specific commitments. The General Obligations and Disciplines covers 
all the services under the GATS. The specific commitments on the other hand refers to the designated 
services to which members States have committed themselves pursuant to Article XX of the GATS. 198 Lowenfeld A., "International Economic Law, " Oxford, 2003, at p 70 
199 Qureshi A., "International Economic Law, " 1999, at p 146 where it was stated that the Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) ". Js however subject to certain exceptions. For example, the m-f-n standard does not 
preclude members from entering into economic arrangements in which trade in services are liberalised 
amongst members, or to enter into labour market integration Agreements. Members may also specify m-f- 
n exemptions in relation to specific services. Secondly, there must be full transparency in so far as 
measures pertaining to services are concerned. ' 
200 Article II(l) of the GATS provide that: "Each Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally, 
to services and service suppliers of anY other Member, treatment no less favourable than that it accords 
to like services and service suppliers of any country. " 
201 Hay R, "Information Exchange and The Offshore Financial Services Centres Part L' Private Client 
Business, 2002,2,88-97 at p. 94. 
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6.9.2 United Nations and IMF 
The United Nations with its membership of 191 countries (as of 19'h November, 2003) 
has the responsibility of securing peace and security universally. 202 In doing so it has 
embarked on a number of projects which include combating crime 203 and providing for 
humanitarian needs globally. 204 Closely aligned with the role of the United Nations is a 
number of specialized agencies of which one is the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
It was established 'by treaty in 1945 to help promote the health of the world economy. 
The role of the IMF is stated as follows: 
"It was established to promote international cooperation, monetary cooperation, 
exchange stability, and orderly exchange arrangements; to foster economic growth 
andhigh levels of employment; and to provide temporary financial assistance to 
countries to help ease balance ofpayment adjustments. , 206 
That role is very varied but is also significant to the economies of countries world wide 
The IMF attempts to achieve those purposes by conducting an annual review of the 
performance of its member countries and reporting on their performanceS. 207 If 
necessary, recommendations are also made for the improvement of their economies. 
The IMF is therefore in the position to conduct a balanced and reasoned assessment of 
the impact on the economy of a member country due to its exposure and vulnerability to 
money laundering activities. A presumption that the actions of the IMF are unfairly 
prejudicial to the economy of one country in favour of a group of countries is unlikely 
to occupy the contemplation of member countries to the same extent that it would about 
the OECD and FATF. Therefore, the conduct of the IMF will be viewed with much less 
scepticism and apprehension than the actions of the FATF and greater cooperation is 
more likely to ensue given the seriousness of the IMF's intervention. 
The IMF launched a money laundering initiative entitled the financial stability forum 
(FSF). Its approach to the money laundering issue was noticeably different from that of 
the FATF although it recently recognised the 40 Recommendations as global anti- 
money laundering standards. 208 OFCs were not targeted as being solely responsible for 
202 
www. un. org 
203 Ibid 
204 Ibid 
205 www. imforg 'What is the International Monetaa Fund' 
'06 Ibid, 'About the IMF' : See also Article I of the IMF Agreement 
207 Article IV(3) of the IMF Agreement 
208 Gilmore W., "Changes to the Global Regime, " in Clark A., & Burrell P., - "A Practitioner's Guide t 
International Money Laundering Law and Reizulation, " 2003 at p. 288. 
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the proliferation of money laundering activities globally. 209 Instead, the IMF sought to 
advise and encourage member countries to promote and implement measures that would 
adequately combat money laundering. 210 In that regard it categorised the financial 
system of its member countries into three groups. 21 1 Those countries that were 
categorised in Group III were therefore encouraged to improve their regulatory and 
supervisory framework. 212 Although it is arguable that the IMF's mandate permits it to 
take certain coercive measures 213 against those member countries whose anti-money 
laundering mechanisms are inadequate and therefore threaten to destabilise the 
economy, that was not the approach taken by the IMF. It accepted that the provision of 
offshore financial services was to be encouraged 214 albeit in an environment that makes 
it difficult for criminals to abuse the mechanisms through which those services are 
provided. Accordingly, the IMF in a recent report 215 has stated that it will be monitoring 
the activities of OFCs to ensure that they comply with "supervisory and integrity 
standards. , 216 Moreover, it will be providing technical assistance to OFCs to help 
"build the necessary institutional capacity for effective supervision -217 and the 
promotion of transparency. 218 
The UN over the years has been at the forefront of the war against crime. In particular it 
has produced numerous reports and passed a multitude of resolutions on organised 
crime. 219 In the light of the fact that the UN, through the Vienna Convention 1988 had 
commenced the fight against drug money laundering, the time is ripe for further 
progress to be made in its anti-money laundering efforts. Although it is heartening to 
see the recent anti-money laundering efforts of the UN bear fruit with the coming into 
force of the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime on 29th September 
209 
Ali S., "Money Laundering Control in the Caribbean, " Kluwer Law International, 2003, at p 263 210 
lbid 
211 
lbid 
212 
Ibid 
213 International Monetary Fund Articles of Agreement, Article X11 Secs 7&8 where the Fund can 
publish report and its views to any member; Article XXVI sec 2(a) where the Fund can declare a member 
ineligible to use its resources where a member has failed in its obligations, Article XXVI sec 2(b) where 
the Fund can suspend the voting rights of a member, where the member persistently fails in its obligation, 
Article where a member can be made to withdraw as a member from the Fund. 
214 Ali S., "Money Laundering Control in the Caribbean. " Kluwer Law International, 2003, at p 263 
215 IMF- Offshore Financial Centres-The Assessment Program, 31" July, 2003. 
2: 6 
Ibid at pp. 16-18 27 
Ibid at pp. 19-21 218 
lbid at pp. 18-19 
2 19 Bassiouni C., & Vetere E., "Organised Crime-A compilation of UN Documents 1975-1998. ' 
Transnational Publishers Inc., 1998, For an appreciation of the work done by the UN in the fight against 
organised crime. 
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2003 220 more work needs to be done to ensure that all member countries ratify the 
Convention with alacrity.. It is anticipated that this approach will be more objective and 
also acceptable to member countries. The current FATF's anti-money laundering 
initiative due to the manner in which it was introduced to non-member countries and 
territories, created an air of scepticism which may adversely affect the effective 
administration of the money laundering systems in certain countries. Moreover, the IMF 
during its annual review of its member countries will be in a much better position to 
evaluate the application of the anti-money laundering mechanism and assess its impact 
on the economy as a whole. The superficial review conducted by the FATF and its 
apparent readiness to encourage its member countries to flex their muscles against the 
poorer and weaker States that do not appear to do exactly as they were told will do more 
harm than good to the universal fight against money laundering. It is therefore 
suggested that the UN and not the FATF should initiate measures for the alleviation or 
eradication of money laundering worldwide. Further, the IMF, not the FATF should 
conduct the evaluation of the implementation and administration of those measures. In 
this way it is anticipated that there will be greater participation from countries not only 
in legislating against money laundering but also in ensuring that the legislation is 
effectively administered. 
The FATF with a membership base of only 33 countrieS221 is likely to be perceived as 
an inter-govemmental organisation that is prepared to circumvent international law to 
promote the interest of its member States to the detriment of non-members. It is 
therefore difficult for such an organisation to appeal to the international community 
even if its initiative is laudable. Recommendation 21 together with the other 
recommended countermeasures 222 is a clear demonstration that the FATF was aware of 
its unpopularity and therefore needed to place weaker countries under undue economic 
and other pressures in order to have its way. That recommendation should be viewed in 
the light of Article VIII(2) of the IMF Agreement which prohibits those member 
220 www. unodc. orp-/unodc/en/crime cicp convention. html - "The Convention represents a major step 
forward in the fight against transnational organised crime and signifies the recognition of UN Member 
States that this is a serious and growing problem that can only be solved through close international co- 
operation. The Convention, concluded at the Wh session of the Ad Hoc Committee established by the 
General Assembly to deal with this problem, is a legally binding instrument committing Mates that ratify 
it to taking a series of measures against transnational organised crime. These include the creation of 
domestic criminal offences to combat the problem, and the adoption of new, sweeping 
frameworb for 
mutual legal assistance, extradition, law-enforcement cooperation and technical assistance and 
training. " 
22 ' http: //wwwI. oecd. org/fatf/AboutFATF-en. htm 
222 See chapter 6.7 
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countries that have not assumed Article VIII obligations from 'imposing restrictions on 
the making ofpayment and transfers for current international transactions' without the 
approval of the IMF. Current international transactions was defined by Article XXX(d) 
of the IMF Agreement to include: 
"(1) all payments due in connection withforeign trade, other current businesses, including 
services, and normal short-term banking and creditfacilities; 
(2) payments due as interesiftom loans and as net incomefrom other investments: 
(3) payments of moderate amount for amortisation of loans or for depreciation of direct 
investments; and 
(4) moderate remittances forfamily expenses. 
Since the FATF countries have assumed their obligations under Article VIII 223 it would 
appear that Recommendation 21 and the advisory that was issued by FINCEN against 
SVG may well have been inconsistent with Article V111(2). 224 The unduly strict scrutiny 
of payments and transfers on international transactions originating from and destined to 
SVG resulted in unnecessary delays 225 and vital loss of business. As a matter of fact the 
National Commercial Bank (NCB) of SVG (the largest bank in the country) lost its 
correspondent banking relationship with two US banks and at one point experienced 
tremendous difficulties obtaining correspondent banking relationship with other US 
banks. 226 The financial advisory that was issued by the US which may well have been 
partly responsible for the difficulties that were faced by the NCB was issued in July 
2000 upon the blacklisting of SVG and subsisted until July, 2003 when it was lifted. 
The apparent lack of concern about the adverse impact that their initiatives would have 
on the economy of SVG clearly exemplified the narrow perspectives of the OECD and 
FATF. What is required to bring about efficacy, especially in the money laundering 
initiative is the participation of SVG in the decision making process that led to those 
initiatives and a greater appreciation and concern for the well being of its peoples. 
These basic requirements are more readily accessible if the regulation of world trade 
and the monitoring of the money laundering phenomena are left to the IMF and the 
WTO in whom the vast majority of the countries in the world has entrusted their trading 
223 Lowenfeld A., "International Economic Law, " Oxford, 2003, at pp 508-509 - for a brief history as to 
why some states had not previously assumed Article Vill but have since assumed such responsibility. 
224 Hay R, "Information Exchange and The Offshore. Financial Services Centres Part I, ' Private Client 
Business, 2002,2,88-97 at p. 94. 
225 Qureshi A., "International Economic Law, " 1999, pp 143-145 
226 Mitchell L., "A World of Opportunities, " The Searchlight Newspaper, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, 
vol. 9 No. 40 Friday 3rd October, 2003 at p 26 
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and financial affairs. In this regard Qureshi in emphasising the significance of 
liberalisation of trade as the primary purpose of the WTO enunciated that: 
"The WTO is to ensure these primary purposes in order to facilitate in the economies Qf 
Memher States higher standards of living, full employment, growing volume of real 
income and effective demand, and an expansion of production and trade in goods and 
services. These national ohjectives correspond to those of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). , 227 
Essentially, by maintaining the primacy of the IMF and the WTO in the regulation of 
the state of the world's finances and world trade respectively, it is anticipated that there 
will be greater cooperation from member countries. Moreover, the cohesion that is 
necessary to secure peace and security and a better standard of life for everyone, will be 
more readily acquired from all countries. In that regard the recent developments in the 
anti-money laundering efforts by the IMF in the wake of the terrorists attacks against 
the USA on II th September, 2001 is a welcoming sign . 
228 Moreover, the FATF issued a 
press release on I Oth September, 2002 which provided a brief outline of those 
developments. The press release provided as follows: 
"With regard to the FATFs collaboration with the IMF and the World Bank recent 
efforts have resulted in the FATFs endorsement of the use of a global methodology 
based on the FATFs 40 Recommendations and Eight Special Recommendations in 
conducting assessments as part of the IMFIWorld Bank's Financial Sector Assessment 
Programme (FSAP) and its Reports on Observance of Standardv and Codes (ROSC). 
FA TF also agreed to make available experts in anti-money laundering and combating 
terrorist financing issues ftom FA TF and FA TF- style regional bodies to IMFIWorld 
Bank led mission teams to assess compliance based on the comprehensive 
methodology. , 229 
6.10 Conclusion 
The manner in which the FATF and the OECD imposed their initiatives on SVG was 
clearly in violation of the principle of non-intervention under international law. Their 
conduct could not have been justified on the basis that SVG was in breach of 
international customary rules since there were no such rules in existence when in June 
2000 both the OECD and FATF listed SVG as an uncooperative jurisdiction. SVG in 
fear of being subjected to the continued difficulties associated with Recommendation 21 
227 Qureshi A., "International Economic Law, " 1999, pp 143-145 at p. 238 
228 Gilmore W., "Changes to the Global Regime, " in Clark A., & Burrell P., - "A Practitioner's Guide to 
International Money Laundering Law and Regulation. " 2003 at p. 288. 
229 lbid 
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of the FATF's 40 Recommendations 230 and the defensive actions recommended by the 
OECD/FATF succumbed to their initiatives. Essentially, it apparently came to accepting 
those initiatives by undue influence rather than voluntarily accepting that it was 
ordinarily legally bound. Moreover, SVG not being a member of either the FATF or the 
OECD was not legally obligated to implement the initiatives that they developed for 
themselves. Equally, they were not legally empowered under international law to dictate 
the economic policies or the regulatory functions of SVG. However, with the 
IMF/World Bank adopting the FATF's 40 Recommendations as internationally 
accepted standards and with the entering into force of the UN Convention against 
Transnational and Organised Crime it will be interesting to see how fast those standards 
are crystallised into international customary rules. 
The countermeasures that were recommended against SVG by the OECD and FATF 
were unlawful. They were also unjustified and aggravated an already debilitating 
economic situation in SVG. As a result of the threats of countermeasures and the 
naming and shaming of SVG certain measures were introduced that adversely impacted 
on the economy. This essentially restricted SVG's right to sel f-determ i nation under 
international law. Consequent upon the initiatives of both the FATF and OECD there 
was a loss in revenues to the country and persons lost their jobs. Indeed those initiatives 
appeared to have ignored the likely humanitarian impact that they would have on the 
people of the country due not only to a loss of opportunity in the OFSS but also the 
domestic financial services sector as well. 
Under the UN's ICESCR and ICCPR, every State has a right to self- determination and 
to introduce policies that improve the welfare of its peoples. States are required to 
respect those rights and to assist each other in the furtherance of policies that will 
achieve those goals. It has already been noted that SVG having suffered a serious 
decline in one of its main industries (the banana industry), due to lack of resources, has 
very little, if any, options for economic growth unless it was able to engage in an 
industry that can compete in the global market on a level playing field. Not being able 
to acquire the status as a producing country because of the diseconomies of scale 
mentioned in chapter one it turned to the financial services sector. It was anticipated that 
a symbiotic relationship would have been developed between SVG and the rest of the 
230 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Parliamentary Debate, Wednesday 21" November, 
2001 at p 3. as per 
Prime Minister Dr. Ralph Gonsalves, 
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developing world, in that SVG would assist in the management of some of the wealth 
that emanated from the production sectors of those countries. 231 
That idea seemed plausible until the OECD and FATF initiatives caused investors to 
divert their investments from SVG. This unfortunately resulted in a loss of opportunity 
to develop what was turning out to be a vibrant financial services sector. Bearing in 
mind the high unemployment levels that are currently existing in SVG and the 
unacceptably high level of poverty, the initiatives of the OECD and FATF have done 
more harm than good to the economy. Therefore, the ICESCR and ICCPR which were 
introduced to assist the disadvantaged people of the world have been blatantly flaunted 
by the OECD and FATF under the very sinister tax and money laundering initiatives. 
Such a conduct invites the question, where is the fairness under international law, when 
a few economically powerful States can in unison unjustifiably decide amongst 
themselves to undermine the legitimate economic efforts of a sovereign State and 
knowingly place the well-being of its people and the security of that State at great risk? 
The OECD and FATF being organisations that promote the interests of their member 
States should not be permitted to usurp or circumvent the roles of the WTO and the UN 
which have a wider membership of States and whose functions should be within the 
interest of the greater number of States. Issues relating to fair trade should be discussed 
and formulated within the framework of the WTO and concerns about the financial 
stability and peace and security of the world are within the province of the UN and its 
specialised agencies such as, in this case, the IMF. To allow the OECD and FATF with 
just a few member States to instruct non-member States how to manage their internal 
affairs is not only unacceptable but it is also setting a very bad precedent. One of the 
roles of the UN is to promote the principle of self-determination of peoples. But the 
manner in which the OECD and the FATF have sought to impose their initiatives on 
non-member States and are allowed to flout the principles of freedom of movement of 
services and capital is an affront to the principle of self-determination and a blatant 
abuse of power. 
The money laundering initiative is laudable and should be pursued vigorously. The role 
of monitoring the global impact of money laundering is not a matter for the FATE It is 
231 Interview with Sir James Mitchell the former Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
November 2003. 
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understandable that the member States may wish to evaluate themselves and harmonise 
their approaches. But the international money laundering initiative is a matter for the 
LN and the monitoring of that initiative falls within the auspices of the IMF. In this way 
there is likely to be a much greater effort by countries to fight money laundering. 
Approximately 191 countries will consider themselves as being part of the decision 
making process, determining their own destinies and acting in accordance with their 
own consciences and in the interests of their respective peoples. Accordingly, there will 
be greater participation and cooperation and the initiative will gain momentum and 
efficacy. If countries are encouraged to labour under the perception that the FATF's 
initiative is sinister and bears the hallmarks of a rejuvenated modernised form of 
imperialism the anti-money laundering regimes will appear to be effective but money 
laundering will nonetheless continue unabated. Such a state of affairs will be untenable 
but is very probable unless the UN and the IMF assume and maintain their rightful 
places and authority in the fight against international crime. 
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7.0 Introduction 
This chapter primarily provides a summary of the conclusions of each of the 
foregoing chapters. However, rather than merely repeating those conclusions, the 
purpose of this chapter is also to draw very brief conclusions on certain issues that 
were discussed in the previous chapters, and where appropriate, to comment upon any 
current developments in the harmful tax and money laundering initiatives that are 
relevant to this study. In the light of the fact that there is so much detail in the study, 
this chapter attempts to further clarify those details and to put them into a sharper 
perspective. 
This study was undertaken in order to ascertain whether the listing of SVG by the 
OECD and FATF as an uncooperative jurisdiction for tax and money laundering 
purposes respectively, was justified or unjustified. In seeking to reach a conclusion 
the terms justified and unjustified were given their ordinary meanings. For example, 
the Oxford Reference English Dictionary' defines 'justify' in the following manner; 
(a) "demonstrate the correctness of an act" and; (b) "adduce adequate grounds for 
conduct. " For the purposes of this study the correctness of the initiatives and the 
adequacy of the grounds for the OECD/FATF's conclusions about SVG's regulatory 
and supervisory regime were considered in the light of domestic and international 
legal principles. Essentially, the study considered the credibility of the initiatives and 
more importantly, whether the initiatives imposed upon SVG an international legal 
obligation to which it did not conform. It also considered whether the regulatory and 
supervisory regime in SVG should be considered as uncooperative within the context 
of established international legal principles and any United Nations declarations 
concerning friendly, economic and other relations with other countries. The study 
concludes that SVG did demonstrate within the context of international law a 
willingness to cooperate with other countries in the fight against international crime 
and by its conduct was not perpetrating a harmful tax regime but was instead pursuing 
a fiscal policy within the framework of the requirements of international legal 
principles concerning international taxation. Therefore, the blacklisting of SVG by the 
OECD and FATF was unjustified. 
' 2002 at p. 768 
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The study also demonstrates how vulnerable small island States are to the dictates of 
big developed States. In particular, it shows how the preservation of international 
legal principles relating to non-intervention and sovereign equality can depend largely 
on the economic and military power of nation States as opposed to the authority of the 
rule of law. In essence, it appears that large developed States are not prepared to 
adopt, conform or act consistent with those international legal principles when to do 
so may not be in their best interests or if to do so does not accord with their own 
agendas. But as in the case of a small island State like SVG the OECD/FATF 
demanded that it modified its regulatory and supervisory framework even though by 
so doing harm was being caused to the economy of SVG. The study therefore raises 
questions about whether small island States that are so dependent on economic and 
other assistance from big developed States do possess the qualities and characteristics 
of a State, 2 especially when the doctrines of sovereign equality and non-intervention 
can be so easily flaunted against them without any apparent effective recourse to 
redress. As Professor Warbrick has observed: 
"... the doctrine of sovereign equality means that as a matter of foundational 
principle, all States may participate in the law making processes of international law, 
all States may make the initial determination about whether their rights have been 
violated and, if so, about what action to take to restore legality, and all States will 
bear international responsibility for failure to comply with their international 
obligations. All these are formal matters. The actual capacity of a Slate to influence 
the law making process or to obtain compliance with its le 
, 
yal rights is in large 
measure proportionate to the resources available to the State. - 
The study shows the adverse impact that the OECD's harmful tax initiative and the 
FATF's money laundering initiative can have on the economies of small island OFCs 
in general and the economy of SVG in particular. To gain a better appreciation of the 
global money laundering phenomenon and the harmful tax initiative, it was important 
to review the origins of OFCs, the growth of OFCs and also the historical imperatives 
of money laundering. It was noted in chapter I that the inception of offshore financial 
services may be traced all the way back to the I 9th century. However, modem day 
offshore financial services were developed through initiatives in certain European 
2 Article I of the Montevideo Convention of the Rights and Duties of States 1933 provides that: "The 
State as a person of international law should possess the following qualities; 
(a) a pennanent population; 
(b) a defined territory; 
(c) government; and 
(d) capacity to enter into relations with other States. 
3 Warbrick C., "States and Recognition in International La)yLin Evans M., "International Law" 2003, 
at p. 212 
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countries and then transported abroad to the colonies of the New World. OFCs still 
exist in Europe today, with London being the biggest of them all. Switzerland and 
Luxembourg are also very big players in the provision of offshore financial services, 
specifically in the areas of private banking and mutual funds respectively. Certain 
States of the US, including Delaware, Nevada and Montana also provide offshore 
financial services. Therefore, when condemnation is made of OFCs, the small island 
OFCs should not be made to feel solely responsible for instituting liberal laws that 
attract investors. Neither should they be held or appear to be held solely responsible 
for the global money laundering problem. But they should nonetheless, ensure that 
they do not facilitate the money laundering process by making it easy for their 
financial services sectors to be abused by criminals. Therefore, their regulatory and 
supervisory regimes should adequately detect criminal activity and provide reciprocal 
arrangements with other countries for the apprehension and prosecution of criminals. 
7.1. The OFSS and SVGs Dilemma 
The OFSS was heralded by SVG as an important economic sector. It was being 
championed as the sector in which opportunities were provided for investors to 
maximise their wealth. It was also anticipated that the OFSS would create 
employment and greatly contribute to the lessening of the inequality of wealth and 
high levels of poverty. By their conduct and the manner in which they implemented 
their initiatives the OECD/FATF have ignored the economic aspirations of SVG and 
effectively taken away its Statehood. In essence, the OECD/FATF interfered with 
SVG's right to self determination4 when they dictated to SVG the form that its 
economic policies should take, concerning the provision of financial services. 
If the OECD/FATF's initiatives main concern was the detection and prevention of 
crime, the manner in which they implemented those initiatives does not appear to 
reflect that concern. Within the context of the economic status of SVG, the 
contraction of legitimate sources of employment will further augment the already high 
and debilitating levels of unemployment and poverty, which may in turn trigger an 
undesirable rise in criminal activities. Therefore, rather than the initiatives being 
engaged in the efficacious detection and prevention of crime in SVG they are 
highly 
4 Article lof the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966: See also 
chapter 6.8 
327 
Chap 7- "A Review of the OECD/FATF's Initiatives and Their Implications. " 
likely to create the conditions for the furtherance of criminal activities, since in the 
absence of legitimate sources of employment illegitimate sources may well be 
substituted in their places. Essentially, such a state of affairs will defeat the purposes 
for which the initiatives were apparently established in the first place. 
7.2 Views on The theory ofInternational Co-operation 
The OECD/FATF accused small island OFCs of being responsible for the global 
money laundering phenomenon. In so doing they ignored the extent of their member 
countries' involvement in and contribution to the global money laundering process. 
Although they appeared to be advocating different perspectives, the OECD and FATF 
are nonetheless seeking to achieve the same result, i. e., the exchange of information 
on offshore investors and the removal of the tax advantages which accrue to persons 
investing in the OFSS. It is not difficult to see who would benefit and who is likely to 
suffer economic loss if the OECD/FATF were to achieve those objectives. SIE are so 
small and generate so little from their local investment opportunities that they depend 
largely on investors from the OECD/FATF countries to carry out investments in the 
OFCs in order to assist in the stimulation of economic growth. 
When information about investors can be easily disclosed to the authorities of the 
OECD/FATF member countries this will undoubtedly create a high level of 
apprehension amongst investors and greatly act as a deterrent to their involvement in 
offshore investment products. On the other hand, there will be little, if any, need for 
small island OFCs to request information from OECD/FATF member countries when 
there are relatively few tax payers of the small island OFCs that are actually investing 
in OECD/FATF member countries. Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is a strong 
argument for international cooperation in the fight against organised criminal 
activities. The difficulty is finding the right balance between the disclosure of 
information that will assist law enforcement in the detection and prevention of crime 
and the preservation of investors' confidentiality and privacy. In the final analysis, if 
an investor does not feel comfortable that his affairs will be kept confidential he is 
unlikely to consider an offshore investment proposition as being desirable. This may 
well be the case whether or not that investor is a law abiding citizen or he is engaged 
in criminal activities. 
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The theory of international cooperation (a phrase which is used in this thesis to refer to 
the OECD/FATF's initiatives) though laudable in the circumstances may nonetheless 
circumvent established international legal principles relating to sovereign equality and 
non-intervention when it is used as a blanket application to the fiscal policies and the 
regulatory and supervisory regimes of other countries. It may be more acceptable to 
all States if the theory of international cooperation is established through a series of 
bilateral and multilateral treaty arrangements between and among countries. At least 
those affected by the tenns of those treaties will feel part of the process of their 
construction, and as a matter of State responsibility, will consider those terms as 
imposing legally binding obligations to which they should conform. In this way the 
doctrine of sovereign equality as expounded above by Professor Warbrick will be 
emphasised since States will participate through treaty arrangements in the law 
making process. Similarly, the principle of non-intervention is more likely to be 
observed because an international legal obligation will be imposed on States to 
implement the terms of the treaty arrangements. Therefore, action taken by parties to 
the treaty to coerce the delinquent State to perform its part of the treaty obligations 
may not be seen as interfering into the domestic affairs of the delinquent State. 
7.3 Comments on the OECD's Harmful Tax Initiative 
The OECD accused small island OFCs of pursuing harmful tax practices which 
encourage the tax payers of OECD member countries to invest in those OFCs, thus 
eroding the tax bases of OECD member countries. Essentially, the OECD complained 
that small island OFCs due to their no or low tax policies and their banking secrecy 
and privacy laws encourage the taxpayers of OECD member countries to engage in 
tax avoidance and tax evasion schemes. Therefore, the funds from tax collection that 
would otherwise be available to OECD countries to enable them to implement certain 
economic projects were lost to their economies and this eroded their tax bases. 
Moreover, their efforts to apprehend those involved in the tax avoidance and tax 
evasion schemes have been significantly frustrated by the lack of transparency of 
offshore operations and the lack of exchange of information about their tax payers. 
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Whereas in principle the OECD' initiative may have some merit, in practice the 
argument is difficult to sustain in a globalise environment without actually infringing 
international legal principles concerning non-intervention and sovereign equality of 
States. Although it is accepted that tax evasion is illegal, tax avoidance is not illegal, 
and therefore should not be placed into the same category or treated similarly as tax 
evasion, which the OECD has in effect done. Moreover, it has been demonstrated in 
chapters I and 4 that there is a preponderance of case law in support of tax avoidance. 
It is also accepted that in so far as criminal matters are concerned every country 
should endeavour to cooperate by providing information that will lead to the 
apprehension and conviction of those involved in criminal activities. However, it 
cannot be acceptable to require another country to utilise its limited resources to 
diligently police every tax payer or investor in order to ascertain whether that person 
is involved in criminal activities. The request for information in that regard will 
always be seen as a 'fishing expedition' unless sufficient evidence is adduced to 
create the suspicion or belief that the investor is in some way involved in or about to 
be involved in the commission of a criminal offence. 
The OECD's initiative quite understandably encountered problems from the start. 
Four of its member countries were and still are not in agreement with the initiative. 5 
Switzerland and Luxembourg refused to participate in the process. The USA publicly 
condemned the initiative by expressly indicating that promoting the global 
harmonisation of taxation is an unacceptable concept. Moreover, research showed that 
200 tax preferential regimes existed in OECD countries and 85 such regimes in its 
dependent or associated territories, at the time that SVG was placed on the list of 
uncooperative tax havens. Yet no OECD country was listed as uncooperative, thus 
exposing the discriminatory characteristic of the initiative. In chapters 1,4 and 6 it 
was shown that the OECD's initiative was not consistent with international laws and 
that SVG's fiscal policy conformed to international legal principles. The OECD 
required of SVG the exchange of criminal and civil tax information, an adjustment to 
the tax rates and a convergence of the domestic and offshore financial services sectors 
by removing a regime which the OECD referred to as 'ring fencing. ' In general, the 
5 Austria, Switzerland, Luxembourg and the USA. 
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OECD required greater transparency in the operations and functioning of the OFSS, 
with particular emphasis being placed on the disclosure of tax information. 
Interestingly, it nonetheless appeared that SVG was prepared to entertain negotiations 
with any country on bilateral treaty arrangements concerning taxation. Support for 
this assumption can be gleaned from the MLAT 1998 between SVG and the USA and 
in which provisions were made for the exchange of criminal tax information between 
the two countries (see chapter 3.14). Accordingly, the OECD as a group or its 
member countries individually could have attempted to negotiate with SVG bilateral 
treaty arrangements that provided for the exchange of tax information. The OECD 
seemed not to be interested in that approach. 
The provision of the CRPA 1996 6 that prohibited the disclosure of confidential 
information on tax and revenue matters accorded with established international legal 
principles relating to international taxation. Those principles do not impose upon a 
State the duty to take notice of another State's tax laws. They clearly provide for each 
State the latitude to introduce fiscal policies that are beneficial to its economy and 
peoples. The mere fact that such policies may harm another State does not in itself 
make them inconsistent with international law. Moreover, the OECD did not provide 
any indication of a tax rate that was acceptable in the circumstances. By stating that 
SVG was gaining an unfair tax advantage partly due to its lower tax rates, the OECD 
was effectively demanding that SVG should increase its tax rates to a level which was 
higher than it was when SVG was listed as an uncooperative tax haven. SVG has been 
pursuing a low tax policy as part of its economic strategy to increase the spending 
power of its tax payers and stimulate investment. The OECD's attack on such a 
policy was essentially an attack on SVG's right to self-determination. It was exerting 
pressure on SVG to disengage from a fiscal policy that provided for the needs of the 
people of SVG. No consideration was apparently given to the likely economic 
consequences that would have ensued as a result of the initiative. Therefore, no effort 
was made by the OECD to compensate SVG for the economic difficulty that it is 
experiencing by giving up its right to self determination in order to comply with the 
OECD's initiative. Essentially, the OECD's initiative went to the root of a major 
Section 3(3)(b)(iii) of the Confidential Relationships Preservation (international Finance Act) 1996 
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economic sector of SVG and interfered with its internal domestic affairs. Such a 
conduct cannot be said to be in conformity with international law but instead 
represents a contravention of the principle of non-intervention under international 
law. 
On 18 th April 2002 SVG was removed from the OECD's list of uncooperative tax 
havens. In order to be removed from the list SVG was only required to issue a letter of 
commitment to exchange criminal and civil tax information by January 2004 and 
January 2006 respectively. That letter was issued on 26 th February, 2002. At a recent 
OECD meeting (held I and 2 nd June, 2004) in Berlin the OECD extended the 
commitment to providing civil tax information indefinitely. 7 This in itself is cogent 
evidence that there were no established international standards which had evolved 
into international customary law and which SVG was legally obliged to follow. The 
OECD has effectively established itself as the tax regulator of the world and imposed 
its initiative on SVG regardless of its legal authority to do so. In chapter 6 it was 
argued that although the OECD was an international organisation endowed with 
international legal personality and empowered to act on behalf of its member States 
on the international plane, it nonetheless did not impose any legal obligation on SVG 
to follow its harmful tax initiative and therefore the OECD's conduct was not in 
conformity with international law. 
7.4 Comments on an International Tax Organisation 
Within recent times there has been a call for the establishment of an International Tax 
Organisation (ITO). 8 It has been proposed that this organisation would amongst other 
things "engage in the surveillance of tax developments in the same wqj, that the IMF 
maintains surveillance of macroeconomic policies. "9 However, the proposed purpose of 
the ITO that is most relevant to small island OFCs in general and SVG in particular is 
the suggestion that the ITO would act as a body that would engage in negotiations 
with tax havens to persuade them to "desist from harmful tax competition. "' 0 It is 
nonetheless difficult to see in a globalised environment where every State is 
7 The Searchlight Newspaper, "SVG makes Changes at OECD Berlin Forum. ' Vol. 10, no. 24, 
Friday I Vh June, 2004 at p. 9 
Wob/itogen1hyril "An International Tax Organisation (ITO) http: //www. ub. es/obse 
Ibid 
'0 Ibid 
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encouraged to become more competitive, how tax competition can be harmful. Some 
countries pursue a relatively high tax policy either to finance their defence or welfare 
programmes, whereas others may pursue a lower tax policy either because they do not 
finance such high defence or welfare programmes or they seek to increase the 
spending power of their tax payers which in turn will generate investment 
opportunities and stimulate economic growth. " The reason for the imposition or 
removal of tax rates is dependent on the level of economic activity that each State 
considers to be beneficial to its peoples. An ITO will encounter tremendous 
difficulties dealing with such complex and unique issues which become more 
complicated where, in countries like SVG, the fiscal policy may be the only economic 
tool available to manage their economies. 
Taxation is a domestic policy that is formulated either for the purposes of stimulating 
economic growth or reducing the rate of consumption which may either stabilise or 
contract the economy. 12 It is usually implemented by the State as an economic and 
political strategy to improve the welfare of its people. 13 How will the ITO be able to 
determine what is best for the people of each State? Furthermore, what will be the 
basis for demanding that a country that has a no tax policy should revise its fiscal 
policy and introduce a tax rate that the ITO considers to be fair and not harmful? 
Similarly, what is a desirable tax rate? The answers to those questions are largely 
dependent on the status of the domestic economy of every country and the welfare of 
its peoples. Attempts to interfere in that regard will not be in conformity with 
international legal principles, unless the ITO is invited by the State through some 
forrn of arrangement to dictate the manner in which the fiscal policy is implemented 
or the type of fiscal policy that is desirable. 
There may well be strong arguments for the establishment of an ITO but it is 
suggested that its role should be restricted to an advisory capacity along the lines that 
have been proposed. For example, for the compilation of statistics, to identify trends 
and problems, present reports, offer technical assistance, and provide a forum for the 
" Parkin M., Powell M., and Matthews K., "Economics, " 2003, at p. 418 
12 Parkin M., Powell M., and Matthews K., "Economics. " 2003, at p. 418 
13 Ibid 
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exchange of ideas and the development of norms for tax policy and administration. 
14 
In the light of the obvious relationship between tax and trade and due to the large 
membership of the WTO, 15 it may well be more acceptable to States for the ITO to be 
an arm of the WTO as opposed to being an OECD organisation with such limited 
membership. Moreover, within the context of the OECD's initiative consideration 
may also be given to ascertaining whether it was in fact GATS compliant. 
7.5 The FA TFs Initiative its Strengths and Weaknesses 
The FATF's money laundering initiative is laudable. It represents an alternative 
approach to combating criminal activities, especially organised criminal activities. 
Within recent times (i. e. since the September 11,2001 terrorists attacks on the USA), 
it has also extended its terms of reference to include the financing of terrorist 
activities, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. By going after the proceeds of 
crime, the lifeblood of organised crime (including terrorism) can be frozen, the 
incentive to commit crime can be mitigated and the conviction of criminals may be 
more easily procured. In the face of globalisation and liberal trading arrangements 
among countries, transnational. criminal activities can be more easily facilitated. 
Similarly, with improved telecommunications (e. g. fax, internet, wire transfers etc. ) 
and also the formation of regional blocs, monies can be transferred within seconds, 
thus making it more difficult for law enforcement officials to detect, apprehend, 
prosecute and convict those involved in criminal activities. 
Some OFCs with liberal regulatory and supervisory regimes increase the difficulties 
for law enforcement by facilitating the money laundering process. The FATF argues 
that the banking secrecy legislation of some OFCs is too restrictive. It impedes the 
disclosure of information, frustrates the efforts of law enforcement and therefore 
creates havens through which criminals can launder the proceeds of crime. Therefore, 
unless those OFCs become more vigilant and transparent the efforts of law 
enforcement will be thwarted and money laundering will continue unabated. In 
essence, the money laundering initiative can only gain efficacy with the support of all 
countries. Therefore, the FATF targeted countries that it perceived to have liberal and 
14 http: //www. ub. es/obsgiob/itogcn2. htmi "An International Tax Organisation (ITO)" 
15 See chapter 6.9 
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inadequate laws and condemned them as uncooperative unless they amended their 
regulatory and supervisory framework to accord with the FATF's 40 
recommendations and its 25 assessment criteria for non-cooperating countries and 
territories. SVG's regulatory and supervisory framework was evaluated by the FATF 
and found to be inadequate, thus SVG was blacklisted by the FATF as uncooperative 
in the fight against money laundering. But it was demonstrated in chapter 4 that the 
blacklisting of SVG was unreasonable, unjust and premature and the conclusions of 
the FATF's evaluation were for the most part erroneous and unsubstantiated. 
The FATF's money laundering initiative is commendable in principle. However, it 
lacked credibility because of the manner in which it was implemented by the FATE 
Firstly, it was developed and introduced by FATF member countries without 
consultation with and suggestions from non-member countries. Secondly, it was 
imposed on non-member countries along with threats of countermeasures if those 
countries did not comply. Thirdly, the evaluation process was biased in favour of its 
member countries and discriminatory against SVG. It must be noted that at the time 
that SVG was blacklisted by the FATF none of the FATF's member countries was 
blacklisted. In the cases of Austria and Turkey the FATF was prepared to hold 
discussions with them following the identification of deficiencies in their regulatory 
and supervisory regimes. No such dialogue was held with SVG in order to clarify and 
rectify any deficiencies that were identified by the FATE It was also noted in chapter 
4 that even though the evaluation of the US identified areas of concern no attempt was 
made by the FATF to have those concerns resolved. Moreover, in some instances the 
scope of the 25 assessment criteria went well beyond the 40 Recommendations and 
their interpretative notes. 
Fourthly, the FATF's evaluation of SVG was inaccurate and inconsistent due to the 
fact that during the evaluation process all of the relevant legislation was not consulted 
by the FATF and in many respects those that were consulted were not accurately 
interpreted. Moreover, the FATF did not take the time to familiarise itself with the 
manner in which the OFSS actually functioned and therefore could not have fully 
appreciated the implications of the effective application of the provisions and 
procedures of the regulatory and supervisory regime. Incidentally, the FATF in 
carrying out its evaluation of SVG did not visit SVG. It would appear that the FATF 
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had already decided to blacklist SVG and was not prepared to conduct a thorough 
evaluation of SVG's operations, since to do so may well have been seen by it as an 
exercise in futility. 
Fifthly, the initiative appeared to have been designed for the purposes of punishing 
states with regulatory and supervisory regimes that were not considered to be 
consistent with it. The FATF established itself as the world's anti-money laundering 
regulatory body and set about its task irregardless of the effect that it had on the 
economies of small countries like SVG. The UN with a greater membership is much 
more suited to assume the functions of the anti-money laundering regulatory body 
with the IMF being given the responsibility to conduct the relevant evaluations of all 
countries. SVG is not a member of the FATF and the FATF does not possess 
international legal personality and therefore does not have any legal authority under 
international law. Accordingly, it is not cloaked with rights, immunities and duties 
that are accorded under international law to international organisations which possess 
international legal personality that may be acknowledged by SVG. Therefore, the 
countermeasures that were imposed by the FATF do not result in the attribution of 
any responsibility to the FATF for the negative and disproportionate adverse impact 
that they had on the OFSS of SVG. Neither was the FATF responsible for its failure 
to conduct itself in conformity with international law. Essentially, any responsibility 
arising out of its conduct is considered to be that of its member States either jointly or 
severally. Finally the FATF's conduct was unlawful. It was not in conformity with the 
principle of non-intervention since FATF was imposing on SVG an international legal 
obligation that it did not have the legal capacity to impose. It was essentially 
interfering into SVG's domestic affairs by demanding of SVG the modification of its 
regulatory and supervisory framework. Moreover, the imposition of countermeasures 
did not occasion a breach of an international obligation by SVG. 16 Accordingly, 
FATF's countermeasures cannot be said to be in conformity with international law. 17 
It is nonetheless noteworthy that in light of the fact that the IMF/World Bank have 
now accepted the FATF's 40 Recommedations as internationally accepted standards 
and will be assessing countries on that basis, the speed with which those standards are 
likely to crystallise into international customary rules may be hastened considerably. 
16 See chapter 6.7 
17 lbid 
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Similarly, the recent UN Convention against Transnational and Organised Crime has 
been formulated along the lines of the FATF's 40 Recommendations in so far as 
money laundering is concerned. 18 With the Convention being entered into force in 
September, 2003 further support is therefore given to the anti-money laundering 
impetus which imposes on the international community internationally accepted 
standards to which legally relevant behaviour should be accorded. 
The FATF's initiative is further weakened by the fact that it appeared to have 
concentrated its efforts on small island OFCs and ignored that the criminal activities 
that generate the substantial proceeds which are laundered actually occur in its 
member countries. What is most distressing is that the foreign policies of some FATF 
member countries and their agencies may have condoned and encouraged criminal 
activities in the past, the consequences of which are still being felt today. Moreover, 
the majority of the money laundering activities takes place in its member countries. 
The placement of the majority of funds that are laundered globally originates and ends 
in FATF countries and the weapons that are used by criminals to perpetrate their 
criminal activities are mainly manufactured in FATF member countries as well. Yet 
in spite of it all, not one of its member countries was blacklisted in June 2000. 
Instead, SVG which was ranked a low to medium risk country for money laundering 
purposes and in which a money laundering case had never been prosecuted was 
actually blacklisted. The money laundering initiative would have been more credible 
had the FATF concentrated its efforts in reducing criminal activities including money 
laundering in its member countries before demanding non-member countries to 
accord with standards that were ignored by its own members without any reprisals. 
The FATF appeared to have ignored the extent to which money laundering and the 
criminal activities that generate the proceeds of crime actually occur in its member 
States and have instead held OFCs as being responsible for the global money 
laundering phenomenon. Unless, there is a concerted effort in the FATF member 
countries to sanitise the environment in those countries that actually facilitate criminal 
activities money laundering will continue to be a global problem. 
18 See Articles, 7,18,26 and 27 
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7.6 SVGs Legislative Regime 
It was demonstrated in chapters 4 and 5 that prior to it being blacklisted SVG had 
illustrated legislatively and otherwise that it was willing to cooperate internationally 
in the prevention of crime. SVG did so by ratifying the Vienna Convention and by 
introducing legislation which gave effect to the requirements of the Convention. In 
that way, SVG was demonstrating concern for criminal activities that occurred within 
and without its borders. It was also instituting measures that would assist foreign law 
enforcement officials to detect, apprehend, prosecute and convict those engaged in 
criminal activities. Essentially, the legislative regime in SVG was a focal aspect of its 
crime prevention mechanism. It has nonetheless been identified in chapter 4 that there 
were certain aspects of SVG's legislation which required further strengthening. It was 
also mentioned that steps were being taken by the government, legislative and 
otherwise to plug any loopholes that did not favour the prevention of crime. SVG 
expressly indicated to the FATF that it had put measures in place to rectify through 
parliament certain legislative deficiencies relating to the lack of transparency of 
offshore operations. It was therefore evident from SVG's efforts and public 
pronouncements by Ministers of Government in the House of Parliament and 
elsewhere that SVG did not intend to create a safe haven for criminals and criminal 
activities. 
The FATF demanded of SVG a legislative framework beyond the requirements of the 
Vienna Convention, a regime in which SVG participated as equal partners with other 
States of the United Nations. The FATF demanded that SVG's legislation should be 
amended to include suspicion as a state of mind sufficient for criminal liability, 
particularly for those charged with the responsibility of reporting suspicious 
transactions. SVG due to its compliance with the terrns of the Vienna Convention was 
viewed internationally as being cooperative in the fight against crime, albeit of a drug 
related nature. It seems somewhat harsh that even after SVG had introduced money 
laundering legislation that included crimes other then drug related crimes it was still 
condemned by the FATF as being uncooperative. The DPMA 1988, DTOA 1993 and 
the PCA 1997 contained money laundering offences and imposed reporting 
responsibilities on financial institutions. Other legislation including the MACM 1993. 
FOA 1989 and the CRPA 1996 made provisions for the disclosure of information to 
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assist law enforcement of other countries in a criminal investigation. There were also 
treaties that were executed with other countries for the purposes of assistance in 
criminal matters. 19 It would appear that the efforts of SVG were geared towards the 
prevention of crime. It had therefore demonstrated that it was prepared to do 
everything necessary to cooperate internationally without significantly damaging the 
commercial viability of the OFSS. Therefore, any deficiency that the FATF identified 
in SVG's regulatory and supervisory regime could have been rectified through 
effective dialogue along the same lines that were pursued by the FATF with Turkey 
and Austria. Sadly, there was no such dialogue with SVG concerning the form that its 
legislation should take and the likely adverse effect that its recommendations would 
have on the economy of SVG. The FATF merely dictated its initiative and demanded 
that SVG should follow it or suffer the consequences. 
Little, if any concern was shown by the FATF for the impact that its global 
condemnation of SVG will have on SVGs economy and its peoples. SVG being 
fearful of the FATF's threats of countermeasures and continued vilification moved 
hastily to condemn its own financial system and introduced measures that adversely 
affected its OFSS in an attempt to satisfy the FATF. Accordingly, SVG repealed the 
PCA 1997 and the CRPA 1996 and included the PCMLA 2001 and the EIA 2002 in 
their places. Amendments were also made to the IBA 1996, IBC 1996 and the ITA 
1996. Additionally a FlU was established pursuant to the FlUA 2001. The FlU is 
primarily responsible for receiving and evaluating suspicious transactions reports and 
Raising with other foreign FlUs and similar organisations on matters of a criminal 
nature. Closer examination of those legislative measures have shown that very little, if 
any, changes were made that were substantially different to the regime that existed 
prior to June 2000 when SVG was placed on the FATF's blacklist. Nonetheless, in 
June 2003, three years after it was blacklisted, SVG was removed from the FATF's 
blacklist. This in effect raises the question why, was SVG blacklisted in the first place 
and why did it take 3 years before SVG was removed from the blacklist? Those 
questions are relevant when consideration is given to the fact that none of the FATF's 
member States was blacklisted even though some have been unable to effectively 
control the criminal activities that occur within their borders and the fact that some 
19 See chapter 3 
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have not maintained or introduced regulatory and supervisory regimes that accorded 
with the FATF's 40 recommendations. 
7.7 Further implications of the OECDIFA TF Initiatives 
The global condemnation of SVG by the OECD/FATF and their threats of sanctions 
significantly contributed to the drastic contraction in the registration of offshore 
entities. The OECD/FATF appeared to have exercised regulatory power arbitrarily 
and without any accountability. The exercise of regulatory power must be fair and 
legitimate but it was demonstrated that the OECD/FATF's initiatives were not 
implemented in that way. They had the option of regulating the transfers of monies 
which originate from within their jurisdictions to be sent abroad to non-member 
countries but they failed to exercise that option. In that way they would have been 
able to keep track of the money flows and the persons that are involved in such 
transfers. Such an approach, although it may have encountered some difficulties 
satisfying the requirements of Article 8(2) of the IMF Agreement 20 may nonetheless, 
have avoided the interference into the domestic affairs of other countries. 
Essentially, the OECD/FATF by globally condemning SVG and imposing 
countermeasures and threats of countermeasures were prohibiting SVG from its 
pursuit of its 'political, economic and cultural development' of its peoples. This is a 
requirement of Article I of ICESCR 1966 which is endowed with a peremptory 
character from which the OECD/FATF member countries are not permitted under 
international law to derogate. Therefore, the manner in which the initiatives were 
implemented and the negative impact that they had on the OFSS bring into issue the 
infringement of the human rights of the people of SVG. It also demonstrates the 
inconsistency of the initiatives with respect to international legal principles. 
The two pronged approach of the OECD and FATF had very serious implications for 
SVG's OFSS which lost over half of the offshore entities that were registered. This 
resulted in increased unemployment and a lost of opportunity to further develop an 
economic sector that appeared to have great potential and one which it is anticipated 
would have increased employment in the foreseeable future. In chapter I it was stated 
20 See chapter 6.9.2 
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that unemployment in SVG ranges between 22% and 40% and the poverty level is 
approximately 37%. If those that are unemployed cannot find legitimate sources of 
employment the temptation to engage in illegitimate sources of employment in order 
to sustain themselves and their families will be greatly augmented. With such high 
unemployment and poverty levels, the environment for involvement in criminal 
activities is cemented by the OECD/FATF's initiatives. This in itself will defeat the 
apparent purposes for which those initiatives were created and establish the conditions 
for the furtherance of crime. 
On the basis of the aforesaid further questions are raised concerning whether the 
initiatives of the OECD/FATF were a conspiracy to prohibit SVG ( and certain small 
island OFCs) from providing financial services on the pretext that its legislative 
regime was inadequate and that it devoted insufficient resources to the prevention of 
money laundering. It can be argued that the OECD/FATF were not actually seeking to 
regulate for the international cooperation and harmonisation of standards among 
States but instead they were seeking to regulate the competition involving the 
provision of financial services. Did the OECD/FATF member countries have a 
preference as to which countries should be allowed to provide offshore financial 
services? 
The OECD/FATF countries were not supportive of the cartel arrangements that were 
made by the OPEC countries during the Arab Oil Crisis of the early 1970s. It was 
argued that the conduct of the members of OPEC was inconsistent with international 
legal principles. If the OECD/FATF's initiatives were designed to create a cartel for 
the provision of offshore financial services then the same argument that was used 
against the OPEC countries can also be extended to the actions of the OECD/FATF. 
Whatever, the reason, the manner in which the OECD/FATF implemented their 
initiatives gave the impression that there was an insidious reason lurking in the 
background which was embellished and adorned in the cloak of crime prevention and 
harmful tax competition. The flaws in the evaluation processes, the apparent disregard 
for the adverse economic consequences, the forging ahead with the initiatives in total 
disregard for the sovereignty of SVG and that of other countries and their reluctance 
to blacklist their member countries cannot be seen as the proper application of 
plausible initiatives and therefore cannot be justified. 
(a 
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